THE

HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT

OF THE

EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

FROM

Its ORIGIN in 1600 to the PRESENT TIMES.

VOL. I.

A GENERAL MAP of INDIA within the GANGES.

PERSIA
SCINDI HINDOS.
MULTAN
DELHI
AGRA
AZMIR
MALVA
GUZERAT
BERAR
CANDEISH
GOLCONDA
CARNATICK
BAHAR
BENGAL
ORISSA
BAY OF BENGAL
COAST OF MALABAR
COAST OF COROMANDEL
GULF OF CAMBAY
LACKADIVES
MALDIVES
CEYLON

Multan, Dipalpour, Tegipour, Bukor, Batnir, DELHI, PATAN, Jaiselmir, Azmir, AGRA, Laknour, Butiah, Haur, Azour, Barrah, Coulpy, Helebas, Banaras, Ganges R., PATNA, Malda, Tatta, al Mansora, Meerta, Narnar, Sah R., Shalaur, Junagur, Sasseram, Mongur, Rajmol, Mucadabad, Seronge, Keist, Chitor, Ugen, Rotas, Birbohen, DACCA, Nudea, Amedabad, Soan R., Sumelpour, Balseti, Cambay, Brodar, Nirbidda R., CALCUTTA, Barokia, Brampour, Naopour, Surat, Elespour, Zaffer abad, Ganga R., Balasore, Katek, Diu, Daman, Muler, Auringabad, Basin, Chekaner, Ziner, Nander, Patna, Ganjam, BOMBAY, Ahmednagur, Chaul, Darur, Indovay, Gandevari R., Chicacole, Coriangapatnam, Dabul, Beder, Rajapour, Golconda, Heidera bad, Rajamandri, BIJAPOUR, Viziadrug or Geriah, Raolconda, Narsipour, Kalighi, Cristna R., Kalur, Masulipatnam, Goa, Donam, Kaman, Dive, Landoor, Adoni, Udegheri, Bigenagur, Cudapah, Nelur, Gangapatnam, Barcelor, Tripetti, Pulicat, Mangalor, Colalam, Conjeveram, MADRAS St Thomas, Cobelong, Seringapatnam, Pal Aru, Madrastpatnam, Cananor, Tellichery, Mahé, Ingee, Ikkeri, PONDICHERY Fort St David, Calicut, Inaru, Coleroon R., Tanor, Tanjore, Karikal, Cranganor, Trichinopoly, Negapatnam, Cochin, Madura, Tinevelly, Cutan, Anjenga, Putecarin, Trinconomaley, Cape Comorin, Battecola, CANDY, Colombo, P. de Galle

T. Kitchin Scr.t Sculp.t

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THE HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

FROM

Its ORIGIN in 1600 to the PRESENT TIMES.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

Containing the AFFAIRS of the CARNATIC; in which the RIGHTS of the NABOB are explained, and the INJUSTICE of the COMPANY proved.

THE WHOLE COMPILED FROM AUTHENTIC RECORDS.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

MDCCLXXIX.

PREFACE.

THE Court of East-India Directors, having, perhaps
indistinctly, resolved the affairs of the Carnatic in
obscurity, but not unanimously, the Author of the fol-
lowing Work found himself obliged to deduce his accounts,
from an early period of time. To extricate the subject from
difficulty, he has rejected the superfluous part of the

PREFACE.

THE Court of Eaſt-India Directors, having, perhaps induſtriouſly, involved the affairs of the Carnatic in obſcurity, by their voluminous Defence, the Author of the following Work found himſelf obliged to deduce his accounts, from an early period of time. To extricate the ſubject from difficulty, he has connected the controverſial part of the diſcuſſion, with an authentic and impartial narrative of the moſt important tranſactions, on the coaſt of Coromandel. His arguments and reaſonings are only ſuch, as naturally reſult from his facts; and his facts are founded upon the moſt incontrovertible evidence, to which the Reader is referred, at the bottom of every page.

The Directors, in the volumes of Original Papers, publiſhed under their inſpection, have furniſhed the Author, with authentic materials, ſufficient to overſet entirely the ſyſtem, which they wiſhed to defend. He has alſo availed himſelf of the information of other papers of EQUAL AUTHORITY, which a Gentleman employed by the Crown, for ſome years, in a public capacity on the Coaſt, was pleaſed to place in his hands. Private papers and documents, together with written evidences of a PRIVATE nature, which unveil the ſprings of many meaſures, have come into his poſſeſſion. But as his object has been, to expoſe PUBLIC

injuſtice,

injuſtice, and not to trace the delinquency of INDIVIDUALS, he has made no uſe of ſuch information. Though ſome may think or, at leaſt, allege, that public bodies, as well as public meaſures, are treated with a degree of ſeverity, in the following Volume, the Writer cannot be accuſed of harſhneſs to private characters. Should any of the actors, in the ſcene, which he has choſen to exhibit, complain of their parts, the Author of the piece aſſures them and the Public, that much of the buſineſs is concealed, behind the curtain.

The labour and toil, which attended the ſelection of the materials, upon which this Volume is founded, employed a conſiderable portion of time. The facts and authorities were weighed, with the moſt ſcrupulous attention to truth and impartial juſtice. The relation of tranſactions is ſupported, every where, by a cloud of witneſſes; and where the conduct of the Company is moſt blamed, the foundation of cenſure is placed, on their own records, as publiſhed by their Directors. In the printing, and even in the compoſition, of the Work, the ſhortneſs of the time allotted to both may have been productive of errors. But as the arrangement has not been ſubject to that inconvenience, it is to be hoped, the matter of fact is eſtabliſhed, beyond the reach of any juſt reply.

Without preſumption, we truſt, it may be affirmed, that the ſyſtem, which the Directors endeavoured, with ſo much

labour

labour and expence, to defend, has been completely overturned. That they have not only failed "in refuting any "one of the heavy charges brought againſt them," in former publications relative to Tanjore; but that many other charges equally heavy are eſtabliſhed, on their own evidence. That it only remains for them to retrieve their characters, by acknowledging their errors and doing juſtice. That a contrary conduct will probably remind the nation of their ſolemn appeal to the Public, in their Declaration of the 26th of March 1777. Their words were, "That could "the heavy charges brought againſt them be proved, thoſe "charges would not only render them unfit to conduct "the affairs of the Company, but utterly unworthy of "every degree of public truſt and confidence." If the charges are actually proved, the World will draw the inference.

In the authorities, at the bottoms of the pages, the papers publiſhed by the Directors, in their own defence, are cited, under the title of Mr. Rous's Appendix. This appellation was adopted merely to diſtinguiſh thoſe papers, from others publiſhed by the Directors. As the Court had diſavowed Mr. Rous's pamphlet, by refuſing to authenticate it, that gentleman, ſtrictly ſpeaking, had no *legal* right to an Appendix, printed at the expence of the Company.

The writers, who have eſpouſed the cauſe of the Directors, are ſeldom alluded to, and never mentioned, in

the courſe of the following Volume. This ſeeming neglect proceeded neither from any diſreſpect for their genius, nor any want of attention to their labours. Their toil has ſurely been rewarded, by their employers, in proportion to the badneſs of their cauſe. With that boon they ought to ſit down contented; and to add to the account of profit, their preſent eſcape from cenſure. To purſue phantoms, through the foggy regions of romance, was no part of the labour, which the Author impoſed on himſelf. Truth, and only truth, was his object; and the advocates of his opponents are completely anſwered, if he has attained his end.

The wading through the ſink of Eaſt-India corruption and miſmanagement is a taſk, which adds diſguſt to toil. But the Author fears he has gone too far, not to go further ſtill. Bengal is a fruitful ſcene of peculation, injuſtice, and even death; and the Northern Circars, though ſcarcely twelve years, in our hands, preſent oppreſſions proportionable to their extent and *our* time. The ſecret intrigues in Leadenhall-Street, though leſs important and inſtructive, than the revolutions of kingdoms, merit ſome attention; and the world may chuſe to be made acquainted with the actors in the ſecret ſcenes of domeſtic management. Theſe conſiderations may, perhaps, induce the Author, to give a SECOND VOLUME to the Public, in the courſe of a few months.

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THE

THE HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

CHAP. I.

A ſhort Hiſtory of the Company, from its Origin in 1600 *to the Year* 1744.

CHAP. I.

State of Europe after the fall of the Romans.

DURING the decline and after the fall of the Roman Empire, the weſtern provinces received, in a certain degree, new inhabitants, and conſequently new manners, from thoſe vaſt countries, which comprehend the northern diviſions of Europe and Aſia. The fierce nations who triumphed over Rome had ſcarcely brought any virtue, except valour, from home; and, therefore, their ravages were too general and too deſtructive to leave any examples of that civilization, which in ſome degree atones for the deſolations of war. In the midſt of that barbarity, which had cramped the liberal exertions of their minds in the north, the invaders ſat down in the regions of the ſouth; where many ages paſſed over them, without having been diſtinguiſhed by any of thoſe improvements, which, by rendering life comfortable, enlarge the

CHAP. I.

views of mankind. The peculiar opinions, which annexed every honour to the ſword, threw contempt on the arts of civil life; and the inſecurity of property prevented even avarice, which diſregards contempt, from purſuing induſtry and commerce, as they could produce nothing but toil.

Revival of arts and commerce.

Europe, however, was not deſtined to remain always under that gloomy barbariſm, which had clouded its annals for near a thouſand years. The firſt dawn of improvement aroſe in Italy, where its laſt ray had ſet. The revival of letters, in that country, was followed by the encouragement of genius. Men becoming acquainted with the improvements of former ages, began to transfer their diſcoveries to their own times. The human mind, being ſoftened by the acceſſion of knowledge, acquired a taſte for the ſweets of peace and the comforts of life. Government, relaxing its habitual ſeverity, and laying aſide its former pride, gave ſecurity to property, and ſome protection to induſtry. A free intercourſe of commerce was eſtabliſhed at home; its communication with foreign ſtates became leſs obſtructed; and either rivalſhip or imitation ſoon extended a degree of the ſame kind of improvement to the reſt of Europe.

Progreſs of Indian commerce in ancient times.

A commercial intercourſe had been opened between Europe and India, in remote antiquity. The Greeks knew it, when the Perſian empire flouriſhed; and they continued it, during the exiſtence of their own. The Syrians, under the Seleucidæ, who were the immediate ſucceſſors of Alexander, in his Aſiatic conqueſts, brought the manufactures of India to the weſtern markets, through the gulph of Perſia. The Egyptians, when ſubject to the Ptolemies, ſupplied Europe, in the ſame manner, by the Red Sea. The Romans ſucceeded both, in their commerce, as well as in their power; and transferred the trade of India, with the ſeat of their empire, to Conſtantinople. During the decline of the eaſtern empire, the Italian ſtates, particularly the Venetians, engroſſed the commerce of

CHAP. I.

Aſia. The Portugueſe had the merit, by exploring a new paſſage to the Eaſt, to lay open, though contrary to their inclination, that beneficial trade to the reſt of Europe. The ſubjects of John the Second, after coaſting the weſtern ſide of Africa, doubled the Cape of Good Hope; and Emanuel improved the plan eſtabliſhed by his predeceſſor. In the reign of the latter prince, the famous Vaſco de Gama, with four ſhips, penetrated, beyond the Cape, into ſeas before unknown, and arrived on the coaſt of Malabar in 1498, about ſix years after Columbus had diſcovered America.

The Portugueſe the firſt who found a new courſe to India.

The ſucceſs of the Portugueſe on the coaſt of India, and the rich cargoes which they imported from that country, raiſed the envy, but did not immediately excite the imitation of the reſt of Europe. A whole century paſſed before thoſe nations, who now, in a manner, engroſs the commerce of the Eaſt, turned their eyes to that part of the world. The veil of ſecrecy, with which the Portugueſe had induſtriouſly covered their courſe to India, was not the only cauſe which prevented them from having rivals in their conqueſts as well as their commerce. The principles of navigation and internal policy were ſtill in their infancy in England. France was only juſt emerging from the ſavage rudeneſs of its feudal ſyſtem; and the Dutch had not yet emancipated themſelves from the ſtern tyranny of the heirs of the houſe of Burgundy, ſtrengthened by their acceſſion to the crown of Spain.

Reaſons why they were the firſt.

The Dutch, ſenſible of the advantages of an Indian commerce, from the ſucceſs of the Portugueſe, had turned their ſpeculations towards a new and a more expeditious paſſage to India, than that which the latter had found, by doubling the ſouthern point of Africa. They endeavoured to make their way, by the north-eaſt, to the ſeas of China and Japan; and to arrive firſt on thoſe coaſts, which to

The Dutch were the next.

CHAP. I.

the Portugueſe were the moſt remote in the Eaſt-Indies *. A diſcovery of that kind would not only ſhorten the voyage, but diminiſh its dangers; as the commerce of the Portugueſe, together with the dominion of their country, had fallen to Philip the Second, the mortal enemy of the Dutch nation. Their attempts to find a north-eaſt paſſage were ſuddenly undertaken, and as ſuddenly laid aſide. But an accident ſupplied what their induſtry had, in vain, endeavoured to acquire. A Dutch ſeaman, whoſe name was Houtman, and who had been ſeized in Portugal, in the year 1594, diſcovered the route of the Portugueſe, by the Cape of Good Hope †. Under the direction of Houtman a fleet was equipped, and in the year 1596 ſailed from the Texel ‡.

After them the Engliſh.

The Engliſh nation, like the Dutch, had attempted to find a new paſſage to India. Before their neighbours on the continent had turned their attention to the north-eaſt, they had made three different attempts to explore a paſſage to Tartary and China, by the north-weſt. But the lights furniſhed by Drake, Cavendiſh, and other eminent navigators, pointed out a more direct way to the trade of India. Encouraged by their diſcoveries, ſeveral wealthy merchants of London petitioned Queen Elizabeth for a charter empowering them to undertake this trade. On the 31ſt of December 1600, the prayer of their petition was granted. They were erected into a body corporate, by the ſtile of "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London, trading to the Eaſt Indies." The charter granted a common ſeal: Thomas Smith, an alderman, was appointed Governor, with twenty Directors, to be choſen annually on the 1ſt of July, or ſix days after. They were veſted with powers

Origin of the India Company.

1600.

* Diſcours ſur le Paſſage par le Nord-eſt de l'Europe, dans les Mers des Indes.—Grot. Annal. Le Clerc, Baſnage.

† Avertiſſement à la tête de Recueil de Voyages de la Compagnie, p. 27.

‡ Vide Journal of this Voyage, printed at London, 1601.

to

to make bye-laws, to export goods free from cuſtom, for four years, to ſend to India by every voyage 30,000 l. in foreign coin, provided they brought that ſum by their commerce from foreign countries. The charter was excluſive; the Queen bound herſelf to grant none to other merchants, for the ſpace of fifteen years; but a proviſion was made, that if it appeared the new Corporation ſhould prove, in any reſpect, detrimental to the Public, the charter, upon two years warning, under the Privy Seal, ſhould become void. The excluſive commerce, granted in the charter, extended to all places of Aſia, Africa, and America, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and the Streights of Magellan; and to execute the deſign, a joint ſtock of 72,000 l. was quickly ſubſcribed and paid into the treaſurer's hands.

Their firſt expedition to India ſucceſsful.

This capital enabled the Company to equip and man five ſhips of ſmall burden; and to ſend a conſiderable ſum in money and goods, as a trading ſtock. The fleet put to ſea, under the command of Captain James Lancaſter; and after a tedious and ſickly paſſage, came to anchor in the road of Achin, in the iſland of Sumatra, on the 5th of June 1602. The voyage was, however, ſo proſperous, in point of commerce, that a ſecond trading expedition, to India, was undertaken in the year 1604, under the conduct of Sir Henry Middleton. The ſucceſs of Middleton was ſtill greater than that of Lancaſter. But both yielded, in good fortune, to Captain Keeling, who returned in May 1610, with three ſhips committed to his care, richly laden, and without the loſs of a man.

But ſtill they labour under various inconveniencies.

Notwithſtanding the profit derived from theſe voyages, the trade to India was ſtill inconſiderable, and liable to great inconveniency. The ſucceſs of the adventurers depended entirely on chance, on the civility of the natives, or on the addreſs of their officers. Without ſettlements to accommodate their factors, deſtitute of defences to protect their perſons and property, they were ſubject to diſappointment, and expoſed to inſult. Other nations had

CHAP. I.

had harbours, which they could command; forts, which they had either built themſelves, or had bought from the Indians; and even territories, acquired by treachery or conqueſt. On the other hand, the Company were ſo far from commanding reſpect abroad, that they were ill-provided with reſources at home. Though the Engliſh nation had already exhibited a great deal of ſpirit, and a conſiderable degree of knowledge in navigation, they had made but little progreſs in the art of ſhip-building. The Company, during the firſt ten years of their deſultory commerce to Aſia, had even been obliged to purchaſe their ſhips from the *Hanſe* Towns of Germany.

Their commerce, conſidering the times valuable.

Though the Company laboured under theſe diſadvantages, their profits, if compared to their capital, were very conſiderable; and, conſidering the ſtate of commerce in thoſe times, an acquiſition to the wealth of the nation. Government, therefore, enlarged the time of their charter; and, encouraged by the countenance of the State, they themſelves began to build their own ſhips. In the year

1609.

1609, they launched a ſhip of twelve hundred tons, in the preſence of King James, and his ſon the Prince of Wales. This ſhip, together with two others of conſiderable burden, under the conduct of Sir Henry Middleton, ſailed for Surat; where the jealouſy of the Portugueſe fruſtrated the intention of the voyage. Middleton made up for his loſs in trade, by a ſpecies of piracy. He ſeized ſome rich ſhips belonging to the Portugueſe, on the coaſt of Malabar; and, ſteering his courſe to the Red Sea, plundered the trade of Mocha, under the pretence of procuring ſatisfaction for damages he had formerly ſuſtained at that place.

Their quarrel with the Portugueſe.

1610. Engliſh, in a manner, excluded from the continent of India.

The injuſtice and power of the Portugueſe had, hitherto, prevented the Engliſh from eſtabliſhing themſelves, or even from purſuing commerce, with any degree of ſucceſs, on the coaſt of Hindoſtan. The houſe of Tamerlane, who had reigned near a century at Delhi, had uniformly encouraged foreigners to trade in their do-

minions. But, as they were poſſeſſed of no naval power, they could not enforce their authority beyond their own ſhores, or prevent hoſtilities at ſea, between the rivals for their trade. Though in the year 1608, the third of the reign of Jehangire, an envoy from the Company had obtained the uſual privileges of ſettlement and commerce from that prince, they had been debarred from the advantages of both, by the intrigues of the Portugueſe. Force only could obtain juſtice from that jealous nation, who claimed, from their long poſſeſſion, a kind of excluſive right to the commerce of India. Four ſhips of conſiderable burden were, therefore, put under the command of Captain Thomas Beſt, a reſolute officer. He arrived at Surat, in September 1612; and having defeated, in two actions, the Portugueſe ſquadron, enabled the factors of the Company to avail themſelves of the privileges, which they had obtained in the Empire.

They defeat the Portugueſe.

1612.

To ſecure the advantages obtained by the victory of Beſt, the Company prevailed with King James the Firſt, to ſend a royal ambaſſador to the court of Hindoſtan. The perſon veſted with this high character, was Sir Thomas Roe, who arrived in the end of 1614, at Ajmere, the capital of the province of that name, where the Emperor Jehangire, at that time, kept his court. But though the ambaſſador was received with every mark of eſteem by Jehangire, he found an enemy in his ſon, Sultan Kurrum; to whom, as lord of Surat, the department of redreſſing the grievances of the Engliſh had been aſſigned. The Emperor's favour prevailed at laſt, in ſome degree, over the prejudices of the prince. In the month of January 1615, new firmâns were obtained, for the eſtabliſhment of factories in various provinces; but they were worded with caution, and the privileges granted, were defective and circumſcribed *.

1614.
An ambaſſador ſent by King James I. to the Mogul.

1615.

* Dow, vol. iii.

CHAP. I.

Radical defects in the conſtitution of the Company at home, miſconduct, and even misfortune abroad, the ſmallneſs of their capital in Europe, their having no ſolid eſtabliſhments, or fortified ſettlements in Aſia, the want of protection from a government, which, ſoon after, could not protect itſelf, together with the jealouſy of two powerful, and even faithleſs rivals in trade, the Portugueſe and Dutch, all combined to cramp, and, at length, to annihilate a commerce, which, at its beſt, depended merely on lucky adventures. The Hiſtory of the Company, from this period forward, conſiſts of inſtances of misfortunes in trade, and inſtances of ſpirit in adventure and feats of valour in war. Rivalled, and even ruined aſhore, by the Portugueſe and Dutch, they revenged themſelves of the former at ſea; but the latter, by their barbarous ſeverities at Amboyna, in the year 1622, put, in a manner, an end to their trade with the iſlands of Aſia. On the coaſts of Hindoſtan, and even in ſome inland cities of that great empire, they continued to carry on a languid commerce for ſeveral years. The government of the Moguls had, then, arrived at a degree of vigour, ſufficient to command peace, and even juſtice, between the Europeans under its protection. The advantages derived from the commerce of foreigners, had even procured for them privileges, which had been denied to the natives.

1622. The affairs of the Company decline.

1636. Yet they obtain an eſtabliſhment in Bengal.

It was during this untoward ſtate of the Engliſh commerce in Aſia, the ſervants of the Company obtained that eſtabliſhment in Bengal, which time and accident have ſince improved into ſo many and great national advantages. Though the Portugueze had viſited Bengal *, before it fell under the power of the Moguls, they had never eſtabliſhed regular governments and garriſons in that country †. The Dutch had ſettled there about the year 1625, in the reign of the Emperor Jehangire ‡. In 1636, when his ſon Shaw Jehan ſat on

* In 1534. † Orme, vol. ii. p. 7. ‡ L' Expedition de trois Vaiſſeaux, tom. i.

the throne, one Boughton, an Engliſh ſurgeon, ſent from Surat to Agra, had the good fortune to cure the emperor's favourite daughter, who laboured under an illneſs, which had baffled the ſkill of the natives. Among other favours, Boughton was gratified with a patent, or Duſtuc, for a free trade throughout the empire. Having proceeded to Bengal, his ſkill in phyſic procured for him the friendſhip of the Nabob of that province; who extended the privileges given to Boughton, to the whole Engliſh nation §. The Company's ſervants at Surat, availing themſelves of the influence of Boughton, built a factory at Hughley, on the weſtern branch of the Ganges, one hundred miles from the mouth of the river.

Their commerce loſt during the civil war.

But the privileges obtained by Boughton, for his countrymen, were incapable of reſtoring vigour to a commerce, which had fallen into an irrecoverable decline. Haraſſed abroad by European rivals, who, from their ſuperior advantages, could bring their imports cheaper to market at home, the Company loſt their ſpirit with their ſucceſs. To haſten their fate, the civil commotions, which afterwards terminated in the ſubverſion of the conſtitution of the ſtate, engaged the whole attention, and employed the whole exertion of the nation. The Dutch, availing themſelves of the decline of the Portugueze, and the diſtractions in England, engroſſed the commerce of the Eaſt; and even Cromwell, though he gained a ſuperiority over them in war, neglected, as perhaps he underſtood not, the intereſts of the nation in India, in a peace, the conditions of which he dictated himſelf. He, however, renewed to the Company their ancient privileges in 1657; but before they could avail themſelves of the ſupport of government, his death threw the nation back into thoſe public diſtractions, from which it had emerged but a few years before.

1657. Charter renewed by Cromwell.

§ Orme, vol. ii. p. 8.

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1661. New charter granted by Charles II.

The revolution, which reſtored England to its ancient conſtitution, brought back, ſoon after, the commerce of India to its former channel. Charles the Second, though addicted to pleaſure, was capable of uſeful exertions, and he loved commerce. His brother, the Duke of York, though poſſeſſed of leſs ability, was endued with greater perſeverance; and, by a peculiar felicity, placed his chief amuſement in commercial ſchemes, whilſt he poſſeſſed the whole influence of the ſtate. Under his auſpices, a new charter was iſſued, on the 3d of April 1661. The animoſity of the two royal brothers againſt the Dutch, the manifeſt advantage to the revenue, as well as to the nation, which was likely to be derived from the commerce of India, inſured the ſupport of government to the Company.

Great privileges and powers granted.

The charter which had been granted by Queen Elizabeth, in the forty-third year of her reign, inveſted the Company with an excluſive right of commerce for fifteen years. They had been erected into a perpetual body-politic, by a charter which they had obtained in the ſeventh of James the Firſt. In that of April 3, 1661, new privileges were added to the old, which were all confirmed. The Company were inveſted with a civil juriſdiction and a military authority, with a power of making war or concluding peace with the INFIDELS of India; the ſtate reſerving to itſelf, by this diſtinction, thoſe prerogatives, with reſpect to Europeans. They were alſo impowered to export bullion to the amount of 150,000l. in every voyage, provided they re-exported foreign goods to the ſame amount. The clauſe in the charter granted by Elizabeth was reſerved, which declared, that it ſhould become void and of no effect, after three years notice given, ſhould the privileges granted prove detrimental to the general intereſt of the nation. A capital of 369,891. was ſubſcribed, though only one half was paid, to derive imme-

immediate advantage from privileges as extenſive in themſelves, as they were liberally beſtowed by the Crown.

Company much favoured by the King and Duke of York.

Charles the Second, having eſpouſed the Infanta of Portugal in 1662, obtained the poſſeſſion of the iſland of Bombay in the year 1663, as a part of the portion of that Princeſs. Finding that the revenues of the place were unequal to its expence, the King ceded it, in fee-tail, to the Company, in the twentieth year of his reign; and, five years after, he alſo granted to them the iſland of St. Helena. To this ceſſion of territory, Government added its whole ſupport, in the encouragement and protection of the Company's trade. The injuries which they had received from the jealouſy of the Dutch Company, had formed one of the oſtenſible reaſons for entering into the firſt Dutch war. The Commons, by the management of Government, which then was ſwayed by the Duke of York, addreſſed the Crown, againſt the wrongs and indignities done to the Eaſt-India Company. The Duke himſelf, who ſpent half his time in the buſineſs of commerce in the city, preſided frequently at the meetings of the Court of Directors. In ſhort, no aid was wanting to the proſperity of the Company, that either the aſſiduity of the Duke or his influence in the ſtate could procure.

Their ſucceſs raiſes jealouſies.

The encouragement and protection of government, joined to their own induſtry, raiſed the Company, in outward appearance, to a ſtate of amazing affluence in the ſpace of a few years. In 1680 and the three ſucceeding years, the price of India ſtock was 360 per cent. with proportionable dividends. Circumſtances ſo favourable could not fail to raiſe the jealouſy of foreigners, and to inflame the avarice of individuals at home. The mercantile intereſt and the court became, at length, divided, on a ſubject of ſo much importance. The firſt were prompted, by their eagerneſs for gain, to invade the excluſive rights contained in the charter; the latter, won by the influence, and perhaps the money, of the Company, as eagerly oppoſed their deſigns.

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More ample privileges given by Charles II.

During the latter years of the life of Charles the Second, the victory obtained by the court over the city, repreſſed the complaints of the merchants of London, as they were likely to produce no good effect againſt a ſociety favoured by government. Charles had renewed the charter, in the twenty-eighth year of his reign; he had extended the privileges of the Company in the thirty-fifth; but when his brother James the Second acceded to the throne, he poured his favours, with a very laviſh hand, on a body whom he had before patronized. To raiſe them into an equality with the Dutch Company, and, perhaps, to give them a ſuperiority over their republican rivals, he not only increaſed their immunities, but even transferred to them many of his own prerogatives. He impowered them to build fortreſſes, to levy troops, to determine cauſes, under the form of courts martial, and to coin money. Encouraged by ſo many privileges, under the patronage of a Prince, who both knew and loved trade, the Company not only aſſumed the pride, but even the tyranny of ſovereignty. Inſtead of repreſſing the encroachments of their foreign rivals, they perſecuted ſuch of their countrymen as ſeemed inclined to invade their excluſive commerce. The principal ſervants abroad, encouraged and protected by thoſe who managed the affairs of the Company at home, carried inſolence, oppreſſion, and injuſtice into every department of their government.

James II. grants ſtill more extenſive powers.

1686.

Reflections on the tyranny of great ſocieties, particularly of commercial bodies.

Unlimited power, in the hands of a ſingle perſon, may be prevented from degenerating into acts of tyranny, by the terrors of ignominy or by perſonal fears. But a body of men, veſted with authothority, is ſeldom ſwayed by reſtraints of either kind. As they derive, individually, but little applauſe from their beſt meaſures, ſo the portion of infamy which may fall to each for the worſt public actions, is too ſmall to affect perſonal character. Having, therefore, no generous inducements to follow virtue, the moſt ſordid paſſions frequently lead them into vice. It is from this circumſtance, that the deciſions of public bodies ſometimes partake of that mortifying

ſpecies of tyranny, which is incapable of redreſs, and yet is beyond revenge. Theſe obſervations may be applied, without the leaſt injuſtice, to the actions of the India Company both at home and abroad. Avarice, the moſt obſtinate and hardened paſſion of the human mind, being the firſt principle of commerce, was the original bond of their union; and humanity, juſtice, and even policy, gave way to the proſpect or love of gain *.

Iniquitous conduct of the Company at home.

The miſmanagement of the Company at home had been long covered by that veil of ſecrecy which the private intereſts of the leaders had induſtriouſly thrown over their affairs. It afterwards appeared, that thoſe leaders had uſurped an abſolute dominion over the other adventurers. That, by their private contracts and unheard-of deductions, and by the moſt iniquitous frauds in both, the joint ſtock had ſuffered a loſs to near one half of its original amount. That when, by embezzlement, avarice, and inattention to their truſt, they had in a manner devoured the property of their conſtituents, by unjuſt and unreaſonable dividends, to give the fallacious appearance of health to a body fallen into a deep decline. That, though in proſecution of the ſame ſyſtem of deception, they had doubled their capital, in the year 1682, they had not taken in but one half of the ſum at firſt ſubſcribed. That,

* Beſide that want of generous principle, which ſeems excluded from the very inſtitution of a ſovereign corporation of commerce, the great diſtance of their adminiſtration in India ſecured the Company from a general inſpection into their conduct, and conſequently furniſhed ample opportunities for a wanton and uncontrolled exerciſe of power. All reſiſtance, therefore, to their arbitrary edicts, whether they regarded their own ſervants or the natives of the country, was conſidered as treaſon, and puniſhed with ſeverity. The rulers at home had their favourites abroad, whom they protected in the moſt cruel and oppreſſive meaſures by their authority. Hence it happened that private reſentments and ſelfiſh views were too frequently the only rules of their conduct; and that their adminiſtration had ſcarce any other principle of union, than a mutual permiſſion to commit injuſtice. Even the excluſive privilege, which was thought neceſſary for the proſperity of their commerce, became an engine of tyranny againſt all thoſe whom they conſidered as interlopers; and ſuch inſtances of their barbarity might be produced, ſupported by facts, as would excite horror.

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whilſt they were making extravagant dividends to the proprietors, the Company was languiſhing under a debt of two millions at intereſt. That, inſtead of anſwering legal demands, the Directors had fixed a paper on the Treaſury-door, declaring that they could pay no more till a certain period; and all this at a time, when they pretended the affairs of the Company were in the moſt flouriſhing condition *.

Their oppreſſions, injuſtice, and piracies abroad.

Theſe iniquitous deceptions at home naturally produced frauds, oppreſſion, and injuſtice abroad. To repair the ruins made by the avarice of the Directors, they iſſued orders to their governors and factors to borrow large ſums in India on the credit of the Company. Their conduct, upon this occaſion, was treacherous, baſe and unworthy of the ſubjects of any civilized ſtate. In their letters to their factors they intimated, that as ſoon as they had puſhed their credit to the utmoſt extent, they would then contrive means of quarrelling with the creditors, and of putting a ſtop to their trade †.

The commands of the Directors were faithfully executed by ſervants ſuitable to ſuch maſters. Having borrowed from the merchants of Surat, under the maſk of friendſhip, near three hundred thouſand pounds, they followed the orders they had received, and retired to Bombay. To complete the injuſtice and even villany of theſe tranſactions, they began to make ſpoil of the ſhips and goods of their creditors and benefactors. One Sir John Child, a repreſentative worthy of a vicious ſociety, without any declaration, without the leaſt pretence to juſtify hoſtilities, ſeized thirteen rich ſhips, belonging to the merchants of Surat, to the amount of more than a million ſterling ‡.

Their cruelty to their ſervants

To this treachery to foreigners, the Company had added the moſt dreadful oppreſſions towards their own nation. They had ſeized

* White's account of the India trade.

† Hamilton, vol. i. p. 187.—Harris, vol. ii.

‡ As afterwards appeared upon oath in the court of exchequer. The value of three hundred thouſand pounds of this ſpoil was ſent home to the committee of Directors who had iſſued the orders.— White's Account of the India Trade.

the

the ſhips and condemned the property of interlopers, after having put the crews in irons, and killed ſome of the captains §. Their injuſtice at ſea was preceded and followed by unheard-of inſtances of tyranny aſhore. The merchants and inhabitants of Bombay, exaſperated into a degree of madneſs by the oppreſſions of their maſters, had revolted from their authority, declared for the King and nation, impriſoned their preſident, and had taken the reins of government into their own hands ‖. When, upon a promiſe of pardon, and upon ſtipulated conditions, they returned to their duty, the faith of the Company was broken, and they were treated with inſolence, tyranny, and wanton cruelty. To ſuch a degree of oppreſſion had the Governor of Bombay ſtretched his authority, that he actually erected an inquiſition under the preſidency of a refugee Greek; to haraſs, ruin, and deſtroy, by a religious perſecution, ſuch as, in other reſpects, had eluded his vengeance *.

occaſions a revolt.

The conduct of the Company towards their ſubjects and ſervants was uniformly oppreſſive, unjuſtifiable, and cruel; yet, from its being unknown or diſregarded at home, they eſcaped thoſe animadverſions, and, perhaps, puniſhments, which they had ſo much deſerved. But Aurungzebe, who then ſat on the throne of Delhi, reſolved to obtain juſtice for his own ſubjects at Surat, for the piracies committed by the Company. Having demanded that juſtice in vain, by meſſages to the government of Bombay, he had ordered an army into that iſland. The conduct of the governor was as puſillanimous in war, as it had been inſolent and unjuſt in time of peace. Being preſſed by a ſiege, three deputies, in the name of the Company, were diſpatched to Aurungzebe, who then reſided at Jehanabad. They preſented themſelves in the preſence of the offended monarch, with their hands tied before them; and having proſtrated themſelves

Their hoſtilities againſt the ſubjects of the Mogul.

1688.

Their abject ſubmiſſion to Aurungzebe.

§ Hamilton, vol. i. Harris, vol. ii.
‖ Dodſley, vol. ii. Hamilton, vol. ii.

* Dodſley, Hamilton, &c. Univerſal Hiſtory, vol. x.

on

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on the ground, they implored his clemency, confeſſed their faults, and humbly requeſted his pardon. The Emperor, having ſeverely reprimanded them, conſented to withdraw his army, and to renew the Phirman, which they had ſo juſtly forfeited, upon condition

1689. of their making ſatisfaction to his ſubjects at Surat for the injuries which they had ſuſtained †.

1691. Their affairs brought under diſcuſſion in parliament.

Soon after theſe tranſactions, both at home and abroad, the vehemence of perſons injured by the injuſtice of the Company, and the jealouſy of the merchants of London, brought their affairs into public diſcuſſion, and under the conſideration of parliament. The Houſe of Commons, having examined the ſubject in three different ſeſſions, had propoſed regulations for carrying on, in future, the commerce with the Eaſt Indies. But the Company had eluded all the endeavours of that aſſembly, by procuring a new charter from Queen Mary, who managed the affairs of the kingdom in the abſence of King

1694. September. William, in September 1694. The Houſe of Commons having,

1695. in the beginning of 1695, detected various flagrant abuſes in the management of public affairs, were led to conclude, that the court, the camp, the city, and even parliament, had been infected with one general contagion of bribery, corruption, and venality. The Eaſt India Company, having had the influence to remove the conſideration of their affairs from the legiſlature to the privy council, were naturally ſuſpected of having gained the King's principal ſervants by bribes. The Commons, therefore, ordered a committee

They are detected in bribery and corruption. to inſpect the books of the Company. The abſtracts of the ſums paid for ſpecial ſervices ſoon led to a diſcovery. In the reign of James the Second, the annual charges of the management at home had ſcarcely exceeded 1200l.; but in the year 1693, when the charter was firſt renewed, they had amounted to 90,000l. Sir Thomas Cooke, the governor of the Company, on whoſe notes the money

† Hamilton, vol. i.

had

had been lent, terrified by a bill of pains and penalties paſſed by the Commons, made a diſcovery which was not ſatisfactory. Ten thouſand pounds were, however, traced to the king himſelf; and other ſums to his miniſters and principal ſervants ‡. The duke of Leeds, as being the moſt obnoxious, was impeached for receiving a gratuity of five thouſand pounds; but king William, by putting ſuddenly an end to the ſeſſion, quaſhed at once the impeachment and all further enquiry §.

The affair reſumed in 1698, by means of the aſſociated merchants.

Though the weight of the Crown, and the influence of the Company, as well as thoſe who had received bribes, had quaſhed the enquiry, in the year 1695, the aſſociated merchants, or, as they were called by the Company, the *interlopers*, found means to bring the charter obtained in 1694, under the conſideration of parliament in the beginning of 1698. Excluſive of the miſmanagements of the Company at home and their tyranny in India, together with the general arguments againſt the expediency and juſtice of a commercial monopoly, the principal objection offered againſt the charter, was its not being confirmed by an act of the legiſlature. Government, ſtanding in need of a ſupply, had reſolved to ſupport the cauſe of that party which ſhould pay the moſt for their favour. The Company, apprized of that circumſtance, offered 700,000 l. at four *per cent.* upon condition of having the charter confirmed by act of parliament. The *interlopers*, protected by Mr. Montague, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, propoſed to advance two millions, at eight *per cent.* in conſideration of an excluſive trade to be veſted in the ſubſcribers. A bill was accordingly paſſed on this affair, notwithſtanding the petitions and oppoſition of the Old Company. The latter, however, obtained in the ſucceeding year the ſanction of parliament to their charter; and thus the nation had two Eaſt-India

Government reſolves to ſupport thoſe who paid moſt.

1698. June.

‡ Journals, April 1695. § Ibid.

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Companies by parliamentary authority, inſtead of one by prerogative †.

1700. Quarrels between the Old and New Company.

The animoſities, which had ſubſiſted for many years between the Old Company and the *interlopers*, who had been comprehended in the New, were increaſed by mutual jealouſies, after both had been confirmed by the ſanction of the legiſlature. They were now as ſolicitous for the deſtruction of each other, as each had before been for their reſpective eſtabliſhment. Having both taſted the ſweets of the Eaſt-India commerce, both were inflamed with that envy and irreconcilable reſentment which ambition and avarice never fail to inſpire.

Both guilty of bribery and corruption.

In the general elections which happened in the year 1700, they had been both detected in bribery and corruption. "The Old began with corrupting members and purchaſing voices in the houſe. The New, inſtead of purchaſing votes, bought ſeats; inſtead of corrupting the repreſentatives bribed the conſtituents, and endeavoured to ſecure a majority in the houſe *." Their feuds and jealouſies in the mean time continued; nor did theſe in the leaſt ſubſide till more than two years after the charter of the Old Company had been confirmed by parliament.

They unite into one company.

Tired, at length, of a quarrel which might poſſibly terminate in the ruin of both, they reſolved upon an union of ſtocks; and agreed that the future management of their joint trade ſhould be according to the charter of the New Company, bearing date the 5th of September 1698.

Deſpotiſm and tyranny of the company, both at home and abroad.

During theſe conteſts in England, the ſame miſmanagements and the ſame oppreſſions continued in the ſettlements of the Company in India. The principles of the Company's government abroad, may be collected from the orders ſent by their governor at home. This commercial deſpot, in writing to the judge appointed by the Company for civil affairs, makes uſe of the following remarkable words: "I expect my will and orders ſhall be your rule, and not

† Ralph, vol. ii. p. 845.

* Univerſal Hiſt. vol. x.

"the

" the laws of England, which are a heap of nonſenſe, compiled by " a number of ignorant country gentlemen, who hardly know how " to govern their own families, much leſs the regulating companies " and foreign commerce."—" Having now the power of condemning " the Company's enemies, or ſuch as ſhall be deemed ſo, particular- " ly thoſe who ſhall queſtion the Company's power over all the Bri- " tiſh ſubjects in India, I expect my orders, from time to time, ſhall " be obeyed and obſerved as ſtatute laws *."

The oppreſſed inhabitants of Bombay revolt.

Though the judge, to whom this letter had been written, was too prudent to *promiſe* obedience to the arbitrary mandates which it contained, the governors of the different ſettlements ſeemed to have thoroughly imbibed the deſpotic principles of their maſters in England. The profligate Sir John Child had been followed in the government of Bombay and the generalſhip of India, by a ſucceſſion of petty tyrants. The union of the two Companies brought only a freſh ſupply of rapacity and injuſtice, to the old ſtock of avarice and tyranny. In ſome inſtances, the oppreſſed found themſelves obliged to ſtrike the reins of government from the hands of their oppreſſors. This was the fate of Sir Nicholas Waite, whoſe looſeneſs of morals, bare-faced perverſion of juſtice, and arbitrary exertion of his authority incenſed to ſuch a degree the inhabitants and ſoldiers of Bombay, that they ſeized his perſon and ſent him priſoner to England. A train of ſimilar oppreſſions, joined with other misfortunes, at length reduced that iſland to a ſolitary and diſmal deſart. War and peſtilence had reduced the Engliſh inhabitants from eight hundred to ſixty perſons. " Still the ſpirit of injuſtice re- " mained, which neither war nor peſtilence could ſubdue. The un- " fortunate few, who ſurvived thoſe dreadful calamities, were de- " nied the liberty of returning to their native country, or even of " removing to other parts of India. They were detained in the

They ſend the Preſident priſoner to England.

* Hamilton, vol. ii.

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" Company's ſervice, under the laſh of authority, inſolence, and " oppreſſion, without a glimmering of hope *."

Quarrels between the ſervants of the two Companies after their union.

The union of the two Companies in England was found incapable of reconciling their ſervants in India. The ſame principle of avarice and ſelf-intereſt, which had joined the former in one ſcheme of commerce, increaſed rivalſhip, animoſity, and injuſtice between the latter. The heat of the climate ſeems to have inflamed their rancour, jealouſy, and enmity. Thoſe paſſions had their riſe among the leaders of the Companies at home, from the phlegmatic, though vigilant and eager principle of avarice: but in India, ſelf-intereſt, ſelfiſh notions, rapacity, and conſequently injuſtice, became blended, as it were by fermentation, with the whole conſtitution of the mind. The affairs of the united Company muſt naturally have languiſhed, as they were conducted by men more attentive to their own mutual deſtruction, than to their duty to their maſters. Neither honour, juſtice, or humanity were regarded, when any occaſion offered, for ruining each other, or enriching themſelves †: all was conducted by ſecret fraud or open force ‡.

Negligence of Government in not interfering.

The State, whoſe correcting hand ought to have been ſtretched forth to petty deſpots, whoſe quarrels and oppreſſions had diſgraced the nation, was too much embroiled at home, to extend its attention to India. A diſputed ſucceſſion, the events, the hurry, the expence of a great war, and, above all, the conteſts for places, which parties dignify with the name of principle, occupied the whole attention of the great body of the people. Men in office had neither leiſure, nor, perhaps, ſufficient knowledge of the ſubject, to rectify abuſes in commerce; and thus, whilſt the great intereſts of the nation

* Harris, Dodſley, &c.

† The inſtances of rapacity, oppreſſion, and injuſtice, committed by the ſuperior ſervants of the Company, are too mean for the pen of an hiſtorian; at leaſt, they are too numerous to be comprehended in a diſquiſition, where brevity is to be ſtudied. Bribery, corruption, and venality ſeem to be inherent in all the members of commercial bodies; by whom authority never fails to be made the inſtrument of avarice.

‡ Hamilton, vol. i. Dodſley, vol. ii. Univerſal Hiſtory, vol. x.

were

were neglected, the Miniſtry were engaged in defending their places from the attacks of rivals, and not in executing the duties of their ſtation.

Self-intereſt, at length, begets unanimity at home.

Time, which ſmoothes down, in its progreſs, the moſt furious paſſions of the mind, extinguiſhed, at length, the jealouſies between the leaders of the two united Companies in England. Their common intereſt created unanimity in their meaſures; and, in looking back to the conditions on which they had been united, they perceived defects and inconveniences, which they wiſhed to remove. The two Companies, when ſeparate, had been converſant in the means of gaining the favour of individuals with money; but, now, the neceſſities of the State itſelf had rendered it an object for bribery. To obtain ſuch a law as would ſettle their affairs on a proper footing, they reſolved, in the ſixth year of Queen Anne, to lend to Government, at a ſtated intereſt, 1,200,000 l. over and above the 2,000,000 l. lent, when the New Company was eſtabliſhed, about ten years before. The Earl of Godolphin, then at the head of the public finances, ſeized the offer with all the eagerneſs of a miniſter who wants a ſupply. In conſideration of a trivial ſum, which might have been borrowed upon common intereſt from individuals, Parliament was ready to grant to the Company whatever privileges and powers they required, for the benefit of their trade. A bill was accordingly paſſed, in which the above ſum of 1,200,000 l. was declared an addition to the ſtock of the Company, free from all taxes *.

1708. They purchaſe a new law, in their favour, by a loan to the State.

1713. Treaty of Utrecht favourable to commerce.

The treaty of Utrecht, which reſtored peace to England, after a war which had continued, with little intermiſſion, three-and-twenty years, promiſed to bring back interrupted commerce to her ancient channel. Years of tranquillity ſucceeding times of trouble and public waſte, induſtry and trade were revived, and the Eaſt-India Com-

* Publications of the times.

pany

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pany obtained its own ſhare of the general proſperity. The leaders in the Court of Directors, either guided by chance, or ſwayed by judgment, had ſent perſons of prudence and commercial abilities, in quality of chiefs, to their ſettlements, which gave a proſperous turn to their affairs. Envy and jealouſy, which tread cloſe on the heels of proſperity, again raiſed enemies to the Company. Men of eminence and weight joined, in the general cry, againſt an excluſive commerce. A variety of arguments, plauſible, at leaſt, if not juſt, were urged, with great vehemence, on that head. "The whole "kingdom was filled with complaints of the injuſtice of a mono-"poly, by which a body of private merchants ſatiated their avarice, "at the expence of all the other ſubjects of the ſtate*." To obviate the conſequences of ſpeculative reaſonings, become ſo general, the Company had recourſe to the never-failing argument of the purſe. They bribed the State, by what the State, perhaps ignorantly, thought advantageous propoſals†; and, notwithſtanding the clamours of the people, obtained a perfect ſecurity to an excluſive right of trading to the Eaſt-Indies.

The Company proſpers.

The nation complains of their monopoly. 1729.

The Eaſt-India Company continued in the ſame flouriſhing and ſecure condition, both at home and abroad, till the war, which was declared between France and England, in the year 1744. The French having failed, for near eighty years, in all their attempts to erect and ſupport an Eaſt-India Company, at length accompliſhed their object about the year 1720. The regular returns made by the French, ever ſince their complete eſtabliſhment in India, had been ſo conſiderable, that the jealouſy of the Britiſh Company was raiſed. Government, entering with ſome degree of warmth into that jealouſy, turned a part of their attention towards the Eaſt, when war

* Publications of the times.

† Theſe were 200,000l. as a gratuity, and a reduction of the annuity of 160,000l. upon their capital ſtock lent to Government, to 128,000l. The reduced annuity to be charged on the ſame duties and revenues as before.

was likely to ariſe between the two nations. The French, fearing hoſtilities, as they were anxious to promote a commerce ſtill in its infancy, had propoſed a neutrality between the two Companies, as early as the year 1742. The Court of Directors, at firſt, accepted and then rejected the propoſal; but, whether inſtigated by Government, or ſwayed by their own verſatility, is uncertain. When, therefore, war commenced in Europe, its flame ſpread to Aſia. Their reſpective ſovereigns aſſiſted each Company; and, thus, the buſineſs of commerce yielded to the occupations of arms. New ſcenes were opened; and events aroſe, which became the foundation of that ſtate of things, to explain which is the principal object of this work.

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CHAP. II.

Origin of the three Preſidencies.—The Conqueſts of the Mahommedans in the Decan deduced from the earlieſt Times.

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Origin of the three Preſidencies.

THE three Britiſh Preſidencies, which command the inferior factories in Hindoſtan, were eſtabliſhed under various circumſtances, and at different periods. During the vigour of the Mogul empire, the race of Timur, who ſat on the throne of Delhi, diſdained to permit the appearance of any ſovereignty but their own. Even the conqueſts and forts of the Portugueſe in India, had been confined to the dominions of petty Rajahs, to whom the Moguls had never extended their invaſions. But as the nature of the commerce of Europeans had placed ſo much of their property in the hands of the natives, they became, through neceſſity, entirely dependent on the Government of the country. This circumſtance had, at length, ſo far removed the jealouſy of the State, that they were permitted to erect ſuch ſlight defences, as might protect the perſons of their Factors from the inſults of invaders or inſurgents, without rendering them formidable to the Empire.

Of Madras.

MADRAS, which commands the factories on the coaſt of Coromandel, owed its origin to the gallantry of Sir William Langhorne; who fixed on a ſterile and inconvenient ſpot, merely on account of its vicinity to the Portugueſe ſettlement of St. Thomas, where he had a miſtreſs. This injudicious choice was made, during the great civil war in England, when the trade to India had languiſhed ſo

much, that, in the year 1654, it expired, in a manner, by a natural death.

Of Bombay.

BOMBAY, which has long preſided over the factories on the coaſt of Malabar, was itſelf formerly dependent on Surat, and governed by a Deputy ſent from that ſettlement. Their naval power enabled the Portugueſe to poſſeſs themſelves of that iſland, ſoon after their firſt arrival in Hindoſtan. Secured by the force which acquired it, Bombay had ſcarcely any defences but the ſea, by which it was ſurrounded. Being a part of the portion aſſigned to the Infanta of Portugal, when ſhe became Queen of England in 1662, it fell into the hands of Charles II. in the end of 1663. That prince, finding that it was not worth its expence to the State, transferred it, in fee-tail, to the Company, about the year 1669.

Of Bengal.

The Engliſh, extending their commerce to Bengal, under the patronage of Boughton, a ſurgeon, were permitted, about the year 1640, to build a kind of factory at Hughley, a port on the weſtern branch of the Ganges. But ſuch was the jealouſy of the Mogul Government, that, for the ſpace of forty years, the Company were only allowed to retain thirty ſoldiers and an enſign in their pay, to do honour to their principal agents. The war kindled by Sir John Child, on the coaſt of Malabar, extending itſelf to Bengal, the Engliſh were obliged to quit Hughley; and, ſoon after, to retire to Madras. Upon the pacification made in 1689, with the Court of Delhi, the factory was permitted to return, firſt to Soota-nutty, and afterwards to ſettle at the village of Calcutta. Upon an inſurrection of the Rajahs, on the weſtern ſide of the river Hughley, in the year 1696, the factory declared for the Mogul Government. The Nabob of Bengal ordered them to defend themſelves againſt the enemy; and they raiſed walls with a few baſtions, which they called Fort William, in honour of the reigning king.

The French at firſt unſucceſsful in India.

Though the French had made a voyage to India in 1601, the ſame year in which the Engliſh firſt ſailed, in the way of commerce, to

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Their commercial character.

that country, they were, for more than a century, unſucceſsful in almoſt all their ſchemes. A lively nation, without ſolidity for trade, calculated for ſudden exertions, but incapable of perſeverance in one determined line of conduct. Perpetually changing the object, without altering their manner, they attempted every thing, and loſt all.

Their miſmanagements.

Their voyages to India were remarkable, only for the ſingularity of their misfortunes. A company, deſtitute of reſources as well as policy at home, vehement and injudicious, though ſpirited agents abroad; both ignorant of commerce, and yet too proud to learn.

Pondicherry.

Having founded a kind of factory at Surat, they quitted that city without any ſolid reaſon, and after making an unſucceſsful attempt on the iſland of Ceylon, eſtabliſhed themſelves, by accident, at Pondicherry, about the year 1670. There they carried on a languid commerce, under the protection of the Mogul government, till Pondicherry was taken by the Dutch in 1693. Though the treaty of Ryſwick reſtored the place, little advantage was derived from it, till Cardinal Fleury began to ſupport the French intereſt in India, in an effectual manner. Under the auſpices of that miniſter, men of abilities were appointed to ſuperintend the trade, and to increaſe the power of the India Company. Having ſucceeded in the former, they became too attentive to the latter; till, by one of thoſe reverſes of fortune to which ſchemes of ambition are often liable, both objects were entirely loſt.

Their East-India Company flouriſhes.

But is ruined by their ambition.

Party-writers have rendered a retroſpect into the affairs of India neceſſary.

To throw complete light on the ſubject of this diſquiſition, it may not be improper to return to events, which, as they are placed far back in antiquity, are perhaps overlooked, though they deſerve to be known. Writers, who, by defending the conduct of the Company, admit that it ſtands in need of defence, have recurred to the ancient hiſtory of India, for arguments of exculpation. Though the facts they have choſen to give, may have carried conviction to their own minds, they are too imperfect to guide the judgment of the Public, on an affair, on which the Public ought to decide.

This defect in the narratives, on which they found their reaſoning, we ſhall endeavour to ſupply, with all the conciſeneſs conſiſtent with perſpicuity. If they have been miſtaken in their premiſes, their concluſions muſt, of courſe, have been wrong. If they have decided without evidence, the nation will reverſe the judgment.

General obſervations on the rights derived from conqueſt.

A thirſt for plunder and an avidity for power have ever been motives of hoſtility and injuſtice to avaricious and ambitious men. But, from whatever cauſe war may ſpring, when it ends in conqueſt, it inveſts the victor with all the property of the vanquiſhed*. The beſt writers on the laws of nature and of nations terminate, at this point, their enquiries into the rights, by which monarchs ſit on thrones, or nations poſſeſs dominions. To puſh their examination further, might juſtly invalidate every claim of a prince and right of a people. Almoſt every period of antiquity, in every country, owes perhaps its being remembered at all to revolutions accompliſhed by reſentment, ambition, or rapacity. Mankind therefore, being either guilty themſelves of this ſpecies of injuſtice, or deriving benefits from it, have uniformly acquieſced in the abſolute right, which every man, in a ſolemn war, acquires in the property which he takes from the enemy; and that without rule or meaſure†. When, therefore, ſtrangers obtain, either by chance or accident, a ſettlement in any region, they are not to look back either to the juſtice or injuſtice of that force, which originally defined the uſages, or eſtabliſhed the government of the country, into whoſe boſom they are received as ſubjects.

The Company's ſervants ſubjects of the Mogul empire.

This was certainly the caſe of the Engliſh Eaſt-India Company, in thoſe two ſettlements, the Carnatic and Bengal, in which their ſervants, aided by the force of the State, have made ſo ſplendid a figure for the nation, at leaſt ſo profitable an adventure for them-

* Ariſtot. de Repub. lib. i. cap. 4 Xenoph. de Inſt. Cyr. l. 7. Grot. lib. iii. c. 6. ſ 3.

† Auctores citat. paſſim.

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ſelves. In both countries, they owned themſelves, and they naturally were, the ſubjects of the Mogul empire†. They received the *phirmâns* of the Emperor, with every eaſtern ceremony‡; upon various occaſions they voluntarily proſtrated themſelves, and ſometimes with their hands bound, in the preſence of that monarch, with all the humility of eaſtern ſlaves‖; they paid him a yearly revenue; and, to uſe the hyperbolical language of Aſia, they "worſhipped the ſhadow of his greatneſs, in his lieutenants and governors§." The Mogul and his officers conſidered them, in return, in the light of good ſubjects¶; and, upon occaſions of diſtreſs or injuſtice, interfered in their favour, and protected their perſons and property*. To a certain prince, who now complains of their injuſtice, they expreſſed themſelves, about thirty years ago, "We are at your ſervice, if you can truſt us;" words as expreſſive of their obedience to him, as they are of doubts concerning their own ſincerity†.

Ancient hiſtory of India involved in fable and allegory.

The hiſtory of Hindoſtan, before the Mahommedans extended their invaſions to that country, is either involved in fable, or diſfigured by allegories; which, to their natural obſcurity, have added the difficulties ariſing from a language, little ſtudied and leſs underſtood. The authority of one monarch is ſaid to have extended itſelf over all India, in remote antiquity; but, either through the negligence or weakneſs of the princes who reigned, the Governors of the different provinces, throwing off their allegiance, aſſumed the titles as well as the independence of ſovereigns, about the year 618. In this ſituation they had continued for ſome ages, prior to the eſtabliſhment of a Mahommedan ſovereignty at Ghizni, in the mountains to the north-weſt of the weſtern branch of the Indus. This happened

Origin of the kingdom of Ghizni.

† Vide Accounts of India paſſim.
‡ Hamilton, vol. i.
‖ Ibid.
§ Dow's Appendix, vol. iii.
¶ Nizam to Nabob, Jan. 21ſt, 1747. Rous's Appendix, vol. i. p. 15.
* Rous's Appendix, vol. i. paſſim.
† Ibid. vol. i. p. 9.

about

about the middle of the tenth century, under Abiſtagi, who had revolted from the kingdom of Bochara; and whoſe ſucceſſor Subuctagi became the anceſtor of a long line of kings.

Several Mahommedans had made predatory expeditions into India, prior to the foundation of the kingdom of Ghizni; but Mamood, the ſon of Subuctagi, was the firſt who eſtabliſhed his authority to the eaſt of the five great rivers, which form the Indus. Mamood mounted the throne of Ghizni, in the year of our æra 997. In his zeal to propagate the faith of Mahommed, but, more probably, prompted by his avarice, he made many expeditions into India; and having retained the places which he had ſubdued, extended his conqueſts and dominions to the kingdoms of Ajmere, Guzerat, and even to a part of Malava. Thirteen princes of the family of Mamood inherited his empire, but none of them his talents. Inſtead of extending, they, at length, loſt all their dominions to the petty princes of Ghor, who had been their ſubjects; and who mounted the throne of the Mahommedan conqueſts in India, in the year 1184. The dynaſty of Ghor, ſubſiſting in the perſons and deſcendants of the adopted ſlaves of that family, poſſeſſed the throne, without extending their dominions, for the ſpace of one hundred and four years *.

Mamood the firſt Mahommedan, who retained conqueſts in India.

He extends his conqueſts to Guzerat, &c.

The princes of Ghor ſucceed the Ghiznides.

In the year 1289, Feroſe, the firſt of the dynaſty of Chilligi, having extinguiſhed the race of Ghor, obtained the throne of Delhi †. Alla-ul-dien, the nephew of this prince, was the firſt Mahommedan, who entered the Decan ‡. In a predatory expedition, which he undertook in the year 1293, he ſurpriſed Deogire, afterwards called Dowlatabad. The incredible booty which he found in this place, enabled him, ſoon after, by the murder of his uncle Feroſe, to mount the throne of Delhi ||. Alla-ul-dien held with vigour the

Dynaſty of Chilligi.

Alla-ul-dien the firſt Mahommedan who penetrated into the Decan. 1293.

* Dow's Hiſtory of Hindoſtan, vol. i. p. 231.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 232.

‡ The general name given to all thoſe provinces, which are comprehended in the weſtern peninſula of India.

|| Dow, vol. i. p. 242.

ſceptre,

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ſceptre, which he had obtained by injuſtice. Having impoſed an annual tribute on the Rajah of Deogire, which that prince had neglected to pay, the Emperor ordered an army againſt him, in the year 1305, under the conduct of Malleck Caffoor, who was at once his miniſter, favourite, and catamite §.

His general, Caffoor, ſubdues the Marattas.

Malleck Caffoor having penetrated the mountains of Bucklana, entered, and reduced into the form of a province, the country of the Marattas; and proceeding to Deogire, received the ſubmiſſion of

1306. Reduces Tellingana.

the Rajah, whom he carried in triumph to Delhi *. Purſuing, in the enſuing year, his good fortune, he entered the province of Tellingana, beſieged Lidderdeo, the Rajah, in his capital of Arinkil, which he took by aſſault. The Rajah, driven to extremity, bought his peace with three hundred elephants, ſeven thouſand horſe, and money and jewels to a vaſt amount, agreeing to pay an annual tri-

1309.

bute to the Empire †. Encouraged by theſe repeated ſucceſſes, Caf-

1310.

foor, reſolving to puſh his conqueſts to the ſouthern extremity of India, marched, in the year 1310, through Tellingana and Golconda,

Conquers the CARNATIC.

paſſed the river Criſtna, and entered the Carnatic. Having engaged and taken in battle Bellal-Deo, Rajah of the Carnatic, he ravaged the country, plundered the temples, and, in a moſque, which he built, read the Chutba in his maſter's name, as ſovereign of that extenſive province. In a fourth expedition, undertaken in the year

1311.

1311, Caffoor ſeized and put to death the refractory Rajah of Deo-

Penetrates to Malabar.

gire, ravaged the country of the Marattas, and penetrating to the coaſt of Malabar, reduced ſeveral provinces along the ſhore of the ocean. After this expedition, he took up his reſidence at Deogire,

As Nizam, receives the tribute of the Carnatic, &c.

and, as Nizam or Viceroy of the Decan, raiſed the annual tribute from the Rajahs of Tellingana, Carnatic, and other conquered provinces ‡.

§ Dow, vol. i. p. 282. * Ibid. p. 285. † Ibid. p. 286, 287. ‡ Ibid. p. 292.

Malleck

Malleck Caffoor, upon the death of Alla-ul-dien, having ſeized the throne, was aſſaſſinated by ſome of the officers of the court, and Mubaric, the ſon of Alla-ul-dien, and the fourth prince of the race of Chilligi, mounted the throne*. During the confuſions which attended the uſurpation, the reduced princes of the Decan revolted, under the conduct of Hirpaldeo, the nephew of the Rajah of Deogire. Hirpaldeo being defeated, taken, flead alive, and beheaded by Mubaric, the provinces of the South returned to their former dependence on the Mahommedan empire of Delhi†. Mubaric, imitating his father, inveſted his catamite, Chuſero Chân, with the enſigns of royalty, and ſent him from Dowlatabad, with a part of his army, to reduce the provinces on the coaſt of Malabar. The immenſe plunder acquired by Chuſero, in this expedition, encouraged him to aſpire to the throne, which, by the murder of Mubaric, the laſt of the race of Chilligi, he mounted in the year 1321; but, after he had reigned five months, he was defeated and ſlain by Ghazi Malleck, who became his ſucceſſor, under the name of Tuglick Shaw‡.

He uſurps the throne.

The Decan revolts, and is again reduced.

1318.

1321.

The princes of the Decan, ſtill averſe to the yoke of the Mahommedans, had revolted during the uſurpation of Chuſero; and Tuglick, ſoon after his acceſſion to the imperial dignity, diſpatched his eldeſt ſon, Aligh Chân, to chaſtiſe the inſurgents. Aligh Chân, though he failed in the firſt expedition, by the deſertion of his nobles, returned in the ſucceeding year; and having retaken the the capital of Tellingana, reduced the revolted provinces. Having, in the year 1326, ſucceeded his father Tuglick in the throne, by the name of Mahommed, he became a great conqueror. Either in perſon, or by his generals, he ſubjected all thoſe vaſt provinces, which extend from Chittagong, on the eaſtern ſhore of the bay of Bengal,

Decan revolts.

1322.

But is reduced by Sultan Mahommed.

1323.

1326.

Who conquers the Decan to Cape Comorin, and from ſea to ſea.

* Dow, vol. i. p. 296. † Ibid. p. 298. ‡ Ibid. p. 308.

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to the ocean, which waſhes the extenſive coaſt of Malabar. Extending his conqueſts, along the coaſt of Coromandel, he reduced the Carnatic to Cape Comorin, the extremity of the Decan; and ſtretching his authority with his arms from ſea to ſea, made the whole peninſula dependent on the empire of Delhi §.

Decan revolts under its Mahommedan governors.

They are reduced by Mahommed.

Sultan Mahommed, having by his wild ſchemes, ambition and avarice, created a general diſguſt, many of the nobles, whom he had left in governments in the Decan, confederating under his nephew Kirſhaſib, aroſe in rebellion. Kirſhaſib being defeated under the walls of Deogire, by the Emperor in perſon, fled to the Rajah of Compala in the Carnatic, who, endeavouring to protect the fugitive, was overcome in battle, and taken priſoner by the Imperialiſts. Kirſhaſib having, in the mean time, made his eſcape, threw himſelf into the hands of Bellaldeo, Rajah of the whole Carnatic. That prince, acknowledging his own ſubjection to the Mahommedan government*, delivered the fugitive to his offended uncle, who ordered him to be flead alive, and to be ſhewn, a horrid ſpectacle, all around the city of Deogire. Mahommed, in order to retain with more eaſe his vaſt conqueſts in the Decan, reſolved to make Deogire the ſeat of empire; and, to people it with the greater expedition, he ordered Delhi to be deſtroyed, and the inhabitants to be carried to his new capital †.

He makes Deogire the capital of the empire.

1343. A general revolt in the Decan.

The preſence of Mahommed in Deogire repreſſed, for ſome time, the ſpirit of revolt, which had ſo frequently appeared in the Decan. But when diſturbances in the North and Eaſt, and eſpecially a rebellion in Bengal, recalled him from the ſouthern provinces, a conſpiracy was formed, by the principal Hindoos, to recover their independence, by expelling all the Mahommedans from the Decan. Kinſa-naig, the ſon of Lidderdeo, the depoſed Rajah of Tellingana,

The Mahommedans expelled.

1344.

§ Dow, vol. i. p. 314, 315. * Ibid. p. 319. † Ibid. p. 320.

joining

joining with Bellaldeo *, the tributary prince of the Carnatic, their united forces drove, in a few months, the Mahommedans from all their conqueſts, except Deogire or Dowlatabad †. Sultan Mahommed having determined to reconquer the Decan, in the year 1346, divided that vaſt country into thoſe four provinces, which became, afterwards, four indépendent Mahommedan ſovereignties. He entered into articles with four governors, whom he appointed, and provided with armies, that they ſhould pay annually into the Imperial treaſury, near nine millions of our money ‡. The Hindoos, either terrified or defeated by the Imperial armies, ſeem to have returned to their former dependence; when a ſudden revolution rendered the Decan entirely independent on the throne of Delhi.

1346. But they re-eſtabliſh themſelves.

The Mahommedan princes, who had already reigned over the greateſt part of India, for more than three centuries, had ſupported their authority among the natives, by the means of hardy troops, called from the provinces beyond the Indus. The chiefs or leaders of thoſe mercenaries had formerly ſeized the throne, which they had been hired to defend; or, at leaſt, had appropriated to themſelves provinces, in the reduction of which they had been employed by the court of Delhi. This injuſtice, on their part, frequently created jealouſy in the mind of the prince whoſe pay they received. Plots, aſſaſſinations, and even maſſacres had often been the conſequence of thoſe paſſions, when carried to extremes.

Circumſtance which led to the revolt of the Decan.

Sultan Mahommed, becoming jealous of his Mogul mercenaries, had ordered many of their chiefs to be murdered at a feaſt to which they had been treacherouſly invited §. Thoſe who remained, dreading the ſame fate, revolted, ſurpriſed Dowlatabad, and, in the year 1347, inveſted Iſmael Muche, one of their chiefs, with the enſigns of royalty, under the name of Naſir-ul-dien ‖. This new

Sultan Mahommed's cruelty to his Mogul mercenaries.

1347. They revolt, and ſurpriſe Dowlatabad.

* This ſeems to have been the general name of all the Rajahs of the Carnatic.

† Dow, vol. i. p. 323, 326.

‡ Dow, vol. i.

§ Ibid. p. 329.

‖ Ibid. p. 332.

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monarch was, ſoon after, defeated in battle, and beſieged in Dowlatabad, by Sultan Mahommed. A rebellion in Guzerat having called the Emperor to that province, the vanquiſhed Moguls aſſembled under Haſſen Caco Bemini, defeated the Imperialiſts who beſieged Dowlatabad, and drove them towards Malava. Haſſen Caco, under the title of Alla-ul-dien, aſſumed the royal enſigns, which had been reſigned, in his favour, by Naſir-ul-dien. Whilſt Sultan Mahommed was meditating an expedition againſt the rebels, he died, on his march to Tatta on the banks of the Indus, in 1352 ‡.

Haſſen Caco, one of their chiefs, declared king.

1352.

Feroſe Shaw, who ſucceeded his uncle Mahommed in the throne of Delhi, was a good and humane man, but a weak prince. More attentive to the improvement of the dominions, which he poſſeſſed, than to the recovery of thoſe, which his predeceſſors had loſt, he emancipated, by a formal treaty, both the Decan and Bengal, from the government of the empire; upon condition of their paying a ſmall annual tribute. The debility of Feroſe deſcended to his poſterity and ſucceſſors, who were engaged in a civil war, which had ſprung from a diſputed ſucceſſion, when, in 1397, Timur §, by an invaſion of Hindoſtan, broke entirely the power of an empire already mutilated and divided. In Mamood, who then poſſeſſed the Imperial title, but no authority, the dominion of the race of Tuglick Shaw expired. The family of Beloli Lodi, a noble Afgan, obtained the throne of Delhi in 1450, which they held for ſeventy-five years; till by the defeat and death of Ibrahim, the third of the race, the empire was transferred to the Moguls, in the perſon of the great Sultan Baber, lineally deſcended from Timur *.

Decan and Bengal loſt to the empire.

1357.

1397. Revolutions in the empire.

1450.

1525. Mogul conqueſt.

Neither Sultan Baber nor

Sultan Baber found too much employment, in ſettling the dominions, which he had wreſted from the family of Lodi, to avail himſelf of the ancient claims of the empire, on the revolted provinces.

‡ Dow, vol. i. p. 336.
§ Tamerlane.
* Dow, vol. ii. p. 111.

Dying

his ſon Humaioon attempt to recover the Decan.

Dying in the prime of life, in 1530, he was ſucceeded in the throne, but not in his good fortune, by his ſon Humaioon; who, after a troubleſome and diſaſtrous reign of twelve years, was expelled from his dominions by Shere Shaw, an Afgan, who uſurped the throne. Humaioon, after an exile of twelve years, returned to Hindoſtan with an army; and, having come to battle with Secunder Shaw, the laſt Patan poſſeſſor of the throne of Delhi, transferred the government, a ſecond time, to the houſe of Timur. But dying by a fall in the following year, he left the yet unſettled empire to his ſon Ackbar, who was ſtill a youth †.

1542.

1554.

1555.

Ackbar a great prince.

Though Ackbar, whether we regard his character or his good fortune, was one of the greateſt princes who ever ſat on the throne of Hindoſtan; he neglected, for many years, to revive the pretenſions of the empire, to the kingdoms of the Decan.

Uncertainty of the internal hiſtory of the Decan.

The internal hiſtory of thoſe extenſive countries, which form the peninſula of India within the Ganges, ſtill remains involved in the obſcurity of an unknown tongue. The eminent writer ‡, who has favoured the public with the hiſtory of the empire of Delhi, had alſo an intention of tranſlating, from the Perſian language, that of the Mahommedan ſovereignties of the Decan. But other purſuits having prevented the execution of his deſign, we muſt content ourſelves with the few lights which are thrown on this ſubject, by its connection with the affairs of the Moguls. The information of travellers, whether they only viſited the coaſts, or even penetrated the country, gives little ſatisfaction with regard to ſuch revolutions as happened in former ages. Though worthy of credit in their narrative of tranſactions which fell within the circle of their perſonal knowledge, they loſe themſelves in uncertainty and fable when they recur to ancient times. Where the great line of facts is aſcertained by domeſtic hiſtory, we may ſafely rely on their fidelity relative to

The degree of credit to be given to travellers.

† Dow, vol. ii. paſſim.

‡ Colonel Dow.

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circumſtances; but when we find them without a guide, we are in danger of being led into a region of clouds and darkneſs.

Four Mahommedan principalities in the Decan.

In the reign of Ackbar, the conqueſts of the Mahommedans in the Decan, were found to have been divided into four principalities, under the poſterity of the Moguls, who had revolted from the empire of Delhi, about the middle of the fourteenth century. Theſe were the kingdoms of Chandez, Berar, Golconda, and Bijapour §; the latter known in Europe by the name of Viſiapour. Chandez, the capital of which was called Burhanpour, comprehended the extenſive countries lying between the mountains near the Nirbidda and the ſprings of the Ganga. Berar, whoſe chief town was Ahmednagur, lay between the Ganga and the Soan; and the dominions of the king of Bijapour, who reſided in a city of the ſame name, ſeem to have extended themſelves from the ſources of the Criſtna, to the ſouthern extremity of the kingdom of Myſore. The territories of the king of Golconda, beginning, on the Eaſt and North, on the banks of the Gandevari and Ganga, comprehended the whole coaſt, from Oriſſa to Cape Comorin; being ſeparated, on the Weſt, from the kingdom of Bijapour, by the vaſt mountains of Gata, which divide the coaſt of Coromandel from that of Malabar.

Chandez.

Berar.

Bijapour.

Golconda.

Conſtitution of their government.

The authority, which thoſe princes exerciſed over the territories, which they affected to comprehend within their reſpective kingdoms, ſeems to have been various, both in its kind and degree. Contrary to the uſages of other Mahommedans, they permitted honours, governments, and real property to deſcend, in regular ſucceſſion, from father to ſon. Thoſe hereditary chieftains, though they owned themſelves ſubjects, executed all the functions of ſovereignty, within their governments. They fortified their places of reſidence againſt the tyranny of their prince, as well as againſt the injuſtice of neighbours; and they not only made war upon one an-

§ Dow, vol. ii. p. 284.

other,

other, but frequently took up arms againſt their ſovereign. They were bound by their tenures to give an annual tribute to ſupport his dignity; but the regularity of the payments depended on his power to enforce them. The rights of the Mahommedans, in ſhort, differed in nothing from thoſe claimed by the hereditary Rajahs; who, upon agreeing to perform military ſervice, and to pay an annual tribute, were left in the management of their reſpective dominions. As long as they performed the conditions of their dependence, the prince never interfered with the internal management of their countries; but when they failed in their duty, and he found himſelf poſſeſſed of power ſufficient to enforce his authority, either he ſtript them entirely of their territories, or made them pay ſeverely for their refractory conduct.

Their fears from the claims of the empire of Delhi.

To theſe diſadvantages at home, were added perpetual fears from abroad. The empire of Delhi had never relinquiſhed its pretenſions to the ſovereignty of the Decan; and nothing had hitherto prevented its enforcing its claims, but the want of power. The martial character of Ackbar had impreſſed with ſuch terror the mind of Mubarick Shaw, king of Chandez, that in the year 1563 he paid homage at Mendu, the capital of Malava, which the emperor had juſt reduced into the form of a province *. Though Ackbar always viewed the Decan "with an eye of conqueſt," an opportunity for hoſtilities did not offer itſelf for more than twenty years. In 1585, the brother of Murtiza Nizam, king of Golconda, flying to Agra, prevailed upon the emperor to order the Mogul governor of Malava to invade the Decan; but the princes of that country joining in confederacy againſt the invaders, the imperialiſts were obliged to retreat †. In the year 1588, the emperor diſpatched ambaſſadors to the four ſtates of the Decan, leſs to gain their favour than to learn their weakneſs ‡; and to derive, from their expected

* Dow, vol. ii. p. 238. † Ibid. p. 279. ‡ Ibid. p. 284.

refuſal

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refuſal of demands, which could not be granted, a pretence for war.

The Emperor Ackbar conquers two of the ſovereignties of the Decan.

The favourable opportunity ſo long ſought by Ackbar, preſented itſelf in the year 1593. A diſputed ſucceſſion had kindled a civil war in the kingdom of Berar, and one party applied for aid to the Mogul. A numerous army laid ſiege to Ahmednagur, the capital, in 1595; but the views of the emperor were, for this time, fruſtrated by powerful ſuccours ſent to the beſieged, by the other princes of the Decan. In the year 1600, Ackbar having taken Ahmednagur, the capital of Berar, by his generals, and Aſere, in the dominion of Chandez, in perſon, both kingdoms were reduced into the form of provinces ‡. Ibrahim Adil, king of Bijapour, terrified by the ſucceſs and vicinity of the Moguls, ſolicited peace, paid homage, and ſubjected himſelf to an annual tribute to the empire §; upon which Ackbar annexed his conqueſts, in the Decan, to his other royal titles, in a proclamation.

1605. Ackbar dying, is ſucceeded by his ſon Jehangire.

The emperor Ackbar dying in 1605, was ſucceeded in the throne of the Moguls, by his only ſurviving ſon Sultan Selim, who aſſumed, upon his acceſſion, the name of JEHANGIRE. During the firſt ſix years of the reign of this prince, the conqueſts of his father in the Decan remained undiſturbed and confirmed in his hands.

1611. The Rana over-runs the province of Chandez.

In 1611, Amar Sinka, chief of the Marattas, diſtinguiſhed by the title of Rana, ſetting ſuddenly on the Imperial troops in the province of Chandez, defeated them ‖; and an army ſent againſt him, under Sultan Purvez the emperor's ſecond ſon, retreated on account of diſſenſions among the nobles.

Jehangire moves towards the Decan.

Jehangire, alarmed at the progreſs of the Rana, moved the Imperial ſtandard towards Ajmere, diſpatched the famous Mohamet Chan to command the army, and, after him, his third ſon Sultan Churrum, known better by the name of Shaw Jehan. That prince entered the mountains, defeated the

The Rana reduced by Shaw Jehan.

‡ Dow, vol. ii. p. 296. § Ibid. ‖ Dow, vol. iii. p. 39.

Rana, in ſome indeciſive ſkirmiſhes, took his capital, forced him to throw himſelf at his feet, and impoſed upon him an annual tribute *. Five years after this pacification, Shaw Jehan had the good fortune to intimidate into ſubmiſſion the princes of the Decan, who had confederated againſt the empire. Some of thoſe princes attended him to the preſence of the emperor, and agreed to pay a ſettled tribute for the future †. In the year 1620, the kings of Golconda and Bijapour refuſing to pay the ſtipulated Peiſhcuſh, were again reduced to their dependence, by the arms of Shaw Jehan ‡, who forced them to pay the arrears of their tribute, which was ſettled at the annual ſum of fifty-five lacks of rupees §.

1616. Princes of the Decan engage to pay a tribute.

1620. But breaking the treaty, are again reduced.

Shaw Jehan, encouraged by his ſucceſs in the Decan, rebelled againſt his father; but being defeated by that prince, and afterwards by his elder brother, Sultan Purvez, he retired into the mountains of Ballagat, under the protection of his former enemies, particularly the Rana ||. Driven to extremity by his bad fortune, he ſolicited and obtained pardon from Jehangire; but he choſe to remain in the countries where he had taken refuge, till the death of his father delivered him, from his fears and placed him on the throne. During the latter years of the emperor Jehangire, the princes of the Decan, though impatient of their dependence on the court of Delhi, were reſtrained from hoſtilities, by the reputation of thoſe generals, whom the Moguls employed in the conquered kingdoms of Berar and Chandez.

1622. Shaw Jehan rebels.

1623. Being defeated, he flies to the Decan.

1624.

1625.

1628.

Shaw Jehan, having obtained the throne of Hindoſtan ſoon after the death of his father in 1628, became a great prince. His jealouſy of Chan Jehan Lodi, one of his principal Omrahs, who was deſcended from the Patan family, who formerly poſſeſſed the empire of Delhi, became the ſource of a new war in the Decan. Lodi,

1628. The emperor Shaw Jehan.

His jealouſy of Lodi occaſions a war in the Decan.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 41.
† Ibid. p. 50, 51.
‡ Ibid. p. 59, 60.
§ 687,500 l.
|| Dow, vol. iii. p. 77.

having

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having taken refuge in Dowlatabad, had the addreſs to unite, in one confederacy, againſt the empire, Adil Shaw king of Bijapour, Nizam Shaw ſovereign of Golconda, and Chuttub ul Dien, who ſtyled himſelf prince of Hydrabad and Tellingana. Shaw Jehan marched from Agra on the fourth of February 1631, with 300,000 men; and having arrived at the capital of the province of Chandez, he detached armies into the dominions of the confederates. Notwithſtanding the activity and abilities of Lodi, who commanded the forces of the allies, they found themſelves incapable of reſiſting the great force of the enemy. Inſtead of oppoſing that force in the field, they ſhut themſelves up in their fortreſſes. Shaw Jehan laid waſte the country; and a dreadful famine was added to the calamities of war. The vizier Aſiph Jâh, having ravaged with fire and ſword the kingdom of Bijapour, the ſovereign of that country came into terms, when nothing worthy of defence was left. The kings of Golconda and Tellingana ſued for peace, in the ſame ſubmiſſive terms. A peace was granted, upon their paying large ſums of money, with an annual tribute; the emperor keeping, by way of ſecurity, poſſeſſion of ſuch forts as had fallen into his hands *.

1631. Shaw Jehan, having marched againſt the princes of that country,

1632. forces them to a ſubmiſſion.

The war renewed.

Notwithſtanding this pacification, the war was renewed in the year 1633 by the Imperialiſts, under the conduct of Mohabet Chan, governor of Chandez; who, leading an army into Golconda, took the impregnable city of Dowlatabad, by the treachery of its governor, the ſon of Malleck Amber, who had ſo often ſignalized himſelf againſt the Moguls. The old king of Golconda was dead; an infant had ſucceeded to the throne, and he was ſent in triumph to Agra, whilſt his dominions were reduced into the form of a province, and annexed to the empire †. The further progreſs of Mohabet, who had reſolved to invade the dominions of Tellingana, was

Golconda conquered, and annexed to the empire.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 147. et paſſim. † Ibid. p. 149.

checked by the jealouſy of Sultan Suja, the emperor's ſecond ſon, who had joined the army ‡.

1636. Shaw Jehan reſolves to conquer the Decan.

In 1636 Shaw Jehan, having formed a reſolution to reduce entirely the Mahommedan ſovereignties of the Decan, marched from Agra, on the firſt of October; but he did not arrive at Dowlatabad till the latter end of the rainy ſeaſon of 1637. His forces were ſo numerous that he divided them into twelve armies, which he ſent, under twelve leaders, into the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana. War was, at once, in all parts of the dominions of the two kings. The open country was ſubmitted to fire and ſword; the garriſons which reſiſted were cut off to a man. One hundred and fifteen towns and caſtles were deſtroyed in the ſpace of one year. The confederates, driven to extremity, implored for peace, which was granted upon terms ſuitable to the neceſſity of their condition. They were re-eſtabliſhed by commiſſions from the emperor, as hereditary governors of their own dominions, upon agreeing to give an enormous annual tribute; the firſt payment to be made at the ſigning of the treaty. They were, beſides, to acknowledge the emperor and his ſucceſſors, lords paramount of their countries; and to deſign themſelves, in all their public deeds *, the humble ſlaves of the empire of the Moguls.

1637.

He ravages Bijapour and Tellingana.

1638. The two kings ſue for peace.

They are made hereditary governors,

and forced to declare themſelves the ſlaves of the empire.

To awe the tributaries into an obſervance of the treaty, Shaw Jehan occupied with garriſons all the places, which he had taken in Tellingana and Bijapour. Several years of tranquillity ſucceeded a war, which had effectually broken the ſpirit of the vanquiſhed. The tribute, which they had undertaken to pay, and which they durſt not evade, lay heavy upon their finances. They reſolved, therefore, to ſearch for reſources beyond the limits of their immediate dominions, and to extort from their tributaries thoſe ſums which they were obliged to pay to the empire †. The moſt wealthy, and

The emperor retains all the forts he had taken,

to ſupply the waſte made by the war.

‡ Dow, vol. iii. p. 142. et paſſim. * Ibid. † Ibid.

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The kings of Bijapour and Golconda resolve to attack the Carnatic.

consequently the most powerful, of those tributaries was the Rajah of the Carnatic; a country then better known by the name of Bigenagur. The Rajah had furnished a pretence for war, by refusing or neglecting to send, as tributary, the stipulated succours, upon the requisition of the king of Bijapour, when the emperor Shaw Jehan invaded his dominions *.

Ancient history of that country.

To explain this subject, it is necessary to recur to a period of more remote antiquity. When the Mahommedans penetrated into the Carnatic, under the conduct of Malleck Caffoor, in the year 1310 †, Bellaldeo, king of that country, was sovereign of the kingdoms of Canara, Mysore, and Travancore, together with Tanjore, Marava, and Madura ‡. To secure his wealth and family in the mountains, whilst he opposed the Mahommedans in the plain country, he built the city of Bigenagur §, about a hundred and eighty geometrical miles to the south-east from Goa ||.

Its dependence on the Mahommedans.

The new city, becoming the capital, communicated its name to the dominions of Bellaldeo; which, for some centuries, were distinguished by the title of the empire of Bigenagur. When the Decan was lost to the crown of Delhi in 1347, the dependence of the tributary Rajahs passed to the new sovereignties, erected by the Mogul mercenaries, who had revolted. The intermediate history of the Carnatic, between the revolt and the middle of the sixteenth century, is involved in darkness, which has not hitherto been penetrated. In the year 1565, Bigenagur was attacked, by the united force of the four Mahommedan princes of the Decan ¶. Having defeated the king in battle, they entered and plundered his capital; and though they did not retain their conquests, the distractions which followed their victory broke the empire to pieces, and divided the country among many chiefs, who assumed the indepen-

Attacked by the united force of the four princes of the Decan.

The kingdom of Bigenagur dissolved.

* Thevenot's Travels, part iii. &c.
† Dow, vol. i.
‡ De Faria, vol. i. p. 95, &c. vol. ii. p. 83—142.
§ Dow, vol. i.
|| Lettres Edifiantes, tom. xxiii.
¶ De Faria, p. 252.

dence of ſovereigns *. But notwithſtanding this temporary diſſolution of the empire, all its provinces ſeem to have been united under one king in 1597. This prince, whom we only know by the diſfigured name of Wentakapati, kept his court at Kande-Gheri †, three miles from the famous Pagoda at Tripeti, and fifty-three to the north-eaſt of Arcot. His anceſtors were ſaid to have comprehended within their dominions all the countries from Goa to Cape Comorin; but it appears that, lately, the Naigs of Travancore, Madura, Tanjore, and Gingee, had thrown off the yoke of their ſovereign, the king of the Carnatic ‡.

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Revolt of the Naigs of Madura, Tanjore, &c.

Nothing of importance is recorded concerning the Carnatic from this period forward, till its entire conqueſt by the Mahommedans, about the middle of the ſeventeenth century. The kings of Bijapour and Golconda, offended with the Rajah for refuſing ſuccours againſt Shaw Jehan, and deſirous to ſupply the waſte made by the war in their own treaſures by the wealth of the Carnatic, invaded that country with all their forces. The king of Bijapour, having entered it through the mountains, ſeized Velore, which was then the capital, and having taken Gingee and ſeveral other places of ſtrength, penetrated as far as Porto Novo and the cape of Negapatam. The famous Amir Jumla, who made afterwards ſo great a figure under the emperor Aurungzebe, led the troops of Golconda, and ſeized the provinces along the coaſt of Coromandel. The war began in 1650, and laſted ſix years, before the Mahommedans reduced the Carnatic and its dependencies, with all their ſtrong fortreſſes, into the form of a province.

Entire conqueſt of the Carnatic.

1656. In his expedition into the Carnatic, and the conqueſt of that country, Amir Jumla acquired much wealth for his maſter, but more for himſelf. Cuttub, wiſhing to poſſeſs a larger portion of

Quarrel between the king of Tellingana and Amir Jumla.

* Cæſar Frederic's Voy. apud Purchas, vol. ii. p. 17

† Vide Lettres Edifiantes, paſſim.—Jeſuit's Letters, p. 770—836.

‡ Epiſt. de Reb. Japan. et Indic. ab Hayo Collect. p. 774—803.

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the ſpoil, had raiſed the fears of Jumla, who prudently gained the friendſhip and claimed the protection of Aurungzebe, who commanded for his father Shaw Jehan in the neighbouring countries. When Jumla withdrew himſelf from the ſervice of Cuttub, that prince impriſoned his ſon, as the beſt hoſtage for his father's return. The influence of Jumla turned the arms of the Moguls againſt his old maſter. Mahommed, the eldeſt ſon of Aurungzebe, was entruſted with the management of this war; a brave, a haughty, and an obſtinate youth, not to be ſwayed from his purpoſe, either by argument or fear. He entered the dominions of Cuttub, who inſtantly paid the arrears of his tribute, and releaſed the ſon of Jumla; but the wealth of that lord he ſtill retained. Mahommed ſtormed Hydrabad. He defeated Cuttub before the old city of Golconda. Cuttub threw himſelf in vain at the feet of the victor, till he produced his daughter Rizia. Her beauty ſoftened the rigour of Mahommed; and a peace was concluded which ſcarce left any thing but the title of prince to the unfortunate Cuttub *.

Jumla takes refuge with Aurungzebe.

War, on his account, againſt the king,

who is ſtript of every thing but the title of prince.

1557, War with Bijapour,

Whilſt the ſovereign of Tellingana was reduced to this abject condition, a ſimilar fate hovered over the head of the king of Bijapour. Upon the death of Adil Shaw, his ſon, without aſking the permiſſion of his lord paramount, mounted his father's throne. This conduct was highly reſented by Shaw Jehan, who conſidered Bijapour as an appendage of his empire. Jumla, who had been appointed viſier, was ordered with an army to depoſe the ſon of Adil. Aurungzebe, who commanded in the province of Chandez, joined the viſier with his forces. That prince took the ſtrong city of Bider by aſſault, where he found all the wealth of Bijapour. He defeated the young king before Kilburga; he beſieged and took the place by aſſault. The young king threw himſelf at the feet of the victor, who permitted him to remain governor of his own domi-

reduced to the ſame abject condition.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 205—206.

nions, upon paying the expences of the war, together with a ſettled annual tribute, amounting to 1,875,000 l. of our money; and, to ſecure the allegiance and tribute of Bijapour, Mogul garriſons were placed in all the ſtrong places within the kingdom *. Aurungzebe had ſettled the affairs of the Decan with ſuch prudence and ability that the ſouthern provinces remained quiet under the government of his ſecond ſon Mahommed Mauzim, during the civil wars, which ended in placing him on the throne of the Moguls.

1660. Wretched ſtate of Golconda or Tellingana.

At this period of the hiſtory of the Decan, we are left to wander without a guide, or to the uncertain light furniſhed by travellers, who had neither leiſure, nor, perhaps, abilities to inquire into paſt revolutions. The peace concluded with Mahommed, the ſon of Aurungzebe, in 1656, had been ſo humiliating and unfavourable to the kingdom of Tellingana, that the monarch was ſtript of authority in his own dominions, and his country expoſed to invaſion. The ambaſſador of Aurungzebe, at the court of his tributary, aſſumed the ſtate, and poſſeſſed the power of a ſovereign. He commanded, threatened, inflicted puniſhments, gave paſs-ports, without either meaſure or fear of controul. The ſpirits of Cuttub having fallen with the loſs of his authority, he abandoned the reins of government, and ſhut himſelf up in his palace; being unwilling to expoſe to public view that wretched figure, a king deprived of all influence and power. This ſeclusion of the monarch brought diſtreſs upon his people. The tyranny of the nobles was without controul; the additional impoſts, on account of the heavy tribute to the Mogul, the diſadvantages of a government which oppreſſed, without being able to protect, the ſubject, had rendered the people melancholy and diſcontented, "breathing after nothing but the juſt, at leaſt firm and equal government of Aurungzebe †." The kingdom of Bijapour had been reduced to the ſame wretched ſtate

The prince ſtript of his authority.

1667. The Mogul ambaſſador commands in every thing.

The king abandons the reins of government.

Diſtreſs of the people.

They wiſh for a total conqueſt.

Bijapour in the ſame wretched condition.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 207, 208, 209.

† Bernier's Hiſt. of the Mogul Empire, p. 60.

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the ſpoil, had raiſed the fears of Jumla, who prudently gained the friendſhip and claimed the protection of Aurungzebe, who commanded for his father Shaw Jehan in the neighbouring countries. When Jumla withdrew himſelf from the ſervice of Cuttub, that prince impriſoned his ſon, as the beſt hoſtage for his father's return. The influence of Jumla turned the arms of the Moguls againſt his old maſter. Mahommed, the eldeſt ſon of Aurungzebe, was entruſted with the management of this war; a brave, a haughty, and an obſtinate youth, not to be ſwayed from his purpoſe, either by argument or fear. He entered the dominions of Cuttub, who inſtantly paid the arrears of his tribute, and releaſed the ſon of Jumla; but the wealth of that lord he ſtill retained. Mahommed ſtormed Hydrabad. He defeated Cuttub before the old city of Golconda. Cuttub threw himſelf in vain at the feet of the victor, till he produced his daughter Rizia. Her beauty ſoftened the rigour of Mahommed; and a peace was concluded which ſcarce left any thing but the title of prince to the unfortunate Cuttub *.

Jumla takes refuge with Aurungzebe.

War, on his account, againſt the king,

who is ſtript of every thing but the title of prince.

1557, War with Bijapour,

Whilſt the ſovereign of Tellingana was reduced to this abject condition, a ſimilar fate hovered over the head of the king of Bijapour. Upon the death of Adil Shaw, his ſon, without aſking the permiſſion of his lord paramount, mounted his father's throne. This conduct was highly reſented by Shaw Jehan, who conſidered Bijapour as an appendage of his empire. Jumla, who had been appointed viſier, was ordered with an army to depoſe the ſon of Adil. Aurungzebe, who commanded in the province of Chandez, joined the viſier with his forces. That prince took the ſtrong city of Bider by aſſault, where he found all the wealth of Bijapour. He defeated the young king before Kilburga; he beſieged and took the place by aſſault. The young king threw himſelf at the feet of the victor, who permitted him to remain governor of his own domi-

reduced to the ſame abject condition.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 205—206.

nions, upon paying the expences of the war, together with a ſettled annual tribute, amounting to 1,875,000 l. of our money; and, to ſecure the allegiance and tribute of Bijapour, Mogul garriſons were placed in all the ſtrong places within the kingdom *. Aurungzebe had ſettled the affairs of the Decan with ſuch prudence and ability that the ſouthern provinces remained quiet under the government of his ſecond ſon Mahommed Mauzim, during the civil wars, which ended in placing him on the throne of the Moguls.

1660. Wretched ſtate of Golconda or Tellingana.

At this period of the hiſtory of the Decan, we are left to wander without a guide, or to the uncertain light furniſhed by travellers, who had neither leiſure, nor, perhaps, abilities to inquire into paſt revolutions. The peace concluded with Mahommed, the ſon of Aurungzebe, in 1656, had been ſo humiliating and unfavourable to the kingdom of Tellingana, that the monarch was ſtript of authority in his own dominions, and his country expoſed to invaſion. The ambaſſador of Aurungzebe, at the court of his tributary, aſſumed the ſtate, and poſſeſſed the power of a ſovereign. He commanded, threatened, inflicted puniſhments, gave paſs-ports, without either meaſure or fear of controul. The ſpirits of Cuttub having fallen with the loſs of his authority, he abandoned the reins of government, and ſhut himſelf up in his palace; being unwilling to expoſe to public view that wretched figure, a king deprived of all influence and power. This ſecluſion of the monarch brought diſtreſs upon his people. The tyranny of the nobles was without controul; the additional impoſts, on account of the heavy tribute to the Mogul, the diſadvantages of a government which oppreſſed, without being able to protect, the ſubject, had rendered the people melancholy and diſcontented, "breathing after nothing but the juſt, at leaſt firm and equal government of Aurungzebe †." The kingdom of Bijapour had been reduced to the ſame wretched ſtate

The prince ſtript of his authority.

1667. The Mogul ambaſſador commands in every thing.

The king abandons the reins of government.

Diſtreſs of the people.

They wiſh for a total conqueſt.

Bijapour in the ſame wretched condition.

* Dow, vol. iii. p. 207, 208, 209.

† Bernier's Hiſt. of the Mogul Empire, p. 60.

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of dependence in the year 1657, retaining nothing but the name of a ſtate; its ſtrong-holds in the poſſeſſion of the Moguls; and the country, beſides the uſual revenue paid to its prince, groaning under a tribute of near two millions ſterling, no part of which ever returned.

1667. Bijapour makes a feeble effort for independence.

In 1667, Adil *, the king of Bijapour, made a feeble effort to extricate himſelf from the yoke of the Moguls, and the unſupportable tribute which he paid. Defeated in the field, and beſieged in his capital by Dilêre Chan the Imperial general, he was on the point of ſurrendering, when the jealouſy which Shaw Allum, the eldeſt ſon of Aurungzebe, entertained againſt Dilêre, ſaved the unfortunate Adil, for the time, from deſtruction †. But the peace which ſucceeded threw him back into his former intolerable condition, under which his kingdom languiſhed, till it was relieved, near twenty years after, by an abſolute conqueſt. Aurungzebe, more to keep his army in action, than on account of any freſh efforts made by the wretched Adil, to render himſelf free, deprived him, in the year 1686, of the ſhadow of ſovereignty which he had left him near thirty years before. Golconda ſhared the ſame fate in 1687. Both kings being brought priſoners to the Imperial camp, their kingdoms were annexed, as provinces, to the empire.

1686. Abſolute conqueſt of Bijapour,

1687. and Golconda.

* This was the general name of the whole Mahommedan race, who reigned at Bijapour.

† Dow, vol. iii. p. 385, 386.

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A Summary of the Hiſtory of the Carnatic and its Dependencies, from 1686 *to* 1756.

THE conqueſt of the kingdoms of Bijapour and Golconda, together with their dependencies, inveſted Aurungzebe with the ſovereignty of the whole *peninſula*, as far as Cape Comorin; ſo that his empire had no other boundary, but the ocean, towards the ſouth. The petty ſtates and provinces of the Decan were either tributary or ſubject to one or other of thoſe kings, whom he had ſubdued *; and, by the right of abſolute conqueſt, he became the heir of the allegiance of their dependents and ſubjects. There were ſome Rajahs, in the vaſt mountains, which ſeparate the two coaſts, who ſtill governed their own people †; yet it is doubtful, whether they owed their ſecurity more to the inacceſſibleneſs, than to the poverty of their dominions. The princes, who poſſeſſed the plain country, had been greater objects of plunder, and had leſs the means of defence. Where they happened to be near the ſeat of the governments eſtabliſhed by the conquerors, they were ſometimes deprived of all authority in their dominions, which were reduced to the form of provinces. Where they lay at a diſtance, they were permitted to govern their people, upon paying a ſettled tribute, performing military ſervice, and owning themſelves, in all public deeds, dependents and ſubjects.

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The conqueſt of Bijapour and Golconda inveſted Aurungzebe with the ſovereignty of the Decan.

Only ſome petty Rajahs remained independent in the mountains.

The tenure of the Rajahs, who poſſeſſed the plain country.

* Harris, vol. ii, p. 650.

† Ibid.

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Tranquillity in the Decan.

During the remaining part of the reign of Aurungzebe, the Decan enjoyed its proportion of that regular and firm government, which the great talents and authority of that prince had eſtabliſhed, in his extenſive dominions. He ſeems to have paſſed the greateſt portion of his time, within the limits or on the frontiers of his new conqueſts; and, from a jealouſy of the ambition of his ſons, to have ſpent his old age in the field. On the 21ſt of February 1707, he died at Ahmednagur, in the province of Dowlatabad, after he had lived ninety and reigned fifty lunar years. Imitating the Mahommedan kings of Golconda, who, laying claim to the ſovereignty of all the Decan, had aſſumed the title of Nizam-ul-Muluch, or "Regulators of the Country," he dignified his governor-general of the ſouthern provinces with that pompous name; and his youngeſt ſon Mahommed Cambuckſh appears to have enjoyed it at his death.

1707. Death of Aurungzebe.

His youngeſt ſon Nizam, at his death.

The death of Aurungzebe opened a freſh ſcene of conteſt for the throne of the Moguls. His eldeſt ſon, Mahommed Mauzim, then between ſeventy and eighty years of age, having defeated Azim Shaw the ſecond ſon, who was ſixty-ſeven, aſſumed the imperial dignity, under the title of Bahâder Shaw ‡. Soon after the acceſſion of this prince, he marched to the Decan; and defeating his youngeſt brother, who had acted as Nizam or governor general of that country, took him priſoner in Hydrabad, where he died of his wounds.

1707. Mahommed Mauzim mounts the throne, by the name of Bahâder Shaw.

He defeats and takes the Nizam.

Upon the death of Bahader Shaw in the year 1712, his eldeſt ſon, Jehandar Shaw, having, by the aid of Zulfukar Chan, overcome his brothers, mounted the throne. But, being murdered by the famous Seids, within the year, he was ſucceeded by his nephew, the ſon of Azim-ul-Shaw, who aſſumed the title of Mahommed Ferochſere. In the reign of this prince, Cutulich Chan, better known to Europeans by the title of his office, the Nizam, ſeems to have obtained the Su-

1712. Jehandar Shaw ſucceeds his father.

But is murdered by the famous Seids.

Succeeded by his nephew, Ferochſere.

‡ Gemelli, p. 220. Dow's Hiſtory of the Decline of the Moguls.

bahſhip

bahſhip of the Decan, upon the death or removal of Daôod Chan; and this government, or rather ſovereignty, he held for more than thirty years. Ferochſere, after a reign of ſix years, being confined and murdered by the brothers, who had raiſed him to the throne, was ſucceſſively followed by two other unfortunate princes of the race of Aurungzebe §. The firſt of theſe had ſcarcely taſted of royalty, before he fell a ſacrifice to the jealouſy and ambition of the faction, who had placed him on the throne; and the ſecond may, perhaps, be ſaid to have only eſcaped the hands of the aſſaſſin, by dying a natural death, a few days after his acceſſion †.

who is alſo murdered.

Mahommed, the ſon of Jehan Shaw, grandſon of Bahader Shaw, and great-grandſon of Aurungzebe, mounted the throne of Delhi, in the year 1718. Having cut off the two Seids, who had raiſed, dethroned, and murdered ſo many princes, inſtead of endeavouring to reſtore the vigour, which the empire had loſt, he reſigned himſelf to indolence and the enervating pleaſures of the Haram. An unſettled ſucceſſion, and the confuſions ariſing from ſo many revolutions, encouraged the Nabobs of the remote provinces to pay little attention to the mandates of a government, which poſſeſſed neither ſteadineſs nor ſtrength to enforce its own commands. The moſt powerful, the moſt artful, and, perhaps, the moſt ambitious of thoſe governors, was the Nizam, who had, for ſeveral years, commanded all the provinces of the Decan. Being ſenſible of the debility of the empire, he maintained a great ſtanding army, under pretence of awing the Marattas; but his real deſign ſeems to have been, to found an independent kingdom for himſelf, in the ſouthern provinces, after the example of Haſſen Caco Bemini, who mounted a throne at Kilburga, in 1347 ‡.

1718. Mahommed Shaw.

His indolence.

The confuſions attending revolutions encourage the governors of provinces to render themſelves independent; particularly the Nizam of the Decan.

§ Raffeih-ul-Dirjat and Raffeih-ul-Dowlat.

† Dow's Decline of the Mogul Empire, p. 4.

‡ Dow's Decline of the Mogul Empire, p. 7.

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His designs upon royalty.

The Nizam, though bent upon royalty, was too prudent to break forth into open rebellion, till time and circumſtances ſhould render the power of the declining empire ſtill leſs formidable. He, therefore, preferred art to force. Having failed in his ſchemes of becoming ſole miniſter to Mahommed, he invited the famous Nadir Shaw to Hindoſtan. The misfortunes, diſtreſſes, and calamities, which that fierce invader brought upon an empire already haſtening to its decline, are foreign to the purpoſe of the preſent diſquiſition. The artifice of the Nizam ſucceeded to the utmoſt extent of his deſign. When Nadir Shaw evacuated Hindoſtan, the management of affairs fell entirely into his hands. He nominated his creatures to the governments of the various provinces. He continued the Vizir, as he was connected with his family by double ties of affinity; and he raiſed his own ſon, Ghazi-ul-dien Chan, whom he had left in the government of the Decan, to the office of captain-general of the Imperial armies. Without the name, he poſſeſſed the power of king, whilſt the indolent Mahommed languiſhed under the faded enſigns of deſpiſed royalty *.

1738. He invites Nadir Shaw.

1739. Nizam poſſeſſed of the whole power of the Empire.

Revolutions in the Carnatic.

Whilſt the Nizam carried every thing before him at Delhi, ſome revolutions in the Carnatic, which had partly ſprung from his own intrigues, turned his eyes towards his government, on which that province of the empire was immediately dependent. To explain the cauſes of thoſe revolutions, which formed the foundation of the power and influence of the Britiſh nation in Hindoſtan, we muſt recur to facts, further back in point of time, than ſome of thoſe already related.

A ſhort account of the Carnatic, ſince it became ſubject to the Empire.

The Nizam or Viceroy of the Decan, being accountable to the empire for the whole government of that extenſive country, was inveſted with a power of appointing deputies in the various provinces.

* Dow's Decline, paſſim.

It

It appears, however, that Aurungzebe had retained, during his reign, that prerogative in his own hands, with reſpect to the Carnatic. The firſt Nabob he appointed was Zulfukar Chan, who afterwards obtained the high office of Buckſhi, or paymaſter-general of the forces, under the Emperor Bahader Shaw. Zulfukar was ſucceeded in the government of the Carnatic by Daood Chan. In the year 1710, Sadatulla Chan obtained the Nabobſhip, which he held, with reputation, till his death in 1732†. Having no iſſue male, he adopted the two ſons of his brother; Dooſt Ali, who ſucceeded him in the Nabobſhip; and Bâkir Ali, whom he had appointed to the government of Velore, which had been the capital, when the province was conquered by the kings of Bijapour and Golconda. When Dooſt Ali acceded to the government, upon the death of his uncle Sadatulla, his ſon Sipadar Ali was arrived at man's eſtate; and, to ſtrengthen the ties of blood by thoſe of affinity, he gave one of his daughters to his nephew, Mortaz Ali, the ſon of Bakir Ali; and another to Chunder-Saheb, a near but more diſtant relation.

Some Gentoo chiefs left in poſſeſſion of their native territories.

In the Carnatic, as well as in every province of the Mogul empire, the conquerors had left, in poſſeſſion of their territories, ſeveral Rajahs and petty chiefs, who, upon paying an annual tribute, and owning themſelves ſubjects, were permitted, not only to govern their people, but even to entertain a ſtanding force, to add authority and dignity to their government. The moſt conſiderable of thoſe dependent chieftains, were the Rajahs, or rather the Naigs *, of Tritchinopoly and Tanjore. The chief of the former dying in the year 1736, a diſpute aroſe about the ſucceſſion; and, to ſettle it, the Nabob ſent an army, under the conduct of his ſon Sipadar Ali, and his ſon-in-law and relation Chunder Saib. The latter, having ſeized the capital by a ſtratagem, extinguiſhed the power of the natives; and, having aſſumed the government in his own per-

Tritchinopoly ſeized, and its native government extinguiſhed.

Held by Chunder Saib.

† Orme, vol. i. p. 37.

* Epiſt. de Reb. Japan. & Indic. ab Hayo collect. p. 774—803.

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son, but in the name of the Nabob, fortified himself against the power of a master, whose authority he still pretended to own †.

The Nabob, Dooſt Ali, defeated and slain by the Marattas.

Things remained in a state of tranquillity, for three years; but in 1740, new and dangerous enemies appeared upon the frontiers of the Carnatic. These were the Marattas, being privately urged against Dooſt Ali by the Nizam, whom the troubles of the empire and an attention to the preservation of the power, which he had acquired in the management of affairs, had detained, for several years, at Delhi. Dooſt Ali, endeavouring to oppose the enemy in the passes of Damal-cherri, was defeated and slain, together with his son Hassen-Ali. The eldest son of the Nabob, Sipadar Ali, who had not been present in the action, retired to Vellore; and Chunder Saib, who had entertained hopes of the government, shut himself up in Tritchinopoly. The enemy ravaged the country, without controul; till they were bribed to retreat by Sipadar Ali, with the promise of one hundred lacks, to be paid at stated times. As a security for the payment of this enormous sum, it was privately stipulated, that they should be put in possession of the fort and territory of Tritchinopoly, which Chunder-Saib then held, as a kind of property ‡.

1740. May 20th.

The Marattas bribed to retreat.

They return and take Tritchinopoly.

Six months after their retreat, the Marattas returned to the Carnatic, in consequence of the private article in the treaty with Sipadar Ali, which had ceded to them Tritchinopoly. Chunder-Saib, having sustained a siege of three months, was obliged to surrender at discretion, on the 26th of March 1741. Sipadar Ali, in dread of the Nizam, the determined enemy of all authority assumed without his consent, took up his residence at Vellore, then possessed by his cousin Mortaz Ali, as the heir of his father Bakir Ali. The Nabob, by assessing Mortaz Ali, with a part of the ransom due to the Marattas, had imprudently alarmed the avarice and rouzed the resentment of that profligate man. The consequence was, that on

† Orme, vol. i. p. 38. ‡ Dow's Decline of the Moguls, p. 31.

the

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the 2d of October 1742, the unfortunate Sipadar Ali was aſſaſſinated, by the procurement of Mortaz Ali, who proclaimed himſelf Nabob of the Carnatic. But a general mutiny ariſing, the murderer was obliged to fly, in a female dreſs; and Mahommed, the ſon of Sipadar Ali, though ſtill an infant, was raiſed to the government †.

1742. Sipadar Ali aſſaſſinated.

The Nizam, rouſed, at length, by theſe revolutions, quitted Delhi, and arrived at Hydrabad, the ſeat of his government. Marching from that city, with a powerful army, he entered the Carnatic, ſeized the perſon of Mahommed, nominated Abdalla Chan, general of his forces, Nabob of Arcot, obtained poſſeſſion of the city of Tritchinopoly, by means of a ſum of money paid to the Marattas; and entirely ſettled the affairs of the Carnatic, without drawing the ſword §. The new Nabob, having left one of his dependents in the government, accompanied the Nizam to Golconda. Preparing to return in March 1744, he was found dead in his bed. Anwar-ul-dien, father to the preſent Nabob, who ſucceeded Abdalla in his government, has been accuſed, by ſome malicious writers, of having been acceſſary to a death, by which he profited. The aſperſion ſeems to have had its ſole foundation in the idle tales of a ſuſpicious vulgar. Theſe tales, however, have been ſince impoſed upon the world, as matters of fact, by the enemies of the family of Anwar-ul-dien; who, either ſwayed by intereſt, hired by party, or warped by paſſion, revenge themſelves of the living, by raking up the aſhes of the dead.

1743. Nizam marches into the Carnatic.

Appoints Abdalla to the Nabobſhip.

Auguſt.

1744. Who dies, and is ſucceeded by Anwar-ul-dien.

Anwar-ul-dien was far advanced in years, when he received the government of Arcot, from the hands of the Nizam. To advantages, ſeldom found among thoſe Mahommedans, who make a figure in the courts of the Eaſt, he added nobility of birth, and experience and valour in war. His family, lineally ſprung from

Some account of the family and life of the new Nabob.

† Dow's Decline of the Moguls, p. 33. Orme, vol. i. p. 56.

§ Dow and Orme, ubi ſupra.

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Omar ‡, the firſt Caliph, had ſignalized themſelves in the ſervice of the princes of the Mogul race, before they deſcended from the mountains of Afganiſtân into the plains of India. His father, having diſtinguiſhed himſelf, by his erudition and piety, acquired the favour and experienced the munificence of the Emperor Aurungzebe †; who gave him a conſiderable eſtate, and conferred upon him the office of Duan of the province of Patna. He himſelf had paſſed, in the courſe of a long life, through various important truſts and public employments. He had ſucceſſively held the governments of Kurra-Jehanabad, Cambay, and Putlad; and he had been Nabob of the provinces of Yalore and Raja-Mundrum, for many years *.

The Nizam confers on him the guardianſhip of the ſon of Sipadar Ali,

The Nizam was ſo far from ſuſpecting Anwar-ul-dien of having been inſtrumental in the death of his predeceſſor, that he committed to his guardianſhip and care, Mahommed the young ſon of Sipadar Ali, the late Nabob. That youth, as the deſcendant of Sadatulla, was ſo much beloved in the provinces, which his family had ſo long governed, that the Nizam had probably deſigned to appoint him to the Nabobſhip after the death of Anwar-ul-dien, then in the decline of life. The Nabob arriving in his government, in the month of April 1744, placed Mahommed in the palace of Arcot, where he was treated with kindneſs, and maintained with ſplendor. He had ſcarce remained two months in that happy ſituation, when a band of diſcharged Patans, either by the procurement of Mortaz Ali, who had murdered his father, or rather exaſperated by affronts, received from Mahommed's attendants, put a period to his life, by aſſaſſinating him in the hall of public audience. The Nizam, ſoon after the death of Mahommed, inveſted Anwar-ul-dien with all the legal authorities of government, by ſending him a full and regular commiſſion

whom he treats with kindneſs, and maintains with magnificence.

1744. Anwar-ul-dien inveſted with all legal authorities as Nabob.

‡ Nabob's Account of his Family. † Orme, vol. i. p. 52. * Ibid. p. 53.

for the Nabobſhip of Arcot †, under the ſanction of the Court of Delhi §.

Facts relative to the dependent provinces.

Having explained the general ſtate of the Carnatic, and enumerated its general revolutions, it may not be improper to deduce, from former times, ſome facts relative to the dependent provinces, ſituated within its bounds. The country of Tritchinopoly with its capital, and Madura, as depending upon it, with its territory, though formerly tributary to the Mahommedans, had not fallen entirely into their hands, till the year 1736, as has been already related. The next, in ſituation and extent, is the province of Tanjore, which has been, of late, as much the ſource of altercation among party-writers, as it has been an object of conteſt between parties. A brief ſtate of the hiſtory of that country will throw light on a ſubject, which, though it has been much diſcuſſed, is hitherto little known.

Tritchinopoly. Madura. Tanjore.

Deſcription of that province.

The province of Tanjore forms the figure of a triangle, one ſide of which ſtretches itſelf for ſeventy miles, along the weſtern ſhore of the bay of Bengal. The river Coleroon, the name given to the largeſt branch of the Cavery, delineates the northern boundaries; and its limits are terminated on the ſouth, partly by the ſea, beyond Cape Negapatam, and partly by the country of the two Marawars. Near the weſtern angle, within twenty miles of Tritchinopoly, is ſituated the capital, bearing the name of the country; which, like many other places of ſtrength in India, was originally no more than a fortified Pagoda. The river Cavery, riſing in the mountains of Malabar, and after a courſe of four hundred miles, paſſing near Tritchinopoly, is divided by art, and not by nature, into numerous branches, and having watered the country, falls, by many mouths, into the bay of Bengal. This circumſtance, which gives fertility to Tanjore, muſt have always rendered it dependent on its neighbours; as the artificial bank, near Coiladdy, which diverts the Cavery from

† Orme, vol. i. p. 60. § Nabob's Papers, paſſim.

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its natural courſe, into other channels, lies beyond the limits of the province.

Subject to the king of the Carnatic.

Governed by a Naig,

The province of Tanjore formed anciently a part of the extenſive kingdom of Bigenagur, a name impoſed upon the Carnatic, in the fourteenth century of our æra *. An inferior officer, by the title of Naig, governed the country. When the power of the kingdom of Bigenagur was entirely broken, and its capital taken, towards the end of the ſixteenth century †, by the united force of the Mahommedan princes of the Decan, the Naig of Tanjore, together with thoſe of Madura, Tritchinopoly, and Gingee, revolted from their ancient lord ‡. But in the year 1597, we find the provinces of Bigenagur united again under one monarch §; ſo that the revolted Naigs muſt either have been entirely reduced, or, at leaſt, have become tributary to their former maſter.

who revolts about the year 1570.

1597. But is either reduced entirely, or made tributary.

1650. The king of Bijapour conquers the Carnatic,

In this ſtate Tanjore ſeems to have remained, till the entire reduction of the Carnatic, by the Mahommedan kings of Bijapour and Golconda, in the year 1650 ‖. Adil Shaw, croſſing the mountains with his army, ſeized Vellore, and then Kande-gheri, the capital, together with the ſtrong fortreſs of Gingee. Purſuing his conqueſts, he took all the places of ſtrength, between Gingee and the Coleroon, and, paſſing that river, ſeized Tanjore, reducing the whole country, from Porto Novo to Cape Negapatam ¶.

together with Tanjore.

The Naigs of Tanjore become feudatories.

Notwithſtanding this conqueſt, the Naigs ſeem to have been indulged, as feudatories, with the poſſeſſion of their former governments; which, by the ſame tenure, they tranſmitted to their poſterity. When Aurungzebe conquered the kingdoms of Bijapour and Golconda, in the years 1686 and 1687, the allegiance of their de-

* Dow, vol. i.

† About the year 1565.

‡ Epiſt. de Reb. Japan. & Indic. ab Hayo collect. p. 774 803, & ſeq.

§ Vide Jeſuits Epiſtles, paſſim.

‖ The war continued till 1656. Dow, vol. iii.

¶ Thevenot, part 2, p. 92, &c. Tavernier, part 2, p. 66. Bernier, part 2, &c. &c.

pendents,

pendents, and, among others, that of the Naig of Tanjore, was or ought to have been transferred to the empire of the Moguls.

1696. Tanjore ſeized by Ecko-jî, a Maratta adventurer.

Some time after the reduction of the kingdom of Bijapour, one Ecko-jî, and other Marattas, ſervants to the dethroned king, fled, with a few troops, from the perſecution of the Moguls, and eſtabliſhed themſelves at Gingee, in the Carnatic. Some differences ſubſiſting, at that time between Wagira, the Naig of Tanjore, and Trimul, Naig of Madura and Tritchinopoly, the former applied to Ecko jî for aſſiſtance. But the treacherous Maratta ſeized the government, which he had been called to defend. The unfortunate Wagira was forced to fly and to take refuge in Seringpatnam, the capital of Myſore *. This revolution, in the government of Tanjore, happened about the year 1696 †.

He treacherouſly expels the former Naig.

He draws on himſelf the vengeance of the Moguls.

Ecko-jî, not content with his acquiſition of Tanjore, began to extend his territories, and to give aſſiſtance to rebels, againſt the Empire ‡, though he owned himſelf its ſubject. His death, which happened about the year 1702, transferred the vengeance, preparing for him by the Moguls, to his ſon and ſucceſſor, Shaw-jî or Sahu-ji. Aurungzebe, reſolving to bring the Carnatic to an entire ſubjection to his government, ordered his youngeſt ſon Mahommed Cambuckſh, Aſſad Châن, who became Vizir in the next reign, and Zulfukar Châن, whom he appointed Nabob of the Carnatic, to march into that province, to appeaſe tumults, to expel the Marattas, and to eſtabliſh regular government in the country. The Moguls, having taken Gingee, Velore, and all other places of ſtrength to the north of the Coleroon, Zulfukar Châن, with a part of the army, carried the war into Tanjore. Shaw-jî, with his capital, fell

* Wagira had a ſon Chimgul Muldaſs, whoſe ſon, the grandſon of Wagira, the expelled Naig, is ſtill living in, or near, Seringapatnam.

† Authentic MS. Account of Tanjore, taken on the ſpot, and now in the hands of the Author of this Diſquiſition.

‡ Culnamma of Zulfukar Cawn. Nabob's Papers, vol. i. p. 41.

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into the hands of Zulfukar. But a fortunate incident reſtored him not only to his liberty, but to his government *.

Death of Aurungzebe occaſions a civil war.

The death of Aurungzebe, which happened at Ahmednagur, on the 7th of February 1707, involved the Empire in a civil war. Two of his ſons Mahommed Mauzim, who afterwards aſſumed the title of Bahadar Shaw, and Mahommed Azem, diſputing for the ſucceſſion, took the field with two powerful armies. Zulfukar Chan, Nabob of the Carnatic, favoured the claim of Mauzim, who raiſed him to the office of Buckſhi, or paymaſter-general of the forces, when he acquired poſſeſſion of the throne †. The Nabob, willing to join the arms of his patron, reſolved to releaſe Shaw-jî, and to replace him in his government, upon paying large preſents to himſelf, as well as conſiderable ſums to the State.

Tanjore reſtored to its Naig.

The oſtenſible conditions, on which Shaw-jî was reſtored, are contained in a paper, already in the hands of the Public ‡. He agreed to pay, according to the cuſtom of India, the expences of the war, and an annual tribute of thirty lacks of rupees §; twenty lacks to be paid down at the ſigning of the agreement, together with jewels and elephants. He was, at the ſame time, obliged to deliver up all the forts and diſtricts, which he had taken from his neighbours. In conſideration of the ſubmiſſion, tribute, and preſents of Shaw-ji, he was, for the firſt time, dignified with the title of Rajah; an honour conferred upon him, by the Emperor. He received, beſides, a legal confirmation of the Zemindary of Tanjore ‖, which he had wreſted, by treachery, from the former Naig.

The conditions on which it was reſtored.

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 70.

† Gemelli.

‡ Culnamma, Nabob's Papers, vol. i. Appendix.

§ 375,000 l.

‖ Culnamma, ubi ſupra.

MS. Hiſtory of the Revolutions of Tanjore. In all the countries and provinces of India, it is a fixed cuſtom, among the great Rajahs, to put the title of Rajah on their chops; but neither Ecko jî nor the other Maratta Naigs of Tanjore ever put that title on their chops. In the country of Tanjore, and even in the Naig's own family, from Ecko-jî to Tuljagee, who has been lately reſtored, their own people called them only Duans, or collectors of the revenue.

Though

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Though Shaw-jî, the eldeſt ſon of Ecko-jî, enjoyed the enſigns of government, he poſſeſſed not the whole territories of Tanjore. Theſe were divided between him and his brothers Shurfa-jî and Tucko-jî. Shaw-jî held the capital and its diſtrict; Shurfa-jî poſſeſſed Madeopatnam; and Tucko-jî, Punda Nellore. Upon the death of Shaw-jî, without iſſue, his brother Shurfa-jî obtained the title of Naig, and the dominion of Tanjore; but his brother Tucko-jî, by his intrigues, kindled the flames of a civil war. Both the brothers died ſoon after; Shurfa-jî, without lawful iſſue; but Tucko-jî left a ſon, Baba-Saib, who ſucceeded to the government of Tanjore. Baba-Saib did not long ſurvive his acceſſion to that dignity, and, having left no iſſue, and the ſon of his brother Nana, being ſtill an infant, his widow was dignified with the titles of government, whilſt Seid, the commander of the fort, poſſeſſed the whole power. But ſhe was ſoon diveſted of even the appearance of authority, and thrown into priſon. Seid raiſed a real or pretended ſon of Shurfa-jî, to the office of Naig; but that wretched figure ſoon fell a ſacrifice to the rage or convenience of his maker. Sahu-jee, the ſon of Tucko-jî, was then placed in the government; but either his own incapacity, or the jealouſy of Seid, deprived him of his authority. Seid ſent for Pretaupa-Sing, natural ſon of Tucko jî, who lived in a diſtreſſed condition at Madeopatnam, and placed him in the government, in the year 1741. One of the firſt acts of authority executed by Pretaupa-Sing, was the aſſaſſination of the man to whom he owed his elevation *.

Tanjore divided between the three ſons of Ecko-jî.

A diſputed ſucceſſion.

The internal troubles, ariſing from theſe diſputed ſucceſſions, did not prevent the perſons, who happened to be in poſſeſſion of the government, from paying regularly the tribute to the Nabob of Arcot, or from executing their duty, as feudatories of the empire. During the Nabobſhip of Daood Chan, and the long government of

The Naigs of Tanjore remain long obedient to the Nabobs of Arcot.

* Revolutions of Tanjore, MS.

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Sadatulla, they conducted themſelves, in every reſpect, as dutiful ſubjects †. In the Subahdarry of Dooſt-Ali, the Tanjorines exhibited a ſpirit of refractorineſs and diſobedience. He, therefore, ordered his ſon, Sipadar-Ali, to proceed, with a large force, againſt them. Having firſt broke down the mound near Coiladdy, which turns the waters of the Cavery, from their natural courſe, into the province of Tanjore, he marched into that country, ſeized the capital, impriſoned the Naig, placed the government in the hands of his own preceptor, Meer Aſſud, and garriſoned the place with a force, under the command of Sheik Lutfulla. But that officer, terrified by the defeat and death of the Nabob, Dooſt-Ali, which happened on the 20th of May 1740, reſtored Tanjore to its former maſters. When the Nizam came to ſettle the affairs of the Carnatic, in 1743, he ſent a detachment of his numerous army, under Abdulla, whom he had made Nabob of Arcot, to take Tanjore; but Pretaupa-Sing bought his peace with a ſum of money, upon agreeing to increaſe his annual tribute to fifty lacks of rupees ‡.

Tanjore taken from them by the Nabob Dooſt Ali.

They recover it at his death.

Recapitulation of facts, relative to the abſolute dependence of Tanjore,

The preceding chain of facts has, it is hoped, rendered more clear a ſubject hitherto very imperfectly underſtood. It appears, that the Mahommedans acquired that moſt indiſputable of all rights, the right of conqueſt, in a regular and ſolemn war, to the Carnatic and its dependencies. That the province of Tanjore had always been conſidered a diviſion of the Carnatic, and an appendage or rather a part of its ſovereignty. That the Naigs of that country had been originally the ſubjects of the kings of the Carnatic of the Indian race. That their allegiance had been transferred, by a particular as well as a general conqueſt, to the kings of Golconda and Bijapour. That the Moguls, as the conquerors of thoſe princes, acquired an undoubted general title to all their claims of dominion, over their dependents. That, in enforcing that title, they had acquired the ſtill

† Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 70.

‡ 625,000 l.

more

more inconteſtible right of particular conqueſt to the territory of Tanjore. That the preſent race of Rajahs obtained, by treachery, and not by war, poſſeſſion of that country, ſeveral years after the Moguls had acquired a right of conqueſt to the Carnatic and its dependencies. That the ſeizure of Tanjore by Ecko-jî was conſidered, as it actually was, an invaſion of the rights of the Moguls. That the emperor, in aſſerting thoſe rights, ſtript the ſon of Ecko-jî of his government. That his receiving back that government, upon the conditions on which it was received, was eſtabliſhing a conſtitution and tenure, rendering him, his poſterity and ſucceſſors, vaſſals of the empire. That, by breaking the conditions upon which that conſtitution and that tenure were founded, ſubſequent Rajahs had been ſubjected to puniſhments, to fines and even to deprivation. That they owed the continuance of their authority and government to favourable accidents, and neither to any acquieſcence in their rights, or opinion of their power.

on the empire of the Moguls.

It has, upon the whole, appeared, that the Rajahs of Tanjore of the race of Ecko-jî were, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, feudatories, liable to loſe their territories to their ſovereign, upon any breach of their duty, as ſubjects. It has been ſhewn, that the emperor of the Moguls was their undoubted ſovereign, who governed them through the medium of his deputy, the Nabob of the Carnatic. It has been proved, that the emperor poſſeſſed various and irrefragable titles to their allegiance. That he had been lord paramount of their territories, before they wreſted them, by injuſtice and treachery, from the hereditary Naig. That he had acquired a freſh right to their duty, as ſubjects, in a regular war, which terminated in conqueſt. That they themſelves had placed that right beyond the power of cavil, in written teſtimonies of their "humiliation, ſubmiſſion, penitence, and dejection." That, whilſt they acknowledged the condition of ſubjects, they had performed their duty

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duty as ſuch, without murmuring, for more than thirty years. That, when they deviated from their obedience, they were deprived of their lands, and even ſubjected to corporal puniſhment. That they were ſo far from aſſuming the ſtate and independence of ſovereignty, that they ſolicited and obtained, from the emperor, the title of Rajah for their family; and that, by this act, they not only acknowledged their dependence on the empire, but likewiſe, that, neither by birth nor acquiſition, they had any right to that dignity.

The Mogul government the only acknowledged and effective ſovereignty in the Carnatic.

Such was the real ſtate of Tanjore in the year 1744, though ſome late writers, blinded by zeal, miſled by faction, or ſwayed by intereſt, have erected that province into a kingdom, and encircled the brows of its Naig with a crown. The truth is, that there was no acknowledged, no effective, no independent, no ſovereign power in the Carnatic, at that time, except the Mogul, who had delegated his authority, in a regular and legal manner, to the Nizam.

Anwar-uldien the legal repreſentative of that ſovereignty.

That viceroy, according to the conſtitution of the empire, had inveſted Anwar-ul-dien, in the ſame regular and legal manner, with the government of the province. All perſons of every nation, and of every degree, who held lands or purſued trade in that province, were therefore ſubject to his authority, according to the tenures, by which they held their poſſeſſion, or the privileges, by which they carried on their commerce. Being inveſted with all the authority of the crown, the Nabob had a right to enforce the performance of all the duties which ſubjects owe to the ſovereign power; and, in the execution of that high privilege, he naturally involved the prerogative of making peace and war. Every hoſtility, committed without his conſent, muſt, therefore, have been an act of rebellion.

State and tenure of the Engliſh Company in that country.

The ſervants of the Eaſt-India Company had not yet extended their ambition to the renown attainable by feats of arms. Confined within the circle of a few miles of a ſandy beach round Madras, the preſidency neither reated jealouſy, nor commanded reſpect. Though

they had been indulged with the privilege of fortifying themſelves, they had neglected that firſt of all duties, ſelf-defence. They had works, but ſuch as ſeemed rather built by chance, than deſign. They had baſtions, but they were placed contrary to all rule; and the curtain was no better than a long, unflanked garden-wall *. Ill-provided with implements of war, yet deſtitute of ſkill and even courage to uſe the few they poſſeſſed, they naturally truſted their protection to the Moguls, under whoſe government they had lived ſo long in ſecurity. They, therefore, congratulated, with ſincerity, Anwar-ul-dien, on his arrival in his government. They praiſed his valour, celebrated his wiſdom, and hoped every thing from his juſtice; and they thought themſelves favoured by Almighty God, by his ſending them ſo good and juſt a governor †.

Reflexions on the character and views of M. Dupleix.

The intriguing abilities of M. Dupleix, who governed for the French Eaſt-India Company at Pondicherry, had already begun to plan or to foreſee the diſturbances, which ſoon after followed, on the coaſt of Coromandel. The circumſcribed circle of commerce was too narrow for his talents, too confined for his ambition. Perceiving the declining ſtate of the empire of the Moguls, he wiſhed and hoped for a ſhare of its ſpoils. With a ſelf-ſufficieney, which is too often blended with good parts, he foreſaw no difficulties which he thought he could not ſurmount. Converſant in the character of the Indians, he had imbibed their ſpirit for management and intrigue; and, by combining the informations he had received from various quarters, he hoped to obtain a principal influence in the affairs of Hindoſtan. A deſire to gratify his exceſſive vanity had tinctured his mind with avarice; and the vehement demands of his ambition had unfettered his mind, from thoſe ties of ſincerity and honour, which bind more moderate men. But the paſſions, as well as the talents of M. Dupleix, lay hitherto concealed within the walls

* Commodore Barnet s Account.

† Rous's Appendix, No. I.

of

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of Pondicherry; where he brooded over his mighty ſchemes of conqueſt, with ſcarce three hundred men to defend the place.

War had been declared between Great Britain and France in 1744; but its operations were not extended to India, till the enſuing year. Some actions, which happened at ſea, like moſt rencounters on that element, were attended by no deciſive conſequence; and nothing was attempted by land, between the two nations, till

1746. The French take Madras.

September 1746. On the third of that month *, a body of French troops, under M. de la Bourdonnais, landed near Madras; and, on the tenth, the town ſurrendered, without killing a man to the enemy, and without loſing but five lives, and that by accident, within the walls.

Nabob beſieges the French in that place in vain.

The Nabob, who, as diſpoſer of peace and war in his own government, had forbidden hoſtilities by land, was ſo much offended at the capture of Madras, that he beſieged the place. The French, by a ſpirited effort, defeating his army at St. Thomè, drove them from the field; and, thus, gained the firſt deciſive advantage obtained by Europeans, againſt the troops of the Mogul empire, in the ſpace of one hundred years †.

1746. His troops take the field againſt them.

The Nabob, irritated at the defeat of his army, reſolved to recover the laurels, which his troops had loſt. The French, encouraged by their victory, determined to purſue their advantage, by attacking the Britiſh ſettlement of Fort St. David. Two bodies of the Mogul forces took the field, under the Nabob's two ſons. Theſe were Mapheus Chan, and Mahommed Ali; the latter deſtined by the Nizam and the court of Delhi, to ſucceed his father in the government of the Carnatic.

His two ſons defeat them, and ſave Fort St. David. December.

The firſt, ſetting upon a body of French, defeated them near Sadras ‡. The latter, with a ſtill more fortunate effort, ſurpriſed and routed their army on its march to beſiege Fort St. David. Their baggage, with ſome trophies of war, fell into the hands of the victor; and their whole force retreated, with diſgrace and loſs,

* Univerſal Hiſt. vol. x. p. 176. † Orme, vol. i. p. 76. ‡ Ibid. p. 79, 80.

to Pondicherry *. Another attempt on the ſettlement of Cuddalore, was diſappointed, by the determined adherence of the Nabob to the Company's cauſe †. To form a diverſion for the troops of the Carnatic, the French carried fire and ſword, from Madras, into the defenceleſs villages around. But, in this expedition, they loſt honour, and gained nothing but plunder. The Nabob's troops ſtill remained at Fort St. David; and the mind of that prince "was more exaſperated than before," againſt the French cauſe ‡.

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The French, in revenge, carry fire and ſword into the Carnatic.

Notwithſtanding theſe obvious, great, and deciſive ſervices rendered, by the Nabob, to the Company, his conduct has been much miſrepreſented by the prejudices of individuals and the malice of party. Some profligate writers, either inflamed by paſſion themſelves, or hired by others to inflame and deceive the public, have not ſcrupled to affirm, that Anwar-ul-dien was throughout INIMICAL § to the Britiſh nation. They ſay, that "he prohibited the Britiſh fleet from acting in the Carnatic:"—He was the governor of that province, and the guardian of its peace. "He permitted the French to take Madras:"—Yet he ſent a meſſenger to M. Dupleix "expreſſing his great ſurpriſe at the preſumption of the French in attacking Madras, and threatening to ſend his army thither, if the ſiege was not immediately raiſed ‖."—Finding that the town had been unexpectedly and even ſhamefully ſurrendered, he reſolved to retake it by force; and, being diſappointed, he gave that effectual aſſiſtance, which, by ſaving Fort St. David, preſerved the very exiſtence of the Company on the coaſt.—The ſame writers affirm, that the Nabob declined "to aſſiſt the Engliſh, in the defence of Fort St. David, till they had ſtipulated to pay the ex-

Party-writers confuted.

1747.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 83.—Univerſal Hiſt. vol. x.

† Ibid. p. 84.

‡ Ibid.

§ This awkward, unanalogical word ſeems to have been purloined from thoſe reſpectable bodies of men, the American Committees of Safety.

‖ Orme, vol. i. p. 68.

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pences of his army:"—Yet the authority, which they cite for this aſſertion, ſays, "the Nabob readily engaged to ſend his army to Fort St. David, on condition that the Engliſh would furniſh a *part of the expence* *:"—And why not? was not the war their own?

January. Gloomy ſtate of affairs on the coaſt.

The managers of the Company's affairs at home, having neglected to ſend any aſſiſtance whatſoever to their ſervants abroad †, their affairs wore a very gloomy aſpect, on the coaſt of Coromandel, in the beginning of the year 1747. The king's ſquadron, which had performed no ſervice of importance, in the preceding year, had quitted the coaſt on the 23d of Auguſt 1746; and there was no appearance of its return. The French, to ſeparate the Nabob from the Britiſh intereſt, had carried a deſtructive war into the defenceleſs parts of his dominions; while, at the ſame time, they endeavoured, by management, miſrepreſentation, intimidation, and preſents, to gain his neutrality. The tranquillity of his government was the great object of Anwar-ul-dien. Though the affairs of the Britiſh Company were not entirely deſperate, there was no probability, without aſſiſtance from Europe, of reſtoring them to their former proſperity. He, therefore, liſtened to the propoſals of the French; and, having received near 20,000 l. as an indemnification for loſſes ſuſtained, he concluded a treaty of peace, in which it was "expreſsly ſtipulated, that the French ſhould give no further moleſtation to the Britiſh at Fort St. David ‡." The French, faithleſs to their ſtipulation, prepared to attack that fort, in the beginning of March 1747 §; but they retreated, upon the appearance of the Britiſh ſquadron, which, being reinforced from Europe, had returned from Bengal ‖.

Nabob makes a peace, wherein he ſtipulates with the French,

not to moleſt the Engliſh.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 79.
† Ibid. p. 85.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. I. p. 13.
§ Ibid. p. 20.
‖ Orme, vol. i. p. 87.

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The Nabob, highly incenſed at the flagrant breach of a treaty ſo lately concluded, had already begun to make preparations for chaſtiſing the French *. His ſon Mahommed Ali, the preſent Nabob of the Carnatic, expreſſed that attachment, which he has uniformly exhibited, ever ſince, to the Britiſh cauſe. He affirmed, that it was the delay of the return of the ſquadron, that induced his father to conclude the treaty of neutrality. He was incenſed at the breach of it; and declared, that, "as the French had tranſgreſſed his orders, and proceeded againſt Fort St. David, he would chaſtiſe them, and ſend a force to aſſiſt the Britiſh, if they required it †." The preſidency of Fort St. David were ſo ſenſible of the ſincerity of Mahommed Ali, ſo grateful for his offered aſſiſtance, that, in the perſon of their preſident, they returned thanks, in words expreſſive of their thorough perſuaſion of his good intentions to ſerve the Britiſh nation ‡.

He is highly incenſed at their breach of that ſtipulation.

Uncommon attachment of Mahommed Ali to the Britiſh.

War ſuſpended.

During the remaining part of 1747, the war between the two Companies remained ſuſpended on the coaſt of Coromandel. The ſquadron, under Commodore Griffin, being ſuperior to that of the French, and the force at Pondicherry too weak to encounter the united power of the Nabob and the Company, both ſides remained quiet, expecting ſuccours from Europe. The ſuccours, however, did not arrive; and more than one half of the year 1748 paſſed in the ſame ſtate of ſuſpended hoſtilities. But on the 29th of July §, admiral Boſcawen arrived from England, with a reinforcement of land-forces, and with a ſquadron of ſhips of war; which, when joined to thoſe already on the coaſt, formed the greateſt marine force, that had ever been ſeen in the Eaſt Indies. The admiral, poſſeſſing a decided ſuperiority, immediately began to act offenſively, and laid ſiege to Pondicherry. The negligence of the Company's

1748.

Admiral Boſcawen lays ſiege to Pondicherry.

* Rous's Appendix, No. I. p. 13.
† Ibid.
‡ Rous's App. ubi ſupra.
§ Univerſal Hiſt. vol. x.

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agents in gaining the neceſſary intelligence, the ignorance of the engineers, and, perhaps, of the admiral in military operations by land, with various untoward accidents, defeated the ſucceſs expected from ſo great an armament. The ſiege was raiſed on the 30th of September *. The Britiſh retired to Fort St. David; and the French magnified the diſappointment of their enemies, into a victory obtained by themſelves †. The treaty of Aix la Chapelle had put an end to hoſtilities in Europe, in the month of April; and intelligence of that event arrived in India in November, which terminated the war between the two nations.

which is raiſed.

1749. A war with Tanjore, about the reſtoration of the lawful Rajah.

Admiral Boſcawen remained on the coaſt, for ſeveral months, after news of the definitive treaty arrived. In February 1749, Shaw-jî, or Sahu-jî, the lawful ſon of Tucko-jî, and grandſon of Ecko-jî, who had been expelled from the government of Tanjore by his illegitimate brother, the noted Pretaupa-Sing ‡, made application to Boſcawen, as general of his Majeſty's forces in India, to reſtore him to his right. He had alſo made a ſimilar application to the Company's preſident at Fort St. David §. The *oſtenſible* terms he offered, was the fort and territory of Devi-Cotah, and the expences of the war, ſhould it be attended with ſucceſs. An expedition was undertaken, but the firſt operations were directed againſt Devi-Cotah; the object of the war being more the poſſeſſion of that place, than the reſtoration of Shaw-jî. A firſt attempt, in May 1749, failed; another ſucceeded in the month of June. Pretaupa-Sing, truſting to negociation more than to the ſword, ſoon detached the Company's ſervants from the cauſe of the wretched Shaw-jî. He ceded to the Company Devi-Cotah, with a territory of the annual value of 9000 pagodas. He *promiſed* to reimburſe the expence of the war. The Preſidency, to ſave appearances, had requeſted a

Shameful conduct of the Preſidency.

* Univerſal Hiſt. vol. x.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 106.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. V. p. 28.
§ Ibid. ubi ſupra.

penſion

penſion of about 4001. a year, for "the right and lawful king" of Tanjore *. This they thought a handſome annual allowance for *their* ROYAL ALLY †. But they ſeem afterwards to have loſt ſight of even this wretched pittance, in the attention to their own intereſt, and—that of the Company ‡. This was the firſt ſample of the Company's wars in India. They began hoſtilities under a pretence of doing juſtice to another; but they put an end to them, when they obtained the object deſtined for themſelves. His dethroned MAJESTY, however, had a very lucky eſcape. Pretaupa-Sing had inſiſted ſtrongly on his being delivered into his hands §. But when the Preſidency heſitated on this point, the honour of Admiral Boſcawen interpoſed; and inſiſted on their refuſing the *modeſt* demand of the reigning *king* of Tanjore. But neither the honour of Admiral Boſcawen, nor any regard for their own, could induce the Board to reject, with ſpirit, the inſolent demands of Pretaupa Sing. On the contrary, they gratified his reſentment and pacified his fears, with a breach of public faith, ſcarce paralleled by any inſtance in hiſtory. It was ſtipulated by a ſecret article, that "they "ſhould prevent the Pretender," the very perſon, whom they had.

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Various inſtances.

Honour of Admiral Boſcawen.

* Rous's Appendix, No. V. p. 28.

† Ibid. p. 31.

‡ Ibid. p. 33. Where Shaw-jî is not mentioned, at all, in the articles agreed upon, between Major Lawrence and Pretaupa-Sing.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. I. p. 32—33.

Extract of Fort St. David Conſultations, 30th June, 1749.

The Preſident having received a letter from Major Lawrence at Devi-Cotah, in anſwer to the propoſals ſent him the 28th inſtant, to make to the ambaſſadors towards forwarding a peace, which were rejected by them; that they were highly incenſed at the article of allowing a maintenance for the ſupport of Sahajee Rajah, and inſiſted ſtrongly upon his being delivered up to them; but that after a long conference they had offered the following propoſals, which Major Lawrence writes the Preſident he believes to be the beſt terms they can be brought to:

To pay one lack of rupees on account of the expences of the expedition.

To give a grant of the fort of Devi-Cotah to the Company for ever, with lands about it to the yearly value of 9000 pagodas.

Upon the receipt of the above letter, he laid the ſame before General Boſcawen and Mr. Prince; and Major Lawrence writes that it is his opinion no better terms could be obtained, and thoſe made being very advantageous to the Honourable Company, it was agreed upon by them to accept the ſame, and a letter was wrote to that purpoſe to Major Lawrence laſt night.

called

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called in a ſolemn treaty "the right and lawful king" of Tanjore, "from giving any further moleſtation to Pretaupa Sing; to enſure "which, it was neceſſary to ſecure his perſon." The wretched Shaw-jî having found means to eſcape, from the hands of his faithleſs allies, they ſeized his uncle and, by a ſtrange perverſion of juſtice, detained him a priſoner at Fort St. David, for nine years, till he was releaſed by the French, when they took the place, in 1758 ‡.

Circumſtances leading to a revolution in the Carnatic.

Though courage was none of the virtues poſſeſſed by Pretaupa-Sing ||, the terms he granted were not the effects of his fears from the Britiſh arms. A ſtorm, which threatened more ſerious conſequences, than the efforts for the pretended reſtoration of Shaw-jî, had been advancing, for ſome time, and had partly fallen already in the neighbourhood of Tanjore. Mahommed, emperor of the Moguls, having languiſhed upon his throne, ever ſince the villainy of his ſervants and the violence of Nadir Shaw broke the power of the Empire, had died in the year 1747. His death was ſoon after followed by that of the Nizam, who had arrived, notwithſtanding the anxieties and inquietudes ariſing from a life of intrigue, iniquity and ambition, to the amazing age of one hundred and four years. The reverence impreſſed by great age and long continuance of power had effectually eſtabliſhed his authority; and, as he had, in a manner, outlived the memory of half his crimes, he was much reſpected throughout an empire, which his villainy had ruined *.

Death of the old Nizam.

His family.

The Nizam left five ſons, ſome of whom inherited his talents, but all his crimes. When he moved the whole machine of government at Delhi, after the departure of Nadir Shaw, he obtained the office of Captain-general of the Imperial troops, for his eldeſt ſon, Ghazi-ul-dien, who had remained at the capital, diſturbing, by intrigue and faction, the government of the prince, whoſe commiſſion

‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 318. || Orme, vol. i. * Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 47.

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he bore. Nazir Jung, the ſecond ſon, had accompanied his father to the Decan, and had borne a part of the weight of his government. The other three ſons paſſed their time, in their father's court or camp, in that unimportant obſcurity, which ever attends princes, who are not employed in public affairs. The abſence of the eldeſt ſon at Delhi had encouraged Nazir Jung to expect the government of the Decan, after his father's demiſe; but the inclinations of the Nizam, for he had no conſtitutional power to diſpoſe of the ſucceſſion, ſeem to have leaned to his grandſon, Muziffer Jung, the ſon of Nazir †. The latter, poſſeſſing himſelf of the Nizam's treaſure, ſeized, with facility, his government; whilſt the former, who had magnified his grandfather's affection into an actual diſpoſal of the Decan by will in his own favour, retired to the countries weſt of Golconda, where he kept the field with a conſiderable army ‡.

His ſecond ſon, Nazir Jung, ſucceeds him.

Chunder-Saib, who had been taken by the Marattas in Tritchinopoly, in March 1741, had remained, for ſix years, priſoner at Sattara. Having, at length, obtained his enlargement, by the promiſe of a conſiderable ranſom, for the payment of which M. Dupleix had pledged his word ‖, he collected an army, and joined himſelf to the fortunes of Muziffer Jung. In concert with the councils of the French, the united force of the two adventurers, conſiſting of forty thouſand men, moved towards the confines of the Carnatic, where they were joined by four hundred Europeans, and two thouſand diſciplined ſepoys, at the inſtance of M. Dupleix. Anwar-ul-dien, Nabob of the Carnatic, receiving intelligence of the invaſion, had encamped with twenty thouſand men under the fort of Amour, about fifty miles weſt of Arcot. On the 23d of July 1749 *,

Chunder-Saib releaſed from priſon.

1749.

Joins Muziffer Jung.

† Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 52. Orme ſays, that Muziffer, to whom he gives the name of Murzafa, was the Nizam's grandſon by a daughter. But, on the internal ſtate of India, we chuſe to follow the authority of Mr. Dow.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 125.

‖ Ibid. p. 220.

* Ibid. p. 129.

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French defeat and kill the Nabob, Anwar-ul-dien, July 23d, 1749.

he was attacked in his camp, firſt by the French, then by the troops of Chunder-Saib; and, after exhibiting proofs of ſpirit and perſonal valour, he loſt his life and the field to the enemy. His eldeſt ſon, Mapheus Chan, was taken priſoner; but his ſecond ſon, Mahommed Ali, the preſent Nabob, found means to eſcape to Tritchinopoly, where the treaſure of his father lay §. The victors took poſſeſſion of Arcot, where Muziffer aſſumed the ſtate as well as the title of Nizam. Proceeding from thence to Pondicherry, he appointed, at that place, his friend, Chunder-Saib, Nabob of the Carnatic †.

Indolence and negligence of the Preſidency.

While the French, led by the ſpirited counſels of M. Dupleix, were eſtabliſhing their influence in the Carnatic, by accompliſhing a revolution in its government, the ſervants of the Engliſh Company were negligent and idle ſpectators of a ſcene, which involved their intereſts, if not their very exiſtence, on the coaſt of Coromandel. In vain did Mahommed Ali ſolicit their aid to overturn the fabric which their rivals had erected, and to reſtore the authority of his family ‡. Either exceſs of caution or fear had reſtrained thoſe vigorous reſolutions, which their ſtate required ¶. They only ſent a hundred and twenty Europeans ‖ to the aſſiſtance of Mahommed Ali; and though Admiral Boſcawen, perceiving the dangerous criſis of affairs, had declared, that, upon a proper requiſition from the Preſidency, he would remain on the coaſt, they ſuffered the fleet and troops to return to Europe, on the 21ſt of October 1749 *.

Their unpardonable conduct.

Chunder-Saib attacks Tanjore.

Chunder Saib, having acquired the title of Nabob of the Carnatic, began to exert the authority annexed to the office. The reſources of Muziffer Jung, as well as his own, being exhauſted, he reſolved to ſupply the waſte in their treaſure, by the wealth of the

§ Orme, vol. i. p. 133.

† Major Lawrence's Narrative, p. 4.

‡ Univerſal Hiſtory, vol. x. p. 190.

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* Orme, ubi ſupra.

Rajah of Tanjore. Pretending an illegality in all acts of government, ever ſince the murder of Sipadar Ali, in 1742, he made a demand of the arrears of tribute, and marched with his army to ſupport that demand. Pretaupa-Sing, terrified by the invaſion, yet unwilling to pay ſo large a ſum, endeavoured to protract affairs by negociation. He correſponded, in the mean time, with Mahommed Ali at Tritchinopoly; and both joined in exhorting Nazir Jung at Golconda, to come in perſon, after the example of his father, to ſettle the affairs of the Carnatic. Chunder-Saib, but eſpecially his French auxiliaries, tired by this ſtudied delay, attacked and carried one of the gates of his capital; and, though they were prevented by ſtrong retrenchments, from entering the town, Pretaupa was ſo thoroughly intimidated, that he agreed to pay 875,000 l. to Chunder-Saib, as Nabob, and 25,000 l. to the French troops, as his auxiliaries *. But a ſudden change in the ſtate of affairs ſaved his money to the Rajah, excepting an inconſiderable ſum, which he had immediately paid.

Extorts the tribute, as Nabob of the Carnatic.

The Emperor Mahommed had been ſucceeded in the throne of Delhi, by his ſon Ahmed, a weak, irreſolute, and unfortunate prince. Ghazi-ul-dien, the eldeſt ſon of the late Nizam, had obtained from Ahmed the government of the Decan. Nazir Jung, hearing of his brother's appointment, had marched with a great army from Aurungabad towards Delhi; not on pretence of war, but to pay his reſpects to the Emperor. Ahmed, dreading this ceremonious viſit, confirmed Nazir Jung in his uſurpation by a formal commiſſion †; and that viceroy had juſt returned to his capital, when intelligence of the progreſs of Muziffer Jung and Chunder-Saib arrived from the Carnatic. Having left Golconda with an army, which increaſed on its march to three hundred thouſand men, with eight hundred pieces of cannon, and thirteen hundred elephants, he arrived in the province, in the month

Circumſtances which led to another revolution in the Carnatic.

1750. Arrival of Nazir Jung in that province.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 136.

† Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 48.

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* Orme, vol. i. p. 136.

† Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 48.

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of February 1750. Mahommed Ali, as Nabob of the Carnatic ‡, had been ſummoned to attend his ſuperior, with his forces; and he accordingly joined him at Waldore, about fifteen miles from Pondicherry, with ſix thouſand horſe, together with the few Britiſh troops, whom he had in garriſon at Tritchinopoly.

He is joined by the Nabob.

Major Lawrence, with ſix hundred Europeans from Fort St. David, joined Nazir Jung, on the 22d of March, juſt as that viceroy had come in ſight of the army under Muziffer and Chunder-Saib. A mutiny ariſing among the officers, the French troops, with Chunder Saib, retreated to Pondicherry. The army of Muziffer was routed and diſperſed. He himſelf ſubmitted, and, having implored the mercy of Nazir Jung, remained a ſtate priſoner in his camp §. Nazir Jung, in conſequence of his victory, was acknowledged every where Viceroy of the Decan, and his acts of government were conſequently legal. M. Dupleix, whoſe ſchemes were rather retarded, than fruſtrated, by the apparent ruin of his allies and friends, wrote him a letter of pretended ſubmiſſion; though he had the preſumption to inſiſt, that none of the family of Anwar-ul-dien ſhould ever govern the province of Arcot †.

He is joined by the Britiſh.

Muziffer's army diſperſed, and he himſelf ſubmits.

M. Dupleix writes againſt Mahommed Ali.

This inſolent requiſition neither deſerved nor received any anſwer. Nazir Jung, in the mean time, retired to Arcot, where he reſigned himſelf to his favourite pleaſures of the Haram and hunting. Without abilities and deſtitute of application, he ſuffered his miniſters to propoſe meaſures, upon which he inſtantly decided without examination, or any regard either to their juſtice or iniquity. The abſurdity of his conduct offended his friends; and his inattention to all buſineſs raiſed the contempt of his enemies. The number of the latter was great, within his camp and near his perſon;

Negligent conduct of Nazir Jung.

He offends his friends.

‡ It appears from Rous's Appendix, that Mahommed Ali had, in his father's life-time, obtained, from the old Nizam, the reverſion of the Nabobſhip of Arcot. Though this grant might not have been ſtrictly legal, yet it furniſhed a claim to preference in the eyes of Nazir Jung, who was actually the legal Subah, by a commiſſion from the reigning Mogul.

§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 7.

† Ibid. p. 8.

and

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and, having formed a ſecret deſign againſt his life and government, they held a correſpondence with M. Dupleix and adviſed him to proceed to open hoſtility. The French, accompanied by Chunder-Saib, took the field. Mahommed Ali oppoſed them, in conjunction with the Britiſh troops; but his treaſury being exhauſted, he could neither furniſh thoſe troops with pay, nor provide magazines ‡. They were, therefore, ordered to quit his ſtandard. The next night, after this deſertion, the French ſurpriſed the Nabob in his camp; and, with little loſs to themſelves, routing and diſperſing his undiſciplined army, forced him to fly to Arcot *. Purſuing their victory, they took Gingee by aſſault; which, at length, rouzed Nazir Jung from that dream of pleaſure, which he had indulged ever ſince the defeat and impriſonment of his ſon. Having, therefore, aſſembled a conſiderable army, in the end of September 1750, he moved his ſtandards, from Arcot, towards Gingee †.

A conſpiracy againſt his life.

The French defeat Mahommed Ali.

Nazir Jung's taking the field was the great point, towards which the conſpirators had turned their eyes, for accompliſhing, with certainty and ſecurity, his deſtruction. Whilſt he remained in a ſettled place of reſidence, the pomp and numerous attendants ſurrounding his perſon rendered any attempt upon his life doubtful in the execution and dangerous to the aſſaſſin, ſhould he even ſucceed in his deſign. But, in any expedition, the conſpirators, from their rank, were certain of commanding one half of his army, and they had it in their power to make the events of war ſubſervient to their views. The moſt conſiderable of thoſe, who were engaged in the plot, were the Nabobs of Cuddupa and Canoul, who had attended Nazir Jung, in his expedition to the Carnatic, from their reſpective governments. Both were Patans by birth, and both led their native troops; a race of men, though fierce and bold, leſs remarkable for valour againſt declared enemies, than for treachery to thoſe who hired their ſervice.

The conſpiracy againſt Nazir Jung.

Headed by the Nabobs of Cuddupa and Canoul.

‡ Lawrence's Narr. p. 10. * Orme, vol. i. p. 151. † Orme and Lawrence, paſſim.

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Nazir Jung's camp attacked by the French.

The unwieldy army of Nazir Jung, being obſtructed, in its march, by the rains, which ſet in at that ſeaſon of the year, was forced to remain in a camp, within ſixteen miles of Gingee. Whilſt he ſuffered himſelf to be amuſed by a negociation, which was carried on with M. Dupleix at Pondicherry, the conſpirators had ſettled their plan of operations, which was to be carried into execution, in concert with the French at Gingee. Things being, at length, prepared, M. de la Touche, who now commanded the troops †, marched from Gingee with eight hundred Europeans and three thouſand ſepoys. With this ſmall force, he ſurpriſed, in the night, the camp of Nazir Jung, who expected nothing leſs than hoſtilities from a nation, with whom he had juſt ratified a treaty. The immenſe rabble, rather than army, which were next the enemy, were ſoon thrown into confuſion. Riding on an elephant, to bring up the Patans, who were in his rear, to action, the Subah queſtioned harſhly the Nabob of Cuddupa; who anſwered him with his carrabine, and ſhot him with two bullets through the heart. He had ſcarcely fallen to the ground, when his head was ſevered from his body, fixed on a ſpear, and carried to Muziffer Jung; who was inſtantly releaſed, and declared Nizam, amidſt the ſhouts of the whole army.

He himſelf murdered.

Muziffer declared Subah.

Intemperate vanity of the French.

Though ſuch revolutions are not uncommon, in the annals of the Eaſt, the French, with their uſual vanity, magnified an event accompliſhed, by mere aſſaſſination, into one of the moſt brilliant actions that had ever happened in war. M. Dupleix, whoſe reputation ſeemed to require, that the part he had acted, in this diſgraceful buſineſs, ſhould remain concealed, formed a plan for perpetuating the memory of it to future ages. He propoſed to build a city on the ſpot, under the name of Dupleix-Fatteabad *; thus branding, by exceſſive vanity, his own name to poſterity, by connecting it with a deteſtable murder. To thoſe, who may chuſe to conſider this ſubject

† Orme and Lawrence, paſſim.

* The city of Victory.

with

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with attention, it will, perhaps, appear that events, which became afterwards deſtructive in their conſequences, proceeded more from Britiſh negligence, than French valour. Had the Preſidency accepted the offer of Admiral Boſcawen, in the preceding year, the influence of the nation, and the intereſts of the family of Anwar-ul-dien, might have been ſupported without the aid of Nazir Jung. Had Major Lawrence accompanied that viceroy to Arcot, according to his moſt earneſt deſire, he ſhould not have fallen by French perfidy. Had the Preſidency not recalled the Britiſh troops from the aid of the Nabob, the French could not have obtained the victory at Trivadi; which enabled them to give a Subah to the Decan, and a Nabob to the Carnatic. But it would appear, that Major Lawrence ſuffered his own gallant ſpirit to be cramped and confined, by the narrow councils of a commercial Board.

Negligence of the Company's ſervants the true cauſe of theſe misfortunes.

Several inſtances.

The murder, which raiſed Muziffer to the Subahſhip of the Decan, ſubjected him to the inſolence of thoſe, to whom he owed his power. Though aſſaſſination was but a light crime in the eyes of the Patan Nabobs, they valued its reward at a high rate. That reward they inſtantly aſked, in terms more ſuited to create terror than to excite gratitude. Having evaded, without refuſing their demands, Muziffer entered Pondicherry, on the 15th of December, whither he was followed, the next day, by the clamourous Nabobs. They explained to M. Dupleix the promiſes of Muziffer, and their own claims, which were a remiſſion of all paſt arrears, a total exemption from future tribute, and an augmentation of territory, with one half of the treaſure of Nazir Jung. Finding that M. Dupleix was determined to ſupport Muziffer, they ſuppreſſed their reſentment, for the time, acquieſced, in appearance, to his propoſals, and ſwore allegiance to the new Subah *.

The conſpirators diſcontented with Muziffer.

1750. Their inſolence.

December 15.

They ſuppreſs their reſentment.

* Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, Private Information, paſſim.

Though

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Though the Patan Nabobs complained of Muziffer's deficiency in gratitude, he ſeems to have carried that virtue to a degree of extravagance towards M. Dupleix and the French nation. He raiſed the former to the regency of the whole country, between the Criſtna and Cape Comorin; he ceded to the latter conſiderable territories in the Carnatic, together with the city of Maſulipatnam in Golconda. Chunder-Saib obtained the Nabobſhip of Arcot, in ſubordination to M. Dupleix; and others were rewarded in proportion to their merit in the late revolution. As the perſonal ſafety of a prince, who owed his power to the intrigues of M. Dupleix, and the arms of the French, was a matter of the laſt importance, a body of French troops, under M. Buſſy, was ordered to attend the new Subah to Golconda. It conſiſted of three hundred Europeans, and two thouſand Sepoys, with ten field-pieces; and, under this eſcort, Muziffer left Pondicherry, on the fourth of January 1751 *.

Muziffer's gratitude to the French.

He raiſes Dupleix to the regency of the countries to the ſouth of the Criſtna.

Declares Chunder-Saib Nabob.

He is attended by a body of French troops.

In the beginning of February, Muziffer Jung, with his unwieldy army, had advanced as far as the province of Cuddupa, the government of his predeceſſor's murderer. Some irregularities committed, by a few licentious horſemen, brought, at once, to view, a conſpiracy that had been long formed. The Nabobs of Cuddupa, Canoul, and Savanpore, joining their forces, under pretence of repreſſing the depredations of the horſemen, attacked the rear-guard of the Subah; and, being repulſed, occupied a defile in his front. Driven from thence by the French artillery, they were purſued with too much eagerneſs by Muziffer Jung; who, coming up with the Nabob of Canoul, was ſlain by that chief in ſingle combat. The revolted Nabobs were all either killed or wounded mortally in the action, which coſt his life to the Suba; and thus, in leſs than two months after the aſſaſſination of Nazir Jung, the four principal conſpirators fell by each other's ſwords. M. Buſſy, to preſerve the in-

Muziffer-Jung departs for Golconda.

A conſpiracy by the Patan Nabobs.

Muziffer Jung killed.

* Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, Private Information, paſſim.

fluence of his nation, by creating a new Subah, raiſed to that dignity Sullabut-Jung, third ſon of the old Nizam; who, with two of his brothers, was a priſoner in the camp, when Muziffer was ſlain †.

Sullabut-Jung declared Nizam.

The ſame languor which had ſeized the Engliſh Preſidency, after the retreat of Lawrence from the army of Nazir Jung, when that Subah marched to Arcot, in the preceding year, ſtill benumbed their councils; if they can be ſaid to have had any councils at all. The retreat of their troops, from Trivadi, though the immediate cauſe of all ſucceeding misfortunes, was only a continuation of thoſe narrow and undeciſive meaſures, which had uniformly marked their conduct, ever ſince the commencement of the diſputes, which had involved the Carnatic in all the horrors of a civil war. Major Lawrence, though not remarkable for political abilities, was a man of ſpirit and a good ſoldier; but ſo little impreſſion had the uncertainty of public events made upon the Preſidency, that they permitted that officer to return to Europe, in October 1750, on his own private affairs. The aſſaſſination of Nazir Jung, the elevation of Muziffer, the influence acquired by the French, in not only diſpoſing of the provinces, but even the empire of the ſouth, inſtead of rouſing the minds of the Preſidency, to a ſenſe of their own danger, depreſſed their ſpirits with aſtoniſhment and fear.

Supineneſs of the Preſidency.

Their errors,

and weak councils.

Struck with aſtoniſhment at the murder of Nazir Jung, &c.

Chunder-Saib, by the authority of Muziffer Jung and under the protection of the French, exerciſed all the functions of government at Arcot, as Nabob of the Carnatic. The fort of Tritchinopoly remained only to Mahommed Ali; for Madura, which depended upon it, had heen ſeized by one Allum Chan *, who had declared for Chunder-Saib.

Chunder-Saib acknowledged Nabob.

Mahommed Ali poſſeſſes Tritchinopoli only.

† It is generally believed, by the beſt informed natives of Hindoſtan, that M. Buſſy himſelf was no ſtranger to the conſpiracy, which deprived Muziffer of his life and government. That acute Frenchman foreſaw the advantages, which were likely to ariſe to himſelf, from having it in his power to make a new Subah; and winked, perhaps, at a conſpiracy, which he might have defeated.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 169.

Unaſſiſted

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His diſtreſſed condition.

Unaſſiſted by the Engliſh, whoſe intereſt was involved in his cauſe, without treaſure, and conſequently without an army, oppreſſed by the defection of his friends, and awed by the apparent ſuperiority of his enemies, the Nabob began to deſpair of his own affairs. Under an apparent impoſſibility of recovering the whole province, together with the improbability of being even able to keep what he poſſeſſed, he opened, by the advice of the Preſidency, a treaty with his rival; offering to relinquiſh his claim to the Carnatic, upon condition of being permitted to keep the quiet poſſeſſion of Tritchinopoly and its dependencies †. In vain had the court of Delhi eſpouſed the cauſe of Mahommed Ali, by ſending him Sunnuds for the government of the Carnatic. Troubles at home had deprived them of the power of quieting diſturbances abroad.

He offers terms.

He is acknowledged by the court of Delhi.

1751. The terms offered to him rejected.

Fortunately for the intereſts of Great Britain, as well as for thoſe of the family of Anwar-ul-dien, Chunder-Saib, but more eſpecially the French, who had proſcribed that family, treated the propoſals made by the Nabob, under the ſanction of the Preſidency, with the higheſt contempt. This peremptory refuſal was the firſt thing, which rouſed the ſervants of the Company, to a ſenſe of their own danger. In the end of January 1751, they ſent a ſtrong detachment to ſupport the Nabob in Tritchinopoly ‡. In the beginning of April, upon intelligence that Chunder-Saib and his allies, the French, intended to beſiege Tritchinopoly, conſiderable force took the field under Captain de Gingins. But they were defeated at Volconda; and retreated to Tritchinopoly, which was inveſted by the enemy in the end of July. Inſtead of attacking the place in form, they contented themſelves with a uſeleſs cannonade, which they adorned with all the terms of a regular ſiege *.

He is at length ſupported by the Company's ſervants.

Chunder-Saib and the French beſiege Tritchinopoly.

A ſucceſsful diverſion.

A ſucceſsful diverſion made, on the ſide of Arcot, which place was ſurpriſed by Captain Clive on the firſt of September, formed

† Lawrence's Narrative, p. 12. ‡ Ibid. * Ibid. p. 14.

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the moſt ſplendid part of a campaign, little diſtinguiſhed by important events. Chunder-Saib, having weakened his army by a detachment ſent to retake Arcot, lay inactive in his camp, before Tritchinopoly. The negociations of the Nabob had raiſed new allies to ſupport his cauſe. The troops of the Rajah of Maſſore had marched from Seringapatnam, the capital, in the end of 1751, upon a promiſe of extravagant terms for their aid. A body of Marattas, a nation accuſtomed to ſell their valour to the higheſt bidder, had already penetrated the mountains, in favour of the Nabob; but, with the uſual caution of Indian mercenaries, they remained inactive, till fortune ſhould incline the ſcale; being determined to join the ſtrongeſt, and ſo partake of the advantages of victory, without the dangers of war.

The Myſoreans and a party of Marattas aid Mahommed Ali.

The Rajah of Myſore, being a minor, his troops were commanded by his uncle, who arrived, with a conſiderable force, at Tritchinopoly, in January 1752. The mercenary Marattas, under the command of Morari-row, an enterpriſing partizan, at the ſame time joined the Nabob. Theſe junctions induced the Rajah of Tanjore to liſten to the requiſitions of that Prince and to the ſolicitations of the preſidency, to ſend two thouſand foot, with three thouſand horſe, under the command of his General, Mona-jî †. Whilſt the event remained doubtful, he was cautious of declaring for either ſide. He permitted the Britiſh and the French troops to march indiſcriminately through his country, to the ſcene of action ‡. Though he poſſeſſed a natural averſion for Chunder-Saib, he was not a friend to the legal Nabob. His object, at leaſt his wiſh, was to ſee both reduced to a ſtate of weakneſs, which might prevent the victor from enforcing the payment of the tribute, which the troubles of the times had enabled him to keep in his own hands.

They arrive at Tritchinopoly,

which induces the Rajah of Tanjore to ſend aſſiſtance.

Ambiguous conduct of that Rajah.

1752.

† Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, paſſim.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 182.

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Major Lawrence takes the command.

Major Lawrence arriving from England, at Fort St. David, on the 15th of March, took the command of a party, ready to march to Tritchinopoly, on the 17th, which place he reached on the 29th of the ſame month §. A detail of military operations is foreign to the deſign of this diſquiſition. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that Chunder-Saib and his allies, the French, became inferior in conduct, as well as in number, to their enemies.

The French and Chunder-Saib incloſed in the iſland of Seringam.

Incloſed in the iſland of Seringam, which is formed by the divided ſtreams of the Cavery, near Tritchinopoly, their army was reduced, at laſt, to the greateſt extremity. Chunder-Saib, without money to pay his troops, found them more dangerous enemies, than thoſe whom he oppoſed.

Chunder-Saib delivers himſelf to the Tanjorines.

Deprived of reflexion, by his misfortunes, he entered into a negociation for protection with his greateſt foe, Mona-jî, the commander of the troops of Tanjore. Vainly hoping, that the gratifying his avarice would ſuppreſs his reſentment, he advanced the laſt poor pittance of his treaſure to Mona-jî. But, though that chief had promiſed and even ſworn, to permit him to eſcape, through his part

May 31. of the camp, the perfidious villain put him in irons, the moment he was in his power ‖.

June 1. A diſpute about the poſſeſſion of his perſon.

A diſpute aroſe between the allies about the poſſeſſion of the unfortunate priſoner. The Nabob wiſhed to ſecure the perſon of a rival, who had been, and ſtill might be dangerous, to his own power. The Myſorean, inveterate againſt Chunder-Saib, for endeavouring, under the government of Dooſt Ali, to enforce the claims of the Carnatic, on the dependence of his country, breathed nothing but revenge. Morari-row, who commanded the Marattas, wiſhed to convert the captivity of the wretched priſoner, to his own profit; and Mona-jî, remembering his repeated attacks on Tanjore, hoped to gratify his maſter, with the poſſeſſion of his ancient enemy.

§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 21, 22, 23. ‖ Ibid. p. 28.

Finding

Finding that the power of the competitors would effectually defeat his deſigns, he reſolved to finiſh the conteſt, by putting an end to the life of the priſoner *. To execute his purpoſe, he employed a Patan, who found the wretched old man, in fetters, ſtretched on the floor, and rendered unable, by the infirmities of ſickneſs, to rear himſelf from the ground †. Having ſtabbed him to the heart, the aſſaſſin carried his head to Mona-jî ‡, who afterwards ſent it, according to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, to the Nabob.

He is murdered by the Tanjore general.

The death of Chunder-Saib, inſtead of putting an end to the troubles, which his ambition had raiſed, ſowed the ſeeds of a new war. The Nabob, when deſerted, or rather feebly aſſiſted by the ſervants of the Company, in the year 1751, had obtained the aid of the Myſoreans, upon terms ſo extraordinary, that both parties had an intereſt in keeping them concealed. Theſe were no leſs than the ceſſion of Tritchinopoly, with all its dependencies, to the Rajah of Myſore, for the aſſiſtance of that prince, in putting Mahommed Ali in poſſeſſion of the Carnatic. When Chunder-Saib was removed and his army diſperſed, the Myſorean inſiſted, that his part of the agreement was fully accompliſhed. But the Nabob aſſerted, with more reaſon, that the wages ought not to be paid, till the ſervice was effectually performed. Much yet remained to be done. The French and the adherents of Chunder-Saib were ſtill in poſſeſſion of ſeveral places of ſtrength §; and many chiefs, taking advantage of the public confuſions, maintained ſeveral large diviſions of the Carnatic, in defiance of both the rivals for its government. He argued, that it was neither agreed, nor in itſelf reaſonable, that Tritchino-

His death the ſource of a new war.

The Myſoreans demand Tritchinopoly, as one of the conditions of a ſecret treaty.

Nabob's arguments againſt that ceſſion.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 240. Lawrence's Nar. p. 28.

† Orme, vol. i. p. 241.

‡ Thus did Chunder-Saib pay the juſt price of his ambition and preſumption. In private life he is ſaid to have been a man of great benevolence, humanity, and generoſity. With regard to his public character; in this country, ambition being a venial fault, every man who ſucceeds is a great man; if he fails, he is only reckoned unfortunate. Lawrence's Narr. p. 28.

§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 32.

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poly ſhould be the price of its own relief; for that ſhould he be deprived of that place, without being put in poſſeſſion of any other dominion, it was indifferent to him, whether it fell to his enemies or to his pretended friends †.

Myſoreans remain inactive;

Theſe reaſonings had ſo little effect on the Myſorean, that though he did not break forth into open hoſtility, he declined to appear as the Nabob's ally in the field. He ſtill continued in the neighbourhood of Tritchinopoly, with the Marattas, whom he had gained over to his views; and, taking poſſeſſion of the pagoda of Seringam, was himſelf ſafe againſt inſult, whilſt he watched every opportunity to ſeize the city, which, he affirmed, was his right, as the reward of the aid he had already beſtowed. The remaining part of the year 1752 was diſtinguiſhed, by various events. The Britiſh were repulſed in an attempt on the fortreſs of Gingee. They defeated the French at Bahoor ‡. M. Dupleix, forging Sunnuds from Delhi, inveſted himſelf with the governments of all the countries to the ſouth of the Criſtna. In his quality of pretended Subah, he firſt raiſed and then diſplaced the ſon of Chunder-Saib, as Nabob of the Carnatic. He conferred that title on Mortaz-Ali, hereditary governor of Vellore; but it was to obtain money from that wealthy chief. Having inflamed the diſcontent of the Myſorean, by his artifices and promiſes, he had the addreſs, before the end of the year, to turn, againſt Mahommed Ali, thoſe very arms, which had come to his aid the preceding year *. But the intrigues of M. Dupleix only ſuſpended, but could not alter the fate of the

but have hoſtile deſigns.

1752. French defeated at Bahoor.

M. Dupleix forges a Sunnud in favour of himſelf.

He declares Mortar-Ali Nabob.

He turns the arms of the Myſoreans againſt Mahommed Ali.

His intrigues are ineffectual.

† Lawrence, p. 29. Orme, vol. i.—Private Information, India Papers, paſſim.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 256, 257. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 36.

* Auct. citat. paſſim.

In October 1752, Ghazi-ul-dien, the eldeſt ſon of the old Nizam, marched from Delhi, with an army of 150,000 men, to take poſſeſſion, by a royal Sunnud, of the Subahſhip of the Decan. When he had advanced to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, his brother Sullabut Jung, the reigning Subah, prevailed with one of Ghazi-ul-dien's wives to take him off, by poiſon, which put an end to the conteſt. Dow's Decline, p. 52.

Carnatic. The very war, which he had firſt fomented and had continued ſo long, deprived him of reſources for carrying it on, either with vigour or with ſucceſs. The chiefs, attached to the family of Sadatulla had contributed to the expence, as long as Chunder-Saib lived. But they had withdrawn their ſupplies, on account of the weakneſs of his ſon. Mortaz-Ali, whom M. Dupleix raiſed to the titular office of Nabob, could neither be truſted nor ſupported by the friendſhip of his family; and the only appearance of virtue he poſſeſſed, was a diffidence of himſelf. The Marattas, whom M. Dupleix had gained to his aid, were ſcarcely leſs dangerous, as friends, than they had been, as enemies. His acquiſition of the Myſoreans, though it gave trouble to his opponents, brought no benefit to himſelf. Their commander was weak, credulous, and undeciſive; miſtaking perpetually his own intereſt, and, inſtead of giving aid, ſtanding always in need of ſupport. His obſtinacy, however, ſupplied, in ſome degree, the place of firmneſs. Determined to obtain an object, which would ruin him in the poſſeſſion, he remained three years, in the neighbourhood of Tritchinopoly; and nothing but a ſerious invaſion at home, could recal him, at laſt, from his wild ſchemes abroad. Having remained, in a manner beſieged, in the iſland of Seringam, till the 14th of April 1755, he ſuddenly decamped, after having loſt his time, his treaſure and many troops, in purſuit of a chimerical advantage.

Various inſtances.

All his meaſures broken and ruined.

Weak, however, as the conduct of the Myſorean was, and wild and impracticable, as the ambitious ſchemes of Dupleix had been, they created much trouble to the Engliſh and much anxiety and loſs to their ally, the Nabob of the Carnatic. During the doubtful events of war, their pretended friends proved faithleſs to the former; and his vaſſals to the latter. The Rajah of Tanjore, in particular, whoſe money and whoſe power ought to have turned the ſcale, in favour of the Nabob, amuſed him with inſidious promiſes of aid *, at a time, he

Weak conduct of the regent of Myſore.

Faithleſs conduct of the friends of the Company and vaſſals of the Nabob.

Treachery of the Rajah of Tanjore.

* Lawrence's Narrative, p. 41.

actually

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actually correſponded and treated with his enemies. Whilſt the Marattas aided the French with cavalry, the want of horſe was the principal obſtacle to the progreſs of the Nabob's affairs ||. The Rajah could ſupply cavalry; but his aid was required and ſolicited in vain. In February 1753, at the earneſt requeſt of the Preſidency, he ordered his horſe to march; but he recalled them, before a junction could be made §. This heavy diſappointment obliged Major Lawrence to remain inactive in his camp, "contemplating the "ſituation of the enemy, and fretting at his incapacity to attack "them ‡;"—"whilſt (ſays the Major) the enemy were ſo ſuperior "to us in cavalry, that we were often obliged to march our whole "body, to eſcort ſtores and proviſions from Fort St. David to our "camp; always haraſſed more or leſs by the Marattas †."

He promiſes aſſiſtance, then recals it.

His conduct obſtructs the progreſs of the war.

He again deceives the Engliſh and the Nabob.

In April 1753, the garriſon of Tritchinopoly was driven to the laſt extremity for want of proviſions. Major Lawrence, accompanied by the Nabob, reſolved to march to its relief. To encourage and, if neceſſary, to awe the Rajah, he directed his route, through the neighbourhood of the capital of Tanjore. Pretaupa Sing met the Nabob and the commander of the troops, with great ceremony and ſplendour, accompanied by three thouſand horſe and two hundred elephants, in rich trappings. He ſeemed, in appearance, to be convinced, that it was his own intereſt *, as it certainly was his duty, to ſupport the Nabob. He accordingly gave orders to his horſe to accompany him to Tritchinopoly. But ſo faithleſs was the Rajah to his profeſſions, or his troops to his commands, that they left both the Nabob and Major Lawrence, the very next day ¶. They remonſtrated; they preſſed ┼, they entreated their junction; but in vain. The cavalry retreated to Tanjore, promiſing, however, to

Inſtances of his deceptions.

May 5th.

|| Orme, vol. i. p. 281. Lawrence, paſſim.

§ Orme, vol. i. Lawrence ſays, "They "came on ſome part of the way, but think-"ing us in a bad condition, they amuſed us "only with promiſes; and obliged our party "to return to the army without them." P. 41.

‡ Orme, vol. i.

† Narrative, p. 41.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 281.

¶ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 44.

┼ Ibid.

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return ſoon §. The Major, juſtly ſuſpecting, that the Rajah wanted only to amuſe the Nabob and his allies ‖, proceeded to Tritchinopoly, with troops diſpirited by diſappointment, and decreaſed, in their numbers, by fatigue and ſickneſs ¶.

Suſpected by Major Lawrence.

A conduct ſo faithleſs to his ſuperior and ſo adverſe to the Engliſh cauſe, rendered the Rajah juſtly ſuſpected, of a correſpondence or even a treaty with the enemy. The truth is, that, at the very time Pretaupa Sing paid his reſpects to the Nabob and the Engliſh commander in chief, he entertained an agent from the Myſoreans, at Tanjore. That agent, having bribed the miniſter with money, and wrought upon the fears of the Rajah, gained both to the intereſts of his maſter †. But to provide againſt a reverſe of fortune, the latter palliated his refuſal of aſſiſtance to the Nabob and Engliſh, with ſpecious pretexts of loſſes ſuſtained, from the Myſoreans and their allies the Marattas. He alleged, that the detachments of the latter had already deſtroyed to the value of 100,000 l. in his country. But "this pretended miſchief was no more than what all other parts "of the country had ſuffered from the Marattas, who, in their pre-"datory excurſions, made no diſtinction between the territories of "friends and foes *." The conſequence of this duplicity of the Rajah was, that all ſupplies of proviſions from Tanjore were ſtopt. Inſtead of being able to form magazines, the army near Tritchinopoly and the garriſon within that place found great difficulty in procuring grain, for immediate conſumption. In this diſtreſsful ſituation Major Lawrence was obliged to remain inactive, for five weeks; whilſt the French daily expected reinforcements from the coaſt ‡.

He privately correſponds with the enemy.

He entertains their agent at his capital.

Attempts to amuſe the Engliſh and the Nabob.

By pretended loſſes ſuſtained from the enemy,

He ſtops proviſions from going to the Engliſh army.

Diſconcerts their operations.

An undeciſive action, the increaſing number of the enemy, the want of proviſions, and, above all, the want of cavalry, convinced

June 26, 1753.

§ Orme, vol. i. p. 181.
‖ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 44.
¶ Ibid.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 285, 286.
* Ibid. p. 286.
‡ Ibid. Lawrence, paſſim.

Major

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They reſolve to intimidate him.

Major Lawrence, that a reinforcement of troops was neceſſary to turn the ſcale of the war ‡. The Rajah of Tanjore, deſtitute of every ſenſe of duty and deaf to intreaty, was to be ſwayed by nothing, but perſonal fear. The Major, accompanied by the Nabob, reſolved

They march towards Tanjore.

to move towards Tanjore; and by mixing threats with perſuaſion, to endeavour to induce him to ſend the aſſiſtance, he had ſo often promiſed in vain. On the 2d of July 1753, the troops encamped, about half-way between Tritchinopoly and Tanjore §. The ap-

He gives the aſſiſtance required.

proach of an army ſoon determined Pretaupa Sing to furniſh the aſſiſtance, they were coming to demand ||. The inſtances of Mr. Palk, who had been, previouſly, ſent to Tanjore, began to have effect, when there was danger, in refuſing his requeſt. The Rajah ordered three thouſand horſe and two thouſand ſepoys, under the command of Mona-jî, to join the army; which, when the object of the expedition was, thus, obtained, returned to Tritchinopoly ¶.

He again recals his troops.

But this extorted aid was almoſt immediately recalled, by the verſatility of Pretaupa Sing; for the Tanjorines returned home as ſoon as the ſetting in of the Monſoon obliged the Nabob and Major Lawrence to canton their troops †. A ſum of money, ſent by the Myſorean to Succo-jî, the Rajah's favourite, a threatening letter from

Being bribed by the Myſoreans, and threatened by Dupleix, he is on the point of ſigning a treaty with them.

M. Dupleix to the Rajah himſelf, together with a rooted averſion to the cauſe of the Nabob, and a diſtruſt of his allies, the Engliſh, determined the faithleſs Tanjorine to break all his engagements *. He was even upon the point of ſigning a treaty with the French and their allies and of taking an active part in the war; when an unſucceſsful attempt on Tritchinopoly, in the end of November 1753, terrified him from his intended French alliance †.

‡ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 48.
§ Ibid.
|| Orme, vol. i. p. 296.
¶ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 48.
† Ibid. p. 54.
* Orme, vol. i. p. 319, 320. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 55.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 325.

" The

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"The French finding that their misfortune produced a change in his intentions," and that he began to "repent, that he had ſhewn "ſo much inclination to abandon the Nabob and the Engliſh," reſolved to waſte no more time in negociation, but prepared to ſend a party of Marattas to ravage his country §. Pretaupa Sing, having intelligence of their deſign, ordered a body of troops againſt the Marattas; but pretended that the object of aſſembling thoſe troops was to join the Engliſh ‡. He was ſoon deprived of this aſſumed merit; for the Tanjorines refuſed, upon the requiſition of Major Lawrence, to join the army ¶.

The Marattas attack his country.

The Marattas, having penetrated into the province of Tanjore, had, from their ignorance of the country, entangled themſelves between two impaſſable branches of the river Coleroon. Pent up in that diſadvantageous ſituation, by a ſuperior number of Tanjorines, under the command of Mona-jî, eight hundred of them were killed, and the reſt taken priſoners and impaled alive *. The Nabob and his allies had formed hopes, that this ſucceſs would induce the Rajah to ſend his troops to join them; but they were again diſappointed. Attached to the enemies of the Nabob, nothing but a turn of the ſcale of fortune in favour of that prince, could induce Pretaupa Sing even to *pretend* that he was his friend. When any misfortune happened, he flew off to the intereſts of the enemy. Upon the defeat of the Engliſh convoy at Kelly-Cotah in the month of February, he prevented his merchants from ſupplying Tritchinopoly with more proviſions ‖. When, on account of the neceſſity of "recovering the Rajah to the Nabob's intereſt," Mr. Palk was ſent to Tanjore, in April 1754, he found him of difficult acceſs †. His miniſter was devoted to the intereſts of the French and Myſo-

They are cut off by his troops.

His faithleſs conduct towards the Engliſh and Nabob.

1754. He prevents ſupplies for Tritchinopoly.

§ Orme, vol. i. p. 325.
‡ Ibid.
¶ Orme and Lawrence, paſſim.
* Orme, vol. i. p. 342.
‖ Ibid. p. 346. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 63.
† Lawrence's Narrative, p. 64.

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His irresolute conduct.

reans. The Rajah himself was wavering and irresolute; one hour seemingly convinced by Mr. Palk's arguments, the next listening to his minister, and approving his advice: upon the whole determining nothing ‡. But, though Mr. Palk prevented him from signing the treaty with the Mysoreans, he could not induce him to send his troops to join the English §.

1754. May. He still hesitates.

Though the French, under M. Maissin, had wantonly attacked the Rajah's country; though they had broken down the mound at Coiladdy, which diverted the streams of the Cavery into the province; though their allies the Marattas had cut to pieces twelve hundred of his horse, under his uncle Gauderow, though Major Lawrence, to work upon his fears, had marched to Tanjore; Mr. Palk and Captain Caillaud found some difficulty in persuading him of his imprudence, in withdrawing his assistance from the English and his superior, the Nabob. Terrified by the army, under Major Lawrence ||, and frightened by his own misfortunes, Pretaupa Sing ordered new troops to be raised; and a considerable body, under Mona-jî, joined the English at Atchempettah on the 27th of July 1754. To save his country from the depredations of the Marattas, who had lately cut off so large a body of his horse, he agreed, on the requisition of the Nabob, to furnish the money demanded by those marauders, for evacuating the Carnatic *.

But is intimidated at last.

June 7th, a body of his troops join Major Lawrence.

Party writers reprimanded.

Some late writers, who call fiction to the support of their party, where truth fails, have, from one of the authorities † so often quoted, framed a tale very different, from the facts we have stated above. Contempt is too slight a punishment, for men, who wilfully deceive. Had the intelligent historian, on whom they father their falsehoods, written ambiguously on the character and conduct of

Their false quotations.

‡ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 64.
§ Orme, vol. i. p. 348.
|| Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 66.
* Vide Orme and Lawrence, passim. The sum was three lack of rupees; little more than 30,000 l. and it is even doubtful, whether the money was ever paid, Morari-row having quitted the Carnatic in July 1754.
† Mr. Orme.

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Their want of candour and even morality.

Pretaupa Sing, the world might be induced to aſcribe their errors to zeal, and their miſrepreſentations to prejudice. But what judgment are we to form of their candour, what opinion of their morality, when we find that the very pages, which they cite, preſent irrefragable proofs of their perverſion of truth? Common prudence ought to have ſupplied a want of principle, in this reſpect; for the averſion of the Public to an inveſtigation of Indian tranſactions, is too ſlight a ſecurity againſt detection. But they wrote for the purpoſe of the day; and they hoped, that, on a fugitive ſubject, bold aſſertions might have a chance of paſſing for facts. Fortunately for the memory of the late General Lawrence, they ſeem to have known nothing of his narrative of his own campaigns; otherwiſe that gallant officer might have been raiſed from the dead to ſupport falſehoods, which his honeſt heart abhorred, when alive.

Advance bold aſſertions for facts.

A change in the government of Pondicherry.

A change, which happened, in the government of Pondicherry, on the 2d of Auguſt 1754, put an end, in its conſequences, to the Myſorean war, which had been ſo long carried on, in the neighbourhood of Tritchinopoly; and the Carnatic was reſtored to a kind of temporary tranquillity. The Britiſh miniſtry, upon the complaints of the Eaſt-India Company, had made remonſtrances to the court of France, againſt the troubles raiſed and continued, by the French nation, on the coaſt of Coromandel. To give weight to thoſe remonſtrances, a ſquadron of men of war, with ſome troops, were ordered to the Eaſt-Indies; and the French court, unprepared for a general war, reſolved to exhibit a mark of their pacific intentions, by removing M. Dupleix from the government of Pondicherry. His ſucceſſor, M. Godeheu, arriving at that place, on the 2d of Auguſt 1754, opened his adminiſtration, by communicating to the Engliſh Preſidency, his earneſt deſire, for an immediate termination of hoſtilities between the two Companies. A ſuſpenſion of arms took place, on the 11th of October, and a proviſional treaty was concluded, on the 26th of December 1754.

Spirited conduct of the Britiſh miniſtry.

A ſuſpenſion of arms in the Carnatic.

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1755. Affairs of that province during the year 1755.

The Myſorean, ſupported only by his own obſtinacy, continued a kind of war, in the environs of Tritchinopoly, for the firſt three months of the year 1755. An invaſion by Sullabut Jung, the Subah of the Decan, who had marched with an army to enforce the payment of the tribute due by Myſore, to the empire of the Moguls, recalled him, in the month of April, to defend his own country. Diſappointed, in all his views, from his long expedition, he left the French the heirs of his claims on the Carnatic *. In the month of July, Mahommed Ali was requeſted, by the Engliſh Preſidency, to take up his reſidence at Arcot, being now *de facto* what he had been long *de jure*, Nabob of the Carnatic. Several Polygars, poſſeſſors of forts, and refractory renters of diſtricts, were either reduced by force, or intimidated into a ſubmiſſion, by the joint arms of the Engliſh and the Nabob. Though ſome diſturbances ſtill continued, in the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, they ſubmitted in general to the government of Mahommed Ali; who found himſelf acknowledged, before the end of 1755, from the river Pennar to Tinnevelly.

Mahommed Ali acknowledged Nabob.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 389.

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Tranſactions on the Coaſt, from 1756, *to the Concluſion of the Treaty, between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, in* 1762.

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WHEN the Engliſh and French were contending, about the eſtabliſhment of a governor, over one of the Mogul provinces, the Mogul empire was haſtening to that termination of exiſtence, to which human inſtitutions, like man himſelf, ſeem to be deſtined by fate. The weak Ahmed Shaw, having ſat near ſeven years upon the throne of Delhi, without either exertion or authority, was depoſed and deprived of ſight, in the latter end of the year 1754 *. He himſelf was the author of his misfortunes; but the actor, in the melancholy ſcene, was Shab-ul-dien, ſon of Ghazi-ul-dien and grandſon of the old Nizam. That lord, though ſtill a youth, poſſeſſed all the abilities, courage and villainy of his family. Having impriſoned his maſter, he raiſed Alumgire II. the ſon of Moaz-ul-dien and grandſon of Bahader Shaw, the ſon and ſucceſſor of Aurungzebe, to the vacant throne. But this unfortunate prince, being as weak as his predeceſſor, was but little calculated to reſtore the empire to its former ſplendour †.

The emperor Ahmed depoſed.

Alumgire II. raiſed to the throne.

All the provinces, except thoſe which lay between Delhi and Lahore, had been in fact diſmembered from the empire, though they paid a nominal allegiance. The Decan had been uſurped, by

Moſt of the provinces had already revolted.

* Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 56. † Dow's Decline of the Empire. p. 59. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 58.

the

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the family of the very perſon, to whom Alumgire owed his throne. Guzerat was entirely loſt; the three provinces of Bengal had ſubmitted to the government of a mean Tartar adventurer and his ſucceſſors; Malava was divided among petty Rajahs; and Ajmere owned the authority of an independent prince. Moſt of the provinces, which had been formerly ſubject to the empire, were involved in all the horrors of a civil war. "Villainy was practiſed in every form; all law and religion were trodden under foot; the bands of private friendſhips and connections, as well as of ſociety and government, were broken; and every individual, as if in a foreſt full of wild beaſts, found no ſafety, but in the ſtrength of his own arm *."

Wretched ſtate of India.

Affairs of the Decan.

Sullabut Jung, whom the French had raiſed to the office of Subah of the Decan, upon the death of his nephew, Muziffer Jung, in the month of February 1751, ſtill poſſeſſed the dignity of Nizam, in oppoſition to the court of Delhi. Supported by the arms of thoſe, to whom he owed his power, he held a conſiderable degree of authority in the provinces, which lay neareſt to his capital. The Marattas, who had been formidable, for many years, to the whole empire, had torn ſeveral large diſtricts, from the dominion of Sullabut Jung †; and his friends the French had obtained, from his favour, or rather extorted from his fears, the four maritime provinces of Muſtaphanagur, Yalore, Rajamundrum and Chicacole. Theſe acquiſitions, together with the province of Condavir, put the French in poſſeſſion of "the ſea-coaſt of Coromandel and Oriſſa, in an uninterrupted line of ſix hundred miles, from the Gondegama to the famous Pagoda of Jagganat ‡." This extenſive territory, yielding annually more than half a million ſterling, was the greateſt dominion, hitherto, poſſeſſed by Europeans in Hindoſtan. In return for ceſſions ſo valuable, the French lent their arms to the Subah, to re-

The French obtain four provinces,

which yield annually half a million.

* Dow's Decline of the Empire. † Orme, vol. i. p. 329. ‡ Ibid. p. 334, 335.

cover

cover the tribute due to the empire, from the rich and extenſive province of Myſore. It was his march into that country, which delivered the Carnatic, in April 1755, from the troubleſome, though ineffectual, war carried on at Tritchinopoly by the Myſorean regent.

A ſuſpenſion of arms between the Engliſh and French.

The conditional treaty concluded in 1754 had introduced a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities between the Engliſh and French, not only as enemies to one another, but as allies to the country-powers. Mahommed Ali, now acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic, was ſtill far from profeſſing that deciſive authority over the country, which the nature of his office implied. The Zemindars of the province of Madura, and the Polygars of Tinnevelly raiſed diſturbances in the ſouth; and though the Polygars of the north had made ſome compenſation, for the tribute, which they had retained during the late civil war, their ſubmiſſion had only the appearance of being temporary, as they were not deprived of the means of ſupporting future diſobedience. Mortaz-Ali, the Phouſdar of Velore, was not only a powerful, and, therefore, a dangerous dependent; but had even been, and ſtill might be, the rival of the Nabob, as governor of the country, ſhould the preſent ſtate of the Engliſh influence ſuffer any change. When a force had marched from Arcot, to demand the cuſtomary tribute, the interference of the French, in favour of Mortaz-Ali, had convinced the Nabob, that they only waited for a future opportunity to renew their former exertions againſt his title and power.

Unſettled ſtate of the Carnatic.

Mortaz-Ali ſupported by the French.

Rajah of Tanjore refractory.

To add to his embarraſſment, the Rajah of Tanjore, whom he had a right to conſider as a vaſſal of the empire, accountable for his conduct to him, as Nabob of Arcot, had not only ſhewn an attachment to his enemies in the late war, but had, now, without his authority, kindled a war of his own. This war was carried on, againſt Tondiman, a Polygar, whoſe allegiance had been transferred

Attached to the French.

Makes war on Tondeman.

to

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to the Moguls, as a dependent on Tritchinopoly, when that city and province came under their power. His territories lay between Tanjore and Madura, bordering, in part, to the north, on the province of Tritchinopoly, to the Naig of which the Polygar had been ſubject, from the earlieſt account we have received of the affairs of the Carnatic *. Faithful to his duty, as a vaſſal, he not only ſent a body of four hundred horſe and three thouſand Colleries to the aid of the Nabob, when beſieged in Tritchinopoly in 1752; but had, during the war, ſupplied the army with proviſions †; when, at the very time, the Rajah of Tanjore prevented his merchants from carrying any to the camp or city. Againſt this uſeful and faithful vaſſal, Pretaupa-Sing proceeded to hoſtilities. The pretence of war marks the character and injuſtice of the Rajah. Having ceded Kelly-nelly-cotah and its diſtricts to Tondeman, for ſervices performed, in a ſeaſon of diſtreſs, he diſavowed the ceſſion, when that diſtreſs was removed. Mona-jî, who was, at the time, general and miniſter of Tanjore, enraged at his maſter's perfidy, "purloined the uſe of the ſeal, and delivered the patents, thus apparently authenticated, according to promiſe." Captain Calliaud, who commanded at Tritchinopoly, by working on Pretaupa-Sing's natural timidity, ſuſpended hoſtilities, but could not induce the Rajah to lay aſide the deſign of war ‡.

A faithful vaſſal of the Carnatic.

Cauſes of the war.

War between Great Britain and France.

In May 1756, war was declared between Great Britain and France. But the two Companies, on the coaſt of Coromandel, had ſo much weakened their reſpective forces, by detachments, to other parts of India, that both ſeemed averſe to commit hoſtilities, for ſome time after the advices of a breach, between the two nations,

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 941.

† Orme, vol. i. p. 172. 273. 285. 294. 343. 346. 351. This Polygar, Tondeman, ſtill remained a friend to the Nabob. He ſometimes ſent his troops, and *all* our proviſions came from his country. Lawrence, p. 45. Vide Cambridge's Tranſactions on the Coaſt, p. 78.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 403. Cambridge's Tranſactions on the Coaſt of Coromandel, p. 99.

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arrived §. Though they took the field, at laſt, nothing remarkable happened during the year 1757. The diſturbances of the Carnatic ſtill continued. Two of the Nabob's brothers, aiming at independence, took arms in the two extremities of his government. Mapheus Chan, employed in the reduction of the Polygars, in the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, having obtained a complete victory, held the city of Madura, in oppoſition to the Nabob and his allies; whilſt Nazeabulla, his natural brother *, became refractory in his government of Nellore. To add to the public calamities ariſing from this double rebellion, the Marattas invaded the Carnatic to demand the Chout, which had not been paid ever ſince the defeat and death of Anwar-ul-dien in 1749. But their retreat was purchaſed with the trifling ſum of three lacks of rupees †.

1757. Diſturbances in the Carnatic.

Two of the Nabob's brothers rebel.

The Marattas demand the Chout.

Though Captain Calliaud had, by his ſpirited conduct, ſuſpended the war between Pretaupa-Sing and Tondiman in 1756, the Rajah had reſumed his hoſtile intentions in the beginning of 1757. Kelly-nelly-cotah, the object of conteſt, was taken by Mona-jî, the general of Tanjore, in the month of January. But though Calliaud made a journey to Tanjore, as well to re-eſtabliſh peace, as to obtain troops, from both the contending parties, to aſſiſt in the reduction of Madura, he failed, in all his efforts, and found the difference between them irreconcileable ‡. Both promiſed fair; but Tondiman only adhered to his word. A thouſand of his horſe and one hundred Colleries joined Calliaud at Anwaſhul. Five hundred horſe were expected from Tanjore; but none came. Calliaud "being convinced that the Rajah, notwithſtanding his promiſes, did not intend to ſend any, made a merit of rejecting what he was not likely to obtain ||." Yet a late writer dogmatically affirms, from the hiſtorian juſt cited,

War ketween Tanjore and Tondiman ſtill continues.

Tanjore refuſes to aid the Engliſh.

The Rajah's treacherous conduct.

A late writer cenſured.

§ Cambridge, p. 108.
* Ibid. p. 110. Orme, vol. ii.
† 37,500 l.
‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 198.
|| Ibid.

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that Pretaupa-Sing "had attached *his ſelf* to the cauſe of the Engliſh, had ſupported their ally, had fought his and their battles *.

1758. M. Lally arrives at Pondicherry.

On the 28th of April 1758, a conſiderable reinforcement of troops arrived at Pondicherry, under the command of the Count de Lally. The known ſuperiority of the French on the coaſt, prior to the coming of this force, had determined the Engliſh Preſidency to ſuſpend all operations in the field, and to diſtribute the troops in the different garriſons †. On the very evening of Lally's landing at Pondicherry, he ordered one thouſand men, under Count d'Eſtaign, to march towards Fort St. David; but it was the 26th of May before he opened his batteries againſt the place. On the firſt of June the fort ſurrendered, after a feeble reſiſtance; and Devi-Cotah was evacuated before the enemy marched that way. Nothing leſs, than the total expulſion of the Britiſh from the coaſt of Coromandel, if not from all India, was the object of the French; who were, now, poſſeſſed of a greater force of Europeans, than was ever before, at one period, in that country. Madras was the next object, after the taking of Fort St. David. But the ſuperiority of the Britiſh ſquadron rendered it difficult, if not impracticable, to tranſport, by ſea, the neceſſary ſtores from Pondicherry for beſieging the place; and Lally had neither money nor influence in the country, to enable him to carry them by land.

Takes Fort St. David.

To ſupply his wants, he reſolves to attack Tanjore.

The wealth of the Rajah of Tanjore had rendered him a fit object of plunder; and, beſides, the French government at Pondicherry were poſſeſſed of ſuch a claim as might give a colour of juſtice to demands upon that wealth. When, in the year 1751, Muzzifer-Jung, as Subah of the Decan, and Chunder-Saib, in quality of Nabob of Arcot, had reduced Pretaupa-Sing to extremity, he compounded the arrears of tribute, from the death of Sipadar Ali in 1742, at 5,600,000 rupees ‡. Unable, or rather unwilling, to pay this

His claims on the Rajah.

* Defence of Lord Pigot, p. 40. † Cambridge, p. 123. ‡ 632,500l.

ſum, he had given his bond to Chunder-Saib; and Chunder-Saib had transferred his property, in that deed, to the French government. To add political importance to this kind of private claim, the Count de Lally, in imitation of the Engliſh in 1749, eſpouſed the cauſe of a pretender to the government of Tanjore. The wretched figure, whom he reſolved to raiſe, on this occaſion, to favour his views, was one Gatica, the uncle of Shaw-jî, whoſe pretenſions the Engliſh Preſidency had aſſerted, where they ſuffered themſelves to be purchaſed from his cauſe by the ceſſion of Devi-Cotah. His honourable allies had agreed to detain Shaw-jî, in priſon, when they ſettled matters with his rival; but the unfortunate man found means to eſcape from their hands. In revenge for his flight, or to ſecure his inactivity, they threw Gatica into the fetters from which his nephew had extricated himſelf. With Fort St. David, he fell into the hands of Lally, who produced him at Pondicherry, "with much oſtentation and ceremony *," to raiſe the apprehenſions, and conſequently to open the treaſure, of Pretaupa-Sing to his intended demands †.

He raiſes up a pretender.

The preparations and intentions of Lally having reached the ears of Pretaupa-Sing, he ſolicited the aid of the Nabob and the protection of the Engliſh. Though his former conduct had given him no claim to aſſiſtance from either, they were both willing to give, from policy, what he had no right to aſk from their gratitude. They, therefore, authorized Captain Calliaud, who then commanded at Tritchinopoly, to act as occaſion might require. But that officer, from his perſonal knowledge of the character of the Rajah, together with "the continual and authentic accounts, which he obtained of the duplicity of his councils ‡," was afraid of "ſending ſuccours, which might be betrayed to the enemy §." He was apprehenſive,

Rajah ſolicits the aid of the Nabob, &c.

which he is ordered to receive.

His undeciſive and treacherous conduct.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 318.
† Orme and Lawrence, paſſim.
‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 322.
§ Ibid.

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on the other hand, that his with-holding aſſiſtance might furniſh the timidity of Pretaupa, with a pretext to make terms with the French. " He, therefore, at all riſques, detached five hundred Sepoys with ten European artillery-men, and three hundred Colleries *," to Tanjore. This force, he deemed, was ſufficient to keep up the hopes of the Rajah of receiving more; having prudently reſolved to accommodate his own future aid to the conduct of Pretaupa; which, as he had reaſon to diſtruſt it, he gave directions ſhould be narrowly watched †.

Diſtruſted by Major Calliaud.

Rajah treats with the French.

Lally, marching from Pondicherry on the 18th of June, arrived on the ſame day of July, within ſix miles of Tanjore. Pretaupa-Sing, having endeavoured to amuſe the French in their march with negociation, their commander, with a precipitate folly, inſeparable from his character, expoſed his own incapacity of enforcing any terms, by the nature of thoſe he propoſed. Having reduced his claim of more than five millions of rupees, to one million; he inſiſted upon receiving ten thouſand pounds weight of gun-powder.

Folly and precipitation of Lally.

1758.

Though the want of an article, ſo neceſſary to the operations of war, might be thought a ſufficient encouragement againſt all treaty, the feeble ſpirit of Pretaupa gave way, upon the arrival of ſome battering cannon, from Karrical ‡. " He conferred in earneſt with Lally, and concluded a treaty, the terms of which were founded on that commander's declaration, that he intended to march from Tanjore againſt Tritchinopoly §."

Rajah is intimidated.

July 29.

He agrees to aid the French againſt the Nabob and Engliſh.

To aid the French againſt his ſuperior, the Nabob, as well as the Engliſh, the allies of that prince, whoſe troops were actually defending his capital, the treacherous and timid Pretaupa " agreed to lend three hundred of his beſt horſe, to furniſh one thouſand Coolies and Mattockmen, and to ſupply the French army with proviſions during the ſiege ‖." He alſo conſented " to

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 322. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p 324. § Ibid. ‖ Ibid.

deliver

deliver two reſpectable hoſtages, and to give five hundred thouſand rupees *, to be paid, at different periods, and upon the execution of ſtated terms §.

Raſhneſs of Lally breaks the treaty.

The languor, with which his part of the treaty was executed by Pretaupa Sing, inflamed the iraſcible ſpirit of Lally, into a renewal of the war. The puerile threats of that officer improved the natural timidity of the Rajah into deſpair. He reſolved to defend himſelf to the laſt extremity. He redoubled his ſolicitations for aid from Tritchinopoly. Captain Calliaud, who was no ſtranger to the late negociations, "had hitherto thought it unſafe to truſt any more troops in the Rajah's power, whilſt making engagements to aſſiſt the French, in the reduction of Tritchinopoly †." But, being convinced, from this laſt rupture, that the time of negociation was paſt, he detached on the 6th of Auguſt a conſiderable reinforcement to Tanjore. Lally, having opened his batteries on the 2d, had on the 7th made a breach in the wall. But, having expended his ammunition, and being alſo terrified, by the defeat of the French ſquadron, on the coaſt, he called a council of war, in which it was reſolved to raiſe the ſiege ‡. In his retreat he was haraſſed by the Tanjorines; and, thus, ended an expedition, undertaken through diſtreſs, carried on in folly, and defeated by paſſion and impatience.

He raiſes the ſiege.

The French ſuperior in force to the Engliſh.

Though the ineffectual hoſtilities againſt Tanjore had demonſtrated, that the French were deſtitute of the means of war, as well as of an able commander for carrying it on, their ſuperiority in numbers ſtill induced the Britiſh to confine themſelves within their forts. The Count de Lally, with all the intemperance and impatience of his violent mind, quarrelled with his friends, whilſt he made rapid preparations for attacking his enemies. His diſappointment, rather than defeat, before Tanjore, had roufed his indignation, as having

* 62,500 l.
§ Orme, vol. ii. p. 324, 325.
† Orme, vol. ii. p. 326.
‡ Orme, Cambridge, India Papers, paſſim.

proceeded

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proceeded from a contemptible enemy; and he reſolved to recover from a more reſpectable foe, the laurels, which his own precipitate folly had loſt. Having taken the field, in the end of September, he took poſſeſſion of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, on the 4th of October, with all the oſtentation natural to exceſſive pride §.

Lally takes Arcot.

On the 12th of the ſame month, a conſiderable reinforcement, from the French ſettlements in Golconda, having croſſed the mountains, behind the pagoda of Tripetti, arrived at Arcot. This additional force eſcorted a conſiderable ſum of money, which, with ſupplies of the ſame kind from Mauritius, enabled Lally to proſecute the war, with vigour ‖.

Preparations for the defence of Madras.

The Preſidency at Fort St. George, no longer in doubt concerning Lally's intention to lay ſiege to that place, began to prepare for a vigorous defence. An officer of the moſt diſtinguiſhed merit, Colonel Lawrence, commanded the garriſon; but the nominal "defence of the ſiege *" was committed, by a vote of the Council, to Mr. George Pigot, then Preſident for the Company, at Madras. This gentleman, though bred to trade, was poſſeſſed of perſonal reſolution; and he had once ſeen the face of an enemy, about ſeven years before †. "Every good officer being in the field," in the middle of July 1751, Mr. Saunders, then Governor of Fort St. David, ordered Mr. Pigot, one of the Council, to conduct a convoy of ſtores to Verdachellum, a fort to the north of the river Coleroon. This ſervice he performed, without loſs; but being attacked, upon his return, by the troops of a Polygar, with match-lock guns, Mr. Pigot had the good fortune to ſave himſelf, by the ſpeed of his horſe ‡. The vote, which conferred upon Pigot "the defence of the ſiege ¶," directed him to conſult Colonel Lawrence, on all occa-

Mr. Pigot to have the command.

His former military actions.

§ Orme, vol. ii. p. 368. Cambridge, p. 140.
‖ Orme, India Papers, paſſim.
* Orme, vol. ii. p. 388.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 181.
‡ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 388.

ſions,

ſions, and on extraordinary emergencies to aſſemble a council of the ſuperior officers of the garriſon ‖. Mr. Pigot, during the ſubſequent ſiege, exhibited reſolution and activity. He viſited the works every day, encouraged the garriſon, and rewarded their ſervices, with money. But the moſt commendable part of his conduct was his attention to the proviſions, which were plenty and good in their kind ¶.

His aſſiduity and care of the proviſions.

To theſe arrangements, within the walls of Fort St. George, preparations were made, without, to diſturb the ſiege, with which it was threatened. The garriſon of Chingleput was reinforced. Captain Calliaud, with a party, was ordered from Tritchinopoly, upon which the command and protection of that city were committed to Captain Joſeph Smith, who has ſince made ſuch a diſtinguiſhed figure, on the coaſt of Coromandel. That officer had, by orders from the Preſidency, detached two thouſand Sepoys, from his garriſon, on the 21ſt of November. The Rajah of Tanjore, the Marawar, and the Polygar Tondiman, who had ſo freely and ſo faithfully given aid, in the Myſorean war, gave aſſurances and was really collecting ſome troops *. But the Marawar returned no anſwer †, either to the requiſitions of the Nabob, or the ſolicitations of the Preſidency ‡. The Rajah of Tanjore, notwithſtanding the late injuries he had ſuſtained from the French, and the late aid he had received from the Engliſh, expreſſed himſelf in equivocal terms. To overcome his obſtinacy and, if poſſible, to rouze his gratitude, Major Calliaud was ſent, on the 30th of November, in a common maſſoola, to Tranquebar; from whence he was to proceed to Tanjore, "to convince the Rajah of the impolicy of his indifference §."

Preparations made, without the fort.

The Rajah of Tanjore ſolicited for aid.

His equivocal profeſſions.

Major Calliaud ſent to Tanjore.

‖ Orme, vol. ii. p. 388.
¶ Ibid. p. 457.
* Ibid. p. 384.
† Ibid.
‡ India Papers.
§ Orme, vol. ii. p. 384.

Major

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He arrives at that place.

Major Calliaud, after having encountered various difficulties and overcome many interruptions, arrived at Tanjore, on the 17th of December. Prior to that officer's arrival, Captain Joſeph Smith at Tritchinopoly had "cloſely preſſed" the Rajah, to furniſh the thouſand horſe requeſted by the Preſidency *. But he pleaded the ravages committed by the French, as an excuſe, and "demanded two hundred thouſand rupees † beforehand;" at length he plainly ſaid, that he thought the Engliſh did not care what befel the territories of their allies, provided they could defend their own. But as he could not allege this indifference to himſelf, when attacked by the French, he cited the unconcern, with which they had ſuffered "that nation to take every fort belonging to the Nabob, and even his capital of Arcot, without making any efforts to protect them;" yet "he knew the Preſidency had not the means, and with the Nabob's were loſing their own revenues ‡." Colonel Calliaud found the Rajah ſo prepoſſeſſed of the decline of the fortune of the Engliſh, that he neglected the cuſtomary attentions to himſelf, as their repreſentative; for, inſtead of allotting to him a houſe, he permitted him to reſide in a common choultry, the uſual receptacle of the meaneſt travellers §.

Fai hleſs and unfr endly conduct of the Rajah.

His ſarcaſm on the Engliſh.

His inattention to their repreſentative.

To add inſult to his want of attention, the Rajah permitted the two French hoſtages, whom he had detained, ever ſince Lally's ineffectual ſiege, to depart, as it were, in Major Calliaud's ſight. In a conference with the Major, he alleged, that he had ſufficiently expoſed himſelf to the reſentment of the French, by having already ſent three hundred horſe to the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh. Yet theſe horſe were not furniſhed by the Rajah, but hired in his territories, by the Nabob's agents ‖. The Rajah, knowing that Calliaud could raiſe no money, on the credit of the Company, in the preſent gloomy ſtate of their

He refuſes aſſiſtance, and favours the French.

1758. His evaſive conduct.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 437.
† 25,000 l.
‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 437.
§ Ibid. p. 438.
‖ Ibid. p. 399.

affairs, offered four hundred horſe, provided he would diſcharge their arrears. In vain did Calliaud apply for money at Tanjore, at Negapatam and even at Tritchinopoly. The agents, who had been accuſtomed, in the firſt of thoſe places, to give money, for bills on the Preſidency, were either intimidated by the Rajah, or terrified by the untoward aſpect of the times. The Dutch of Negapatam, though they proffered a loan, took ſuch advantage of the ſtate of things, that they demanded a diſcount of 25 per cent. upon bills; and the Shroff at Tritchinopoly "retracted his promiſe, and refuſed to ſupply money, upon any terms *." But though Mr. Norris, a member of the Council, who happened to paſs through Tanjore, on his way to Tritchinopoly, advanced ten thouſand pagodas; and, "by this ſupply obviated the pretexts of delay," the Rajah broke his promiſe with regard to the horſe †. This diſhonourable and evaſive conduct forced Major Calliaud to quit Tanjore, expreſſing at his departure his utmoſt indignation, which he intended ſhould be conveyed to the Rajah's ears ‡. Terrified by the diſguſt, reſentment and abrupt departure of Major Calliaud, he ordered, at length, the demanded cavalry to march; but having, perhaps deſignedly, broke his promiſe of paying their arrears, they proceeded ſlowly, reluctantly and uſeleſsly, on their way §.

He ſhamefully breaks his promiſe.

The Rajah's treachery to the Engliſh was accompanied by inſults to his ſuperior the Nabob. Under the uncertainty of the ſafety of the fort, Colonel Lawrence had prevailed with that prince, to leave Madras, with his family, on the 20th of December. After a ſhort, but tempeſtuous paſſage by ſea, he arrived at the Dutch ſettlement of Negapatam, on his way to Tritchinopoly. His wife had been brought to bed on board; and had fallen into a dangerous illneſs. The retreat of the Nabob, from Madras, under the cir-

He inſults the Nabob.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 439. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 440.

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cumſtances, which attended it, convinced Pretaupa Sing, that both he and his allies deſpaired of being able to keep the place. The Nabob announced by his agent, that he intended to come into the city of Tanjore, on his way to Tritchinopoly; and that he expected, as uſual, to be met by the Rajah on the road. But the Rajah, "either from the malignant pleaſure of inſulting his ſuperior in diſtreſs *," or from his dread of the French, refuſed either to admit the Nabob into the city, or to pay him the cuſtomary viſit, without the walls. He paid no attention to the repreſentations of Major Calliaud, "who endeavoured to correct his contumacy †." The Nabob, having arrived on the 5th of January 1759, at a village within ſeven miles of Tanjore; Major Calliaud, having viſited that prince, went afterwards into Tanjore; and by exhortations, but chiefly by the appearance of his eſcort, prevailed on the Rajah, to viſit his ſuperior in the cuſtomary manner ‡.

He refuſes to admit him into Tanjore, or to viſit him.

But is prevailed on to the latter by Calliaud.

The French ſit down before Madras.

During theſe tranſactions at Tanjore, the French army were preparing to preſs Fort St. George with a ſiege. The operations of war form no part of the deſign of this eſſay. It is doubtful whether the ignorance of the enemy in the ſcience of attack, or the ſpirit of the beſieged in defence, contributed moſt to ſave the place. The trenches were opened on the 2d of January 1759; and the French quitted them with precipitation, on the appearance of a reinforcement, on the 17th of February. In a ſally conducted, with more ſpirit than judgment, the famous Count d'Eſtaing was taken. The loſs of that active partiſan, together with the death of Saubinet, an able officer, ruined the exertions of Lally, who ſeemed to have had none of the requiſites neceſſary to conſtitute a general, except enterpriſe and courage. The repulſe of the French diminiſhed their military reputation and increaſed that of the Engliſh. The Rajah of Tanjore, in ſubſerviency to this change of fortune, congratulated

1759. The ſiege raiſed.

Rajah of Tanjore congratulates the ſucceſs at Madras.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 439. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

the ſucceſs at Madras, with a diſcharge of his guns *. The Preſidency, encouraged by his profeſſions †, propoſed to him to aſſiſt them in ſurpriſing the fort of Karrical. But Pretaupa, or his miniſter in his name anſwered, that the laſt hoſtilities of the French had ruined his country; that, as the Engliſh had driven the French from Madras, they ſhould drive them alſo from Pondicherry, "when Karrical would fall of courſe ‡." The Preſidency then requeſted, that he would permit beeves to be purchaſed in his country as proviſions for the ſquadron §. Regarding this demand, as an inſult upon his religion, he would not ſuffer the interpreter to go on, in reading their letter ‖.

but refuſes aſſiſtance to the Engliſh.

Will not ſuffer the letter of the Preſidency to be read.

The reinforcement, whoſe arrival had induced Lally to raiſe the ſiege of Madras, rendered the Engliſh equal, in number of Europeans, to the French on the coaſt. But the want of bullocks, coolies, and other neceſſaries prevented their taking the field till the firſt week in March ¶. The gallant Colonel Lawrence, worn out by the infirmities of age and by diſeaſe, found himſelf obliged to relinquiſh a ſervice, in which he had made ſuch a conſpicuous figure. Colonel Draper, the next in command, whoſe health was impaired by the climate, found himſelf obliged to quit the coaſt. Major Calliaud ſucceeded the firſt, in the command of the Company's troops; and Major Brereton the latter, at the head of thoſe of the king. After ſome movements of no conſequence, the two armies, as it were by mutual conſent, remained inactive during the greateſt part of the ſummer. The Engliſh waited for reinforcements; the French were mutinous, for want of clothing and pay. About three hundred men having arrived from Europe at Madras, in the beginning of September, Major Brereton, as commander in chief, took

The Engliſh equal in force to the French.

1759. Colonel Lawrence reſigns the ſervice.

Nothing material happens till the end of the year.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 465.
† Rous's Appendix, No. V. p. 46.
‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 465.
§ Orme, vol. ii. p. 465.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Cambridge, p. 197.

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the field; but being repulſed at Wandewaſh, he ſent the troops into cantonment near Conjeveram †. Lieutenant-Colonel Coote arriving, in the mean time, from Europe, took the command of the army. But the year 1759 cloſed, without any action of much conſequence or great renown.

1760. Battle of Wandewaſh. January.

The year 1760 opened with an action, which, in its conſequences, decided the fate of the war on the coaſt of Coromandel. The Engliſh, having taken Wandewaſh in December 1759, had revived the reputation of their arms in the eyes of the country powers; and the poſſeſſion of that place was of ſo much importance to the French, that they ſat down before it in the month of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, in relieving Wandewaſh, defeated the whole force of the enemy in a regular battle. Having loſt near eight hundred dead and wounded in the action and left all their cannon and other trophies and ſpoils of war on the field, they were obliged to ſhut themſelves up in Pondicherry. Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, fell into the hands of the victors in the month of February ‡. The French, in conſequence of their defeat, recalled their troops from the iſland of Seringam, near Tritchinopoly, which had been relinquiſhed to them, by the regent of the Myſore, in the year 1755.

Arcot taken,

and various other forts.

The forts of Permacoil, Alamparva, Karical, and ſeveral other places of ſtrength, fell, one by one, into the hands of the Engliſh; and Lieutenant-Colonel Coote took meaſures, in the beginning of April, to block up Pondicherry itſelf by land §.

Nabob propoſes to return to Arcot.

During theſe tranſactions, in the Carnatic, the Nabob remained, in the fortreſs of Tritchinopoly. On the 30th of January, he received the news of the battle of Wandewaſh; upon which he pitched his tent, diſplayed his great ſtandard and declared his intention of returning to the centre of his government ||. Solicitous to make his

† Cambridge, p. 256.
‡ Orme, vol. ii. p. 595.
§ Cambridge, p. 269.
|| Orme, vol. ii. p. 599.

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appearance with pomp and figure, he requeſted Captain Joſeph Smith to go and aſk five hundred horſe of the Rajah of Tanjore *. The cavalry, which the Rajah had granted, the year before, to the threats of Major Calliaud, had returned home, in the month of April, without having performed any ſervice †. After the battle of Wandewaſh, changing with the current of fortune, not only the Rajah had ſent horſe and foot, but even the two Marawars their Colleries to the Nabob at Tritchinopoly. But Pretaupa-Sing, with his uſual verſatility, ſoon withdrew his troops. When Smith arrived at Tanjore, the Rajah, who either was, or pretended to be, indiſpoſed, with difficulty admitted his viſit. He recommended him to his Dubbeer, or treaſurer; but that officer, "notwithſtanding the late ſucceſs of the Britiſh arms, inſiſted that the Nabob ſhould furniſh the pay and the expences." This, he knew, would be refuſed; "and Captain Smith returned, without obtaining a ſingle horſeman ‡."

He demands, in vain, an eſcort of horſe from Tanjore.

Evaſive conduct of the Rajah.

The blockade of Pondicherry employed the arms of the Engliſh, during the remaining part of the year 1760. M. Lally, to extricate himſelf, from his diſtreſſed ſituation, had entered into a treaty with the Myſoreans, with whom the French had maintained a correſpondence, ever ſince the war, they had jointly carried on, from 1752 to 1755. A revolution had happened in Myſore, by which Lally had hoped to profit. Hyder-Ali, a Mahommedan partizan, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the ſervice of the Rajah of Myſore as a ſoldier of fortune, had found means to become his miniſter. Having diſplaced the uncle of the young prince, he ſeized the reins of government; but to provide againſt a reverſe of fortune, he was anxious to acquire a place of retreat. Such a place Lally promiſed to procure for him in the Carnatic; which, together with other terms, beyond the power of the French to fulfil, induced the new regent to ſend troops and proviſions to Pondicherry. But the firſt ſoon failed;

Blockade of Pondicherry.

French treaty with Hyder-Ali.

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 601. † Ibid. p. 495. ‡ Ibid. p. 601.

and

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and the latter, with the uſual fickleneſs of Aſiatics, retired. The town reduced, at length, to the laſt extremity by famine, ſurrendered at diſcretion on the 16th of January 1761 *.

Pondicherry taken.

The power of the French expires in India.

With Pondicherry, the power of France, on the continent of India, expired. Some forts of little conſequence, in the center of the Carnatic, were garriſoned by French troops; but when the trunk was cut down, the branches ſoon decayed. Thiagur ſurrendered, in February, to Major Preſton, at diſcretion; and the almoſt impregnable fortreſs of Gingee could only ſecure the honours of war to its garriſon, which capitulated to Captain Smith on the fifth of April †. The fall of that place terminated the war which had continued, with little intermiſſion, for fifteen years, between the Engliſh and French, on the coaſt of Coromandel. The ſame current of misfortune had overwhelmed the latter, in every other part of India. Their government and commerce were extirpated in Bengal. They had loſt the northern provinces, which had been their reward for the murder of Nazir Jung, the untimely death of his ſon Muziffer and their ſupport of his brother Sullabut, as Subah of the Decan. A few military adventurers of their nation had retired to Myſore, in purſuit of fortune and ſubſiſtence; and theſe, with ſome trading houſes on ſufferance at Surat and Calicut, became a kind of inſult on the former power of the French, by connecting its memory with misfortune.

Their other garriſons ſurrender.

Their government and commerce extirpated.

The Engliſh and French only auxiliaries.

Though the hoſtilities, between the Engliſh and French Companies, had become a part of the war between the two nations, as each was aſſiſted by its reſpective ſovereign, they were both, ſtrictly ſpeaking, but auxiliaries to the rivals for the Nabobſhip of the Carnatic. The Engliſh, at leaſt, conſidered themſelves, as only contending for the legal government, under which they had ſo long flouriſhed ‡, againſt uſurpers, either created or ſupported by the in-

Engliſh conſidered themſelves as ſubjects of the Mogul empire.

* Cambridge, Orme, India Papers, paſſim.
† Orme, vol. ii. p. 733.
‡ Governor Saunders's Letter to the French Deputies, Feb. 15, 1754. Cambridge's Ap. p. 34.

trigues

trigues and arms of the French. The former, acknowledging the authority of the Mogul, "from whom they had received Phirmâns, for their ſettlements and trade, and lived under the protection of his governors," conſidered their ſupport of his officers neceſſary, on every principle of juſtice and gratitude *. They knew that the family of Anwar-ul-dien were the undoubted repreſentatives of the emperor in the Carnatic; and their Preſident ſcrupled not to affirm, in a public deed, that the French had violated the fundamental laws of the country, and had actually rebelled, in oppoſing the legal deputies of the empire †. He ſupported the aſſertion with indiſputable facts. Anwar-ul-dien was the acknowledged, undoubted, and legal Nabob, when the French killed him in battle, ſupporting rebels againſt his authority. Nazir-Jung was governor-general of the Decan, the acknowledged repreſentative of the Mogul, when he was aſſaſſinated, by the intrigues of the French; and they continued their rebellion againſt the Mogul, in the perſon of his undoubted repreſentative Mahommed Ali, as his rights to his government had not only been derived from a legal viceroy, but had alſo been approved by the court of Delhi ‡.

They thought it their duty to ſupport its officers.

The family of Anwar-ul-dien its legal officers.

The French, by oppoſing them, become rebels.

The French, on the other hand, had uniformly ſupported uſurpation, rebellion, and aſſaſſination. Having contributed to the murder of Nazir-Jung, the lawful viceroy of the Decan, they raiſed Muziffer-Jung to the vacant Muſnud. This Suba, whoſe only title to office aroſe from murder, appointed Chunder-Saib, his deputy, in the Carnatic. The uſurpation of Muziffer terminating with his life, ſcarce two months after his elevation, the French created another fictitious viceroy in the Decan. Under this illegal viceroy, they obtained ſome provinces for themſelves and diſpoſed of the governments of others, by his illegal commiſſions. Notwithſtanding the declining ſtate of the empire, and the weakneſs of the prince, who ſat upon the throne,

They ſupport uſurpers,

who never received commiſſions from Delhi.

* Cambridge's Appendix, p. 34. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 35, &c.

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the court of Delhi could never be perſuaded to give validity, by commiſſions, to ſuch daring invaſions, upon its authority. Upon the death of Nazir Jung, his eldeſt brother Ghazi-ul-dien was appointed governor-general of the Decan; and when that viceroy was poiſoned, by the procurement of Sullabut Jung, his ſon of the ſame name was nominated to his vacant office. The elder Ghazi ſent his Saneds * to Mahommed Ali, for the government of the Carnatic, which were, afterwards, confirmed by the younger Ghazi, as vizier of the empire. The Mogul himſelf, in proof of his full approbation of the appointment, was pleaſed to ſend his own phirmân to the Nabob; and to order the Engliſh to ſupport him, againſt all the enemies of his authority ‡.

Mahommed Ali legally appointed Nabob.

Recapitulation of facts.

It appears, by the acknowledgment of the Preſident, acting in his public capacity and negociating a ſolemn treaty, that the Engliſh, ſettled on the coaſt of Coromandel, owned themſelves, on all occaſions, the faithful ſubjects of the Mogul empire ||. It appears alſo, that they conſidered the French, who were on the ſame footing with themſelves, with regard to the empire, as actually rebels, on account of their oppoſing the rights and authority of Mahommed Ali, the lawful repreſentative of the Mogul in the Carnatic †. The inferences to be drawn from the whole are, that the Engliſh were ſubjects of the Mogul empire; that, as ſuch, they acknowledged, ſupported, and ought to have obeyed the Mogul governor of Arcot; that Ma-

Inferences from thoſe facts.

* "We wrote to the Mogul of the revolution, and our attachment to the Circar, and deſired his orders, that we might act in obedience to them. He was graciouſly pleaſed to ſend Nabob Mahommed Allee a phirmaund for the Carnatic, to appoint Gauzedey Cawn viceroy of the Deckan, who likewiſe granted Nabob Mahommed Allee a Saned, and gave us orders to ſupport him. This phirmaund from the Mogul, this ſaned from Gauzedey Cawn, have never been revoked; from which it is obvious, that Nabob Mahommed Allee Cawn's title is juſt, and that we have acted according to the fundamental laws of the country."—Governor Saunders's Letter, p. 36, ubi ſupra.

‡ Governor Saunders to the French Deputies, Feb. 15th, 1754, paſſim.

|| Ibid. p. 36.

† Ibid.

hommed

hommed Ali was that governor; that the war, which terminated in the expulſion of the French, as rebels, was *his* war; and that the Company, inſtead of being principals in it, were ſcarcely allies, as they only performed their duty, as ſubjects ‡. It muſt be owned, that they executed, with ſo much ſpirit and ſo effectually, that duty, that they deſerved every reward, conſiſtent with their original condition and fundamental tenure, in the empire.

Engliſh not principals in the war.

There is, however, great reaſon to believe, that the war, which was brought to ſuch a happy concluſion, by the ſpirit of the Britiſh, had originally ſprung from the "adherence of the family of Anwar-ul-dien, to their cauſe. Had the Nabob continued to obſerve the treaty of neutrality, concluded with the French, in the end of 1746, M. Dupleix would not, probably, have had recourſe to a priſon at Satarah, to raiſe a rival, for the government of the Carnatic. But when Fort St. David was threatened, in March 1747, the Nabob, ſtudious to preſerve the peace of the province, made preparations, which plainly indicated his determined reſolution, to ſupport the Engliſh intereſt, then greatly on the decline, on the coaſt. His ſon, the preſent Nabob, with whom and his brother the French had ſettled the treaty of neutrality, made no ſecret of the indignation, which the conduct of that nation had excited in his mind *. To theſe ſources ought, perhaps, to be traced, the extreme animoſity, which the French exhibited, upon every occaſion, againſt the family of Anwar-ul-dien †. Be that as it will, it is certain, that the preſent Nabob aſcribed all the ſucceeding wars with the French, the death of his father, and the ruin of all his fortune and country, to

The Nabob's ſupporting them, the original cauſe of the misfortunes of his family.

‡ Such ſeem to have been the ideas of Governor Pigot. "It is my ſincere wiſh, that your highneſs ſhould be firmly eſtabliſhed in the ſeat of government, with every honour and advantage poſſeſſed by your anceſtors, and that you may enjoy the *whole* Carnatic; and that the Company may carry on their *buſineſs*, under your highneſs's *protection*, as they did *under that* of former Subadars."—Pigot to Nabob, Aug. 5th, 1759. Vide the ſame to the ſame, June 23d, 1760. The ſame to the Begum, July 1ſt, 1760.

* Rous's Appendix, No I. p. 13.

† Vide Dupleix's Letter to Nazir Jung.

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They, however, extricate him from it.

the zeal, which he himſelf had ſhewn in favour of the Engliſh, in the years 1747 and 1748‡. This circumſtance occaſioned no diminution of that gratitude, which he owed to their ſucceſsful exertions in extricating him and his family, from the difficulties, in which they had been involved, by their attachment.

The Nabob thinks ſeriouſly of an agreement between him and the Engliſh.

When the French were incloſed within the bound-hedge of Pondicherry, in 1760, the Nabob began ſeriouſly to think of forming a new government, or rather a new conſtitution, between himſelf and his ſucceſsful allies. The ravages of the French, Myſoreans and Marattas; the public calamities inſeparable from a long ſeries of hoſtilities; the refractory conduct of Rajahs, Polygars and Killedars, in not only with-holding their juſt tribute, but even aiding the enemies of the lawful government, had impoveriſhed the country, and ruined the finances of the prince. The treaſure of Anwar-uldien had been long exhauſted, by the misfortunes of his family. The precarious revenue, irregularly collected, from ſuch diſtricts, as had not been entirely ruined, by the depredations, or poſſeſſed by the power of the enemy, had been expended, as ſoon as received. But the late defeat of the French, and the almoſt certain proſpect of their being driven entirely from the country, ſeemed to promiſe times of tranquillity and proſperity, which, with proper management, might ſupply the waſte made by a war of near fifteen years.

Terms of that agreement.

On the 13th of June 1760, the Nabob wrote a letter to Mr. Pigot, the Company's Preſident at Madras, containing terms, which, though leſs than his gratitude wiſhed to give *, were greater than his abilities. His propoſitions were, that twenty-eight lacks of rupees, charged upon the groſs revenue of the Carnatic, ſhould be paid *per annum* to the Company, till his debts ſhould be extinguiſhed: That this annual allowance ſhould commence, on the 11th of July 1760: That, beſides the ſum mentioned, which was to be paid at Madras,

‡ Nabob's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, Feb. 1761.

* Nabob's Papers, paſſim.

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the Nabob ſhould advance annually three lacks of rupees to the paymaſter at Tritchinopoly, "for defraying the expence of the Company's people in that garriſon." That ſhould Pondicherry be reduced, the whole money, due to the Company, ſhould be paid, in one year, provided the Engliſh ſhould add a proper force to the troops of the Nabob, to bring to account ſuch vaſſals of the Carnatic, as had with-held their tribute and allegiance, during the late troubles *. That, as the ſum reſerved for the expences of his government was the leaſt, to which thoſe expences could be reduced, he expected, in caſe any of the diſtricts, between Nellore and Tinnevelly, ſhould either be loſt to himſelf, or plundered by the French or Marattas, the amount of ſuch loſs, being fairly and reaſonably ſettled, ſhould be deducted from the twenty-eight lacks, aſſigned to the Company.

His demands on that account

In return for this large aſſignment on his revenues, the Nabob declared, that he expected the Company were not to countenance the refractorineſs of dependents, Killedars or Polygars. That the Engliſh officers, in the different garriſons, ſhould not interfere in the affairs of the country, nor the diſputes of the inhabitants. That the Preſidency ſhould write to ſuch chiefs as depended, by different tenures, on the Carnatic, announcing the preſent agreement. That the Company ſhould aid, upon requiſition, the different renters, in the collection of the revenue. That they ſhould not employ, in their ſervice, any perſon in an office of truſt, under the Nabob's government. That the Nabob's flag ſhould be hoiſted, in the different forts, inſtead of that of the Engliſh. And to conclude the whole, the Nabob deſired, that the friendſhip between him and the Company ſhould be transferred, after his death, to his children and continue, as long as Madras ſhould remain. Mr. Pigot, in the moſt explicit manner, agreed to all theſe articles; and declared, "that he "made the agreement, in full hopes, that it will for ever remain

are agreed to.

* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 23d, 1760. Nabob's Papers, vol. iii. p. 44, 45.

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" firm, and be truly performed by both parties, as long as the Eng-
" liſh ſhall remain in Hindoſtan. By the bleſſing of God," continues the Preſident, " the Company will never fail to give proofs of
" their friendſhip and ſincerity to you and your family, and will be
" firm in ſupporting you and your poſterity, in the Subadary of the
" Carnatic *."

The Preſidency's breach of faith.

Notwithſtanding this ſolemn agreement, the Preſident and Council, ſoon after, applied to the Nabob, for fifty lacks of rupees, inſtead of the ſum ſpecified in Mr. Pigot's letter of the 23d of June 1760. Driven to extremities, by the earneſt inſtances of the Preſidency, he was obliged to borrow money from individuals, to ſilence the clamorous demands of the government. Hence firſt proceeded that enormous weight of debt, under which he has ever ſince groaned; and, from which he has, now, little hopes of ever delivering himſelf. The expences of the ſiege of Madras in 1759, he had cheerfully undertaken to pay; " as it was," to uſe his own words, " the reſidence of his friends." But thoſe friends charged him alſo, with the expences of the ſiege of Pondicherry, as it was " the reſidence of their own enemies." To this demand he alſo agreed, upon condition of receiving the ſtores which ſhould be taken in the place. When the place was taken, notwithſtanding their agreement, the Company's ſervants took the ſtores to themſelves; but they promiſed to allow a certain ſum for them, in the Nabob's account. The Preſidency, accordingly, made an allowance in their books; but the Court of Directors ſent orders to charge again the ſum allowed, to the Nabob's account †.

The firſt cauſe of the misfortunes of the Nabob.

Their evaſive conduct.

Injuſtice of the Court of Directors.

The Nabob's requiſition reſpecting tributaries.

Soon after the taking of Pondicherry, the Nabob made a requiſition of the aid of the Company, to bring to reaſon thoſe dependents on the Carnatic, who had either joined his enemies, during the late

* Pigot to the Nabob, June 23d, 1760, ubi ſupra.

† Sir John Lindſay's Narrative, October 13, 1770. Secretary of State's Office.

war,

war, or had taken advantage of the public diſturbances to with-hold the cuſtomary tribute. As the Preſidency had, upon every occaſion, eſpecially during the war, which terminated in 1754, owned themſelves the ſubjects of the Mogul empire *, and had ſupported its authority, againſt the French and "other REBELS," it was no matter of wonder, that the Nabob, as the repreſentative of that empire, conſidered himſelf entitled to the obedience of all the other dependents on his government. But though the moſt powerful and moſt hoſtile of thoſe dependents were expelled, there were other chiefs and feudatories, who, taking advantage of the late diſturbances, had withheld the duties of their tenures, and even fortified themſelves againſt his power. The moſt conſiderable of thoſe were the three great Polygars of the north, Mortaz-Ali governor of Velore, in the heart of the Carnatic; and, in the ſouth, the greater and leſſer Marawars, together with the Rajah of Tanjore, more wealthy, and conſequently more powerful, than them all †. Mortaz-Ali had not only excluded the authority of the Nabob, from his own government; but had even uſurped his title to the Carnatic. The two Marawars, though always dependent on Madura, had with-held their tribute and their ſervice; and the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore had been ſo uniformly evaſive, verſatile, and even treacherous, that it was plain, he wiſhed for nothing leſs, than the proſperity of the affairs of the Nabob and of thoſe, who had ſupported his cauſe. The Nabob, therefore, requeſted and expected, that the army, after the neceſſary repoſe, would accompany him, to ſubdue by force, or to terrify, into reaſon, thoſe refractory dependents ‖.

The moſt conſiderable of theſe named,

The Rajah of Tanjore.

Mortaz-Ali.

The two Marawars.

The attention of the Preſidency, being turned to other objects, they inſinuated their incapacity, for undertaking, with effect, the expeditions, which the Nabob required. But, in teſtimony of

The Preſidency inſinuate their incapacity.

* Vide Governor Saunders's Letter to the French Deputies, paſſim.

† Orme, vol. ii. p. 725.

‖ Ibid.

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their ſenſe of his decided right to the allegiance, tribute, and feudal duties of all the chiefs, from Nellore to Tinnevelly*, and their own reſolution, upon a proper occaſion, to ſupport him, in thoſe rights, they had directed Governor Pigot to write a circular letter to thoſe chiefs, expreſſive of their ſentiments. They informed the Rajahs, Hamildars, Killedars, and Polygars, among others the Rajah of Tanjore, that "by the bleſſing of God, the *whole* country of the "Carnatic, from Nellore to Tinnevelly†, is fallen under the go- "vernment of Mahommed Ali, and is obedient to his Highneſs's "orders. You are, therefore, implicitly to obey his orders and "commands, which will be for your advantage‡." Governor Pigot, in his private capacity, expreſſed the ſentiments, which he, now, enforced, in his public character. In his letter to the Nabob's wife, dated the firſt of July 1760, he ſays: "The Company has, "with great pleaſure, agreed to all his Excellency's buſineſs, agree- "able to his deſire; and they moſt cordially wiſh proſperity to his "affairs, BEING OBEDIENT TO HIM §." Having expreſſed the purport of the general letter to the chiefs of the Carnatic, he ſays: "By the bleſſing of God, the WHOLE Carnatic is entirely and "firmly eſtabliſhed in the Nabob and his poſterity. As long as "the Engliſh ſettlements remain in the Decan, Bengal, and Hin- "doſtan, the Company's people are diligently to uſe their endeavours "in promoting and aſſiſting the affairs of the Carnatic, in its obe- "dience to the Nabob, and in maintaining firm friendſhip and re- "gard ‖."

They write a circular letter to the tributaries.

The Company profeſs their obedience to the Nabob.

They promiſe to ſupport him, as long as the Engliſh ſettlements remain.

Mortaz-Ali reduced.

The unwillingneſs of the Preſidency, to ſend their army, to enforce the Nabob's authority over his vaſſals and tributaries, ſeemed

* Governor Pigot's General Letter. Nabob's Papers, vol. i. p. 42.

† That is, from the river Pennar to Cape Comorin.

‡ Pigot's General Letter, ubi ſupra.

§ Pigot s Letter to the Nabob's Wife, dated July 1, 1760. Nabob's Papers, vol. i.

‖ Ibid.

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to have ſubſided, in the ſummer of 1761. That prince, therefore, renewed his requiſition of aſſiſtance, in the month of Auguſt, by laying before them an account of the tribute, which had been with-held, from his government, during the late troubles. The infamous Mortaz-Ali, who had murdered two princes of his own family, and uſurped the title of Nabob of the Carnatic, ſtill remained in poſſeſſion of the ſtrong fortreſs of Velore. Having, not only, refuſed his tribute, but even the very ſhew of obedience, though within a few miles of the capital of the province, he was the firſt of the refractory vaſſals of the Carnatic, who was called to account. The reduction of his fort employed, for three months, the exertions of the army *. As the obſtinacy of this dependant, if permitted to compromiſe matters, might furniſh a dangerous example to other vaſſals, the Preſidency reſolved, that no terms ſhould be granted, ſhort of abſolute ſubmiſſion to the mercy of the victors. He was, accordingly, reduced; but the trouble and time, which the conqueſt coſt, furniſhed the Preſident with a ſpecious excuſe †, for a change of ſentiment, no leſs ſudden than it was, at that time, unaccountable.

His obſtinacy terrifies the Preſidency.

1762. January.

The Nabob, in his letter in the month of Auguſt 1761, had explained his claims on the Rajah of Tanjore, as a vaſſal of the Mogul empire, accountable to him for his tribute and feudal ſervices, as Nabob of the Carnatic, by the fundamental laws of the empire. He ſaid, "that Sadatulla Cawn, during his government, had only received annually ten lacks of rupees, from the Rajah; but that his nephew Dooſt-Ali, who ſucceeded him in the government, obliged him to pay ninety lacks at one time. That Sipadar Ali, the ſon of Dooſt-Ali, having obtained the Nabobſhip, upon the defeat and death of his father, in the month of May 1740, not only obliged the Rajah to pay eighty lacks, but, upon his continuing refractory,

Nabob's claims upon Tanjore. A recapitulation of facts.

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 52. † Ibid. p. 53.

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ſeized his capital and perſon, placed a garriſon in Tanjore, and gave the management of civil affairs to one of his own officers. That when the Marattas took Chunder-Saib and Tritchinopoly, in March 1741, Pretaupa-Sing, recovered, by their means, his liberty and government. That, when the Nizam came to regulate the affairs of the Carnatic in 1743, Coja Abdulla, whom he had appointed Nabob, received fifty lacks, from that Rajah. That Anwar-ul-dien, who obtained the government, upon the death of Abdulla, ſettled the tribute, at the annual ſum of ſeven lacks, together with two lacks more as preſents and Durbar charges; which was one lack leſs, than the Rajah's predeceſſors had paid, under the regular and peaceable government of Sadatulla. That, as the Rajah, neglected or poſtponed the payment of his tribute, Anwar-ul-dien had been obliged to march an army againſt him, three different times. That, the laſt of thoſe times, the Rajah had amicably paid a part of his tribute, and granted a bond for ſeven lacks, to be paid with intereſt. That the Rajah, taking advantage of the civil wars, had neglected for the laſt fourteen years, to pay his tribute to the lawful government; but the Nabob, at the ſame time, owned that Muziffer Jung and Chunder-Saib had received eleven lacks, out of ſeventy which the Rajah had promiſed, when they beſieged Tanjore*. As a deduction from the ſum due for tribute, the Nabob acknowledged, that, during his diſtreſs when Tritchinopoly was beſieged, the Rajah had obtained ſome exemptions in the arrears, to induce him to give heartily his aſſiſtance †.

1762. Mr. Pigot recommends a treaty.

If Governor Pigot returned any anſwer to this letter, it was ſuch, as neither the Company ‡, nor the defenders of his conduct §, have choſento lay before the public. Intimidated by the obſtinacy of Mortaz-Ali or perſuaded by Pretaupa-Sing, he opened the year

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 50.
† Ibid. p. 51.
‡ In Rous's Appendix.
§ Defence of Lord Pigot.

1762 ||, with a recommendation of negociation, rather than force, in ſettling accounts, with the "principal powers," he ſhould have ſaid vaſſals, of the Carnatic. As for pitiful Killedars or petty Polygars, he conſigned them, without diſtinction, to the diſcipline of the ſword †. But he declared, "that he thinks it proper to try what can be done with the *king* of Tanjore, by way of treaty." In purſuing this peaceable ſyſtem, Mr. Pigot forgot his former profeſſions and his preſent ſtation. Though he actually was, and had owned himſelf a ſubject of the Mogul empire, and conſequently promiſed obedience to the Nabob of the Carnatic *, the legal repreſentative of the emperor, he aſſumed the functions of ſovereignty; and, without conſulting the Nabob, whatever he might have done, with regard to the Rajah, ſtept in between them as a mediator to prevent a war ‡. To explain the nature of the office, thus arbitrarily aſſumed by Mr. Pigot, a ſhort diſquiſition may be neceſſary.

His extraordinary conduct.

He creates himſelf a mediator.

Though the terms *mediator* and *arbitrator* are ſometimes indiſcriminately uſed by writers, who have treated on the law of nature and nations, there ſeems to be an eſſential difference, in point of degree, in their meaning. When two ſtates, independent of each other, enter into diſputes, which may terminate in a war, they may chuſe another power, as an umpire to decide their differences; and that umpire is properly called a *mediator*. When two private men mutually refer the deciſion of their diſputes to a third perſon, that perſon is rightly named an *arbitrator*. In both caſes, the conſent of the parties is neceſſary, to conſtitute not only the power, but even the very exiſtence of the *mediator* or *arbitrator*. This regular appointment to the office inveſts it with deciſive authority; "for every man makes him the ſupreme judge of his own cauſe,

Diſtinction between a mediator and an arbitrator.

Nature of the office of a mediator.

|| Letter, January 2, 1762. Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 53.

† Ibid.

* Governor Pigot to the Nabob's Wife, July 1, 1760.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 53.

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whom he has choſen umpire *." It muſt be owned, that when two ſovereign ſtates quarrel about their reſpective rights and poſſeſſions, a third frequently interpoſes and endeavours, by authority, by argument, and even by intreaty, to bring them to terms of accommodation. But the interpoſing ſtate is not properly a mediator †. In this caſe, the deciſion of the ſelf-created mediator is not binding on the parties; as any one of them is at liberty either to accept or refuſe the offer ‡.

Mr. Pigot had no title to that office.--Facts, reaſons, and arguments.

Many neceſſary qualifications were evidently wanting to Mr. Pigot, to give him a title to the character of *mediator* between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Rajah of Tanjore. The quarrel was not between two independent ſtates. Had that even been the caſe, Mr. Pigot was neither an independent prince himſelf, nor the repreſentative of an independent ſtate, to give him a colour of right to interpoſe. The Rajah was a tributary, a feudatory, a vaſſal, to the Mogul empire; the Nabob was the deputy of that empire in the Carnatic, the mediate power, to whom the Rajah was accountable, for his duty to the throne. The Nabob, finding that the Rajah had failed in that duty, had an undoubted right by his office, to require the performance of the terms of his tenure. Should the Rajah's obſtinacy render hoſtility neceſſary, it could not be called a war, but a rebellion, on his part. Should even the demands, made by the Nabob, have been unjuſt, he was alone accountable for his conduct to the emperor, his ſovereign, and not to Mr. Pigot, who was himſelf an inferior ſubject to the Mogul. The truth is, the Nabob had no right, ſtrictly ſpeaking, to diminiſh, either by treaty or compromiſe, the tribute or the feudal duties, which the Rajah owed to the empire; and had he even conſented to Mr. Pigot's mediation, the latter, by accepting that office, would have infringed

* Adeo ſummum quiſque cauſæ ſuæ judicem facit, quemcunque eligit. Plin. Nat. Hiſt. Præf.

† Puffendorf, lib. v. cap. 13. § 7.

‡ Ibid.

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the prerogative of his ſovereign* the Mogul, who was the ſole judge of the inherent rights of his own crown. But as Mr. Pigot created himſelf a mediator, without the conſent of the Nabob, he actually aſſumed the character and invaded the perſonal rights of his ſovereign, the Mogul; and committed a ſpecies of treaſon againſt his authority.

Mr. Pigot reſolves, notwithſtanding, to make himſelf a mediator.

But whatever title Mr. Pigot might have had to the office of *mediator*, he reſolved to exert it, as a matter of right. His *oſtenſible* letters to the Rajah, though encouraging with regard to the Nabob's claims, were couched in terms, which implied that every thing depended on the mediator. In proportion as the correſpondence advanced, Pretaupa Sing roſe gradually in the eſteem of the Governor. This lucky change, in his favour, could not poſſibly have proceeded from the elegance of his ſentiments; at leaſt, not from the truth of his aſſertions †. His account of paſt tranſactions, in his letter of the ninth of March, is as falſe, as his allegation of great merit towards the Nabob and Engliſh, during the late war ‡. But he had an agent § at Madras, who it ſeems explained matters, in ſuch a ſatisfactory manner, to the Preſident, that, in the ſhort ſpace of four months, the latter was induced, no doubt, from a thorough conviction of his former miſtakes, to contradict his own letters to the Rajah. On the 30th of January, he writes to Pretaupa Sing, "It will always give me very great concern to be obliged to ſpill "human blood, or forcibly to *diſpoſſeſs* any prince of his country; "but REBELS muſt be puniſhed, if they will not hear reaſon ‖."

Pretaupa riſes in his eſteem.

Cauſes of this alteration of ſentiment.

He calls him a rebel in January;

* The fundamental laws of the country are to acknowledge the Grand Mogul for firſt SOVEREIGN, the Governor-General of the Decan, for his repreſentative in that country; and the particular governors appointed by the Governor-General, as holding their authority from him, (p. 33.)—M. Dupleix, in open violence to the *fundamental laws* of the country, *rebelled* againſt Nabob Anaverdy Cawn, the legal repreſentative of the Great Mogul; an obedience which you have laid down, as the fundamental laws of the country, and conſequently ought to obey. Governor Saunders's Letter, p. 34. ubi ſupra.

† Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 56, 57.

‡ We have already ſtated the Rajah's conduct, during that period, from the moſt indubitable authorities.

§ This was the noted Sambo-jî Punt, well known to the Members of the Council, as well as to the Preſident.

‖ Rous's Appendix, p. 56.

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In a letter to the Nabob, dated May 31ſt, the Preſident ſays, "The "ſettling all affairs, in this part of the country, has been left en- "tirely to you. The preſent caſe is different. *I* conſider the *king* "of Tanjore as a SOVEREIGN PRINCE*." To this opinion of the political character of the Rajah, and the tenure by which he held his government, Mr. Pigot adds a ſpecimen of his own knowledge of the law of nations. "It is a cuſtom," ſays he, "when *two* ſtates diſ- "agree, to call in a THIRD, to judge between them. I offered "*myſelf* as SUCH, and, therefore, the treaty *muſt* be conducted by "*me*. I act as MEDIATOR, the affair cannot, according to cuſtom, "be diſcuſſed in your Durbar†."

in May, a ſovereign prince.

Mr. Pigot erects himſelf into a STATE.

As SUCH, takes the character of Mediator.

Though there is ſome impropriety in calling one's ſelf a STATE, the language of the Preſident is truly PRINCELY, in the preceding quotation. The dignity of the diction is not, however, more remarkable than the alteration in the ſentiments of the writer, ſince the preceding year; when he declared, in his public capacity, the Company's, and conſequently his own "obedience" to the orders of the Nabob‡. Purſuing the ſame regal language, which the idea of a Mediator ſuggeſted, the Preſident announced to the Nabob, that he had choſen an agent, for both, to proceed to Tanjore. "I deſire you," ſays Mr. Pigot, "to give "your inſtructions to Mr. Du Prè, whom *I* have appointed to re- "preſent ME."—At the ſame time, that the mediator wrote ſo authoritatively to the Nabob, he uſed the like freedom, with the Rajah of Tanjore. Though Sambo-jî Punt had convinced the Preſident, that his maſter was a "ſovereign prince," he had neglected to advance arguments of ſtill greater weight, to ſupport his claims. The Rajah was, therefore, reprimanded, threatened, ſoothed, and encouraged; every expedient, in ſhort, was uſed to induce him to

His princely language.

Though he had owned himſelf ſubordinate to the Nabob,

he appoints Mr. Du Prè his *repreſentative* at Tanjore.

Negligence of Sambo-jî Punt.

Rajah reprimanded, threatened, and ſoothed.

* Rous's Appendix, p. 59.
† Ibid. p. 59, 60.
‡ Mr. Pigot to the Nabob's Wife, July 1, 1760, ut ſupra.
§ Rous's Appendix, p. 60.

truſt his affairs intirely in the hands of the mediator, who failed not to impreſs his mind with his own importance. "My troops," ſays the chief agent of a mercantile factory, "are peaceably can-"toned at Chillumbrum, and I ſend to you Mr. Du Prè, one of "the gentlemen of *my* Council, to pay *my* compliments to you, and "to aſſure you of *my* regard *."

The Preſident aſſumes the language of royalty.

The event ſhewed, that the Preſident aſſumed no greater power, than he actually poſſeſſed. The Nabob's repreſentation of the rights of his predeceſſors at length convinced him, by its want of ſucceſs, that he could not inforce his own. In vain he requeſted, that the diſcuſſion of a point, which he perceived was to be interpreted againſt his claims, ſhould be poſtponed. The Preſident was bent on a treaty, and a treaty was conſequently made. Mr. Du Prè, a gentleman of addreſs and abilities, had been ſent to Tanjore, as joint agent from the Nabob and Mr. Pigot. Having examined the allegations of both parties, he found that neither was free from error. It was proved, that the Rajah had fallen in arrear, for the tribute of many years; but it alſo appeared, that the Nabob had relinquiſhed, in his diſtreſs, his claim to the ſums payable for ten of thoſe years; as an inducement to the Rajah to give his aſſiſtance in the late war; which, however, he never heartily gave. The Nabob affirmed, that the Rajahs of Tanjore, had paid annually twenty lacks, during the Nabobſhips of Sadatulla and Dooſt-Ali. He owned, however, that his father, the late Nabob, had ſettled it at ſeven lacks, with two lacks of Durbar charges. Pretaupa Sing, on the contrary, alleged, that though large ſums had been extorted by force, the ſtated and regular Peiſhcuiſh was no more than two lacks, *per annum*, to the Mogul, and two to the Nabob of Arcot, as a cuſtomary preſent †.

His exertion of power.

Mr. Du Prè examines the claims of the Nabob, and allegations of the Rajah.

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 60. † Idem, paſſim.

It

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Facts relative to both.

It is impoſſible to reconcile ſo wide a difference, in a manner conſiſtent with veracity, on both ſides. The probability is, that the tribute was much larger, even in peaceable times, than Pretaupa Sing choſe to own. That it was ſettled at nine lacks, in the Nabobſhip of Anwar-ul-dien, is proved by many perſons in India, whoſe memory extends to the times ‖; as well as by public records †. The ſums paid to Sipadar Ali, to Chunder-Saib, to Coja Abdulla, and other Nabobs, ought not to form precedents, as they were rather fines for diſobedience, than arrears of tribute. Beſides, when refractory ſubjects in India force the ſovereign to have recourſe to arms, he obliges them, when reduced, to pay the expences of the war; and theſe ſums have frequently been confounded, with the arrears of the regular tribute. The revolutions of Tanjore, its being repeatedly conquered by the Moguls, its ſituation in the heart of one of their provinces, its abſolute dependence on the poſſeſſors of the reſt of the Carnatic, with regard to the waters of the Cavery, its fertility, its wealth, render it highly improbable, if not impoſſible, that the conquerors of India would accept a ſum little more than 40,000l. from a country, which yielded annually near a million ‡.

Improbability of the ſmallneſs of the tribute mentioned by the Rajah, from various reaſons.

But reaſons had no weight.

But neither theſe reaſons, nor the poſitive affirmation of the Nabob, had any weight with the Preſident. To prove how little he favoured that prince, he entered into a paper war againſt his claims *. In his letters on the ſubject, he employed expreſſions, no leſs unſuitable to his own ſtation, than they were degrading to that of the Nabob. On the 20th of September 1762, the treaty dictated by Mr. Pigot was concluded; which, though forced upon the Nabob, as he afterwards acted under it, became binding with reſpect to tribute, as long as the Rajah performed his part of the agreement. The heads of the conditions were, twenty-two lacks, at five different payments, as arrears of tribute; four lacks, as Peiſcuiſh and Durbar

A treaty dictated by the Preſident, Sept. 20th, 1762.

The terms.

‖ Private information.
† Nabob's Papers, paſſim.
‡ Aurungzêbe Letter to Zulphukar Chan, 1704. MS.
* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 74.

charges, to be paid annually in the month of July; the ceſſion of the diſtricts of Coiladdy and Elangad to the Rajah; and the reſtoration of Trimulrow, the diſplaced Killedar of Arni, for whom Pretaupa Sing had intereſted himſelf †. The Rajah had alſo agreed to give five lacks more, as a preſent; but one lack was to be deducted, from that ſum for his own officers ‡. The Preſident and Council of Madras made themſelves guarantees, in the following words, annexed to the treaty: "We do hereby promiſe, as far as in us lies, "that in caſe either party ſhall fail, in the performance of the arti- "cles, he hath thereby undertaken to perform, or any part thereof, "we will, to the utmoſt of our power, aſſiſt the other party to com- "pel him, who ſhall fail to fulfil his agreement, and to render due "ſatisfaction for his failure therein."

The Company becomes guarantee.

This treaty, when written out fair, was carried by the Preſident to the Nabob; but that prince refuſed to ſubſcribe to terms, to which he had never given his conſent. Mr. Pigot ſeized the Nabob's chop, and put it, with his own hand, to the paper *. M. Dupré, who had negociated the terms, was diſpatched, with this forced treaty, to Tanjore. Though Pretaupa Sing was too prudent to refuſe his ſignature, to conceſſions ſo favourable to himſelf, he had ſcarce affixed his ſeal to the treaty, when he made new demands, which, if granted, would enable him to evade the payment of the paltry Peiſhcuiſh, he had agreed to give. But Mr. Pigot had already done ſo much, that he could not decently do more. In his anſwer to the Rajah's "friendly letter," by the hands of Sambo-jî Punt, he ſays: "I looked "upon the treaty, as it now ſtands, to be ſo favourable to YOU, that "I really flattered myſelf, that you would have been well ſatisfied

Mr. Pigot puts the Nabob's chop to the treaty.

Pretaupa Sing makes new demands,

which are refuſed by Mr. Pigot.

† Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 79, 80.

‡ Ibid. p. 83.

* Nabob to Mr. Palk, October 8th, 1776. General Lawrence, Mr. Bourchier, and particularly Colonel Call and Mr. Palk, were either preſent at this tranſaction, or were convinced of the truth of it from the inconteſtable information, given by others as well as by the Nabob; who made heavy complaints to them of the Preſident's conduct.

"with

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" with it, and particularly the article of future Peiſhcuiſh. I need " not recal to your remembrance, the tranſactions of former go- " vernments; a very ſlight reflection muſt convince you, that in " this article you are *highly* favoured. It has coſt me a great deal " of trouble to *reduce* it, to the ſum ſtipulated, and I ſhould be really " aſhamed to aſk the Nabob to make any abatement ‡." It appears, from the paſſage cited, that the very man, who made the treaty, thought it more favourable to the Rajah, than to his ſuperior the Nabob. That the Peiſhcuiſh had been reduced, from what it had formerly been; and that Mr. Pigot himſelf was convinced, he had already uſed ſo much freedom with the claims of the Nabob, that " he ſhould be aſhamed" to encroach further on his rights.

Real opinion of Mr. Pigot of his own treaty.

The Preſidency were themſelves ſenſible, that the treaty, which had been forced on the Nabob, was ſo inadequate to his juſt claims, that they ſhewed an inclination to excuſe it to the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 9th of November 1762. Inſtead of urging the right the Rajah had to ſuch favourable conditions, they pleaded their own inability to bring him to juſtice, as their chief motive to the treaty †. Their want of a ſufficient force, the expence of an expedition, the danger of raiſing other enemies, in caſe of a rupture with the Rajah, the incapacity of the Nabob to recover a ſingle rupee, without the aſſiſtance of the Company, were the arguments produced, to juſtify their conduct ‖. But what neceſſity was there, for making any demands, as they own they could enforce none? The Nabob wiſhed to poſtpone the buſineſs, till a more fit opportunity. Pretaupa Sing would have been glad to have retained the paltry ſum, he advanced. The beſt, and perhaps the only reaſon, for precipitating the meaſure, is mentioned by the Preſident, that he himſelf " had thoughts of leaving India ſhortly §." The event

The Preſidency write their excuſes for their concluding it, to the Directors.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 81, 82.
† Ibid. p. 83.
‖ Ibid.
§ Ibid. p. 74.

ſhewed,

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That reſpectable body deſire to partake of the ſpoil.

ſhewed, that neither arguments nor reaſons were neceſſary, to convince the Court of Directors. That reſpectable body, with the true ſpirit of their inſtitution, inſtead of being anxious about the juſtice of the tranſaction, wiſhed to partake of its profit. Having underſtood, that in addition to the twenty-two lacks, obtained as arrears of peiſhcuiſh, four lacks had been given, as a preſent, the honourable Court ſay, in their letter of the 30th of December 1763: "Now if this laſt named ſum was given as a preſent, it ſeems as if "the Company ought to have it for their interpoſition and guarantee "of the treaty. We ſhall be glad to have this affair explained to "us, that we may know the real ſtate of the caſe, with reſpect to "that donation *."

Recapitulation of facts, concerning the treaty of 1762.

Such is the hiſtory of the treaty of 1762, faithfully extracted from the papers, which the Court of Directors have publiſhed, in juſtification of their own conduct. It has appeared, that the Preſidency, inſtead of aiding a friend and ally, in the recovery of his juſt demands upon a vaſſal, depending on his government, ſupported that vaſſal, in his refractory conduct, though he had uniformly acted, during a long ſeries of hoſtility and public calamity, an undutiful part towards his ſuperior and had been treacherous to themſelves. That, when they ought to have made him pay his proportion of the expences of a war, which protected him and his dominions, they not only permitted him to "ſit rent-free †," but had reduced his cuſtomary tribute, to leſs than one-half of the ſum uſually paid, in the moſt regular and peaceable times. That, though he was bound, by the nature of his tenure, as well as the laws of ſelf-preſervation, to give his aſſiſtance in the war, they allowed him to ſet off againſt the unſettled arrears of his tribute, a kind of exemption, which he had extorted from the Nabob in his diſtreſs; and that merely as an in-

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 85.

† Mr. Pigot's expreſſion, in his letter to the Rajah, dated Jan. 30th, 1762. Rous's Appendix, p. 55.

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ducement to do his duty, which he otherwiſe refuſed to perform. That, when they ſtripped ſmaller delinquents, though poſſeſſing equal rights with him by the conſtitution of the country, of their territories, and deprived them of their liberty, they ſoothed, flattered, and favoured Pretaupa Sing, more guilty—but more wealthy than them all. That the Preſident, either ignorant of the nature of his ſtation, or aſſuming powers, to which he had no title, had arbitrarily taken to himſelf the office of mediator, without any authority from the parties, upon whoſe differences he was to decide. That, under this uſurped character, he concluded a treaty, without either the communication or conſent of the Nabob; and that to give it validity, he had forcibly ſeized the chop of that prince, and affixed it to the paper, with his own hand.

General obſervations.

But though the treaty of 1762 was evidently forced upon the Nabob, as he afterwards acquieſced under the terms, he was certainly bound to pay attention to its due performance on his part*. This circumſtance neither he himſelf, nor any who has eſpouſed his cauſe, has ever once denied. The treaty had but two objects, the liquidation of paſt arrears of Peiſhcuiſh, and the ſettling the amount of the future tribute. The very gentleman, who negociated the treaty itſelf, has declared, that it "related only to matters of account †," and could not "preclude the Nabob from his conſtitutional claims ‡" upon the Rajah of Tanjore, as a vaſſal and dependent. The guarantee of the Company went only to the point of Peiſhcuiſh. "If "there exiſted in both, or either of the parties, any *original, con-* "*ſtitutional* RIGHTS, which were not the ſubject of the treaty, the "Company were not bound," they had no right, "to interfere §." But, ſhould the Nabob demand a greater tribute than that ſettled by the treaty, or the Rajah either neglect or refuſe to pay the ſtipulated

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 673.
† Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 16.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid. p. 11.

ſum,

ſum, then the Company, though they had arbitrarily conſtituted themſelves umpires, were obliged to adhere to their *own* agreement, and "aſſiſt the party performing againſt the party failing to per-"form" his ſtipulation. The enforcement of their guarantee might, as it actually happened, lead the Company, as allies or auxiliaries into a war; but when a ſolemn war is once declared and terminates in ſucceſs, the PRINCIPAL, and *not* the ALLY or AUXILIARY, acquires the property of what he takes from the enemy, and that without rule or meaſure; ſo that he and his aſſigns are to be defended in the poſſeſſion of them by all nations †.

† Ὁ νομος ὁμολογία τις ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τα κατά πόλεμον κρατυμενα τῶν κρατυντῶν ειναι φασι. Ariſtot.

Τὰ τῶν ἡττωμένων ειναι τε δεῖ και προσαγορεύεσθαι τῳ κρατυντῳ. Plutarch in Vita Alexandri.

Quæ ex hoſtibus capiuntur jure gentium ſtatim capientium fiunt. Cajus Juriſconſultus, lib. v. Naturalem hanc acquiſitionem φυσικὴν κτῆσιν appellat Theophilus, in Græcis Inſtitutionibus, ſicut & Ariſtoteles dixerat πολεμικὴν φύσει κλητικὴν.

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Affairs of the Carnatic, from 1762 *to the Treaty with Hyder Ali, in* 1769.

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Spain joins France in the war.

THOUGH the taking of Pondicherry, in the month of January 1761, and the ſubſequent fall of the few places of ſtrength poſſeſſed by the French in the Carnatic, put an end to the national war in Aſia, its flames ſeemed to acquire additional force in Europe, before the end of the year. Spain having ſuffered the elder branch of the houſe of Bourbon to experience all the calamities, which follow unſucceſsful hoſtilities, threw its own weight into the ſcale of France, when the affairs of that kingdom were too deſperate to be retrieved. The tide of Britiſh ſucceſs, inſtead of being ſtopped by this obſtruction, in a manner, acquired vigour from reſiſtance; and the new enemy was ſoon involved in the ſame misfortunes and diſgraces with the old.

But a general peace enſues.

In little more, than the ſpace of a year from the commencement of the Spaniſh war, a peace was concluded; which ſecured to the Britiſh thoſe advantages in Hindoſtan, which their arms had acquired.

Mahommed Ali guaranteed by the treaty of Paris.

In the eleventh article of the definitive treaty, Mahommed Ali was acknowledged lawful Nabob of Arcot, and guaranteed, in all the rights of that office, by the Britiſh and French nations. He was the firſt Indian prince, except the Nizam, mentioned in the ſame article, who had ever been comprehended as an ally, in a ſolemn treaty, between European powers *.

* Vide Treaty of Paris, Art. XI.

Three

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Three years before Mahommed Ali was declared an ally, by the treaty of Paris, King George II. had honoured him with that title, under his own hand. In a letter of the 21ſt of February 1760, his Majeſty was pleaſed to aſſure the Nabob of his "invariable and per- "manent reſolution of continuing firm to all his allies, in every "part of the world *." Relying on a royal promiſe, ſo ſolemnly pledged, the Nabob requeſted, in a letter which he wrote to Mr. Secretary Pitt, ſoon after the taking of Pondicherry, that, when peace ſhould be made, an article might be inſerted in the treaty, to ſecure the poſſeſſion of the Carnatic to him and his heirs. In this letter he informed the miniſter, that he had ſupplied the army with proviſions, during the ſiege. That he had prevented twenty thouſand Mahommedans, who had been invited by M. Lally, from coming to the aſſiſtance of the French. That he had been, for fourteen years, connected in their adverſity as well as proſperity, with the Engliſh. That he had aſſiſted them at Fort St. David, before either Mr. Griffin or Admiral Boſcawen arrived. That the misfortunes of his family proceeded, from the inveteracy of the French, on account of his known attachment to the Engliſh; and hence he deduced the death of his father, the expenditure of his treaſure, and the ruin of his country †.

The purport of K. George II.'s letter to the Nabob, in 1760.

Nabob's letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt in 1761.

The treaty of Paris, by guaranteeing Mahommed Ali, in the entire poſſeſſion of the Carnatic, confirmed in his perſon all the rights, with which he was inveſted, at the ſigning of the treaty. The two ſovereign princes, who were the principals in that ſolemn ſtipulation, bound themſelves and conſequently their ſubjects, from invading any one of thoſe rights. Every encroachment, upon the immunities of an ally, as recognized by the contracting powers, would have been an act of hoſtility; an infringement, which might have

The treaty of Paris confirms the Nabob in all the rights, with which he was then inveſted.

Every encroachment on his immunities by the ſubjects of either crown

* MS. Copy of the Letter.

† Nabob's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, Feb. 1761.

juſtified

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justified the interference of the party, who had adhered to the treaty, in opposition to the party, by whom it had been violated. A constitution was formed, for the government of the Carnatic, which the subjects of Great-Britain and France were to observe, at their peril. Should either of these presume to invade that constitution, it was the duty of the sovereign of such invaders, to bring them to condign punishment, and to oblige them to make reparation; otherwise he himself became a party, and furnished the other guarantee, with a justifiable cause of war. The servants of the East-India Company were so sensible of the restraint, which the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris had laid upon their avarice and ambition, that they industriously concealed its contents from the Nabob, for several years.

liable to punishment, as a high misdemeanour.

Servants of the Company conceal the guarantee from the Nabob.

In contempt of the guarantee, they seize a part of the Carnatic.

Intelligence of the treaty, which guaranteed Mahommed Ali, in the ENTIRE possession of the Carnatic, had scarce arrived on the coast, when the Presidency shewed their disregard, for the solemn stipulation of their sovereign, by seizing a considerable portion of his ally's territories. The expences of the sieges of Madras and Pondicherry, together with that of the war in other places, being placed to the Nabob's account, that prince had been involved in a heavy debt to the Company. Towards the payment of this debt, he had assigned, as has been already related, the annual sum of twenty-eight lacks of rupees, charged upon his whole revenue. Notwithstanding this settlement, they had demanded near double that sum *, in one year, which his country could not afford to pay. Mr. Pigot, the Company's President, having resolved to return to Europe, in the end of 1763, shewed an inclination to close his government, with a measure, which, by bringing some splendid advantage to the Company, might throw credit on himself †. He, therefore, desired the Nabob to cede a territory to the Company

Their pretence to past, not future services.

* Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, Oct. 13th, 1770.
† Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 4th, 1763.

in Jaghire, as a reward for paſt, not as a condition of future ſervices ‡.

Art and duplicity of Mr. Pigot,

But before Mr. Pigot made this deciſive requiſition, he had managed matters, with an art, if not with a duplicity, unſuitable to thoſe lofty ideas of political honour, with which the defenders of his conduct attempt to adorn his character. In a converſation with the Nabob, at the Admiralty-houſe in Fort St. George, he firſt only aſked for ſome villages round Madras; and theſe only, after the diſcharge of his debt to the Company *. At another meeting he roſe in his demands; and aſked Conjaveram and other three diſtricts. The Nabob, after remarking, that from ſoliciting for villages, the Preſident had increaſed his requiſition to whole countries, reminded him of his having ceded, at different times, St. Thomé, Turendaporum, together with the fort and territory of Punamallee; and, that, beſides, he had relinquiſhed the Peiſhcuiſh for Madras, which the Company were bound to pay, by the tenure by which they held that place †. To this Mr. Pigot replied, "that if the four diſ-

who riſes gradually in his demands.

He offers very favourable conditions.

"tricts mentioned were given, the Company would be extremely "pleaſed and obliged to the Nabob, and would ever aſſiſt him and "his children with a proper force of Europeans, without deſiring "any thing further. That till the Nabob had cleared off his debts "to the Company, the revenues of thoſe diſtricts, after defraying "the expences of the ſoldiers, ſhould be placed to the credit of his "account §."

He proceeds from ſolicitation to requiſition.

When the time fixed by Mr. Pigot, for his return to Europe, approached, he proceeded from ſolicitation to requiſition, as has been already obſerved. The Nabob endeavoured to obtain, in writing, thoſe terms, which the Preſident had verbally agreed to grant. He

‡ Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, Auguſt 13th, 1763.

† Ibid.

§ Ibid. p. 161.

* Rous's Appendix, No. X. p. 160.

ſent,

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He refuſes to ratify his own terms.

His ſeverity to the Nabob,

who is forced to give unconditional Sunneds.

He is permitted to rent the lands he had granted away.

ſent, therefore, the copy of an agreement, containing the terms already ſpecified; which he wiſhed the Governor and Council to ſign, prior to their receiving his Sunneds for the Jaghire. But Mr. Pigot returned the agreement unſigned, with every ſymptom of reſentment. This mark of diſreſpect was followed, by a ſevere letter from the Preſident, in which he reminded the Nabob of his obligations to the Engliſh; and accuſed him, in almoſt direct terms, of ingratitude. He told him, that it did not become a man, who owed his whole country to the Company, to aſk any conditions for a part of it; "for (ſaid he) they do not take any thing from you; but they "are the givers, and you are a receiver *." In conſequence of theſe threats, the unfortunate Nabob was obliged to iſſue unconditional Sunneds, for an extent of country, to the annual amount of fourteen lacks of rupees †. The utmoſt favour he could obtain from his imperious vaſſals, was the privilege of renting the lands, which he had granted away. This he requeſted, not from hopes of profit, for the ſum is much greater, than the revenue yielded by the Jaghire; but merely to preſerve appearances, with his own ſubjects, by keeping up a ſhew of authority in diſtricts, which were once his own ‡. Theſe arbitrary encroachments on the rights ſecured to Mahommed Ali, by the treaty of Paris, were begun by Mr. Pigot, after he had formally announced to the Nabob that treaty, but without mentioning the guarantee ||.

Nizam Ali murders his brother Sullabut.

The news of the treaty of Paris, which arrived at Golconda, in autumn 1763, proved fatal to Sullabut Jung, whom the French had raiſed to the Subahſhip of the Decan, upon the death of his nephew Muziffer, in February 1751. That weak and unfortunate

* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, Auguſt 13th, 1763.

† 175,000 l.

‡ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770.

|| Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 4th, 1763. Mr. Pigot, in a letter to the Nabob, dated Auguſt 14th, 1763, acknowledges the receipt of the articles of the treaty, but ſays, they are *too long to be written.*

prince

prince having been diveſted of his authority, by his brother Nizam Ali, had remained, for ſeveral years, in confinement. As an inſult upon his misfortunes, the uſurper of his authority had permitted him to retain the titles of government. But Sullabut owed this diſtinction and the continuance of his life, to Nizam Ali's fears of the French, who, he believed, were attached to a Subah raiſed by themſelves. But when he found, that they were excluded, by the treaty of Paris, from his part of the Decan, he dipped his hand in his brother's blood *; and, by his murder, ſecured himſelf againſt any revolution, that might be attempted in his favour.

In the month of October 1763, Mr. Pigot reſigned the government of Madras, and returned to Europe. Notwithſtanding the ſeverity and even injuſtice, with which he had treated the Nabob, he found means to reconcile his mind before his departure. Having offered his ſervices in Europe, in the buſineſs of the Carnatic, the Nabob furniſhed him with inſtructions, as his agent, annexing to that office an annual penſion of twelve thouſand pagodas †. Mr. Pigot was ſucceeded in the government by Mr. Palk; a gentleman of a milder diſpoſition than his predeceſſor, and conſequently more ſuitable to the temper of Aſiatics; who are ſurpriſed and diſguſted at the violent ſallies of paſſion, to which ſome Europeans are peculiarly ſubject.

Mr. Pigot returns to Europe.

He becomes agent to the Nabob, with a ſalary of near 5000 l. per annum.

Succeeded by Mr. Palk.

On the 16th of December, in the ſame year, Pretaupa Sing died ſuddenly at Tanjore. Prior quarrels, with his general, Mona-jî, and with his own ſon and ſucceſſor, Tulja-jî, furniſhed a plauſible foundation for reports, that Pretaupa had not made his exit in the natural way ‡. But whether the ſurmiſes of murder proceeded from matter of fact, or from the character of Tulja-jî, who was thought capable of ſuch villainy, is a ſubject unworthy of enquiry. In whatever

1763. Death of Pretaupa, Rajah of Tanjore.

Suppoſed to have been murdered by his ſon the preſent Rajah.

* Nabob to Governor Palk, October 31ſt, 1763.

† Near 5000 l.

‡ Rous's Appendix, p. 88, 89.

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manner Pretaupa came by his death, the complexion of his life was not calculated to leave regret behind him, when he died. Raiſed by a faction, from an obſcure condition, in oppoſition to Shaw-jî, the legitimate heir *, who had been expelled, he was deſtined to be and actually remained a tool, during the greateſt part of his government. Being by diſpoſition falſe and treacherous, his natural timidity † was a kind of virtue, as it prevented him from the commiſſion of dangerous crimes. He was ſucceeded in the government of Tanjore, by his ſon Tulja-jî, a young man, much more weak and more profligate than his father; who, though not virtuous, had confined his appetites to common vices.

Pretaupa had ſhewn no inclination to obſerve the treaty of 1762.

Though Pretaupa Sing had been ſo much favoured, in the treaty of 1762, he ſhewed no inclination to be punctual, in obſerving the terms. The twenty-two lacks, which he had agreed to pay as arrears of tribute to the Nabob, had been transferred to the credit of that prince, in the books of the Company. But the ſecond kiſt, which was payable in April 1763, could only be extorted from him in Auguſt, by the terror of the troops, marching to the ſiege of Madura, who were ordered to ſtop in the neighbourhood of Tanjore ‡.

Neglects to pay his kiſts to the Company,

yet aſks favours.

Notwithſtanding this reluctance, in the performance of his part of the treaty, Pretaupa did not fail to aſk new favours from the Preſidency. He repreſented, that "the river Cavery ſhould be "ſwelled, that his country ſhould be thereby cultivated to produce "money to pay off the debts." He affirmed, that "even the "Soucars ‖ ſeemed unwilling to lend money;" as the river Cavery was not diverted from falling into the Coleroon, by its natural

* Vide p. 68. This Shaw-jî, or Sahu-jî, was the unfortunate perſon, whom the ſervants of the Eaſt-India Company ſet up againſt Pretaupa in 1749. But finding Pretaupa more ſuitable to *their* purpoſes, they agreed to "pre-"vent the pretender" from giving him further trouble, and threw him into a dungeon. Orme, vol. ii.

† Orme, vol. ii.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.

‖ Indian Bankers.

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courſe. But, continues he to Mr. Pigot, "I depend on your ho- "nour's friendſhip, which I have PROCURED in every reſpect*."

Though Mr. Pigot had exhibited every mark of a partial friendſhip for Pretaupa, in the treaty of 1762, he had neglected one ſtipulation in his favour, which left his country much in the power of his ſuperior, the Nabob. The river Cavery, after traverſing the extenſive country of Myſore, falls through the mountains, which ſeparate the two coaſts, into the Carnatic; and, about ſix miles to the north-weſt of Tritchinopoly, divides its ſtreams between two channels. The northern branch aſſuming the name of Coleroon, falls into the ſea at Devi-Cotah †; but the ſouthern branch, retaining that of Cavery, ſeparates itſelf, about twenty miles to the eaſtward of Tritchinopoly, into ſeveral large branches, which, paſſing through the province of Tanjore, give its fertility to that country ‡. The ſtreams of the Coleroon and Cavery form, by their ſeparation, the iſland of Seringham, famous for the pagoda, from which it derives its name. The banks of the two rivers, for ſome miles above and below Tritchinopoly, "are in no part two miles aſunder, in many "ſcarcely one: and at Coiladdy, a ſmall fort fifteen miles to the "eaſt of Tritchinopoly §," the ſtream of the Cavery was certainly intended by nature, to rejoin the Coleroon. But a mound of a conſiderable length had been anciently erected, to prevent the ſtreams of the two rivers, from uniting again. The waters of the Cavery preſs, in their natural courſe, upon this mound with ſuch force, that it requires almoſt conſtant repairs. As the boundaries of Tanjore never extended to within many miles of the bank, that country muſt have depended, from all antiquity, on the government of Tritchinopoly, its neareſt neighbour.

Diſputes about the Cavery.

Deſcription of that river.

The great mound near Coiladdy, which turns its waters into Tanjore, is in the territory of Tritchinopoly.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 187, 188.

† Lawrence's Narrative, p. 17.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 177.

§ Ibid.

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The treaty of 1762 confined to one object, the amount of the tribute.

Presidency had no right to interfere in any other dispute.

The Rajah makes the repairing of the mound, the condition of his paying his just debts.

Mr. Pigot himself finds the right of the mound in the Nabob, which even the Rajah owns.

The Nabob, being dissatisfied with the treaty of 1762, shews no inclination to relinquish his right.

The treaty of 1762, between the Nabob and the Rajah, had been confined to one object, the amount of the future Peishcuish, to be paid by Tanjore *. The Presidency, who had made themselves guarantees of that treaty, had no right to interfere in any other disputes, between the Nabob and Rajah; nor to become arbiters, with regard to the *constitutional right* of the Carnatic over Tanjore †. "THAT was a matter (says the very gentleman who negociated the "treaty itself) which had not been thought of, in settling the treaty "of 1762 ‡." Pretaupa Sing, notwithstanding, seems to have made the reparation of the mound, in some measure, the condition of paying the kists, which the treaty had directed him to pay to the Company. Mr. Pigot, willing to favour him, wrote repeated letters to the Nabob, in the strongest terms §. But, upon examination ||, even Mr. Pigot found the Nabob's right to the mound, so decisively established, that he entirely dropped every requisition, on that head ¶. It appears, that Pretaupa Sing himself acknowledged the right to be vested in the Nabob ⸸, and that all the different deputies, appointed by the Presidency to examine into the subject, made their reports, that the right of repairing the mound existed in the Nabob alone, as Soubadâr of the Carnatic.

The Nabob, who had no reason to be satisfied, with the treaty, which had been forced upon him, in 1762, shewed no inclination, to relinquish any of his rights, which still remained, to gratify the Rajah of Tanjore. Pretaupa Sing, who was neither a stranger to his own want of right to the mound, nor to the Nabob's feelings,

* Vindication of the Government of Fort St. George, relative to the expedition against Tanjore in 1771. By Josias Du Prè, Esq. p. 28.

† Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 28.

‡ Ibid.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 209.

|| Mr. Newton, who was appointed by the Governor and Council in May 1763, to examine into the subject, made his report entirely in favour of the Nabob. Rous's Appendix, p. 209.

¶ Ibid.

⸸ Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore, entered in Country Correspondence, No. LXII. March 21st, 1763.

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on that ſubject, propoſed an interview, which took place in autumn 1763. The Rajah, in the moſt ſubmiſſive manner, acknowledged his faults. He ſolicited the Nabob's forgiveneſs, for his not having paid him the proper reſpect, when he landed at Negapatam in 1758; and for refuſing him admittance into the fort of Tanjore. He begged his pardon, for his invaſion of the diſtricts of the Marawar, in expreſs oppoſition to the injunctions of his ſuperior; for his aſſiſting Uſoph Chan in his rebellion; and for all his paſt offences. He promiſed, that in future neither himſelf nor his ſons ſhould do any thing diſagreeable to the Nabob. That, inſtead of aiding Uſoph, he would take the whole burden of the war againſt him, on himſelf. That he would join the Nabob, "both in body and ſoul;" and that he would conſider the Nabob's enemies as his enemies, his friends as his friends. Theſe declarations "he confirmed with an oath, a "ſtronger than which, in his religion, cannot be taken *."

Submiſſive conduct of Pretaupa at an interview with the Nabob.

The Nabob was ſo well pleaſed, with the ſubmiſſive conduct of Pretaupa, that he forgave him the ſum of four lacks of Trivambore rupees. He alſo agreed to make ſome repairs on the mound; though he uniformly declared, that the diverting all the waters of the Cavery, into the province of Tanjore, was extremely diſagreeable to his own people †, as the flat country to the eaſt of Tritchinopoly would be thereby overflowed ‡. But when Tulja-jî aſſumed the government, he demanded as a right, what his father had requeſted as a favour. Inſtead of flattering the pride of his ſuperior, by applications to him in perſon, he wrote abuſive letters, concerning that prince, to the Preſidency of Madras §; deſiring them to lay their commands on the Nabob to repair the bank. The Preſidency, who had uniformly paid great attention to the government of Tan-

Induces the latter to repair the mound.

Fooliſh and intemperate conduct of Tulja-jî.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 196, 197.

† Ibid. p. 209.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. paſſim.

jore,

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He is supported by the Presidency.

jore, ever since the negociations about the treaty of 1762, vehemently pressed the Nabob ‖, who was incapable of those "winning ways," which had rendered the Rajah so VALUABLE an ally and so great a favourite. The Nabob, conscious of his own rights, and how little the Rajah contributed towards the general defence, expressed his unwillingness, but complied. Besides, the reluctance, with which he was brought to confer favours upon a man, who had added insult to injury, the Nabob had a political reason, for deferring the repairs of the bank. The Rajah's assistance was wanted for the siege of Madura; and he knew that nothing, but necessity, would induce him to perform his duty to his superior *.

Cause of the Nabob's unwillingness to repair the mound.

To

‖ Rous's Appendix, passim.

* Extract of Minutes of Consultation, 28th April 1777.

As the Honourable Court of Directors, in their separate letter per Grenville 12th April 1775, order the Rajah of Tanjore to be restored to the full and entire possession of his dominions as held by him in 1762, without infringing the rights of the Nabob of the Carnatic; and as it appears from the letters mentioned hereafter from Rajah Pretaub Sing, as well as the opinions of this Government subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty of 1762, that the right of repairing or amending the Annacutta was then acknowledged to be vested in the Nabob. Resolved, it is the opinion of this Board, that this right doth exist in the Nabob alone, as Soubahdar of the Carnatic, and that the Rajah of Tanjore is not to begin, or carry on any repairs whatever, unless permitted to do so by the Nabob. That agreeably to the Nabob's request, the people sent by the Rajah of Tanjore to the Annacutta should be forthwith recalled, and that the Rajah be informed, it appears from the Company's records, as well as from his father's Pretaub Sing's letters, that he has no right to repair the bank, unless privileged so to do by the Nabob. That the Rajah of Tanjore be also informed, the Nabob hath granted permission for the repairing the Annacutta at our desire, and will send orders to his Amildar at Tritchinopoly to give every reasonable assistance, that it may be put in the same state it was during the life of Pretaub Sing. Resolved also, as this has been a subject of constant dispute between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, that the following references to the Records be inserted on this day's Consultation, to shew at one view to the Honourable Court of Directors, that the right now claimed by the Nabob, has ever been admitted; but that this Board have at all times considered it as a matter of great moment, that the Annacutta should be repaired whenever the banks were broken down or washed away.

The President is directed to acquaint the Nabob of the proper sense the Board have of his acquiescence to have the Annacutta repaired, agreeably to our request to him on that head.

Consultation 21st March, 1763.

A letter is read from the Rajah of Tanjore, entered in Country Correspondence, No. LXII. requesting the Board would desire the Nabob to permit "him to amend the bank."

Consultation 15th April, 1763.

A letter is wrote from the Board to Mr. Newton, ordered on a survey of the Annacutta, "the

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Recapitulation to explain the rebellion of Iſoph Chan.

To explain this ſubject, we muſt recur to former times. The city of Madura, with the province of the ſame name, being dependent on Tritchinopoly *, fell into the hands of the Moguls, when they conquered the laſt mentioned province. During the captivity of Chuder-Saib in the capital of the Marattas, Madura, with the reſt of the Carnatic, became ſubject to the Nabob Anwar-ul-dien. When Chunder-Saib, in the revolution in favour of Muziffer Jung, aſſumed the title of Nabob of Arcot, Madura was ſeized by Allum Chan †, one of his adherents; but the power of that officer declining at the death of his patron, the Nabob recovered the city, and placed his brother Mapheus Chan in the government. Mapheus Chan was ſucceeded, in the year 1758, by Moodally ‡; and he, in June 1760, by Uſoph Chan, at

" the Board being deſirous to procure for the " King of Tanjore the liberty he deſired, if it " might be done without prejudice to the Na- " bob."

Conſultation 8th May, 1763.

A letter is read from Mr. Newton on the ſubject of the Annacutta.

Conſultation 16th April and 14th May, 1764.

A minute of conſultation, and letters from the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, together with a repreſentation from the Tanjore Vacquiel on the ſubject of the Annacutta.

Conſultation 24th May, 1764.

A letter is wrote to Mr. James Bourchier, ordered on a ſurvey of the Annacutta, wherein the Board ſay, " The King hath probably re- " queſted more than the Nabob can grant " without endangering his own country; and " the Nabob is perhaps too tenacious of his " own privileges, to comply with the King's " requeſt, as far as in reaſon he ought."

Conſultation 24th July, 1764.

A letter is read from Major Campbell, wherein he ſays, " The Nabob has ſent orders " to his ſon, to repair the banks of the Ca- " very immediately, and in ſuch a manner that " the King of Tanjore will have no reaſon to " find fault with it."

Conſultation 2d Auguſt, 1764.

A letter is read from Mr. James Bourchier, deſcribing the breaches of the Annacutta.

Conſultation 24th Auguſt, 1764.

A letter is read from Mr. James Bourchier, wherein he ſays, that " a meſſage from the Na- " bob confirmed what he had all along ſuſpect- " ed, that though the Nabob had given his " conſent to make the repairs the Board re- " quired of him, nothing was more diſtant " from his intention than the performance of " it."

Conſultation 28th January, 1765.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that he had with ſome difficulty prevailed on the Nabob to permit the King of Tanjore to repair the breaches in the Cavery, and the Annacut near Malore.

(A true Extract)

R. J. SULIVAN, Secretary.

* Jeſuit's Letters, vol. ii.

† Orme, vol. i. p. 169.

‡ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. Tetarapa Moodally, renter of the Tinnevelly and Madura countries, found means to obtain Mr. Pigot's private friendſhip; but he behaved ſo ill in his office, that it was found impoſſible to ſupport

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Uſoph patroniſed by Mr. Pigot.

He forces the Nabob to give him the government of Madura.

He ſupplies him with arms, &c.

at the preſſing inſtances of Mr. Pigot, then Preſident of Fort St. George. The Nabob, no ſtranger to the ambition and treacherous character of Uſoph, remonſtrated in vain. The Preſident inſiſted, that he ſhould have the government, at a very ſmall rent; for the payment of which he himſelf pledged his faith §. Whatever reaſon Mr. Pigot might have had for his predilection in favour of Uſoph, it is certain he intereſted himſelf in his favour, with all the warmth and zeal of a friend ||. Not content with extorting the government of Madura for him from the Nabob, the Preſident provided him with arms, guns, and ammunition; which, as there were no enemies then in the country *, ſeem to have been deſtined againſt his maſter.

Origin and hiſtory of Uſoph.

Uſoph Chan was a fellow of mean birth, but poſſeſſed courage and all the activity neceſſary to conſtitute a bold partizan. He

ſupport him long, in his public capacity. He was, therefore, obliged to give way to Uſoph Chan, another friend.

§ Ibid. But he never paid any rent.

|| The original Letters, of which the following are copies, are now in London:

" To the Hon. George Pigot, Eſq; Preſident and Governor of Fort St. George.

" Honourable Sir,

" This moment I received a letter from Anjango, adviſing, that the 4th inſtant arrived there 2 Europe ſhips; they left England 5 months agoe; the Norfolk 74 guns, and Panther 60 guns, full of men. And ſome friends mine wrote me the nams of the Governor and Council of Madras.

" Governor,
" John Smith,
" Charles Bourchier,
" Dawſone Drake,
" John Andrews,
" Henry Vanſittart,
" Richard Fairfield,
" Samuel Ardly.

" Realy I am very ſorry to hear, but I muſt think now that my great misfortune; hope to hear the news to the contrary, and beg, Honourable Sir, to ſettle my affair in good tim, for I am quiet ruined, and have no other friends at all. Conclude this with my kind reſpect, wiſhing your good health & ſucceſs in all your undertaking. Believe me to be always with due reſpect, Hon. Sir,

I am your moſt obedient humble & obliged Servant,

(Signed) MAHOMUD ESOUF CAWN."

Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, incloſing the above.

" Sir,

" I ſend you a letter I have received from Uſoph Cawn, which muſt ſatisfy you he is a good man, as the contents ſhew that he fears, without a friend to recommend him to you, he is ruin'd. He is as good a man as Mr. Smith I will anſwer for it; and if he wants arms they are to defend your country and add to your honour. If I can procure him any, he ſhall have them, and I will anſwer for his being a good ſervant to you. I am, with the greateſt regard and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient ſervant, and aſſured friend,

(Signed) GEORGE PIGOT."

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

owed

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owed his riſe, like ſome greater men, to accident. Having engraved the Company's arms on a gold plate, he ſuſpended it from his neck; and the Preſident, ſtruck with the fancy, ordered an inſcription to be put, on the other ſide, mentioning his merit and valour in war. Uſoph had diſtinguiſhed himſelf, as a good ſoldier, on various occaſions; and his gaining the ſupport and friendſhip of Mr. Pigot, was a proof of his being a good politician. His breaking out into an open defiance to the Nabob's authority, ſo ſoon after his taking poſſeſſion of his government ſeems, however, to have been a little repugnant to the latter character. Though the rent, which he had engaged to pay, had been rendered "extremely eaſy," by the influence of Mr. Pigot, he neglected, from the beginning, to remit even that "eaſy rent" to his maſter. A conduct ſo glaringly obſtinate could not, publicly, be ſupported. The Preſidency, therefore, found themſelves obliged to aſſiſt the Nabob in reducing to obedience a ſervant, whom they had ſo lately and warmly recommended †. An expedition was undertaken againſt him, in the year 1763; but the troops being ill provided, either through deſign or accident, with proper implements for a ſiege, the periodical rains forced them to quit the trenches ‡.

He retains the rent.

Preſidency obliged to aſſiſt the Nabob.

Though Uſoph depended much upon the influence of his friends at Madras, he was not negligent in ſecuring other friends. The firſt, the moſt eager, ſincere and powerful of thoſe friends, was Pretaupa Sing, Rajah of Tanjore. This approved ally of the Engliſh and faithful dependent of the Nabob of the Carnatic entered into a correſpondence with Uſoph, and foſtered thoſe ſeeds of rebellion, which that refractory chief had ſown. He adviſed him not to go to Madras, when his preſence was required at that place;

Uſoph forms a connection with the Rajah of Tanjore.

The correſpondence between them.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. The late General Monſon knew a great deal about this buſineſs. He did *not* aſcribe the want of ſucceſs to *accident*. But it would have been cruel to have deſerted an *old friend* in his diſtreſs.

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for, ſaid he, " the bad man," meaning the Nabob, " gives advice to the Engliſh, to which point WE ſhould attend §." He mentioned that the treaty of 1762 " was nothing more than a name ‖." That, ſhould the Engliſh fail to *order* the Nabob, to permit the mound of the Cavery to be repaired, that he would ſend his troops to the place and expect the aſſiſtance of Uſoph *. Theſe aſſurances were ſent to Pretaupa, much about the time that he took the moſt SOLEMN OATH appointed by his religion, that he would " take the " whole of the war againſt Uſoph upon himſelf and join the Nabob, " both body and ſoul, and would look upon his enemies and friends " as his own †." But notwithſtanding the ſolemnity of his oath, Pretaupa ſeems to have adhered, with a kind of mental reſervation, to the intereſts of Uſoph. That chief had informed him in a letter, " that, by the bleſſing of God, the French ſquadron would ſoon " arrive;" and, ſaid he, " they conſider YOUR protection as their " firſt object ‡."

Yet *ſwears* that he will take the whole of the war againſt him upon himſelf.

Both hope aſſiſtance from the French.

The death of Pretaupa Sing only deprived Uſoph Chan of one friend, to give him another in the perſon of his ſon Tulja-jî. The firſt care of that PRINCE was to ſecure to himſelf the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the government, by cutting off the LEGITIMATE branches of his own family. Before he extended, as was believed, his hand to his father's life ¶, he murdered his couſin, the ſon of Nauzee, whom Pretaupa had kept a ſtate-priſoner. Soon after his acceſſion to the government, he ſent emiſſaries into the territories of the Nabob, who killed " Gatica and two of his relations ǂ." The unfortunate Gatica, who was deſtined to terminate a life of calamity, in a death of violence, was the ſame perſon, whom M. Lally found

Tulja-jî renews his father's friendſhip with Uſoph.

His firſt care to cut off the legitimate branches of his own family.

He murders his couſin, the ſon of Nazee.

He aſſaſſinates Gatica, and two other relations.

§ Pretaupa Sing to Uſoph Chan. Country Correſpondence. India Houſe, Oct. 1764. This letter was written early in 1763.

‖ Iſoph Chan to Pretaupa. Ibid.

* Ibid.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 197.

‡ Uſoph to Pretaupa Sing. Country Correſpondence, 1764.

¶ Separate Letter from the Preſident and Council. March 28, 1764. India Houſe.

ǂ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 198.

priſoner

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priſoner in Fort St. David, when he took that place in 1758. He was uncle to the wretched Shaw-jî, lawful Rajah of Tanjore, whoſe intereſts and liberty, the Preſidency, in a manner, ſold to Pretaupa Sing, in the year 1749. Shaw-jî, having made his eſcape from the hands of the Preſidency, the unhappy Gatica, was confined in his place *. But fate reſerved his life till the year 1764, to fall by the dagger of Tulja jî †.

Having ſecured himſelf, by thoſe murders,

When Tulja-jî had rid himſelf of every cauſe of domeſtic fear, he turned his eyes towards his allies abroad. Upon receiving a letter from Uſoph Chan, who was, now, beſieged in Madura, he returned an anſwer, in which are the following remarkable words: "I am convinced that you heartily wiſh for my proſperity, which "is near at hand. You wrote me, that I ſhould not delay my "aſſiſtance to you. You need not, my friend, write often to me "on this ſubject; ſhould any thing happen, I will, with all my "troops, join yours immediately without fail ‡." At this very inſtant, ſome of his troops were in the camp of the beſiegers of Madura. But that circumſtance would facilitate the performance of his promiſe to Uſoph, ſhould any reverſe of fortune happen to the arms of the Nabob and the Company. Tulja-jî and his father permitted, or rather ordered, a body of French, who were in the ſervice of Tanjore, to join Uſoph Chan. Unfortunately for that chief, M. Marchand was one of the number. This man ſeized his perſon and delivered him to his enemies. This event happened in the month of October 1764 §. The war coſt much blood to the Engliſh, and more than a million ſterling to the Nabob ‖, beſides the loſs of the revenue, which Uſoph had with-held ¶.

he correſponds with Uſoph,

whom he reſolves to aſſiſt.

He like his father ſends French troops to join him.

* Orme, vol. ii.

† Rous's Appendix, ubi ſupra.

‡ Tulja-jî to Uſoph Chan. Country Correſpondence, 1764.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XLII. p. 211.

‖ The Nabob was at the whole expence, except the European ſoldiers, who were paid out of the revenue of the Jaghire. Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

¶ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

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Tulja-jî's ungrateful conduct towards his memory.

Tulja-jî expreſſed himſelf, in a letter to the Preſident of Fort St. George, with peculiar *feeling*, for his unfortunate friend. "I re-"ceived," ſays he, "advice from Madura, that the PERFIDIOUS "WRETCH was ſeized, and the fort taken; this gave me in-"expreſſible joy. I have offered my prayers, night and day, to "God, and it hath now pleaſed his Divine Majeſty to grant what "was my deſire†." But neither the exemplary misfortunes of his ally, Uſoph Chan, nor any gratitude for the favours or fear of the arms of the Engliſh, who had made themſelves guarantees of the treaty of 1762, could induce the Rajah to perform, with any punctuality, his part of the treaty. Though his country yielded annually near a million ſterling ‡, two terms had elapſed without his paying the ſtipulated Kiſts to the Company §. This conduct was the more inexcuſable, that the Nabob had relinquiſhed four lacks of the tribute, in conſequence of his promiſe to Pretaupa Sing, at their laſt interview ‖.

He neglects to pay his Kiſts to the Company.

Nizam Ali invades the Carnatic.

The taking of Madura, in the end of 1764, only reſtored the Carnatic to a temporary repoſe. In the beginning of 1765, Nizam Ali, who had acquired by the murder of his brother, Sullabut, the title as well as power of Subah, entered that province with a great army. With a deſtructive ſpecies of war, he laid waſte the open country, without deriving any conſiderable benefit, from his inhumanity. He ſubjected every place, through which he directed his march, to fire and ſword; and ſuch unfortunate perſons as had eſcaped the latter were only reſerved for ſlavery. The ravages, which he had committed, joined to the heat of the ſeaſon, for it was now the middle of April, reduced his army to great diſtreſs for want of proviſions and water. Colonel Campbell, who then commanded the joint forces of the Nabob and Company, having marched from Arcot, came in ſight

He ravages the country;

† Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 211.
‡ Ibid. p. 198.
§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 198.
‖ Ibid.

of

of the enemy, at the Pagoda of Tripetti; but when the Colonel was preparing to attack Nizam Ali, in his camp, that Subah ſuddenly decamped, and marching near forty miles, in one day, evacuated the Carnatic, by the way of Collaſtria and Nellore *.

but retreats.

During theſe tranſactions, Lord Clive arrived at Madras on his way to his government of Bengal. The conduct of Nizam Ali, together with the expediency of poſſeſſing the whole coaſt, from the boundaries of the Carnatic to thoſe of Oriſſa, induced his Lordſhip to procure, from the Mogul, a Phirmân, for thoſe countries, which are diſtinguiſhed by the name of the Northern Circârs. Theſe provinces, like moſt others in the Decan, were chiefly poſſeſſed by the native Rajahs and Polygars, in ſubordination to the Mogul viceroy, to whom they paid a ſtated annual tribute. There were, however, many diſtricts ſubject to temporary renters †; and the whole was governed by a deputy appointed by the Nizam. Anwar-ul-dien, the father of the preſent Nabob, had executed that office, with ſuch juſtice and reputation, for thirty years, that his family were ſtill very popular in the country. Many of the Zemindars had owed their riſe to Anwar-ul-dien; and not only they, but all the inhabitants and huſbandmen, had expreſſed their wiſhes, that his ſon might obtain the command of the provinces ‡. Sullabut Jung had offered the government of the Circars to Mahommed Ali during the French war, to detach him from the Engliſh cauſe; and he renewed the ſame offer, when he quarrelled with M. Buſſy at Hydrabad. Even Colonel Forde, when he took Maſſulipatam, ſignified the propriety of the Nabob's taking charge of the Circars; but all theſe offers he declined to accept, without the expreſs approbation of the Preſidency §.

Lord Clive arrives at Madras. 1765.

Obtains Sunnuds for the Circârs,

which had been repeatedly offered to the Nabob.

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

† Nabob to Mahommed Nazib Chan. Nov. 25, 1765. MS. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

Lord

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Lord Clive obtains Sunnuds for the Nabob,

rendering him independent of the Nizam.

Lord Clive, who had been uniformly attached to the Nabob, did not forget the intereſts of that prince, when he obtained, from the Mogul, the northern provinces for the Company. He procured from the emperor Shaw Allum, Sunnuds, dated the 12th of Auguſt, 1765 ‖, rendering the Carnatic independent of the viceroy of the Decan. His Lordſhip, at the ſame time that he tranſmitted the Sunnuds, ſeems to have inſinuated his wiſh to raiſe that prince to the Subahſhip itſelf, ſhould it be found neceſſary to expel Nizam Ali, in the war which was likely to ariſe between that prince and the Company, for the northern Circârs. The Nabob excuſed himſelf, from accepting the offer, by declaring that "the Decan was "too great for him to deſire to have the charge of its government *." He at the ſame time aſſured Lord Clive, "that he was perfectly "ſatisfied with his Lordſhip's ſending him the Phirmân of free gift "of the Carnatic, which he had been pleaſed to obtain for him, "from the emperor of the Moguls †."

Nabob declines the Subahſhip of the Decan.

Calliaud marches and takes poſſeſſion of the Circârs. 1766.

To enforce the Mogul's Phirmân, for the Circârs, General Calliaud marched at the head of the troops of the Carnatic to take poſſeſſion of thoſe provinces. This he effected, after ſome ſkirmiſhes with the Rajahs and Polygars ‡. Nizam Ali, who was, at the time, engaged in war againſt the Marattas, in the country of Barad, upon receiving intelligence of thoſe tranſactions, returned with the utmoſt expedition to Hydrabad. To revenge himſelf for the loſs of the Circârs, he made ſudden and great preparations for invading the Carnatic. To prevent the execution of his deſign, the Preſidency of Madras inveſted Calliaud with full powers, ordering him to proceed to Hydrabad to negociate a peace. A treaty was accordingly concluded, on the 12th of November 1766. The principal terms of the treaty were, that the Preſidency ſhould aſſiſt Nizam Ali, with

Nizam Ali prepares to invade the Carnatic;

but a treaty is concluded.

‖ Sunnud, MS. * Nabob's Letter to Lord Clive in 1765, MS. † Ibid.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XII. p. 183.

their troops; and pay an annual tribute for the Circârs. Theſe conditions were much more diſadvantageous, than thoſe upon which the provinces had been offered before; for by the former terms the Company were to have enjoyed the Circârs in Jaghire, on the ſole condition of military aid. By the preſent treaty, they promiſed ſervice and an annual rent. To pave the way for the treaty, ſuch as it was, the Preſidency obliged the Nabob to pay five lacks of rupees to Nizam Alï §; though he was not to derive the value of "a ſingle caſh," from the tranſaction, nor had been even ſo much as named.

Nabob obliged to pay him five lacks.

1767. This diſadvantageous and even diſgraceful treaty ſowed the ſeeds of a dangerous and ruinous war. In conſequence of their promiſe to Nizam Ali, the Preſidency ordered Colonel Smith to march to Hydrabad, with a few Sepoys and a troop of horſe to join that prince. The money given by the Nabob enabled Nizam Ali to pay off the arrears of his mutinous army. The joint force of the Subah and of his new vaſſals, marched toward Bengalore, in the province of Myſore; and took that place from the famous Hyder-Ali. The capture of Bengalore ſeems to have been the object of the treaty of Hydrabad, though that condition is not particularly expreſſed. In Nizam Ali's march towards Myſore, and during his progreſs in that country, he was joined by different detachments of the Company's troops, under Colonel Tod, Major Fitzgerald and others, to the number of one thouſand Europeans, and five or ſix battalions of Sepoys. Theſe reinforcements enabled Nizam Ali to collect the tribute from the different Polygars on his march ‖.

1767. The treaty ſows the ſeeds of a war.

Nizam Ali joined by the Engliſh.

Invades Myſore.

The Nabob, who, from his knowledge of the country, was enabled to obtain the beſt information of the ſecret views of its princes, told the Preſidency, that the collection of the tribute, and not a

Nabob informs the Preſidency, that Nizam Ali is not ſincere in the war.

§ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. India Papers, paſſim. ‖ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

war,

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war againſt Hyder, was the principal object of Nizam Ali. That notwithſtanding the terms of the treaty of Hydrabad had been much more advantageous, than he had any reaſon to expect, he was not pleaſed with the conduct of the Company, in obtaining a Phirmân for the Circârs, without either his knowledge or permiſſion, who conſidered himſelf as their immediate ſuperior. That Hyder Ali was equally diſpleaſed with the treaty, as the Preſidency had ſhewn their animoſity againſt himſelf, by the readineſs which they diſcovered to aſſiſt the Subah in invading his country. That, prior to his expedition to Myſore, Nizam Ali had ſent a copy of his agreement to Hyder Ali. That, from theſe and other circumſtances, he, the Nabob, concluded that both would ſoon terminate their own differences, and, with their united force, attack the Carnatic *.

He is diſpleaſed with the Engliſh, on account of the Circârs.

Hyder Ali alſo diſpleaſed.

Cauſe of Hyder's further diſpleaſure.

The event juſtified the ſuſpicions of the Nabob. Hyder Ali being attacked on another ſide of his dominions, by the Company's troops, reſolved to ſettle matters with Nizam Ali. Major Bonjeur, with ſome Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, had been detached towards Kiſtnagurry, in the Baramault country †, which he over-ran, and took all the mud forts: but he could make no impreſſion, either on Kiſtnagurry, or thoſe forts which were built upon rocks ‡. The country of Baramault had been formerly a part of the Carnatic; but, having fallen into the hands of the Rajah of Myſore, it had ſubmitted, with the reſt of his dominions, to the uſurpation of his rebellious general, Hyder Ali. Theſe, with other reaſons, induced Hyder to make propoſals to Nizam Ali, who ſcrupled not to ſacrifice his engagements with the Company, to the intereſt of his new ally §. A treaty was at laſt concluded between them, by the

He joins the Nizam.

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. India Papers, paſſim.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XI. p. 167.

‡ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. Oct. 13, 1770.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.

means

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means of Mapheus Chan, the Nabob's brother, who had been diſſatisfied, ever ſince the influence of Mr. Pigot had deprived him of the government of Madura and Tinnevelly, in 1758*.

They unite againſt the Nabob and Engliſh.

Auguſt.

Secret information of the concluſion of this treaty, having been brought to the Nabob, he adviſed the Preſident and Council, to order an attack to be made upon Nizam Ali's camp †, before the junction of the Myſorean. This advice was diſregarded, at leaſt it was not put in execution; but the Company's troops had ſeparated themſelves from thoſe of the Subah. In the month of September, Colonel Smith was attacked on his march, near Changamal, by the united forces of the allies. The action was ſharp, and laſted an hour; but though the enemy was repulſed, the Company's troops were obliged to retire. Marching for thirty-ſix hours, without refreſhment, the army, having ſuffered incredible hardſhips, arrived at Trinomally; and having incloſed themſelves, within the walls of that place, where they remained ſeveral days, were forced to be witneſſes of the deſtruction of the country all around, with fire and ſword. Colonel Smith, having again taken the field, encamped near the walls; but, after a few days, he decamped and pitched his tents near Caliſhy-wâcum, about ten miles, to the north of Trinomally ‡.

Attack Colonel Smith.

Lay waſte the country.

Hyder Ali detaches a party of horſe towards Madras.

While both armies lay in this ſituation, Hyder Ali detached his ſon, with five thouſand horſe, into the Carnatic. This body penetrated to the neighbourhood of Madras; and had the commander managed matters with the leaſt addreſs, he might have ſeized the Preſident and Council, in their Garden-houſes, in the environs of that fort. But the attention of the Myſoreans to plunder, deprived them of an advantage, which would have enabled them to dictate

* Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213. India Papers, paſſim.

† Nabob to the Preſident, &c. Aug. 2, 1767.

‡ India Papers, paſſim. Sir John Lindſay's Narrative, &c.

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Colonel Smith defeats the allies.

the terms of peace. Colonel Smith, having in the mean time attacked the allies, before Trinomally, with ſome ſucceſs, ſent the army into cantonments at Wandewaſh. The enemy having appeared beyond Velore, in the month of December, he took again the field, and attacking them, between Ambour and Wanumbaddy, obtained a victory, and purſued them to Caverypatnam. Both before and after the action, Nizam Ali made propoſals of peace to Colonel Smith; but that officer refuſed to treat, till the Subah ſhould ſhew the ſincerity of his intentions, by ſeparating his troops from thoſe of Hyder Ali *.

Nizam Ali makes propoſals of peace.

1768. A treaty concluded.

The Subah, bent upon a peace, ſeparated his army, accordingly, from Hyder, in the month of January 1768. In February, a treaty of perpetual friendſhip was concluded between the Nizam, the Nabob, and the Company.

The terms.

The Nabob's titles, and the grants of ſeveral places, which he had received from the Subah, were confirmed. The Dewanny of the Subahdary of Bijapour, and Carnatic Ballagaut was conferred upon the Company, for which they were to pay ſeven lacks to the Nizam, and a Chout to the Marattas †. In return the Nabob and the Company agreed to furniſh Nizam Ali, with two battalions of Sepoys, and ſix pieces of cannon, upon his requiſition, ſhould the neceſſity of their own affairs permit them to comply. In conſideration of the loſſes ſuſtained by the Company, the Subah agreed to deduct twenty-five lacks, from the revenue paid to him from the northern Circârs; beſides two lacks for five years from Chicacole ‡. The loſſes and expences of war had fallen upon the Nabob; the profits of victory were appropriated by the Company §.

Affairs of Tanjore.

When the junction of Nizam Ali with Hyder, threatened the Carnatic with invaſion, in the month of July 1767, Mr. Bourchier, the

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.
† Ibid.
‡ Vide Treaty. India Houſe.
§ Sir John Lindſay's Narrat. Oct. 13, 1770.

Preſident,

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President, wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore, for his aid, in the expected war *. That Rajah, who was privately in the interests of Hyder, had publicly renewed his complaints, against the Nabob, about the waters of the Cavery. The bank had been already repaired by that prince to gratify the Presidency; but the Rajah alleged, that he had given orders for enlarging an old gutter, which conveyed a part of the waters into the Coleroon †. Upon receiving a letter from the President, the Nabob gave instantly directions for removing every foundation for a complaint on the part of the Rajah, to prevent him from having any excuse for refusing the demanded aid ‡. He accordingly promised publicly his aid to the English §, but he privately assisted, at the very time, their enemies. Whilst he pretended, that the distresses of his country rendered him incapable of paying a tribute of four lacks to the Nabob, he sent four lacks and four elephants, by his own Vackeel, to Hyder Ali ‖. "Depending," says the Rajah, "on your firm friendship, I am "in every respect easy in my mind, and all apprehensions are "removed from me ¶."

Rajah in the interests of Hyder Ali.

He *promises* aid to the English; but actually assists their enemies.

He sends money, &c. to Hyder.

When Colonel Smith had separated the Company's troops from those of Nizam Ali, and retreated into the Carnatic †, Hyder announced that event to his ally the Rajah of Tanjore. "You must "not imagine," said Hyder in his letter to Tulja-jî, "that I "attend to any thing, but the destruction of our mutual enemy; "you may rest assured of this. My reason for marching into "Ballagaut is, that the English troops are retired from my coun-"try, and are marched six or seven stages toward Trenomele. I "will, by the assistance of God, bring all the army together and

Correspondence between those allies.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.
† Ibid. p. 212.
‡ Ibid. p. 215.
§ Ibid. "The Rajah amused them for some time with promises only," &c. M. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 11.
‖ Appendix to Nabob's Papers, No. IV. p. 50.
¶ Rajah Tulja-jî to Hyder Ali. Ibid.
† In September 1767.

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" punish the enemy."—" You need not fear the enemy; depend " upon your strength, and give no money to them, nor send them " any troops, but put them off with delays; and write privately " to all the Polygars, dependent upon you, to be in readiness with " all their troops *."—The Rajah religiously observed the instructions of his friend and ally. But so much perverted has truth been by party, that the advocate of the Court of Directors asserts, that the Rajah of Tanjore was persecuted by Hyder, for his uniform attachment to the interests of the Company †!

Presidency resolve to carry the war into Mysore.

Prior to the treaty concluded in February 1768, with Nizam Ali, the Presidency, encouraged by Colonel Smith's victory over the joint forces of the allies, had resolved, not only to carry the war into Mysore, but to make an absolute conquest of that country. Their letter of the 21st of December 1767 to the Nabob, upon that subject, is a curious instance of clumsy artifice and ill-covered Jesuitry. They press that prince to join the army, promising to give him the management of the conquered country: " But," continues the President, " I cannot now tell you, whom I am to appoint to manage " those parts." They inform the Nabob, " the Company would " not desire any other countries."---" But," say they in the same sentence, " the Company intend taking under their government " some other neighbouring countries at Bombay ‡." They advise him, that they intend to place two lacks of Pagodas to his account of the extraordinary expences of the war. Yet they say, that it is very uncertain whether Nizam Ali began, from his displeasure against the Company, or on purpose to distress the Nabob. The

Their deceitful and contradictory conduct.

They saddle the Nabob with the expences.

* Ibid. p. 51. This letter seems to have been written in the beginning of September 1767: for it alludes to the expedition of 5000 horse, under Hyder's son, who penetrated to Madras in that month. Tulja-jî wrote a very friendly answer to Hyder, to which the reader is referred. Ibid. p. 52.

† Vide Mr. Rous's Restoration, &c. considered.

‡ President Bourchier to the Nabob, Dec. 21, 1767.

truth

truth is, that the war had proceeded from the rooted reſentment of the Subah againſt the Company, for their manner of ſtripping him of the northern provinces. The Nabob appealed to themſelves that this was the caſe; but, as they ſeemed to think that his preſence might be uſeful to their affairs, he promiſed to join the army *.

Their artifice to fix upon him thoſe expences.

The object of the Preſidency, in ſending Mahommed Ali to the camp, was to make a war, which the ambition of the Company had kindled, the war of the Nabob; to furniſh a colour of juſtice, for their charging him with the expence. Though he was ſenſible of their artifice, he thought it prudent to comply. He accordingly joined the army; but the hands of the commanding officer being tied up, by the timidity and ignorance of field-deputies, the whole ſummer of 1768 paſſed in inactivity and fruitleſs negociations for peace. Though, by the original agreement, between the Nabob and the Company, it had been ſtipulated, that no buſineſs with the country powers ſhould be tranſacted, without his participation, the field-deputies, at the inſtigation of Hyder's vackeel, excluded him from having any ſhare, in the conferences. But Hyder, being well informed, that the Preſidency wiſhed eagerly for peace, only amuſed their deputies, to ſtop the progreſs of the war; till the impatience or terror of his enemies ſhould enable him to dictate the terms. Though he affected to wiſh, for an accommodation, he did not neglect ſuch hoſtilities, as promiſed ſucceſs. He took the important fort of Mulwaggle. He gained ſome advantages over Colonel Wood, who had attempted in vain to take the place ‡.

An inactive campaign.

Preſidency wiſh for peace.

Hyder not ſincere in his pacific propoſals.

Though theſe hoſtilities might have convinced the Preſidency at Fort St. George, and their deputies in the field, that Hyder meant nothing leſs, than to negociate, on equal terms, they ſtill continued in a manner to ſolicit peace. The deputies, thinking that the pre-

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770. ‡ Ibid.

ſence

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fence of the Nabob impeded their negociations, preſſed him to return to Madras. The Nabob argued in vain, that his preſence in the army would contribute to keep the Polygars and commanders of forts ſteady to the Engliſh intereſt. The Preſidency, entering into the views of their deputies, COMMANDED him to return. They had even threatened him with deprivation, in a letter to the field-deputies †; and, when he wrote to them complaining of this inſult, they refuſed to receive his letter ‖. He thought it prudent to return to Madras; where he arrived, in the month of November 1768. Colonel Donald Campbell, a gallant and experienced officer, was obliged to quit the field, on account of his health; and he was, ſoon after, followed by the field-deputies. All theſe things diſcouraged the army, and added ſpirit to the enemy. Hyder attacked Colonel Wood, plundered his baggage, and recovered all the conquered countries, except a few places of ſtrength. Thus ended the year 1768, in miſmanagement, diſaſter and diſgrace *.

Inſolence and injuſtice of the Preſidency.

Miſmanagements and misfortunes.

Hyder Ali, having thus, by his addreſs and ſpirit, rendered the efforts of the Preſidency againſt his own country abortive, prepared to carry the war into that of the enemy. In December 1768, he entered the Carnatic "with a conſiderable body of horſe and foot "lightly equipped ‡," and penetrated into the province of Tritchinopoly. Having advanced towards Tanjore, his friend and ſecret ally, the Rajah of that country, ſupplied him with four lacks of rupees §, and proviſions for his troops ¶; and "was ready to join "his intereſt ⸸." Hyder, at the ſame time, detached one of his generals, into the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, who plun-

Hyder Ali invades the Carnatic.

Is ſupplied with money and proviſions, by the Rajah of Tanjore.

† Sir John Lindſay's Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770.

‖ Ibid.

* India Papers, paſſim. Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. Country Correſpondence. India-Houſe.

‡ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 15.

§ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative. Mr. Du Prè's Vindication.

¶ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication.

⸸ Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

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dered and deſtroyed the country. No part of the ſouthern diviſion of the Carnatic, except the territories of the friendly Rajah of Tanjore, eſcaped the deſtructive ravages of the active and enterpriſing Myſorean. The Engliſh army were unprovided with cavalry, and could neither overtake his march nor ſtop his progreſs. The horſe, which the Rajah of Tanjore had ſent to the Engliſh, as a cover for his ſecret connection with Hyder ‡, had been long recalled, by their perfidious maſter §. The Myſorean purſued his predatory operations without obſtruction. He went twice to Pondicherry to confer with the French; and, at the ſame time, amuſed the Engliſh Preſidency with hopes, rather than offers, of accommodation. Having, at length, ſent all his heavy baggage from Pondicherry to his own country, he proceeded with a body of horſe to the Mount, a place within a few miles of Madras *. Mr. Bourchier, under whoſe government theſe misfortunes chiefly happened, had quitted the chair, and returned to Europe, in the beginning of 1769. His ſucceſſor, Mr. Du Prè, wiſhing to put an end to a war, which, by deſtroying the country, deprived him of reſources for carrying it on with ſucceſs, liſtened to the pacific propoſals of Hyder Ali; and a peace was accordingly concluded on the 3d of April 1769.

Ravages the country.

Amuſes the Engliſh with hopes of peace.

He comes to the Mount, with a body of horſe.

A peace concluded.

‡ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 12.
§ Ibid.

* Sir John Lindſay's Narrative.

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Affairs of the Carnatic from the Treaty with Hyder Ali, in 1769, *to the Concluſion of the firſt Expedition againſt Tanjore in* 1771.

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1769.

Reaſons why the Court of Directors are but ſeldom mentioned.

IN the courſe of the preceding narrative, which though ſuccinct, it is hoped, has comprehended the moſt material tranſactions, on the Coaſt, the Court of Directors have been ſeldom mentioned. This circumſtance proceeded leſs, from any inattention to that RESPECTABLE body, than from their want of importance in affairs, over which they are ſuppoſed to preſide. Radical defects in their very inſtitution, their diſtance from the ſcene of action, their being individually called, from narrow and confined occupations, to the extenſive field of political management, their fugitive authority, which ſcarcely laſted a ſpace of time ſufficient for tranſporting their orders to the eaſt, their being too often ignorant themſelves, or too frequently deceived by others, rendered them objects of little conſequence, in a political ſyſtem, which they affected to guide. In a manner conſcious of their want of importance, as a body, they endeavoured to pay the debt owing to vanity, by gratifying the demands of ſelf-intereſt; and, therefore, their great inducement, for ſoliciting and receiving their places, was to provide for their own relations and friends. This object being obtained, they became little ſolicitous about the intereſts of their conſtituents. To ſupport the appearance of authority, ſome ignorant clerk, who thought inſolence a mark of dignity, penned their diſpatches, and aſſumed the manner

Defects in their inſtitution.

Confined ideas.

Fugitive authority.

Selfiſhneſs.

Little ſolicitous about the intereſts of the Company.

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and diction of deſpotic power; but their orders were only obeyed, when they ſuited the views of thoſe, to whom they were addreſſed.

Yet their ſituation, an object of ambition to their returned ſervants,

Unimportant as the condition of the common herd of Directors might appear to have been at home, it became an object of ambition to their ſervants, when they returned from abroad. The latter, together with the ſpoils having acquired the manners of the Eaſt, frequently took arms againſt the authority, to which they owed their power; till by force, by negociation or compromiſe, they obtained ſeats at the Board. The firſt uſe they made of their power was to cover the retreat of their own fortunes from India; and to ſupport, in ſome friend, favourite, or partner in plunder, the ſame ſyſtem of venality and corruption, which had enriched themſelves. Their local knowledge being blended with local prejudices, inſtead of enlightening the ignorance of other Directors, perverted their judgment. Inflamed by diſappointments, but forgetful of favours, they ſeldom failed to ſuggeſt ſuch meaſures, as might contribute to diſtreſs thoſe, who had failed to extend their liberality to the utmoſt limits of their avarice. Thus, the injuſtice and oppreſſion committed by the ſervants of the Company in India, inſtead of being checked by the authority of the Directors, were too frequently encouraged by their approbation. Theſe general obſervations are not intended, as a general cenſure; for, in the conduct of the Court, we ſometimes meet with ſome commendable deviations, from the lines we have above deſcribed and ſtigmatiſed.

who miſlead them,

and ſupport that ſyſtem of corruption, which had enriched themſelves.

Treaty with Hyder.

To return to the affairs of India: In the negociation with Hyder Ali, which terminated in the treaty of the 3d of April 1769, the Preſidency having propoſed, that ſome chiefs, who had aſſiſted the Company, ſhould be included in the treaty; Hyder demanded the ſame advantage, for the Rajah of Tanjore, on *his* part *. The Preſidency juſtly conceived, that this demand was made, at the re-

He deſires to include the Rajah of Tanjore as *his* friend.

* Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 15.

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queſt of the Rajah, to preclude any animadverſion upon his conduct, for having furniſhed Hyder Ali, the enemy of the Carnatic, with money and proviſions *, for carrying on war againſt his ſuperior, the Nabob and his protectors the Engliſh. The ſtipulation, in his favour, proved to a demonſtration the Rajah's guilt; and that circumſtance ought to have induced the Preſidency to reject, with reſentment, a propoſal, which converted a ſubject of the Carnatic, into an ally to its greateſt foe. But, it ſeems, that peace was, at that moment, ſuch a deſirable object, that indignation gave place to neceſſity. As Hyder ſhewed no inclination to deſert his ally, the Preſidency propoſed to include him in the treaty, as *their* friend and ally; to prevent him, from becoming ſtill more attached to Hyder, by permitting that chief to become his avowed protector and guarantee †. Hyder, whoſe ſole object, in the propoſition, ſeems to have been a ſecurity to the Rajah, from animadverſion, acquieſced in the offers of the Preſidency, as ſtill better for his friend, than his own guarantee.

The Preſidency inſiſt on including him, as *their* friend.

This propoſal on the part of the Preſidency "did not proceed "from any opinion, that the Rajah's conduct merited their attention to his intereſt ‡." They had been no ſtrangers to his duplicity and treachery during the whole courſe of the war. Though, at the requiſition of the Preſidency in July 1767 §, he had promiſed to aſſiſt them with a thouſand horſe and twelve hundred ſepoys, he neither ſent that number, nor did thoſe he ſent join the army, till the 19th of February 1768 ‖. Had he ordered a body of cavalry to the aid of the Engliſh, when they were firſt required, they might have been of eſſential ſervice, "whilſt the united forces of "the Nizam and Hyder were acting in the Carnatic ¶." Their appearance could not then be obtained. But when the Nizam deſerted

This proceeded, not from *his* merit.

His faithleſs conduct.

* Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 15.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.
§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.
‖ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 11.
¶ Ibid. p. 12.

Hyder,

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Hyder, and evacuated the Carnatic, Tulja-jî ſent his cavalry to join the Engliſh, "when their ſervice could be of little uſe*." "This "pretended aid was only given to ſave appearances, and to furniſh, "in caſe of need, a future plea to both the contending parties; to "the Nabob, that he had *aſſiſted*; to Hyder, that he only *ſeemed* to "aſſiſt †." His cavalry, ſoon after they had joined Colonel Wood, in the Coïmbettour country, "dropped off by parties at a time;" till, at length, the whole either deſerted of themſelves, or were recalled by their maſter, long before the concluſion of the war ‡.

His pretended aid only given to ſave appearances.

The dilatory and ſuſpicious conduct of the Rajah, his inattention to the requiſition of the government of the Carnatic, which had *conſtitutionally* a right to his aſſiſtance in war §, his acting, upon almoſt every occaſion, contrary to that ſpirit of mutual friendſhip, which had been the oſtenſible baſis of the treaty of 1762, had neither eſcaped the notice, nor had been ſuffered to paſs, without the animadverſion of the Preſidency. In their letter of the 8th of October 1767 ‖, they had ſignified, to the Court of Directors, their reaſons for being diſſatisfied with the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore. The Court of Directors, happening at the time to be led, by men of comprehenſive ideas and political talents, did not heſitate, upon a ſubject, which involved the peace and ſecurity of the Carnatic. Conſcious, that the treaty of 1762, having only the *quantum* of the annual peiſhcuiſh for its object, did neither infringe nor aboliſh "the right of the Carnatic to the military ſervice of Tanjore ¶," without inſinuating the leaſt doubt on that ſubject, they delivered their ſentiments to the Council at large, and ſent deciſive orders to the Select Committee, on the 17th of March 1769; whilſt the war with Hyder Ali was ſtill depending.

His ſuſpicious conduct animadverted upon by the Preſidency.

The Court of Directors offended at his behaviour.

* Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 12.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid.
‖ Eaſt-India Houſe.
¶ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 12.

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Send deciſive orders to aid the Nabob againſt the Rajah.

Theſe ſentiments and orders explain the delinquency of the Rajah of Tanjore, at the ſame time that they define the mode of puniſhing him, for his unjuſtifiable conduct. "We obſerve with great diſſa-
" tisfaction (ſay the Directors to the Council at large) the conduct of
" the Rajah of Tanjore, who forbore ſo long to join you with his
" horſe; and when they did join you, they ſeem to have been of no
" manner of uſe. It is very extraordinary, that when the ſafety of
" the Carnatic was in danger *, he ſhould have acted ſo dubious or
" ſo puſillanimous a part. When we conſider the protection we have
" given that Rajah, and the long and uninterrupted tranquillity his
" country has enjoyed by it, we cannot but feel the ſtrongeſt reſent-
" ment at his conduct. Our further ſentiments on this ſubject,
" and powers of acting therein, are entruſted to the Select Com-
" mittee †."

Their well-founded reſentment againſt him.

Tenor of the orders.

Thoſe powers were accordingly addreſſed to the Select Committee, in the following words: "It appears moſt unreaſonable to us, that
" the Rajah of Tanjore ſhould hold poſſeſſion of the moſt fruitful
" part of the country, which can alone ſupply our army with ſub-
" ſiſtence, and not contribute to the defence of the Carnatic. We
" obſerve the Nabob makes very earneſt repreſentations to you on
" this ſubject, in his letter entered in the book of Country Corre-
" ſpondence; wherein he takes notice, that the Zemindars of the
" Carnatic have been ſupported and their countries preſerved to them
" by the operations of our forces, employed in his cauſe, and that
" nothing was more notorious, than that three former princes of
" the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore Rajah ſeventy, eighty,
" nay, even one hundred lacks of rupees at a time; that to the pre-
" ceding Nizam he had paid a contribution of fifty lacks; and the
" preſent, if he had met with ſucceſs againſt our army, would not

* When attacked, in September 1767, by the united forces of the Nizam and Hyder Ali.

† Directors to Governor and Council, March 17th, 1769. India-Houſe.

" have been content with leſs than a crore* of rupees from the Ra-
" jah. How juſt then does it appear, that he ſhould be made to
" bear ſome part of the expence of thoſe meaſures, to which he
" owes his ſecurity and the peace of his country! We, therefore,
" enjoin you to give the Nabob ſuch ſupport in his pretenſions on
" the Rajah of Tanjore, as may be effectual; and if the Rajah re-
" fuſes to contribute a juſt proportion to the expences of the war,
" you are then to purſue ſuch meaſures, as the Nabob may think
" conſiſtent with the juſtice and dignity of his government †."

Their purport recapitulated.

The ſentiments of the Eaſt-India Company, with regard to the conſtitution of Tanjore as well as the conduct of its Rajah, may be collected, from the above letter and orders. It appears, that, though the treaty of 1762 had limited the annual tribute to four lacks, the ancient *conſtitutional* right of the Carnatic to the military ſervice of Tanjore, remained unimpaired ‡. That the Rajah, having long evaded that ſervice, had at laſt induſtriouſly given it, in a way, which " had been of no manner of uſe." That the Court of Directors conſidered Tanjore, as a *part* of the Carnatic, and conſequently ſubject, by a certain tenure, to its government. That they judged the contributions raiſed, from former Rajahs, proper precedents for the preſent Nabob, in the ſums he might think juſt to demand, as a part of the expences of a war, during which Tanjore had been protected from the ravages of invaders. That they ſeemed to allow, that the Rajah was no more than " a Zemindar of the Carnatic," depending on its government, and deriving from it his protection; and that the Company, as allies to the Nabob, were not only juſtified, but even bound " to purſue ſuch meaſures, as that prince might think " conſiſtent with the juſtice and dignity of his government," in pu-

* About a million ſterling.

† Letter to the Select Committee, March 17th, 1769. India-Houſe.

‡ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 16.

niſhing

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niſhing a vaſſal, who had, neither with arms nor money, contributed to the general defence.

Reaſons why the Preſidency ſuſpended the execution of the orders.

The poſitive orders of the Court of Directors, for calling the Rajah of Tanjore to account, for his conduct in the war, did not arrive till autumn 1769, when the ſeaſon was too far advanced, for carrying them into effect. But other reaſons, beſides thoſe, which aroſe from the climate, weighed with the Preſidency, when they reſolved to ſuſpend the execution of the orders, till a more proper opportunity ſhould preſent itſelf. The ravages of Hyder Ali, the vigour with which he had carried on the late war, the earneſt if not commanding manner, with which he had inſiſted, that the Rajah ſhould be comprehended in the peace, the animoſity, which he had exhibited on every occaſion, againſt the Nabob, rendered it highly probable, that he would not remain a tame ſpectator, ſhould an expedition againſt Tanjore take place *. Though he was engaged in diſputes with Nizam Ali and the Marattas, he might be induced to compromiſe matters, with both thoſe powers, and turn his arms againſt the Carnatic, which he had reſolved, it was believed, on all occaſions to diſtreſs †. Theſe were the oſtenſible motives, which prevented the Preſidency from carrying "the commands of their "maſters into execution;" for they declared, "that the Rajah cer-

They declare that the Rajah deſerved chaſtiſement,

"tainly deſerved chaſtiſement; and not only for the ſupply of mo-
"ney and proviſions, with which he had furniſhed the enemy, in-
"ſtead of aſſiſting the Nabob and the Engliſh, but for ſince delay-

for delaying the payment of the tribute.

"ing the payment of the peiſhcuiſh, ſettled by the treaty of 1762,
"which had become due in the month of July 1769 ‡." This laſt he had done "under the pretence of poverty, and ſoliciting to have "the whole remitted, in conſideration of the expence of the troops

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

"he

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Reaſonableneſs of his contributing to the expence of the war, deduced from various arguments.

" he had ſent to the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, during the late war; " and which gave the Engliſh no aſſiſtance §."

They affirmed, at the ſame time, that had no conſtitutional dependence in the Rajah, no acknowledged ſuperiority in the Nabob exiſted, it was " undoubtedly moſt reaſonable, that Tanjore ſhould " bear a part of the charge of repelling the invaders of the Carna- " tic, by which it was ſurrounded on all ſides *. That this prin- " ciple, even if it had not been eſtabliſhed, by any particular " compact, treaty, or agreement, was clear and determinate, as " reſulting from equity and the natural rights of governments. " That it was certainly contrary to ſound policy in the Carnatic to " ſuffer the exiſtence of ſuch a ſtate. That, if the Nabob poſſeſſed " the whole power of the Carnatic, it would be good policy in " him, and conſiſtent with the principles of the Hindoſtan govern- " ments, to reduce Tanjore to the ſame terms of obedience and " control, to which other Rajahs had been reduced; and that it " would be equally good policy in the Company to do the ſame, " had they poſſeſſed the whole power of the Carnatic †." That the impropriety and inconvenience of ſuch a ſtate ſubſiſting, in the *heart* of the province, had been evident from the Rajah's conduct, in the war with Hyder Ali; and that this conduct might have furniſhed the Preſidency, with a juſt plea for calling him to an account, had not the ſtate of the neighbouring powers rendered an expedition againſt his capital, dangerous in the execution and uncertain in the event ‡.

The Court of Directors enraged at the peace with Hyder Ali.

Whilſt the Preſidency were arguing thus, at Madras, intelligence of the peace with Hyder Ali arrived in England. The letters of the Court of Directors are full of indignation at a treaty, which, they ſaid, could be only juſtified by neceſſity. After accuſing the

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.
* Ibid. p. 938.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.

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Preſidency of having miſrepreſented the Nabob, on account of his diſapproving of a peace, in which he is not ſo much as once named §, they recapitulated ſome inſtances of their unjuſtifiable conduct to that prince, during the war. They reprimanded them, for "having pompouſly appointed him Phouſdar of Myſore;" and for accuſing him, on account of his accepting that nugatory gift, "of an inſatiable deſire of extending his dominions ‖." They inſinuated, that by following their advice, "he found himſelf reduced, diſappointed, and almoſt deſpiſed," yet that they "blamed him for want of temper *." Having repeated ſome paſſages in their ſeveral diſpatches, they endeavoured to condemn them on their own evidence. They accuſed them of irreſolution as men, diſability as negociators, weakneſs and deficiency as politicians. They affirmed, that though they had raſhly dared to rouſe the jealouſy of the country powers, they had not diſcovered, on trying occaſions, the becoming firmneſs neceſſary to ſupport the dignity of the Engliſh name; and that by their feeble conduct in war, and their puſillanimity in ſubmitting to a treaty dictated by an enemy, "they had "laid a foundation for the natives of Hindoſtan to think they may "inſult the Company at pleaſure, with impunity †."

Full of indignation at the Rajah of Tanjore's being comprehended in the treaty.

Proceeding from this general cenſure, they dwelt with particular ſeverity on the article in the treaty with Hyder, which comprehended, at the recommendation, or rather at the command, of that chief, the Rajah of Tanjore. "Had you indeed obtained," ſay the Directors, "from the Rajah of Tanjore the horſe and aſſiſtance "you ſolicited; had he thereby drawn upon himſelf the reſent-"ment of the enemy; had it been difficult, on the Rajah's account, "to have appeaſed Hyder, there might have been ſome merit, in "procuring the Rajah ſafe terms. But we do not conceive that

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XX. p. 534.
‖ Ibid. p. 532.
* Ibid.
† Ibid. p. 533.

"Hyder

" Hyder has diſcovered ſo much want of penetration, in his tranſ-
" actions with you, as to warrant a ſuppoſition, that he could
" himſelf be impoſed upon by ſuch an artifice; and his *warm at-*
" *tachment* to the Rajah of Tanjore, manifeſted by ſtrenuouſly inſiſt-
" ing he ſhould be included in the treaty, could ſcarcely be un-
" known to that prince. What their ſentiments muſt be of perſons,
" whom they had reduced to the neceſſity of practiſing arts of this
" nature, it is not difficult to determine.---We cannot diſcern any
" advantage gained, by this extraordinary effort of your ſkill in
" negociation, which you make matter of ſo much merit. The
" plain fact is, that the Rajah of Tanjore, who, as tributary to the
" Nabob, *ought* to have furniſhed his quota towards carrying on
" the war, which he has *not* done, is ſtill ſtyled by you, a *friend*
" to the Carnatic; and by Hyder's adherence to him, for *refuſing*
" to aſſiſt you, he is, as we conceive, effectually ſheltered by the
" faith of a treaty, from being compellable to contribute a ſingle
" rupee, towards defraying the expence of the war. Our former
" orders, therefore, in *this reſpect*, relative to the Rajah of Tan-
" jore muſt be *ſuſpended*, becauſe they are, by *your* conduct, ren-
" dered utterly impoſſible to be carried into execution without com-
" mitting a breach of the treaty you have concluded ‡."

The pretended ſuſpenſion of the orders of 1769.

That ſubject diſcuſſed.

The concluding paragraph of the above quotation has been held forth, by the advocates of faction and party, as a revocation of the orders of the 17th of March, 1769, relative to the calling the Rajah of Tanjore to account, for his conduct in the late war. It appears, however, by the ſubſequent conduct of the Court of Directors, that they themſelves did not extend the meaning of their own words to the pitch, to which they have been ſince wound up, by hirelings or too buſy friends. In the letter of the Preſidency to the Court, dated the 31ſt of January, 1770, they " point-

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XX. p. 535.

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" edly declare, that they do not think the treaty with Hyder any " obſtacle to the execution of the orders they had received §." That letter was received in July, juſt four months after the pretended revocation had been diſpatched to India. Inſtead of enforcing the paragraph, as revoking their orders of the 17th of March 1769, " the Directors never thought proper to take notice of the ſubject " directly or indirectly." The Preſidency, therefore, had every reaſon to conſider the paragraph, which is now ſet up as a revocation of the orders of 1769, as the ſtrongeſt confirmation and enforcement of thoſe orders ||. The Court, inſtead of doubting of the propriety of their own orders, expreſs much diſpleaſure and diſappointment, at the article of the treaty with Hyder, which, as they conceived, oppoſed the execution of thoſe orders. The truth is, the part of the paragraph, which factious writers conſtrue into a revocation, appears to have been merely an effuſion of paſſion, from minds chagrined, irritated and enraged, at the manner and terms of the treaty with Hyder Ali. But this is not the place for finally diſcuſſing a ſubject, which muſt be reſumed in the order of time.

Superviſors appointed to regulate the affairs of India.

The unſucceſsful war, which had raged, for ſome time, on the coaſt of Coromandel, together with miſmanagements in all parts of India, had not only rouſed the attention of the Court of Directors, but turned the eyes of government towards the Eaſt. In autumn, 1769, the Directors having appointed three commiſſioners, to examine and ſuperintend the affairs of the Company, in all the Preſidencies, applied to Government, for a ſquadron of men of war, " to give coun-

Sir John Lindſay commands a ſquadron to the Eaſt.

" tenance to their affairs *." The commander of this ſquadrom was Sir John Lindſay, an officer of diſtinguiſhed merit in his profeſſion; who received alſo a commiſſion from the Company, as their plenipotentiary to all powers, upon or near the gulph of Perſia; at the ſame time, appointing him " commander in chief of all their

§ M. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 21. || Ibid. * Rous's Appendix, No. XX. p. 531.

"ſhips, frigates, and armed veſſels, in and through all parts of "India †." The commiſſioners, appointed for ſuperintending and managing affairs, throughout India, were Meſſieurs Vanſittart, Scrafton, and Forde, men of character and experience, whoſe melancholy fate is ſtill recent in every one's mind.

He is appointed his Majeſty's plenipotentiary to Indian princes; but particularly to the Nabob.

Sir John Lindſay was inveſted with ſtill higher powers, than thoſe conferred by the Company. He was appointed by a commiſſion under the great ſeal, his Majeſty's Miniſter, with plenipotentiary powers, to Indian princes in general; but more particularly to the Nabob of Arcot, who had become an ally of the crown of Great Britain, by the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris. The managers of the affairs of the Company at home, as well as their ſervants abroad, had induſtriouſly concealed, from that prince, the nature and import of that article for ſeveral years. The ſucceſs, with which this ſecret was preſerved, furniſhes an irrefragable proof, that every individual thought it his own intereſt, to keep the Nabob in a ſtate of ignorance of his rights. Though that prince had obtained, at length, ſome knowledge of the nature of the guarantee, which ſecured to him the poſſeſſion of the Carnatic, he had found it almoſt impoſſible to avail himſelf of that knowledge. The authors of his grievances were the only channels, through which he could convey his complaints; and ſelf-preſervation effectually prevented them, from becoming their own accuſers. In the beginning of 1769, ſome account of his ſufferings had been conveyed to the throne; and, before the end of the year, Sir John Lindſay, as plenipotentiary from his Majeſty, was on his voyage to India.

He arrives at Madras.

On the 26th of July 1770, Sir John, after having remained ſome months at Bombay, arrived at Fort St. George ‡. Having laid his commiſſion before the Nabob, he opened to that prince the object of his embaſſy and the nature of his inſtructions. He

† Rous's App. No. XVII. p. 241. ‡ Sir J. Lindſay to Lord Weymouth, Oct. 13, 1770.

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His assurances in the name of his Majesty to the Nabob.

assured him, that it was his Majesty's firm design to adhere to all the promises made by his late royal grandfather, in his letter of the 21st of February 1760§. That it was his Majesty's permanent resolution, like that of the late king, to continue firm to all his allies, in every part of the world. That the king was determined to support those engagements, into which he had entered, by the treaty of Paris, with other European powers, to secure the Carnatic to the Nabob and his posterity. That should it appear, upon examination, that the distressed situation of the affairs of that country, had proceeded from the intrigues of any of his Majesty's trading subjects, the Nabob might depend on the royal protection and friendly assistance; when the real state of the hardships, under which he laboured, should be laid at the foot of the throne. That to enable his Majesty to vindicate his justice and good faith to the whole world, he had laid his commands on the plenipotentiary, to demand in his Majesty's name, a full and succinct account of the Nabob's transactions with the Company, since the treaty of Paris; that, upon a full information of all affairs, his Majesty might have it in his power, not only to redress past evils, but to prevent future oppressions ||.

He demands, in the king's name, an account of the Nabob's grievances.

Nabob's grateful answer.

In answer to these assurances, the Nabob expressed himself, in terms full of gratitude, for such distinguished marks of his Majesty's friendship, and the repeated assurances of the royal protection to him and family. He assured the plenipotentiary, that he could find no words to express the deep sense he had of his Majesty's goodness, in so seasonably interposing in his behalf, and offering his royal assistance, when he most stood in need of support *. But notwithstanding those expressions of gratitude, he was still afraid to avail himself of the protection of the Crown against men, who might continue to possess that power, under the rigour of which

But is *afraid* to avail himself of the protection of the Crown.

§ Counter-signed by Mr. Secretary Pitt.

|| Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, Oct. 13, 1770. * Ibid.

he

he had already ſo much ſuffered. To improve his fears, various reports were induſtriouſly propagated. Some inſinuated a want of powers in the plenipotentiary; others the inſufficiency of thoſe powers, had they really exiſted, in oppoſition to the charter of the Company. Jealouſy, diſappointment and reſentment aroſe, at once, in arms. The Nabob, knowing the fate of other princes, who had fallen victims to the diſpleaſure of the Company, began to dread, that reſentment might induce them to deprive him of his country, as their ſervants had threatened, two years before †. The example of the Nabobs of Bengal was conſtantly preſent to his eyes, with all its melancholy circumſtances ‡; and he ſhuddered at giving offence to a body of men, whoſe inſolence, tyranny, rigour and injuſtice he had ſo frequently experienced. Diſappointed ambition, and a ſtill more hardened and vindictive paſſion, diſappointed avarice, were likely to lie in wait, for a proper time, to ſatiate themſelves, with the utmoſt exertions of revenge. The ſupport offered was at a great diſtance and in itſelf uncertain; but the enemy was near and ſure of ſeizing every opportunity, to wreck their reſentment upon an unfortunate man, who preſumed to appeal for protection, from the dictates of inſolence and the demands of rapacity.

His reaſons.

The event ſhewed, that the Nabob's fears were better founded than the hopes of ſupport preſented by the plenipotentiary. In a government, ſubject to frequent changes of men and conſequently liable to fluctuations in opinions, promiſes of protection are, at beſt, but unintentional deceptions, which may lead the credulous into ruin. This obſervation has actually been verified, in the perſon of Mahommed Ali, Nabob of the Carnatic. The oppreſſions of the Company, the imperious rapacity of its ſervants, had forced him to throw himſelf under the protection of the ſtate. The ſtate, in

The event ſhewed his fears were juſt.

† Sir John Lindſay to Mr. Wood, Oct. 13, 1770.

‡ Sir John Lindſay to Lord Weymouth, Oct. 13, 1770.

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the moſt ſolemn manner, promiſed its protection; and, in the perſon of an ambaſſador, veſted by the ſeal of Great Britain with every legal power to pledge the public faith, aſſured the Nabob, that it was only neceſſary for him to ſpecify his grievances to have them redreſſed. He accordingly ſpecified his grievances; but, after having been amuſed during three years, with the vain parade of an embaſſy, he found himſelf, in a much worſe condition than before. The royal commiſſion was recalled, without having accompliſhed the leaſt article of the avowed object, for which it had been granted. The plighted faith of the Crown was broken; the credit due to the great ſeal of one of the firſt ſtates in the world was deſtroyed, at the requiſition of a body, who had tarniſhed the honour of a free nation, by innumerable acts of tyranny and oppreſſion. To this ſource may be traced all the late misfortunes of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Government, inſtead of fulfilling engagements, which every ſtate holds ſacred, remanded back the wretched fugitive to the fetters, from which he had attempted to eſcape. The Company enraged at the PRESUMPTION of his defection, have added revenge to thoſe ſordid and unjuſtifiable paſſions, from which he had already ſuffered ſo much; and with a peculiar refinement on cruelty, whilſt they diveſt him of his rights, they deprive him of his reputation, the laſt comfort of the unfortunate.

His ſcruples at length overcome,

The Nabob had ſufficient diſcernment to foreſee a part of thoſe misfortunes, which have ſince fallen on himſelf and his family, on account of his having appealed, from the oppreſſions of the Company, to the juſtice of the Crown. He, therefore, expreſſed the greateſt anxiety about his own perilous ſituation, when the plenipotentiary demanded a faithful account of his grievances. But, upon the plenipotentiary's " promiſing, in his Majeſty's name, that ſhould " it become neceſſary for his protection, and the ſecurity of his fa-

" mily,

by the plenipotentiary's pledging the faith of the crown, in the moſt ſolemn manner.

" mily, he would enter into a ſolemn treaty with him, as ſoon as he " ſhould make the neceſſity of ſuch a meaſure evident *," the Nabob gave a full detail of his tranſactions with the ſervants of the Company, from the year 1760, when he was dignified with the title of an ally by the late king. He juſtly conſidered, that his being acknowledged the ally of that monarch, had entitled him to the royal protection againſt the injuſtice of the ſubjects of Great-Britain, as well as againſt the force of foreign Europeans. This protection had been pledged in the moſt ſolemn manner; but the Nabob's neglecting to ſecure himſelf, by the treaty offered by the plenipotentiary, fruſtrated, in the event, his hopes of redreſs.

The Court of Directors, for the time, favour the Nabob.

Though the ſervants of the Company on the Coaſt had, almoſt uniformly, during the wars with the Nizam and Hyder Ali, treated the Nabob with contempt and injuſtice, the Court of Directors ſeem to have reſpected his rights, in the year 1769. In their inſtructions to the three commiſſioners, dated the 15th of September 1769, they enjoined them " to provide effectually for the honour and ſecurity of " their FAITHFUL ally, Mahommed Ali, Nabob of Arcot." They blamed the Preſidency, for their injuſtice to that prince; and ſtigmatized their conduct, as a moſt " flagrant breach of their repeated or- " ders." They declared their ſorrow to find, that the imprudent and impolitic ſchemes of the Preſidency had eventually increaſed the debts of the Nabob, and accumulated his diſtreſs. " When we re- " flect (continued the Court of Directors) on the long experience we " have had of Mahommed Ali's faithful attachment to the Engliſh " Company, we are ſurpriſed at the idea entertained by the Governor " and Council, in their letters of the 8th March and 27th June " 1768, to reduce him to a *mere nominal Nabob* †. The ſanction of " the

Their inſtructions concerning him to the ſupervifors.

* Sir John Lindſay to Lord Weymouth, Oct. 13th, 1770.

† " To complete the whole, as the Com- " pany's ſervants found the expence of the war " with Hyder increaſing, and as the appear- " ance of troubles in Bengal forbade them to " hope for aſſiſtance from that quarter, as they " probably had then a proſpect of making peace " with

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" the treaty of Paris, by which treaty PUBLIC FAITH became the " guarantee of the Nabob's title, will be of little uſe to him, if no- " torious infringements of the rights and powers uſually inherent " in, and dependent on, ſuch title, ſhould be by us countenanced " and permitted to take place. More eſpecially as, perhaps, we " might thereby involve ourſelves in the very diſagreeable neceſſity " of anſwering, at ſome future period, for the *infraction* of a pub- " lic treaty and the conſequences thereof‡." Unfortunately for the Nabob, the commiſſioners deſtined to carry theſe inſtructions into execution, never arrived in India.

Rajah of Tanjore attached to Hyder,

Though the Preſidency at Fort St. George had affected to comprehend the Rajah of Tanjore, in the treaty of the 3d of April, as *their* friend, he was no ſtranger to the circumſtance, that he owed that favour to Hyder Ali. A principle of gratitude to that chief, or rather a fixed averſion to the Nabob and his allies, the Engliſh, had thrown him entirely into the intereſt of Hyder, with whom he

with whom he correſponds.

carried on an uninterrupted and friendly correſpondence §.

He evades the payment of the peiſhcuſh.

Depending on his aid, or following his advice, he not only evaded the payment of the peiſhcuſh ſettled, by the treaty of 1762, but even peremptorily demanded fourteen lacks of rupees ‖ from the Nabob, as the expences of the troops, which he had ſent to the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh in February 1768, but which he had withdrawn, before they had been of " any manner of uſe *."

" with Hyder, or little hopes of conquering " his country, they reſolved to take the Car- " natic into their own hands, as the only means " of paying the expence of the war, which " they had undertaken contrary to the advice " of the prince of the country; to leave the " Nabob, though included in the treaty of Pa- " ris, and an acknowledged ally by their ſo- " vereign," a name only, " without a country. " This," they ſay, " may look like violence, " but the meaſure is neceſſary, and not a thing " to be conſidered or doubted of." Sir John Lindſay to the Secretary of State, 21ſt January 1771.

‡ Inſtructions to the Commiſſioners, Sept. 15th, 1769.

§ Letter from Select Committee, Sept. 29th, 1770.

‖ 175,000 l. Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 564.

* General letter, March 17th, 1769.

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Though the Rajah ſeems to have been ſincere in his attachment to Hyder, that crafty chief wiſhed to command more deciſively the councils of his weak, verſatile and vicious ally. That profligate young man, being deſtitute of every dignity of mind, was always fond of the Company, and was conſequently led, by the advice of men of the loweſt caſts and moſt ſervile profeſſions. Gilbiliapah, a BARRAWAR, an office ſimilar to that of a pimp in a common brothel, but if poſſible of leſs dignity, was firſt his favourite and afterwards his miniſter *. In the beginning of the year 1770, one Huſſan Khan Soor, a fellow who had uſed to get his living at Putcotah, by catching fiſh †, having recommended himſelf to the Rajah, by playing on a muſical inſtrument, was placed by him, in the chief management of the affairs of government. Mona-jî, who had ſerved his family ſo long, was not only diſplaced, but confined; and even a plot for aſſaſſinating him, in his own houſe, was formed ‡. The new miniſter, who ſeems to have been a Mahommedan, proved ſo ungrateful to a fooliſh maſter, who had raiſed him from the duſt, that he is ſaid to have deviſed a ſcheme for placing the fort of Tanjore, in the hands of Hyder Ali §. Tulja-jî, who was as inconſtant in his favours, as he was verſatile in his politics, became ſoon tired of the fiſherman, and diſmiſſed him from the office of miniſter ‖. But no change of ſervants wrought any favourable alteration in the mind of the Rajah. In the month of July 1770, he was in arrear, for the ſtipulated tribute; and he continued his intrigues and correſpondence with Hyder Ali, throughout the remaining part of the year ¶.

A common pimp his chief favourite.

He makes a common fiſherman his miniſter;

who deviſes a ſcheme to give Tanjore to Hyder.

In December 1770, the deſigns of the Rajah to diſturb the repoſe of the Carnatic, began to be diſcovered by intelligence received, from various quarters, by the Preſidency, as well as by the Nabob. A

Rajah's deſigns diſcovered.

* The Author of the Defence of Lord Pigot expoſes *his ſelf*, in making a Barawar, a character of dignity. That vile appellation is too coarſe to be even pronounced, by any Indian, poſſeſſed of delicacy.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 636, 637.
‡ Ibid. p. 637.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. p. 569, 570.

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vackeel from Hyder Ali, to the Rajah of Tanjore, was ſtopped, with his retinue, at the fort of Caroor *, under the juriſdiction of Tritchinopoly, till orders ſhould be received concerning him, from the Nabob and the Preſidency. An intercourſe of letters had paſſed, between Tulja-jî and Madaverow the chief of the Marattas †; and the hoſtile preparations, which were made throughout the territory of Tanjore, ſeemed to place it, beyond a doubt, that ſomething more, than mere ceremony, was the foundation of the Rajah's correſpondence, with foreign powers. On the 2d of February 1771, the Rajah marched from Tanjore with an army, with the profeſſed intention of proceeding againſt the country of the Marawar ‡. That country extends, along the bay of Bengal, from the borders of Tanjore to point Ramen, the neareſt part of the continent to the iſland of Ceylon, from which that point is ſeparated, by a ſhallow and narrow channel. The ſea, ſtretching to the weſt from point Ramen, borders the country to the ſouth; and an ideal line divides it, on the weſt, from the province of Madura, to whoſe Rajah the Marawar was tributary §, before the Carnatic fell into the hands of the Mahommedans. Madura itſelf, with all its vaſſals, depended on the province of Tritchinopoly, when the latter was reduced by the Moguls; and conſequently its tributaries, under their ancient tenures, were transferred to the conquerors ‖. The Marawar himſelf acknowledged his dependence, and was obliged to furniſh "his quota of troops to the government of Trit-"chinopoly, in time of war and danger ¶." The country, properly called that of the Marawar, was itſelf divided into two governments, the moſt extenſive of which was ſubject to a chief called

He corre-ſponds with the Marattas.

He attacks the Marawar.

Deſcription of his country.

Subject to Madura

and Tritchi-nopoly.

Greater and leſſer Mara-war.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 569, 570.

† Ibid. p. 569.

‡ Ibid. p. 570.

§ Jeſuits Letters, vol. ii. The Preſident and Council of Fort St. George do not appear to have been well informed concerning the dependence of Marava, or the country of the Marawar. We find, by the letters of the Jeſuits, who travelled in Marava in 1709, that it had from all antiquity been ſubject to the government of Madura.

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 581.

¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 672. 680. 682.

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the Polygar of Satputty *, or the Great Marawar; the latter was known, by the name of the territories of the Polygar of Nellah-cottah, commonly, but corruptedly, ſtiled Nalcooty.

Rajah's pretenſions.

The pretenſions, by which the Rajah juſtified his hoſtilities, againſt the Marawar, were founded upon prior tranſactions, which require to be explained. In the year 1716, ſome diſputes ariſing between the Rajah of Tanjore and the Marawar, the former invaded the territories of the latter; who, though he was aſſiſted by his ſuperior, the Rajah of Tritchinopoly, was defeated, and loſt a part of his country to the victor †. Sadatulla Chan, then Nabob of the Carnatic, being the lawful ſuperior of both the contending parties, having interfered, transferred their diſputes into his Divan, who ſettled them under certain reſtrictions, with regard to the countries ſeized by the Rajah of Tanjore ‡. Upon the death of the Marawar, in the year 1725, his ſucceſſor was diſplaced, by a relation, aided by the arms of Tanjore. Another pretender ariſing was aſſiſted, in the ſame manner, by the Tanjorines; but, after he got poſſeſſion of the government, he proved ungrateful to his benefactors, and having defeated them, in the field, expelled them from the countries, which they had ſeized in 1716 §. In the time of Pretaupa Sing, his general, Mona-jî, retook the ceded territories; but the Marawar repoſſeſſed himſelf of thoſe territories, in the year 1764, when the Nabob and Engliſh were engaged in the ſiege of Madura ‖. It was to recover what his father had loſt, that Tulja-jî took the field, with a rabble rather than an army, conſiſting of ſixty-four thouſand men ¶. He was joined on his march by ſome topaſſes and artillery-

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 590.
† Ibid. No. XXII. p. 680.
‡ Ibid. p. 681.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. No. XXI. p. 588. This rabble conſiſted of

Horſe	—	4,000
Sepoys	—	10,000
Peons	—	40,000
Commatties	—	10,000
		64,000

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men, from the ſettlement of Negapatam §, the Dutch being offended with the Marawar for diſturbing their pearl-fiſhery on the coaſt ‖. They were to have been gratified for their aſſiſtance, with ſome diſtricts along the ſhore ‡.

1771. He ravages the country and beſieges the capital.

The Tanjorines, having taken the barrier of Mooderwauly, in the firſt week of February *, entered the territories of the Marawar, ravaged the open country, took almoſt every place of ſtrength, and ſat down before Ramnadaporam, the capital, before the end of the month †. The Marawar himſelf being a minor, the management of affairs was in the hands of his mother, the widow of the late Marawar, a woman of a maſculine ſpirit. To prevent herſelf and her ſon from falling into the hands of the Rajah, ſhe kept a quantity of powder near their apartments, to which ſhe had reſolved to ſet fire, ſhould they happen to be driven to the laſt extremity ¶.

Which is defended with firmneſs.

The vigorous defence of Ramnadaporam, at length, induced the Rajah to liſten to terms, a few days after he had opened his batteries.

A compromiſe.

The conditions were, that the Marawar ſhould give a lack of rupees in ready money, two elephants, two pieces of cannon, ſome jewels, and other things of value. That he ſhould cede to the Rajah the countries he had lately taken by force; and deliver the fort and diſtrict of Armogan, for the reſidence of a perſon of the blood of the Marawar, whoſe pretenſions the Rajah had engaged to ſupport ⸸. "Having *finiſhed* the buſineſs of the Greater-Marawar **," to uſe the expreſſion of the Rajah, that of the Leſſer-Marawar or Nalcooty only remained, which he reſolved alſo to finiſh §§. Having effected *his* mode of ſettlement, by extorting money, territories and things

Rajah extorts money and territory from the Leſſer Marawar.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 572.
‖ Ibid. p. 573.
‡ Ibid. p. 574.
* Ibid. p. 576.
† Ibid. p. 594.
¶ Ibid.
⸸ Ibid. p. 605.
** Ibid. p. 609.
§§ Ibid.

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of value from Nalcooty, he returned to Tanjore; but kept his army in readineſs to take the field †.

1771.

Though the Marawar was almoſt as faithleſs a vaſſal, as the Rajah of Tanjore, to the Nabob, he did not fail to apply very early for the aſſiſtance of that Prince, againſt the invader of his country. The Leſſer Marawar or Polygar of Nalcooty, knowing that he was deſtined to be the next victim, was equally preſſing in his ſolicitations for the ſupport of his ſuperior. Both owned their dependence and ſubmiſſion as ſubjects of the Carnatic*; they ſoothed, flattered, entreated, and promiſed ‡. The Nabob, as the power of the ſword was in other hands, could only ſend remonſtrances to the Preſidency. During the military progreſs of Tulja-jî, which continued only ſix weeks, he wrote twenty-two requiſitions; but the government of Fort St. George were, either too cautious or too ill prepared to take the field. Mr. Du-Prè, the Preſident, wrote a letter to the Rajah, on the 14th of February ‡, expreſſing his ſurpriſe at his commencing hoſtilities, without laying the ſtate of his diſputes with the Marawar before the ſuperior of both, the Nabob of the Carnatic. He told the Rajah, that he had given him, upon other occaſions, his friendly advice; and that, now, on behalf of the Company, as guarantee of the treaty of 1762, he was obliged to give it as his opinion, that the part the Rajah acted was contrary to that treaty §. The Preſident added, "When you reflect on this, if it be your intention to "maintain peace and friendſhip with the Circar of the Carnatic and "the Company, you will, no doubt, immediately recal your troops, "refrain from the leaſt hoſtility againſt the Marawar, depending "that juſtice will be done, upon enquiry into the circumſtances of "the caſe ‖."

The Marawar applies for aſſiſtance to the Nabob.

So does Nalcooty.

Both own their dependence.

Nabob makes twenty-two requiſitions to the Preſidency.

Who write to the Rajah.

† Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 35.
* Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 580, 581. 586.
‡ Ibid. paſſim.
‡ Ibid. p. 574.
§ Ibid. p. 575.
‖ Ibid.

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His inſolent anſwer.

Though the Rajah received this letter, before he ſat down before Ramnadaporam, about the 20th of February, his anſwer was only returned on the 25th of March, a conſiderable time after he had "*finiſhed*" the affairs of the Marawar. Having given ſome account of the origin of his claims on the Greater and Leſſer Marawar, together with injuries which he pretended to have received from the Polygar Tondiman, he concludes his letter with the following words, which are more expreſſive of his views and refractory conduct than any comment that could be made: "You are a protector of my "government," you ſay, "notwithſtanding you have not ſettled "a ſingle affair belonging to me*. If ſtay quiet I ſhall greatly "hurt my *dignity*, wherefore I marched myſelf. If you now ad-"viſe me to deſiſt, what anſwer can I give to it†? In the treaty, "it was not forbidden to clear the country poſſeſſed by the Mara-"war‡, or to undertake an expedition againſt the Polygars, who "may uſe compulſions; ſince it is ſo, it cannot be deemed contrary "to treaty. You write, that if I deſiſt, you will ſettle the affairs in "a reaſonable manner; I continued to ſpeak to you, this long "time, concerning this affair, but you have not ſettled it; not-"withſtanding, if you now write, that I did not acquaint you before "I began it, what anſwer can I make to it§? I have *finiſhed* the "affairs relating to the Marawar and confirmed him in his buſineſs. "The affair with Nalcooty remains to be finiſhed, which I ſhall "alſo *finiſh*||."

His letter conſidered as a defiance.

Though this letter, particularly the ſentence with which it concludes, was conſidered by the Select Committee†, in the light of a

* Mr. Du Prè had *ſettled* the treaty of 1762.

† He had now *finiſhed* the buſineſs.

‡ "The treaty related only to matters of "account." Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 16.

§ At the very time that the Rajah gave, in a manner, the lye direct to the Engliſh Preſident, he correſponded in the moſt friendly manner with the French Governor of Pondicherry; and ſent a Vackeel to the Marattas, who threatened at the time the Carnatic with invaſion. Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 608.

|| Ibid. p. 609.

† March 28, 1771.

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defiance *, they were unwilling, for various reaſons, to carry things to extremities. To a want of ability of taking the field with effect, they added their fears from foreign powers, eſpecially from the Marattas †. Miſtaking the inſolence of Tulja-jî for a confidence derived from the certainty of aid, from the neighbouring ſtates, they became irreſolute and indeciſive in their councils; if a judgment may be formed from the peruſal of their minutes. But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that private animoſity, in this caſe, as well as in affairs of greater intricacy, ſuperſeded, or at leaſt ſuſpended, the regard of the Preſidency for the public weal. The confidence which the Nabob had derived from the ſupport of his Majeſty's miniſter, had diminiſhed *their* influence at his Durbar; and, from a reſentment, natural to men jealous of power, they were unwilling to involve themſelves in a war for the *conſtitutional rights* of a government, which they had ceaſed to controul. An intercourſe of ſharp letters, which had begun between them and the Plenipotentiary upon his arrival, ſtill continued; and, as the Nabob ſeemed to lean towards the ſentiments of the latter, in his correſpondence, freſh fuel was added to the flame. Their deliberations could not be ſuppoſed to partake of any complaiſance to the inclinations of that Prince; and we, therefore, muſt conclude, that their ſubſequent reſolutions againſt Tanjore proceeded either from neceſſity or a ſenſe of juſtice, and not from any favour for the Nabob ‡.

Irreſolute conduct of the Preſidency.

Jealous of the influence of Sir John Lindſay.

Their reſolutions againſt Tanjore proceed not from favour for the Nabob.

Toſſed between the expediency and even neceſſity of bringing the Rajah to account, for his unjuſtifiable conduct, and their own animoſity againſt the Nabob, the Preſidency became irreſolute, indeciſive, and fluctuating in their councils. On the one ſide, a ſenſe of duty and an attention to the public ſafety erected a bulwark of facts and arguments, to ſupport their reſolution; on the

Their fluctuating conduct.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 665.

† Ibid.

‡ "The Company's ſervants really appear "to be exceedingly ſorry, that the princes of "India know their SOVEREIGN is greater than "the Governor and Council; and ſeem hurt "leſt their arbitrary mandates and practices "ſhould meet with any check, from being made "known to their country." Sir Robert Harland to the Earl of Rochford, Feb. 26th, 1772.

other,

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They deliberate on the ſubject of Tanjore,

other, animoſity and exceſſive caution ſtept in and levelled all again. In deliberating on the ſubject, they brought before them ſuch of the Company's orders, as ſeemed to affect what they called "their preſent critical ſituation *." The Court of Directors, in their letter of the 27th of June, 1770, had ſtrictly forbidden them "to become "parties in any diſputes between the powers of India †."---But the Rajah of Tanjore was *not* an independent power, but a feudatory, a vaſſal, who had failed in his duty to the Carnatic, of the peace of which, the Preſidency were the guardians. The Court of Directors had declared, in their letter of the 23d of March, in the ſame year, "that they were bound by the treaty of Paris to ac- "knowledge, and ſtrongly urged by honour and intereſt to ſup- "port Mahommed Ali as Nabob of the Carnatic. Yet they ſtrictly "forbid their ſervants, even in ſupport of their ally, to invade the "dominions of thoſe, who deſire the friendſhip of the Company, and "do not forfeit it, by becoming themſelves the AGGRESSORS ‡." But the Rajah of Tanjore had not only leagued with their enemies, but had become "the aggreſſor," by kindling a war in the heart of the Carnatic, the peace and tranquillity of which they had been ordered to defend and vindicate §. The Court of Directors had, in their letter of the 17th of March, 1769, given ſtrict orders for bringing the Rajah to account, as a vaſſal of the Carnatic, for his conduct during the Myſore war; yet in their letter of the 23d March, 1770, in a fit of paſſion with their ſervants, on account of the treaty with Hyder Ali, they ſeem to *ſuſpend* the execution of their orders relative to Tanjore. But the Preſidency were of opinion, that the article of the treaty, which included the Rajah, was ſo far from ſecuring him, from being brought to account, for any breach on the conſtitutional rights of his ſuperior, that it could not be con-

and different orders of the Court of Directors.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 659.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 660.
§ Ibid. p. 662.

ſtrued

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ſtrued to defend him againſt animadverſion, for his unjuſtifiable behaviour during the war ‖.

Recapitulation of the Rajah's unjuſtifiable conduct.

Without having recourſe to the orders of the Court of Directors, "which, however poſitive, as they were made for general purpoſes, "could never completely embrace the variety of circumſtances "which might ariſe *," the Preſidency ſhould have recurred to the expediency of the meaſure, founded upon the conſtitutional rights of the Nabob and the Rajah. It appears that the Rajah's conduct was not only unjuſtifiable, but deſerved immediate chaſtiſement, "becauſe, being himſelf a tributary of the Carnatic, his "taking up arms againſt its dependents, was an act of hoſtility "againſt the government to which he was a vaſſal †." That had it even been true, which was by no means the caſe, that the Marawar was not dependent on Tritchinopoly, the Rajah was highly reprehenſible, in deciding by arms diſputes, which ought to have been ſettled, according to ancient cuſtom, by the Divan of the Nabob of the Carnatic ‡. That, as his lighting the flames of war, not only without the conſent, but contrary to the expreſs orders of his ſuperior, was an act of rebellion, it was the duty of the allies of that prince to aſſiſt him "in a manner conſiſtent with the juſtice "and dignity of his government §." That independent of their engagements to the Nabob, their own intereſt and the ſafety of the poſſeſſions of the Company, depended on the ſpeedy reduction of a man, who was privately connected with the Marattas and Hyder, and had invited the arms of both to an invaſion of the Carnatic. That, beſides his intrigues with the powers of India, he had not only ſhewn a manifeſt partiality for other European nations, in pre-

Reaſons, facts and arguments.

His conduct dangerous to the Company.

His intrigues with European as well as Indian powers.

‖ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 16.
* Rous's Appendix, p. 659.
† Preſident to the Nabob, Feb. 20, 1771. Rous's Appendix.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXI.
§ Court of Directors to the Select Committee, March 17, 1769.

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ference to the Engliſh, but had obſtructed and diſcouraged the commerce of the latter ‖. That, inſtead of adhering to the treaty of 1762, in which he had been ſo much favoured, he had refuſed or neglected to pay his tribute, for the laſt two years. That, without any diſſimulation on that ſubject, he inſulted the guarantees, who had ſolemnly bound themſelves to "aſſiſt the party performing "againſt the party failing to perform," by declaring, "that if the "Engliſh are inclined to maintain the friendſhip, the tribute may "be paid ſometime ſooner or later *;" plainly making *their* good behaviour the condition of *his* performing his own duty. That it was, as contrary to juſtice as to ſound policy, to permit a power to exiſt in the heart of the Carnatic, who, inſtead of contributing to the general defence †, was ready with his treaſure and troops, to aſſiſt invaders ‡. That, upon the whole, the connection of the Rajah with the enemies of the Carnatic, his hoſtilities againſt its dependents, his flagrant breach of the treaty of 1762 §, his partiality to others in oppoſition to the Engliſh intereſt, his diſobedience to his ſuperior, his ingratitude to his protectors, his behaviour in the late war, the danger, if not certainty of his kindling another war, unleſs prevented, rendered it, at once, juſt, expedient and neceſſary, to bring him to a ſevere account for his conduct ¶.

He inſults the Engliſh.

Juſtice, policy and expedience of bringing him to account.

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 664.
* Ibid. No. XXI. p. 622.
† Ibid. p. 623.
‡ Ibid.
§ The tribute had remained unpaid ſince July 11th, 1769. P. 624. 684.
¶ "The Rajah has, however, given grounds "for many pretences to treat him with ſeverity; he has not paid the Peiſhcuiſh regularly, "he did not furniſh aſſiſtance in the war; and "he *did* furniſh proviſions and paid a ſum of "money to Hyder, when he entered the Car-"natic, in the beginning of 1769." Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 685.

"The Rajah has broke the peace; he "has not even paid the Peiſhcuiſh; he is in "every reſpect the aggreſſor. The Nabob is the "party injured; and the Preſidency are bound "to ſee juſtice done." Sir John Lindſay to the Preſidency, March 20th, 1771. Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. p. 285.

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Though the Preſidency felt the force of all thoſe arguments and facts, they proceeded, with manifeſt caution, if not coldneſs, in their preparations, for an expedition againſt Tanjore. The want of military ſtores, a deficiency of funds for the other expences of war, the declaration of the Marattas in favour of the Rajah *, real or ſuppoſed dangers from Nizam Ali, the attachment of Hyder to Tulja-jî, the connection of that Rajah with the French and other Europeans were the oſtenſible reaſons, for the inactivity of the Preſidency. But, it is apparent, that the jealouſy of the Company's ſervants of the influence of his Majeſty's plenipotentiary with the Nabob, which jealouſy had been inflamed into paſſion and even vindictiveneſs, by an intercourſe of intemperate letters, had been the chief obſtacle to deciſive meaſures †. The Rajah, aſcribing their inactivity to their want of power, acquired confidence, and remained in the ſame ſtate of open defiance to the Nabob and his allies. Having "*finiſhed*" the buſineſs of the two Marawars, he returned to his capital, which he prepared for defence ‡. He advanced a conſiderable force, within two ſtages of Tritchinopoly. He reſolved to take 6000 Marattas into his pay; and as an undoubted demonſtration of his intentions, he detached a body of five hundred choſen horſe, a battalion of Sepoys and two guns, to ſurpriſe and take the Nabob's ſecond ſon, who, he had heard, was on his way to Tritchinopoly §.

Cautious and indeciſive conduct of the Preſidency,

proceeds from their jealouſy of the crown.

Rajah acquires confidence.

Prepares for war.

Notwithſtanding the apparent unwillingneſs of the Preſidency to plunge themſelves into a war, in ſupport of the rights of the Nabob and their own guarantee of the treaty of 1762, the Rajah's conduct had become ſo glaringly hoſtile, that they could no longer remain inactive ſpectators ||. They had been frequently ſolicited in

The Preſidency apply to the Nabob.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 679.

† Sir John Lindſay to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1771. Vide Remarks on the Nabob's Letter of March 24, 1771. Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 682 to 689.

‡ Sir John Lindſay to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1771.

§ Ibid.

|| Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 686.

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vain by the Nabob; but, now, they applied to that prince in their turn *. Mahommed Ali, either impreſſed with thoſe difficulties, which had ſuggeſted themſelves to the Preſidency, or, from a doubt of the expediency of the meaſure, or a deſpair of the ſucceſs of an expedition againſt Tanjore, expreſſed his unwillingneſs to accede to their propoſal. He informed them, that there were three obſtacles to the undertaking, which ſeemed inſurmountable. That the Rajah had ſent a large ſum of money to the French, a thing much in his power, on account of his wealth. That he had gained Hyder, by whoſe means he hoped to become independent of the Carnatic; and that he had ſolicited and obtained the promiſe of aſſiſtance from the Marattas †. The Preſident, in anſwer to the Nabob's objections, obſerved, "that things were now come to ſuch a paſs, between the "Rajah, the Company, and the Nabob, by the great lengths to "which the former had gone ‡," that he really believed Tanjore would join any enemy of the Carnatic. That the reduction of a force ſo hoſtile was eſſential to the ſafety of the Nabob and to the intereſts of the Company. That an expedition of the nature of that propoſed muſt ever be attended with riſk, and might be productive of an invaſion by the Marattas; but that their coming, at that time of the year, would be attended with leſs loſs and danger, than in the ſeaſon, in which the Nabob had been ſo eager for the expedition. That, as to the French, it was indeed moſt probable, they would join the Rajah, as ſoon as they were in any condition for that purpoſe; but, that this circumſtance, inſtead of being an objection to the expedition, was the moſt urgent motive to the undertaking it, before they had acquired the power of giving effectual aid to the enemy. That, as to Hyder, there was little to be apprehended from that chief, conſidering the preſent untoward ſtate of his own affairs §.

He is unwilling to attack Tanjore.

His reaſons.

Preſident explains the neceſſity of the meaſure.

His reaſons.

* June 12, 1771. Rous's App. No. XXII. p. 685. † Ibid. p. 686. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

To theſe reaſons, the Nabob replied, "that he was under the or-"der" of the Preſidency. But the committee, who had waited upon him, on the occaſion, thinking that he wiſhed to ſhelter the meaſure, under that expreſſion, declared that every thing depended, on the reſolution he himſelf ſhould form. Doubting no longer the ſincerity of their intentions, he begged leave to aſk three queſtions: Whether the object of the expedition was merely to chaſtiſe the Rajah? The recovery of a ſum of money, for his contumacy? Or the abſolute conqueſt of the country? The committee anſwered, That could the Rajah be brought to the payment of a large ſum of money, and to ſubmit to ſuch regulations, as might remove all future apprehenſions, it were better than to proceed to abſolute conqueſt. But that, as it was doubtful, whether the Rajah could be brought to ſecure terms, without coming to that extremity, it was neceſſary to adapt the preparations for the expedition to that ultimate object. The reſult was, that the Nabob became, for the time, reconciled to the propoſals of the committee, upon their aſſuring him, that whatever ſums of money might be taken from the Rajah, ſhould be applied to the diſcharge of his debts to private creditors, after deducting from thoſe ſums, the expences of the expedition †. But after this acquieſcence of the Nabob, he recurred, in the beginning of July, to his former objections. Theſe, however, were again over-ruled, by the eagerneſs of the Preſidency for an expedition, which the inſolent conduct and dangerous intrigues of the Rajah had, now, rendered abſolutely neceſſary ‡.

Nabob agrees to the meaſure.

His three reaſons.

He recurs to his former objections.

Notwithſtanding this ſecond acquieſcence to the inclinations of the Preſidency, the Nabob's averſion to a military expedition recurred. Preferring negociation, to a recourſe to war, it appears, that he propoſed to bring about an accommodation, by the means of the Maratta vackeel §. In a conference with the Preſident, on the 22d of July,

He prefers negociation to force;

† Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 687 ‡ Ibid. p. 690. § Ibid. p. 693.

he

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he inſinuated his averſion to hoſtile meaſures, ſtated difficulties, and hinted the expediency of remaining quiet at preſent, and deferring the expedition to another time ‖. In another conference, on the 23d ¶, " he expreſſed his diſinclination to an immediate expedition, " chuſing rather an accommodation with the Rajah, to be negociated " by himſelf, without their interpoſition; but deſiring, neverthe- " leſs, their ſupport to the meaſure *." It appears, that the Select Committee, taking the whole ſeriouſly to their conſideration, had come to a reſolution to leave the negociation to the Nabob, and to give him every ſupport †. " By the minutes of the 29th of July it " alſo appears, that the Nabob had opened his demands to the Tan- " jore vackeel; but that the vackeel declared, he had no powers to " accommodate the matter; that finding the negociations at Madras " might be attended with ruinous delays, he had propoſed to ſend his " eldeſt ſon to Tritchinopoly, requeſting the Preſidency to ſupport " him, with the appearance of reſolution, to compel the Rajah, if " neceſſary, by military force ‡." On the other hand, the Rajah, meaning nothing leſs than a reaſonable accommodation, " uſed de- " lays, procraſtinations, and evaſions, in order to waſte the time, " till the ſetting in of the rains, and the riſing of the Monſoon, " ſhould deprive the Nabob and Engliſh of the power of military " compulſion, for the ſeaſon §."

which is left in his hands.

Preſidency promiſe to ſupport him.

Orders iſſued to the army.

The deſigns of the Rajah appeared ſo evident to the Preſidency, that they perceived no probability of his ſubmitting to ſafe and honourable terms, without military compulſion ⸸. Orders were, therefore, iſſued to General Smith, on the 30th of July, to prepare the army aſſembled at Tritchinopoly, for taking the field. Theſe orders mentioned, " that the Nabob had determined to accept terms from

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 694, 695.
¶ Ibid. p. 695, 696.
* Ibid. p. 726.
† Ibid. p. 718, 719.
‡ Ibid. p. 726.
§ Ibid. p. 718. 720.
⸸ Ibid. p. 728.

" the

" the Rajah;" but the Preſidency, at the ſame time, declared that " it was highly probable, the Rajah would never comply with ſuch " terms, as ſhould be deemed ſafe, honourable and ſufficient, unleſs " compelled by force of arms ‖." Under the ſuppoſition, that matters might proceed to an abſolute conqueſt of Tanjore, they made prior arrangements for that event. Upon the requiſition of the Nabob, they agreed to place the country and capital in his hands; in the ſame manner, as the Company had done, on former occaſions, with reſpect to the forts and territories of other Zemindars, who had been reduced, on account of actual rebellion againſt the government of the Carnatic, or for withholding the cuſtomary tribute ¶. In return, the Nabob promiſed to pay to the Company a free gift of ten lacks of pagodas †, with a donation to the troops, in compenſation for the plunder, ſhould the place be taken by ſtorm. But he refuſed to receive a garriſon of the Company's troops, as a matter of *right*, into the fort; though he declared, " that whenever there " ſhould be occaſion, he ſhould deſire and ſolicit the Preſidency to " garriſon the place ‡, in the ſame manner as Tritchinopoly and Ve- " lore *."

Eventual arrangements, in caſe of war.

Men,

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 722.

¶ Ibid. p. 727.

† 400,000 l.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 727.

* In addition to the facts and arguments, in the preceding pages, it is thought proper to throw into a note the SUBSTANCE of Mr. Du Prè's Vindication of the Expedition of 1771. Though that gentleman's reaſonings are not ſo forcibly expreſſed, in the following abſtract, as in his own work, ſome advantage may be derived from their being compendiouſly collected into one point of view. Whoever will be at the trouble of reading the ENORMOUS volumes publiſhed by the Court of Directors, in their own defence, will readily allow, that Mr. Du Prè is, at leaſt, an IMPARTIAL authority, in whatever regards the intereſts of the Nabob of Arcot.

Subſtance of Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, &c.

The motives to the expedition of 1771 were partly in obedience to particular orders; partly to fulfil the guarantee of the treaty of 1762; but chiefly from juſt apprehenſions that the general peace of the Carnatic, and even the immediate poſſeſſions of the Nabob and Company would be endangered, ſhould not the power of the Rajah of Tanjore be checked.

The temporizing and deceitful conduct of the Rajah, in the Myſore war, had excited the reſentment of the Court of Directors. This they expreſs in very pointed terms, in their letters to Madras, of the 17th of March 1769. In the 7th paragraph of *that* to the Select Committee, after animadverting ſeverely on the conduct of the Rajah, for not contributing to the defence of the Carnatic, which he ought to have done as a tributary, they enjoin them to give

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The whole argument ſtated, relative to the pretenſions of the Company to the diſpoſal of Tanjore.

Men, who neither underſtood the conſtitution of the Carnatic, nor the peculiar ſituation of the Preſidency, have ſtigmatiſed theſe terms with

give the Nabob ſuch ſupport in his pretenſions on the Rajah, as he might think conſiſtent with the juſtice and dignity of his government.

Theſe orders were *poſitive*. But before the Committee had taken any meaſures in conſequence of them, they had the mortification to find that the indignation of the Court of Directors, ſo lately expreſſed againſt the Rajah of Tanjore, was transferred to themſelves. In the treaty with Hyder Ali, at the cloſe of the Myſore war, the Preſident and Council of Madras had, for political reaſons, included the Rajah, on the part of the Carnatic, though his conduct deſerved no attention to his intereſt. From their miſtaking the nature and extent of this tranſaction, it was condemned by the Court of Directors, in terms full of acrimony and reproach. In their letter to the Preſident and Council, of March 23, 1770, after ſome ſarcaſtic obſervations on the ſkill of their ſervants in negotiation, they ſay, that the King of Tanjore, who, as tributary to the Nabob, ought to have furniſhed his quota towards carrying on the war, is effectually ſheltered by the faith of a treaty from being compellable to contribute a ſingle rupee; and that, therefore, their former orders, relative to the King of Tanjore, were neceſſarily ſuſpended, as being rendered utterly impoſſible to be carried into execution.

The chagrin rather than the conviction of the Directors, relative to the conſequences of the treaty with Hyder, is evident. The Preſidency, in their own vindication, wrote their ſentiments very fully in their letter of January 31, 1770. They explained the motives of the war and peace with Hyder, and declared it as their opinion, that the ſtipulation with reſpect to the Rajah could neither be an obſtacle to the execution of the orders of the 17th of March 1769, nor ſhelter him from any conſtitutional claims of the Nabob for military ſervice or otherwiſe.

The ſame ſentiments were repeated at different times. If, therefore, the Court thought them inadmiſſible, they ought to have ſignified their diſapprobation, and thereby have prevented the execution of orders which appeared to them inconſiſtent with the treaty. So far from that, however, they took no further notice of the matter. The Preſidency, therefore, thought themſelves warranted, from the ſilence of the Company, to conſider the orders of 1769 as ſtill ſtanding in force, whenever the ſituation of affairs ſhould demand their execution. They accordingly mentioned them in their diſpatches of the 20th of July 1771, as one reaſon, among others, for calling the Rajah to account. Thoſe diſpatches were received in England in January 1772; and the Court of Directors approved of the conduct of their ſervants to that period.

From theſe circumſtances, it is ſubmitted, whether the Preſidency had not reaſon to underſtand the ſilence of the Court of Directors as an acquieſcence in their explanations on that ſubject; and whether they judged amiſs in conſidering the angry paragraph, which is now ſet up as a revocation of the orders of 1769, to be rather a motive for their enforcement. The Court ſignify much diſpleaſure with their ſervants for a certain article in their treaty with Hyder; but what they ſay is evidently more expreſſive of their *fears* leſt that article ſhould prove an obſtacle to the execution of their former orders, than of a *wiſh* that thoſe orders ſhould be ſuſpended. Were one permitted to hazard a conjecture, it might be ſuppoſed that there was not an intention to *ſuſpend*, much leſs to *revoke*, thoſe orders, until the *new* arrangements for reſtoring the Rajah in 1775 rendered a diſapprobation of *old* meaſures neceſſary.

With what colour of juſtice, therefore, can the Court of Directors paſs ſo ſevere a cenſure upon their ſervants as to tell them that, in the expedition of 1771, they had departed from the letter and ſpirit of the Company's orders? If the duplicity of the Rajah's conduct in the Myſore war appeared to the Company in ſuch a light, as to warrant the deciſive orders which they

with the name of conceſſions, and, as ſuch, have aſcribed them to private and ſelfiſh motives. Theſe ought to have conſidered, that as the CHAP. VI.

they had given to their ſervants in 1769; how much more forcibly did both the *letter* and *ſpirit* of thoſe orders ſpeak, when the Rajah not only refuſed to pay to the Nabob the arrears of a tribute ſtipulated by the treaty of 1762, and for the performance of which the Company had made themſelves the guarantees; but when, at the ſame time, in defiance of all remonſtrances, and in direct violation of the treaty with Hyder, he became an aggreſſor, and took up arms againſt the dependents of the Carnatic!

Had the treaty with Hyder ſtipulated any thing in favour of the Rajah which could even be *ſuppoſed* to impede the execution of the orders of 1769, his following conduct plainly removed the obſtacle. By a breach of the treaty, he forfeited all right to its benefits; and conſequently the orders, inſtead of being any longer *doubtful*, became inſtantly clear and deciſive, and reſumed the ſame force and vigour as if no ſuch treaty had ever exiſted.

But the Preſidency have no need to appeal to *ſuppoſitions*, and the deductions ariſing from them, in their own vindication. They can plead the expreſs declaration of the Company themſelves for the juſtice of their proceedings. The Directors, in their letter to the Nabob of March 25, 1772, acknowledge, that the raſhneſs of the Rajah in taking up arms againſt the Marawar and Nalcooty would, at all events, have urged them to unſheath the ſword in order to chaſtiſe him, had the Nabob enſured the neceſſary reſources. When, therefore, the Nabob did *enſure* the neceſſary reſources, the expedition had their ſanction.

Such was their own ſenſe in 1772, of the principle upon which their ſervants had proceeded in 1771. They avow the ſpirit of the orders of 1769 in its fulleſt extent. Whatever, therefore, may be now alleged to invalidate thoſe orders, it is evident that a different mode of conſtruction was not adopted till after that period. But the expedition of 1773 made a very material change in the ſtate of the Carnatic. That change of circumſtances ſeems to have ſuggeſted a change of meaſures; and, to juſtify the *new* ſyſtem, it became neceſſary to condemn the old.

Enough, it is hoped, has been now produced, both from the records of the Company and their ſervants, to convince the impartial public that the expedition of 1771 was ſtrictly conformable to the orders of 1769. But there were other motives, beſides an obedience to thoſe orders, which rendered that meaſure not only expedient but even neceſſary.

The Rajah of Tanjore refuſed to pay the tribute ſtipulated by the treaty of 1762, for which the Company were reſponſible; he would not contribute his quota towards the charges of the Myſore war; he had rebelliouſly invaded the rights of other ſubjects of the Carnatic, by force of arms; and there were the ſtrongeſt reaſons to ſuſpect, that he had been in negociation with the Marattas, Hyder, the Dutch, Danes, and French. From all theſe circumſtances collected together, the ſervants of the Company thought they ſaw ſufficient cauſe, not only to be upon their guard, but even to make uſe of compulſive meaſures, ſhould the refractory conduct of the Rajah continue to render them neceſſary.

They proceeded, however, with deliberation. Being averſe to a deciſion by arms, if it poſſibly could be avoided, they firſt had recourſe to lenient methods. They remonſtrated to him on the impropriety of his behaviour, and repreſented the conſequences to which it muſt expoſe him. They promiſed him the protection of the Company, as ſoon as he ſhewed that he deſerved it; but aſſured him, at the ſame time, that a regular payment of the peiſhcuiſh, and a ſtrict compliance, in all other reſpects, with the treaty of 1762, were the only conditions on which he could either hope to obtain their friendſhip, or even eſcape their reſentment. But nothing would do. Perſuaſion and threats

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the diſpute related only to the feudal rights of the Carnatic over a dependent on its government, the riſque and expence of the war were to fall on the Nabob; and that, therefore, by the law of nations, he was entitled to the reward of victory. That the Company could only appear, as allies in his cauſe, either as guarantees of the treaty of 1762, or as guardians of the peace of the Carnatic, a character, which they had uniformly aſſumed, ever ſince

were equally employed in vain. The Rajah was not to be moved by the one, nor intimidated by the other. The former he treated either with contempt or neglect, and he ſeemed to ſet the latter at defiance; for he ſometimes carried the inſolence of his anſwers ſo far as to exceed all bounds of forbearance.

Had the Rajah diſcovered any ſymptoms of a conciliatory diſpoſition, there might have been hopes of an amicable accommodation. But his obſtinate and contemptuous behaviour, not only precluded every expectation of that kind, but naturally gave juſt alarm. It ſeemed clearly to point out, that he had a dependence on foreign connections; as it was not to be ſuppoſed that he could rely on his own force alone againſt the united power of the Nabob and the Company. In ſuch a ſituation, what were the ſervants of the Company to do? The ſafety of the Carnatic was in imminent danger. The Nabob ſolicited the aſſiſtance of the Company, both as their own ally and as the ally of the Crown. The Company were bound to protect his government and rights; and the ſecurity of their own poſſeſſions added weight to that obligation. As, therefore, no hopes of an accommodation were left, there remained no other alternative, but to reduce the power of the Rajah to ſuch a degree as to be no longer dangerous.

Compelled by theſe conſiderations, the Committee, at length, yielded to the Nabob's ſolicitations. He agreed to bear the expences of the war; and they, as auxiliaries, gave him the aſſiſtance of the Company's troops, to ſupport the demands of his eldeſt ſon, who was ſent to Tritchinopoly, with powers to propoſe terms to the Rajah. He remained obſtinate. His capital was beſieged; but, when the breach became almoſt practicable, he ſubmitted to the Nabob's propoſitions, and the army returned to Tritchinopoly.

It was eaſy to foreſee, however, that this compromiſe would not be of long duration; at leaſt, on the part of the Rajah. Accordingly, freſh differences ſoon ariſing between the Nabob and him, a ſecond expedition was undertaken againſt him in 1773, which ended in the total reduction of his country.

In the letter of the Court of Directors of the 12th of April 1775, both expeditions have been much cenſured, though the firſt was once approved. But, as the ſame principal ſervants were not in office at Fort St. George, at thoſe different periods, it is only to vindicate the expedition of 1771 that the preſent obſervations are ſubmitted to the public. Thoſe gentlemen, who are chargeable for the ſucceeding meaſures, can, no doubt, if neceſſary, ſufficiently anſwer for themſelves.

It is therefore to be hoped, that enough has been ſaid to vindicate the government of Fort St. George, on that occaſion. But, ſhould any thing further be wanting, to ſatisfy the mind of the reader, it is ſupplied by the Court of Directors themſelves, in their minute of the 18th of Auguſt 1773; wherein their Chairman, in their name, complimented the Governor on his return to England, in very high terms of approbation, for his wiſe and upright management of their affairs; for his good conduct towards their ally the Subah of the Carnatic; and, in particular, for his invariable regard to their orders in all caſes.

the French power had been annihilated on the coaſt. That, as allies, auxiliaries, or mercenaries, they could acquire no inherent right to any territory, they might over-run, to no fortreſs, they might ſeize. That the keeping poſſeſſion of Tanjore, which is a part of the Carnatic, would have been a direct breach of the treaty of Paris, by which Mahommed Ali is guaranteed in the entire and excluſive poſſeſſion of that country. That ſhould it be granted, a conceſſion which we are, by no means, inclined to make, that Tanjore was *not* a part of the Carnatic, yet, if conquered in a regular and ſolemn war, it muſt have become ſuch, as that war was the war of the Nabob, not the war of his auxiliaries and mercenaries, the Company. That, as the Company neither were nor could be principals in hoſtilities, which might terminate in the capture of Tanjore, their taking poſſeſſion of that place for themſelves, or for any other than the Nabob, who was the principal, would have been an act of private injuſtice, if not robbery, puniſhable by the common law of the ſtate, of which they are the ſubjects. That, granting they may have had a right, in ſome caſes, to become principals in war in the Carnatic, they had evidently no ſuch right, in the preſent diſpute; for though the Rajah had broken the treaty of 1762, by his refuſing to pay, for the laſt two years, the ſtipulated peiſhcuiſh, that treaty was not *their* treaty, and they had no right to enforce its terms, but upon the expreſs requiſition of the Nabob. That this requiſition could only place the Company, in the light of allies; and that, as allies, they had no claim to the diſpoſal of any conqueſts, made in the war, either by the law of nature or nations.

Nabob's eldeſt ſon inveſted with powers to accommodate matters with Tanjore.

The Nabob's eldeſt ſon, being inveſted, by his father, with powers to accommodate matters with Tanjore*, arrived at Tritchinopoly, about the 20th of Auguſt 1771†. Preparations, ſufficient for taking the field, being made, Seid Muckdoom Ali, an officer of rank in the Nabob's ſervice, was ſent to Tanjore, with letters from the

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 724.

† Ibid. No. XXIV. p. 861.

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Preſident, from General Smith, and from the Nabob's ſon, containing propoſals of accommodation. Tulja-jî, having impriſoned his general, old Mona-jî, and the Dobeer, who had managed his finances, had thrown the whole of his affairs, into the hands of Gilbilliapah, the *Barawar* or pimp, whom we have already deſcribed. It is doubtful, whether this vulgar miniſter exhibited moſt inſolence or folly, in a conference, which he deigned to hold with the bearer of the joint requiſition of the Nabob and the Engliſh. Seid Muckdoom having informed him verbally of the terms, he had been empowered to propoſe, "Gilbilliapah flew into a violent paſſion ‡." "You will "ſee (ſays this impertinent Barawar) in what manner *I* ſhall *threſh* "*the Engliſh*, ſo that they will long remember" the correction of this hand. "I will order my Sepoys to fire, from the great ſmoke "of which the Engliſh † will not be able to ſee any thing; then I "will fall upon them with *my* horſe; the duſt kicked up by their "heels, will get into the eyes of the Engliſh, as ſoon as the ſmoke "is diſperſed *." "This is an excellent ſcheme (Seid Muckdoom "replied), and certainly the true way of threſhing the Engliſh §." The Barawar-miniſter, ſtill continuing his *apt* alluſions, ſaid, "the "way to catch birds is to put a piece of wax on their heads, when "the ſun is perpendicular; which melting the wax, the ſame will "run into the eyes of the birds, and then they may be taken ‖."

Infolence of the Barawar-miniſter of Tulja-jî.

He threatens to *threſh* the Engliſh.

Rajah's inſolence to the Engliſh.

This wiſe and modeſt miniſter having finiſhed his conference with Seid Muckdoom, that officer was ſent for by the Rajah; who abruptly aſked him, why he had come to Tanjore? "I have brought "(ſaid Seid Muckdoom) letters from the Engliſh governor, the "Engliſh general, and the eldeſt ſon of the Nabob." "What have

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXIV. p. 865.
† Ibid.
* Ibid.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid. Gilbilliapah was not oſtenſibly *reſtored* to the office of miniſter, by the Court of Directors, when they replaced Tulja-jî "on "the throne of his anceſtors;" yet manages affairs for his maſter—and the COMPANY, *behind the curtain*.

"I to

1771.

"I to do (replied the Rajah) with the governor? I do not deſire *him* "to guarantee † the treaty now ‡." But when he ſaw the letter from the Nabob's ſon, he flew into a violent paſſion, and expreſſed himſelf in terms, with reſpect to the Nabob, which ſeemed ſo indecent, that they could not be repeated by Seid Muckdoom. The Rajah's anſwer in writing is marked, with the inſolence and folly of his character. He inſiſted that the Nabob, inſtead of receiving the arrears of tribute, and ſatisfaction, for the Rajah's own rebellion and injuſtice, "ſhould defray the expences of *his* troops; and, in ſhort, in "oppoſition to each demand, he ſet up a like demand of his own *." He concludes his letter, with ſaying: "I, on my part, ſent my "demands in writing, which, I hope, you will take into conſidera-"tion. I am ready to undertake the ſame buſineſs" (that of war) "which you come upon at preſent ⸸."

He deſires not their guarantee.

His counter-demands on the Nabob.

All hopes of negociation being at an end, General Smith marched, with the army, from Tritchinopoly, about the middle of September. Having repulſed the Tanjorines, who had attacked him, on his march, he ſat down before the fort of Vellum, which was evacuated by the enemy, on the 20th of the month ¶. On the 23d, the army encamped before Tanjore ‖; but the batteries againſt the place were not opened, till the beginning of October §. The French of Pondicherry and the Dutch at Negapatam had both ſent Europeans to the aſſiſtance of the Rajah; and the Dutch, beſides, had ſupplied him with guns and ammunition in abundance **. The fort of Tanjore was accommodated with every neceſſary, for an obſtinate defence; a numerous garriſon, compoſed of Arabs and diſciplined Sepoys, plenty of proviſions, and an inexhauſtible magazine of military

Army marches.

Vellum taken.

French and Dutch aſſiſt the Rajah.

Tanjore well provided for defence.

† Mr. Du Prè, who was governor of Madras in 1771, had ſettled the treaty of 1762.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXIV. p. 865.

* Ibid.

⸸ Ibid. p. 866.

¶ Ibid. p. 868.

‖ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 788.

§ Ibid. p. 789.

** Ibid. p. 753.

ſtores.

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ſtores. The care and ſucceſs, with which Tulja-jî had provided the means of war, proved, that he had long meditated a revolt; and had his foreign allies ſeconded his hopes, he might, perhaps, as he afterwards threatened, have "driven the Engliſh, not only from "Tanjore, but from the coaſt."

The ſiege.

During the ſiege, in which inſtances of ſpirit and courage were exhibited, on both ſides, the Rajah, in the uſual manner of the Eaſt, continued to treat for peace, to retard, if poſſible, the operations of war. The ſeaſon was far ſpent; the rains and monſoon were near; and ſhould theſe ſet in, he knew that the enemy muſt break up the ſiege, and conſequently put an end to treating; and another year might procure new allies, or obtain the effectual aſſiſtance of old friends. On the 25th day, after the trenches had been opened, a breach, which was thought practicable, was made. This circumſtance induced the Rajah to think ſeriouſly of a temporary accommodation, to ſave his capital. The rains had, now, ſet in, and the Nabob's ſon, dreading the conſequences of a repulſe, in the aſſault, communicated the offers of the Rajah to General Smith. He, at the ſame time, told the General, that if he thought the fort could be taken, he would delay the negociation; but the General ſpoke ſo undeciſively, on that head, that the terms offered by Tulja-jî were accepted on the 27th of October *.

A breach made.

A peace concluded.

The articles.

The moſt material conditions of this treaty, which, however, the Rajah never meant to perform, were theſe: The immediate payment of eight lacks, being the peiſhcuiſh of the two preceding years; thirty-two lacks, and 50,000 rupees, for the expences of the army; for which diſtricts of his country, capable of paying that ſum, in two years, were aſſigned. The Rajah agreed, beſides, to cede the fort of Vellum, to give up his claim to the diſtricts of Elangad and Coiladdy, and to relinquiſh the Jaghire diſtrict of Arni. He pro-

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 877, 878.

miſed

miſed to reſtore the lands, money and effects, which he had extorted from the greater and leſſer Marawar; to ſend troops to the aſſiſtance of the Nabob, upon that prince's requiſition; to be a friend to the friends, an enemy to the enemies, of the Carnatic; to deliver up European deſerters, to give no protection to the run-away Polygars of Warriarpollam and Arialore. He, alſo, engaged to permit the trade of the Engliſh Company to extend itſelf through his whole country; and to treat their weavers and other dependents with kindneſs †. The Rajah had ſcarcely ſigned the treaty, when he began to equivocate about the terms ‡. But, as the guns had not yet been drawn from the batteries, diſpoſitions were made for recommencing hoſtilities; and a freſh negociation enſued §. Thus ended the firſt expedition againſt Tanjore, and the army returned to Tritchinopoly and its environs ‖.

Preſidency offended at any ſettlement ſhort of conqueſt; think the peace inſecure. 1771.

When intelligence arrived at Madras of theſe tranſactions, the Preſidency expreſſed their concern and ſurpriſe at the terms of the treaty, as inadequate to their expectations, and, in themſelves, totally inſecure. They were ſo much convinced of the latter, that they declared, in their letter of the 7th of November, 1771, to General Smith, that it appeared "neceſſary, that, in the very com-

† Rous's App. No. XXIV. p. 853, 854.

‡ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 931.

§ Ibid.

‖ The pecuniary advantages gained by the treaty were theſe:

Two years peiſhcuiſh recovered		8,00,000
Intereſt on ditto	- -	77,000
Indemnification for charges of the expedition payable in two years		35,50,000
Nazir to Nabob's eldeſt ſon	-	3,00,000
Ditto to his ſecond ſon	-	1,00,000
	Rupees	45,27,000

Countries acquired, and their eſtimated value.

Fort of Vellum, neither diſtrict nor revenue.		
The diſtrict of Elangad and Coiladdy recovered	- - -	80,000
The diſtrict of Arni	- -	2,00,000
The fort and diſtrict of Hanamuntagoody, taken by the Rajah from the Marawar, and now given up to the Nabob	-	2,00,000
Per annum, rupees		4,80,000

The jewels, &c. of the Marawar were of ſmall value. Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 931, 932.

"mencement

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" mencement of peace they ſhould be providing as if they were " on the eve of a war. They ordered him, therefore, as ſoon as " poſſible, to tranſmit to the Board a general return of the artillery, " ammunition and ſtores remaining, with their ſtate and condition, " accompanied with an indent of what might be further requiſite, " in caſe it ſhould become neceſſary to recommence hoſtilities *." They, however, declared that they would, on no account, have the idea entertained, that they meant to renew the war; for that they even wiſhed to conceal from the public, they were apprehenſive another expedition againſt Tanjore might become neceſſary †.

They expreſs their diſſatisfaction to the Nabob,

They expreſſed their diſſatisfaction at the treaty, in ſtill ſtronger terms to the Nabob, in their letter of the 9th of November. " Had the Rajah," they ſaid, " ſubmitted himſelf, and had " your Excellency then granted ſuch terms, as ſhould have been " thought ſafe and honourable to your government and the Com- " pany, ſafe and honourable terms might have been adviſeable. " But the Rajah has acted a very different part. He ſet both your " government and the Company at defiance, and compelled the " army to lay a regular ſiege to his capital. Many lives have been " loſt, and great quantities of ſtores have been expended. The " ſiege advanced ſucceſsfully, the breach was almoſt practicable, and " the officers and ſoldiers were in good ſpirits. Under theſe cir- " cumſtances, there was every reaſon to hope, that the fort might " ſoon have been taken; and then your Excellency might have " given the law, and ſettled the affairs of Tanjore, in a proper " manner ‡."

and to the Court of Directors.

The Preſidency expreſſed the ſame ſentiments, in terms equally ſtrong, in their diſpatches to the Court of Directors, dated the 28th of February 1772 §. General Smith, in his letter to the Preſidency

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 799.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 801, 802.
§ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 929, 930, 931.

of

of the 6th of November, 1771, makes uſe of the following remarkable expreſſions; "I have very freely given my ſentiments, "with reſpect to the Rajah of Tanjore. I urged, that I thought "no medium could be preſerved with him; but, at the time I did "ſo, I hoped whenever an expedition did take place, that it "would be with a firm reſolution on the part of the Nabob, as "well as the Board, to REDUCE HIM ENTIRELY *." The Nabob, urged by the diſcontent of the Preſidency, became highly offended with his ſon, for concluding a peace, when there was ſuch a certain proſpect of terminating the war, by the taking of Tanjore. Having expoſtulated with him, in ſevere terms, for his conduct, he told him, that he could only aſcribe it, to his want of abilities, his facility of diſpoſition, or his having been corrupted by the Rajah †. In ſhort, the peace appeared ſo inſecure in itſelf, ſo inadequate to the claims of the Nabob and the delinquency of the Rajah, that it raiſed a general diſcontent among the Engliſh as well as the natives. Nothing was talked of in the ſettlement, nothing was read but letters from the army, repreſenting the certainty of their taking Tanjore, had not the peace prevented it; and every one declared, "that it was "ſhameful thus to ſtop the progreſs and tarniſh the glory of the "Britiſh arms, in the moment that fortune preſented the laurel ‡." Such univerſal diſcontents at a peace, which ſaved his capital and country to Tulja-jî, demonſtrate, that he had deſerved to have loſt both, in the opinion of all, who, from their being on the ſpot, were the beſt judges of his delinquency §.

Nabob expoſtulates with his ſon.

A general diſſatisfaction at any peace ſhort of abſolute conqueſt.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 804.

† Ibid. No. XXIV. p. 881.

‡ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 930.

§ The Court of Directors, in their letter of the 10th of April, 1770, make uſe of the following remarkable words: "As to what re-"lates to the Nabob, and the conduct, which "you are to hold in the preſent troubles in "your parts of India, a great deal muſt be "left to your deciſion on the ſpot. You have "certainly more opportunities than *we* of "coming at the true knowledge of the cauſes, "the origin and tendency of diſputes, as "on a ſudden ariſe, among the powers of "India, as of relations of intereſt in which "we ſtand to them." Rous's App. No. XVII. p. 404.

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Sir Robert Harland's account of the expedition and treaty of 1771.

To the preceding account of the expedition of 1771, it may not be improper to annex the opinion of Sir Robert Harland, then his Majeſty's Plenipotentiary on the coaſt, concerning the conduct of the Preſidency of Fort St. George. That officer, after blaming their inactivity, from the month of February to September, proceeds thus, in his letter to the Earl of Rochford: "The country of Tanjore "was then, as I have been informed, unprepared. The fort was "unprovided with the means of defence, the Rajah's troops were "neither formed nor diſciplined. On the contrary, the Company's "ſervants poſſeſſed plenty of ſtores and ammunition; and an army "lay idle and inactive at Tritchinopoly, within a very ſhort march "of Tanjore*." After ſpecifying the unaccountable delays in undertaking the expedition, the Plenipotentiary ſtates the equally inexplicable treaty, which terminated the war. "The army was "thirty-ſix days before Tanjore. The walls were breached, and "diſpoſitions made for ſtorming the place, when the whole was ſet"tled by negociation. The Nabob diſavowed his ſhare in that ne"gociation. The Governor was diſſatisfied. The Nabob's ſon, in "his letters to his father, which I have read, ſays, that it was with "the advice, conſent, knowledge, and approbation of the general, "he agreed to terms. The general, denying this charge, con"ſiders the whole, as a contrivance between the Nabob and his "ſon‡." After ſtating the improbability of the Nabob's being concerned in fruſtrating the object of the expedition, Sir Robert Harland proceeds: "To conclude the whole, when I conſider "every thing, the ſituation, the ſtrength, the riches of Tanjore, "its vicinity to the French at Pondicherry, the uneaſineſs of the "Rajah at his preſent ſtate of dependence, the danger of future "inconveniencies, in caſe of his junction with the enemies of

* Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, February 15th, 1772.
‡ Ibid.

"Great-

" Great-Britain, it appears very difficult to diſcover a due attention " to the intereſts either of the Company or nation, through the " whole of this tranſaction *."—" The Rajah's peiſhcuſh had been " much reduced, by the treaty of 1762, from what it had formerly " been; and even that reduced tribute he did not pay. The trou- " bles, which at any time ariſe in the Carnatic, are ſettled ſolely at " the expence of the Nabob; but though Tanjore is protected, the " Rajah contributes nothing towards the general defence †."

* Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, February 15th, 1772.

† Ibid. There were very weighty reaſons for concluding the treaty; but they are foreign to the object of this work.

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Tranſactions on the Coaſt, from the firſt Expedition againſt Tanjore in 1771, *to the taking of that Place in* 1773.

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A war threatened in Europe.

IN the year 1770, a diſpute about the poſſeſſion of a rocky and barren iſland, on the coaſt of South-America, had almoſt involved Great Britain in a war with both the great branches of the Houſe of Bourbon. The Eaſt-India Company, fearing that the expected hoſtilities might extend themſelves to Aſia, applied to Government for a ſtrong ſquadron of men of war, to protect their eſtabliſhments in the Eaſt. Though matters were ſettled in the beginning of 1771, the ſquadron was ordered to ſail in the month of March, under the command of Sir Robert Harland, Baronet, Rear-Admiral of the Blue. That officer, on his departure, was veſted with the ſame plenipotentiary powers from his Majeſty to the princes of India, which had been given to Sir John Lindſay, in the year 1769. The object of the commiſſion, which was dated the 15th of March, was to "inquire how far the eleventh article of the definitive treaty of peace and friendſhip, between the King of Great "Britain, the moſt Chriſtian King, and the King of Spain, concluded at Paris, the 10th of February, 1763, had been complied "with by the parties concerned; as alſo, to treat with any of the "princes or powers in India, to whom the eleventh article might "relate, with regard to the moſt effectual means of having the "ſtipulations, therein contained, punctually obſerved and carried "into execution *." His Majeſty, at the ſame time, promiſed, "That he would approve, ratify, and confirm what ſhould be "agreed and concluded, in relation to the premiſes, between the "Princes and powers aforeſaid, or ſuch perſon or perſons, as they

Company requeſt a ſquadron of men of war.

Sir Robert Harland ſucceeds Sir John Lindſay as plenipotentiary.

Object of his commiſſion.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 417.

"ſhould

" ſhould depute or appoint for that purpoſe, and the ſaid Sir Ro-
" bert Harland *."

He arrives at Fort St. George.

On the ſecond of September, the Rear Admiral arrived at Fort St. George ‡; and, on the 13th, he communicated to the Preſidency the following article of his inſtructions, as Plenipotentiary from his Majeſty, to the Princes and powers of India ||. The words were;

Article of inſtruction, relative to the Nabob.

" You will repreſent, in the freeſt manner, to the Governor and
" Council at Madraſs, any complaints, which in your judgment ſhall
" be well-founded, that may be made by the Nabob of Arcot, and
" tranſmit to us the earlieſt intelligence thereof, with your ſenti-
" ments thereon †." This royal interpoſition, expreſſed in ſuch explicit terms, raiſed the hopes of the Nabob, and expelled his fears. Depending on the protection of the Sovereign, he naturally became leſs anxious about retaining the favour of trading ſubjects; unconſcious that this little glimpſe of ſun-ſhine was ſo ſoon to be extinguiſhed by a ſtorm.

Reflections on the character of the Company's original management.

The Eaſt India Company, founded originally on the principles of commerce, had carried very early into every department of their management, all the hardened and unrelenting paſſions, which never fail to accompany an inſatiable love of gain. Their miſdemeanours had made them known to the world, before their conſequence had rendered them objects of attention; and their original annals are ſtained with oppreſſions, piracies, frauds, and circumventions. Their limited power had confined their miſdemeanors for more than one hundred and fifty years, to a narrow circle; and theſe were partly concealed, under the veil of ſecrecy, with which they affected to cover their tranſactions. But it muſt be acknowledged, that, in thoſe early times, their circumſcribed commerce had confined the management of their affairs to mean and unſkilful hands. Their Directors at home were no more than low and

Their affairs at firſt in mean and unſkilful hands.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p, 417.
‡ Ibid. p. 408.
|| Ibid. p. 409.
† Ibid. p. 410.

rapacious

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rapacious tradeſmen; and their ſervants abroad were chiefly drawn from hoſpitals, appointed by charity for rearing indigent and deſerted boys. When the means of advantage grew more extenſive, by the concurrence of various revolutions in the Eaſt, the management and ſervice of the Company became objects of ambition to perſons of a better education, and more enlarged minds.

Some men of talents concerned in their affairs. Theſe were ſwayed by avarice, &c.

Some men of talents, ſome of honour, ſeveral poſſeſſed of ſpirit and courage conducted affairs at their boards, and fought their battles in the field. But even theſe were not able to reſiſt that ſordid principle of avarice, which is inherent in every mercantile inſtitution; to which alſo the almoſt equally obdurate paſſion of ambition was annexed, when they acquired a controul over Princes, and the management of provinces and kingdoms *.

Men of ability and principle, at this time, on the coaſt. But theſe cannot reſiſt jealouſy.

In the period, which is the object of the preſent diſcuſſion, ſeveral men of talents and ſtrict principles were in the Direction at home, and in the management of affairs on the Coaſt. But even theſe were incapable of diveſting themſelves entirely of jealouſy, when they found that a Prince, whom they had been accuſtomed to controul, had obtained the protection of the Sovereign.

The Company, from ſubjects, become rivals to the Crown.

The extenſive poſſeſſions of the Company, an ample revenue, a large army, the many lucrative, and even honourable places in their gift had, in a manner, raiſed them from the rank of ſubjects, to that of rivals to the crown. Their principal ſervants, conſcious of their own former conſequence, could not permit themſelves to be deprived of any part of that conſequence, without reſentment. This circumſtance introduced a degree of intemperance into their conſultations and

Intemperance in correſpondence and conſultations.

* "Theſe are men, who are now become "governors and viceroys of kingdoms larger, "if we take our poſſeſſions from Surat to Ben- "gal, than made half the Roman empire; and "theſe are the men, who by the rapid and im- "menſe riches they acquire, from amongſt the "*loweſt* of the people, who are to be expected "to look government in the face, with that aſ- "ſurance that has taught them to think, that "money may decide any thing. Nor will they "eaſily ſubmit to part with power, however "they came by it, they have ſo long been al- "lowed to exerciſe; and that has brought "them ſuch an immoderate degree of wealth, "without violent oppoſition to every thing and "every man, employed to prevent it." Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, Jan. 9th, 1773.

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correſpondence; and gave birth to unneceſſary complaints of the conduct of the Nabob to their Superiors at home. Thoſe complaints were greedily ſeized, by a more unprincipled DIRECTION, than that which ſubſiſted at the time; and were made the ſpecious pretexts of coercive meaſures againſt the Nabob; which meaſures ſprung, in fact, from an unforgiving jealouſy, and ſelf-intereſted motives. But theſe were the meaſures of ſucceeding times. The Directors of 1771, though they expreſſed their jealouſy of the interference of the crown, were ſenſible of the independent rights of the Nabob. In their diſpatch of the 10th of April, they uſed the following remarkable words: "We have no natural ally but the Nabob.—Our connection with the Nabob ſtands entirely on ancient friendſhip, and reciprocal kindneſs, and we wiſh to continue it on the ſame footing. But as *we* cannot be compelled to follow his projects, when they appear totally repugnant to our intereſts, ſo, on the other hand, *he* cannot be forced into our views, if they are diſagreeable to him: All we have, therefore, left, is to expoſtulate with him. He muſt determine for himſelf, and we for ourſelves †."

Complaints proceeding from jealouſy made the foundation of injuſtice.

The Directors own, that they have no right to interfere in the Nabob's affairs.

In the paſſage juſt cited, the Directors defined the limits of the Company's power, with reſpect to the affairs of the Carnatic. How a ſucceeding Court trampled down this fence ſhall be, hereafter, both explained and expoſed. The Directors of 1771, notwithſtanding their moderation, with regard to the independent rights of the Carnatic, were, at the very moment of writing their opinion on that ſubject, ſapping the foundation of thoſe rights, by endeavouring to remove the ſupport of the Crown from the Nabob. They lamented, that an unuſual commiſſion had been granted, without any communication with themſelves; and conſequently without previous ſteps being taken, for the prevention of thoſe jealouſies, which might naturally be ſuppoſed to ariſe from ſuch circumſtances *. Though they did not chuſe then to deny the *right* of

Yet jealous of the interference of the Crown.

They lament that a royal commiſſion is ſent.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. p. 401. * Ibid. p. 403.

the

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the Crown to ſend repreſentatives to its allies, they inſinuated, that the rights and privileges of the Company reſted upon as high authority as the King's commiſſion ‡. Theſe ſentiments, expreſſed to their Servants, prove, that they had already made applications to Government, for the redelivering the fugitive Nabob into the hands of his former keepers.

Reflections on the diſpoſition of government.

In a country toſſed by faction, and ſtunned by clamour, miniſters deſtitute of ambition, and fond of eaſe, too frequently become little ſolicitous, about the honour of the ſtate. When the dog of diſcontent growls at the door of the Cabinet, they throw to him a fragment of the prerogative, as a ſop, to procure his ſilence; and, with a pernicious want of dignity, they hope to diminiſh their cares, by leſſening their authority. This torpid diſpoſition of mind is terrified at an extenſion of power, as it is accompanied by an increaſe of labour; and information is diſagreeable and irkſome, as it may bring on the trouble of doing juſtice. Each demand, for circumſcribing the conſequence of the ſtate and the rights of the crown, is heard by ſuch men with avidity, as every diminution of power contracts the circle of public buſineſs. This ruinous ſyſtem of frigid policy, they endeavour to impoſe upon the world under the name of moderation; but, by proſecuting it too far, the honour of the ſtate is tarniſhed, and the pledged faith of the ſovereign violated.

East-India Company had experienced the ſelf-denying principle of the ſtate.

The Eaſt-India Company might have felt this ſelf-denying principle in government, almoſt during the whole of the preſent reign. That Company had obtained countries, provinces, and kingdoms, under the protection and aſſiſted by the power of the ſtate. But government, inſtead of aſſerting the State's claim of ſovereignty, ſeemed afraid to queſtion the Company's rights; for fear the trouble of a revenue of near ſix millions a year ſhould fall into their own hands. The anxiety of the Court of Directors, about a royal commiſſion to

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. p. 403.

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Indian princes, was vain and ſuperfluous. The ſtate had permitted them to riſe from the rank of ſubjects to that of ſovereigns, to hold dominions more extenſive, and ſcarcely leſs valuable, than its own; to maintain an army more numerous than that of Great-Britain; to appoint their relations, dependents and ſervants, to offices of more power and emolument, than any in the gift of the Crown; to carry inſolence and oppreſſion to every quarter of Aſia; to dethrone princes, and to inveſt mean perſons with the pomp and authority of royalty. It was, therefore, highly improbable, that a government ſo indulgent to the Company, would refuſe one poor Nabob to his former lords. It accordingly happened, that when the Directors muſtered ſufficient courage to demand the truant, the royal commiſſion was immediately withdrawn; and he was delivered into their hands, to be puniſhed for his credulity in the ſupport of government, as well as his defection from the authority of the Company.

The Nabob deſerted by government, and delivered back to the Company.

But had the royal commiſſion continued in India, unleſs the promiſe of the Crown to redreſs grievances, and to draw clear lines between the power of the Nabob and that of the Company, had been alſo performed, it was not worth the price of the ſheep-ſkin, on which it was written. Though the managers of the affairs of the Company, both in England and abroad, were at firſt alarmed, they ſoon found, that a commiſſion, neither ſupported nor followed by an enquiry, was no more than a paper-kite, ſuſpended over their heads. Unfortunately for the Nabob, having been accuſtomed to the validity of ſeals in India, he repoſed implicit confidence in the faith of that of Great-Britain. This confidence was encouraged and confirmed, by the paper-war, which was carried on between the plenipotentiaries and the Preſidency; for he was then to learn, that the authority of a king, to which his principles had annexed the idea of invincibility, was deſtined to yield to that of trading ſubjects.

Royal commiſſion nugatory,

yet alarms the Company,

and deceives the Nabob.

The conteſt by letters, between Sir John Lindſay and the Preſidency, which had begun, ſoon after his arrival in July 1770, had

The conteſt between Sir John Lindſay and the Preſidency,

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languiſhed in the courſe of the ſummer of 1771. When Sir John Lindſay left the coaſt in October, he was ſucceeded in his differences with the Preſidency, as well as in his powers to the Nabob, by Sir Robert Harland. That plenipotentiary, either impreſſed with the injuſtice of the Company to the Nabob, or anxious to acquire his confidence, by an appearance of zeal, eſpouſed his cauſe, with a vehemence, which created obſtructions to its progreſs, by its own rapidity *. The Nabob, impreſſed by fears from the Marattas, or gained by their promiſes, had ſhewn a great eagerneſs, for an alliance with that nation, for more than a year. The Preſidency, on the other hand, either afraid of Hyder Ali, or bound by ſecret promiſes to that chief, had oppoſed the alliance; and, with perſeverance, and perhaps with prudence, had hitherto adhered to a ſtrict neutrality †. The Marattas had wooed them, as the lion does his mate, mixing threats with courtſhip. Hyder was extremely polite; and as they had ſmarted under his force, his preſent kindneſs acquired value from the memory of former injuries ‡. They thought it, therefore, expedient to ſupport Hyder Ali againſt the Marattas, "provided the revenues "and reſources of the Carnatic were under *their* controul §." The reſult, however, was, that neither Hyder nor the Marattas were aſſiſted. The latter, willing to gain five lacks of rupees ‖, which the Rajah of Tanjore had engaged to pay, upon condition of their invading the Carnatic ¶, entered the paſſes before the end of the year 1771. To ſave his country, from the ravages of thoſe marauders, the Nabob was obliged to pay down a conſiderable ſum of money, beſides preſents of jewels, fire-arms and elephants ⸸.

taken up by Sir Robert Harland.

Nabob for an alliance with the Marattas.

The Preſidency favour Hyder Ali.

Marattas in the pay of the Rajah of Tanjore.

* Vide Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 415, 416, &c.

† Ibid. p. 1401.

‡ Ibid. p. 1387, & paſſim.

§ Ibid.

‖ Ibid. p. 1394.

¶ Ibid. p. 1395.

⸸ Sir Robert Harland takes the merit of having induced the Marattas to retreat. (Appendix, p. 444.) But it is probable, that the money and jewels of the Nabob added ſome weight to his interpoſition.

In

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In the correſpondence, between the plenipotentiary and the Preſidency, relative to the Marattas, the former explained, in ample terms, the right, which the Nabob had, to rely on the protection of his Majeſty and the ſupport of the Crown. " In the Nabob's pre-
" ſent circumſtances (ſays Sir Robert Harland), he claims the royal
" protection, ſo often promiſed to him, by his late Majeſty George
" the Second, and repeated by his preſent Majeſty, our ſovereign,
" in ſeveral letters addreſſed to his Highneſs, ſtrongly expreſſive of
" the greateſt friendſhip and moſt perfect regard for him and his
" family. At the ſame time, he throws himſelf upon the nation for
" protection, agreeable to his expectations, from the eleventh article
" of the treaty with France and Spain in 1763 †." Having ſpecified the Nabob's right to the ſupport of the ſtate, he animadverts with ſeverity, on the oppoſition given, by the Company's ſervants, to that ſupport. Having demanded an account of their tranſactions with the country powers, they had told him, that they " could not,
" conſiſtently with their truſt, render an account of their conduct to
" him, or to any but a conſtitutional power ‡." This expreſſion, appearing to deny the authority of his commiſſion, threw the plenipotentiary into a violent rage. " Your charge ſeems to me (he ſaid)
" to be directly pointed at the royal authority, and the undoubted
" rights of the Crown. When you take upon you to cenſure a
" meaſure, which is the ſacred privilege of majeſty, and the conſti-
" tutional right of our ſovereign, let me tell you, it is very unbe-
" coming, it is preſumptuous, it is arrogant §."

Sir Robert Harland explains the right, which the Nabob had to rely on the Crown.

He animadverts on the jealouſy of the Preſidency.

He accuſes them of preſumption and arrogance.

This angry language terrified the Preſidency, and, by raiſing the hopes of the Nabob, led that unfortunate Prince into error. He could no longer doubt of the permanent ſupport of a Crown, whoſe authoriſed ſervant had irritated the Company beyond their common pitch of forgiveneſs. In proportion as the Nabob's expectations of

They are terrified.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 416. ‡ Ibid. p. 419. § Ibid. p. 427.

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royal favour increaſed; the confidence of the Preſidency, in their own ſafety, diminiſhed. "The heavy charge brought againſt us," they ſaid, "evidently ſhews what is intended againſt us, and ren-" ders any attempt to juſtify our conduct to Sir Robert Harland im-" proper; as it is neceſſary we ſhould reſerve our defence, until we " are called upon to make it in a legal and conſtitutional courſe *." Trivial as theſe circumſtances are in themſelves, they deſerve to be recorded, as they influenced the conduct of the Nabob; and conſequently the ſubſequent meaſures of the Company.

Expedition againſt the Marawars meditated.

During theſe diſputes between the Plenipotentiary and the Preſidency, the latter were meditating an expedition againſt the Greater and Leſſer Marawars, Polygars dependent on the government of the Carnatic. The country of Marawar, as has been already mentioned,

Nature of their dependence on the Carnatic.

depended anciently on the province of Madura, which was itſelf ſubject to the Rajah of Tritchinopoly, long before the country fell by conqueſt into the hands of the Mahommedans. The ſtate of the ſubjection of the Marawars to the government of Tritchinopoly was, that they paid a certain annual tribute; and brought, upon requiſition, a certain number of troops into the field, at their own expence, when their ſuperior was engaged in war †. In caſe of either neglect or diſobedience of orders they were fined, like other Zemindars; and when they ſent a leſs force than the eſtabliſhed number of troops, government uſed to levy a proportionable ſum upon the revenues of their countries. During the troubles which ſucceeded the death of Anwar-ul-dien, father of the preſent Nabob, the Marawars paid little attention to the government of the Carnatic.

Their refractory conduct.

When peace was reſtored, they ſometimes ſent ſmall preſents, but no regular tribute, to the Nabob; but, in time of war, they neither ſent troops nor furniſhed money for the general defence. When the Rajah of Tanjore invaded their territories in the beginning of

* Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 22. † Ibid. No. XXVI. p. 941.

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1771, they owned their errors and profeſſed their entire ſubmiſſion to the Nabob ‡; but, though the expedition againſt Tanjore was partly undertaken on their account, they furniſhed neither troops nor proviſions during the ſiege, when required by their ſuperior, in terms of their tenure and dependence §.

Refuſe their aſſiſtance againſt Tanjore.

Ramnadaporam, the capital of the Greater Marawar, is ſituated on that point of the continent which advances neareſt to the iſland of Ceylon ‖. That of the Nalcooty Polygar, or Leſſer Marawar, is called Tripatore ¶. The firſt lies at the diſtance of little more than one hundred miles to the South of Tritchinopoly; the latter is forty miles nearer to the laſt-mentioned city *. The two Marawars could bring, upon an emergency, twenty thouſand men into the field †; but their troops, like thoſe of other Polygars, were rather a rabble, than ſoldiers. Having received intelligence of the intended expedition, they aſſembled their native troops in the beginning of March 1772; and entering into a treaty with the Dutch, the Preſidency of Negapatam promiſed to write to the Governor of Colombo, for fifteen hundred Europeans and as many Malays ‡‡. The hoſtile appearance of the Marattas on the borders of the Carnatic, had ſuſpended the expedition for more than ſeven months; but that fear being removed, orders were iſſued to General Smith to march, with the troops in the South, againſt the refractory Polygars. The plan and conduct of the expedition were left entirely to the General. But, as the Company only acted as friends and allies to the Nabob, negotiation and treaty were left wholly to that Prince §§. The Preſidency, at the ſame time that they own, that the right of peace and war was veſted in the Nabob, inſinuated to the General, that he

1772. Capital 100 miles from Tritchinopoly.

They prepare to reſiſt.

Army marches againſt them.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 577.
§ Ibid. No. XXVI. p. 942. 946.
‖ Ibid. No. XXVI. p. 950.
¶ Ibid.
* Ibid.
† Ibid.
‡‡ Ibid. p. 952.
§§ Ibid. p. 956.

ought

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ought not to agree to any treaty till the Polygars were entirely reduced ||.

Ramnadapo-ram taken.

General Smith, having marched from Tritchinopoly on the 11th of May 1772, before the end of the month ſat down before Ramnadaporam *. The town being ill fortified and worſe defended, was taken by aſſault, on the 2d of June, with very inconſiderable loſs on the ſide of the victors †. As the plunder of the place, by the laws of war, became the property of the captors, the Nabob's eldeſt ſon, who attended General Smith, on the part of his father, in the expedition, agreed to pay a ſtipulated ſum to the army for the right to the ſpoil ‡. The other forts belonging to the Greater Marawar ſoon followed the fate of the capital §. General Smith then directed his march againſt the Polygar of Nalcooty, or the Leſſer Marawar. That unfortunate Polygar fell a victim to the negligence of his own Vackeels, who had negotiated a treaty of ſubmiſſion with the young Nabob. Lieutenant-colonel Bonjour, whom the Preſidency had ordered to proceed from Madura with a detachment, to ſupport the operations of the main army, was advancing with haſty ſtrides towards the reſidence of the Little Marawar. When the terms of the treaty were ſettled, General Smith delivered letters to be ſent, by the Polygar's agents, to ſtop the progreſs of Bonjour. But they delayed to ſend the letters; and the reſult was, that the Lieutenant-colonel attacked the ſtrong poſt into which the Leſſer Marawar had retired ¶; and in the aſſault the Polygar was ſlain †. The death of the Leſſer Marawar left his whole country to the entire diſpoſal of the victors. This event happened on the 25th of June 1772 §§.

Army marches againſt Nalcooty;

who is killed in an aſſault, owing to the negligence of his Vackeels.

A new quarrel with Tanjore.

The expedition againſt Tanjore in the year 1771, had rather irritated than humbled the Rajah. The retaining of the fort of

|| Rous's Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 956.
* Ibid. p. 989.
† Ibid. p. 990.
‡ Ibid. p. 998.
§ Ibid. p. 1002.
¶ Ibid. 1085.
† Ibid. p. 1006.
§§ Ibid. p. 1007. 1027. The conqueſt of the two Marawars was obtained with the loſs of twenty men. Ibid. p. 1012.

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Vellum, which had been intended by the Preſidency as a check on Tulja jî *, had hurt his pride and rouzed his reſentment. He, therefore, refuſed to permit proviſions to be carried to the place; alleging, "That the ſtipulation was merely the ceſſion of the fort, "which could by no means be conſtrued as an engagement to ren- "der its market flouriſhing †." To this quibble, in evaſion of the late agreement with his ſuperior, he added ſerious and dangerous intrigues for diſturbing the peace of the Carnatic. In the month of June 1772, he was known to negotiate with the Marattas; and to have offered to that government ten lacks of rupees, upon condition of their ſending an army of horſe to his aid ‡. The objects the Rajah wiſhed to obtain by the aſſiſtance of the Marattas were, "the reduction of Vellum, the removal of the Nabob's people in "the aſſigned lands from his country, and an acquittal of the "Peiſhcuſh §." Thoſe raſh ſchemes were entirely planned by the Rajah himſelf; for, as he knew that both Mona-jî and the Dobbeer ¶ would diſſuade him from meaſures likely to involve him in inextricable difficulties, he carried on this negotiation ſecretly, by his mean dependents and vulgar friends. Whilſt he ſolicited foreign enemies to invade the Carnatic, he received, protected, and encouraged the fugitive Polygars of the Marawar country, who were meditating new diſturbances ⊥.

Rajah prevents proviſions from being ſent to Vellum.

He negotiates with the Marattas.

The negotiation carried on by his vulgar favourites.

He protects the fugitive Polygars.

In the beginning of 1773, the Rajah ſeems to have re-admitted into a degree of his confidence Huſſein Chan Soor, the Mahommedan fiſherman, who had been his miniſter during a part of the year 1770 ‖. Several other perſons of mean birth and abilities planned his meaſures and ſhared his favours. The friends of the expelled Marawars flattering his vanity and inflaming his paſſions by their

He is led by men of low birth and mean talents.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1100.
† Ibid. p. 1099, 1100.
‡ Ibid. p. 1098.
§ Ibid. p. 1099.
¶ Ibid.
⊥ Ibid. p. 1101, 1102.
‖ Ibid. p. 1104. 1106.

intrigues,

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intrigues, endeavoured to obtain his aid to reſtore their affairs. Having applied to Hyder Ali for a force to recover their reſpective poſſeſſions, that chief told them, "That he knew who *they* were, "but that, if they would bring him a letter from the Rajah of Tan- "jore, he would then agree to give them ſome aſſiſtance*." Having carried this intelligence to Tulja-jî, he agreed, with joy, to give them a favourable and full letter, agreeably to their utmoſt wiſhes. He received, at the ſame time, into his capital, with great ceremony and civility, Vencata Narrain, the Vackeel of Hyder†. The Vackeel promiſed, in his maſter's name, that immediately, on his return to Seringapatam, from an expedition in which he was then engaged, he would ſend and promote the aſſiſtance of the Marattas ‡. To prevent a diſcovery, the Rajah diſmiſſed the Vackeel, after loading him with marks of reſpect; whilſt, at the ſame time, he wrote letters to the Maratta government, full of the moſt flattering expreſſions §. But whilſt he was planning meaſures of danger, he was buſy in diſgracing ſuch of his old ſervants, as were poſſeſſed of abilities to carry them into execution. He deprived Mona-jî, not only of all power, but his allowance from government, except two villages, which that chief poſſeſſed by way of Jaghire ‖. Huſſein Chan Soor, the fiſherman, ſo often mentioned, roſe in favour, in proportion as Mona-jî declined. This vulgar ſtateſman, deriving boldneſs from ignorance, adviſed the Rajah to with-hold the money due to the Nabob, and ſet that prince at open defiance ¶.

He corre-ſponds with Hyder.

He loads his Vackeel with civilities and preſents.

He ſtrikes off the allowance of Mona-jî.

Secret intelligence of theſe tranſactions was received at Madras in the month of April; and that part of the intrigues of Tulja-jî, which regarded the Marattas, was fully diſcovered in May, by Mr. Moſtyn, the Company's reſident at the court of Poonah. In a letter

His intrigues at Poonah diſcovered by Mr. Moſtyn.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1105.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1106.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid.

of

of the 14th of May, Mr. Moſtyn informs the Preſidency at Fort St. George, that a Gozamie, by name Mohim Geer, applied to the Maratta government, as Vackeel from the Rajah of Tanjore, for leave to raiſe ten thouſand horſe, which he made no ſecret were to be employed againſt the Nabob of the Carnatic*. The ſame intelligence had been conveyed, on the 6th of May, by Mr. Moſtyn, to his immediate ſuperiors, the Preſidency of Bombay †. Though the Maratta government yielded, at firſt, to the Rajah's requeſt, by means of preſents to ſome of the miniſters, the levying the troops was afterwards ſtopt, by the influence of Sacaram Bapoo, who pointed out the bad conſequences, which might attend the meaſure; but the Vackeel of the Rajah ſtill retained hopes, as he had received no poſitive denial ‡.

The Marattas firſt agree to his levying troops in their country.

Whilſt the Rajah's emiſſaries were employed in ſoliciting the aſſiſtance of the Marattas, he himſelf uſed every art of entreaty and perſuaſion, to gain the ſupport of Hyder Ali. He ſent for Vencata Narain, the Vackeel of that chief, and told him, that he had no other protector, but his maſter §. That no union, no friendſhip, no cordial alliance could ever ſubſiſt between himſelf, the Nabob and the Engliſh Company. That it was incumbent on Hyder to come with his whole force; and that he himſelf would collect his own forces and join him, as well as the expelled Polygars of Marawar and Nalcooty, who were all his allies. That, as their ſucceſs againſt the Nabob and the Company admitted of little doubt, the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly might be eaſily taken, which two countries ſhould be made over to Hyder for his aſſiſtance, together with ſome ſupplies of money. The Rajah earneſtly ſolicited the Vackeel to write to his maſter, in the moſt perſuaſive terms, to prevail upon him to advance ſpeedily, with his whole force. He,

He applies again to Hyder.

He promiſes to join him with his whole force,

and to make over to him Madura, &c.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1105.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid. p. 1111.

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at the ſame time and to the ſame purpoſe, wrote a long letter to Hyder himſelf; and to give more weight to the negociation, the old Dobbeer, or Duan, wrote another letter ‖. To theſe letters Hyder ſent an anſwer deſiring to know, how much ready money the Rajah would give? By what means he propoſed to take and cede over to him the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly? What friends he had in thoſe countries? Who of the Polygars were his allies *? That he muſt determine, on all theſe circumſtances, and inform him of the reſult of the whole †.

Hyder's anſwer.

He deviates in every point from his duty.

Though the intrigues of Tulja-jî, with the Marattas and Hyder Ali, were not likely to produce any ſerious or immediate effect, their exiſtence proved the dangerous and reſtleſs conduct of that Rajah. During his applications for aſſiſtance beyond the limits of the Carnatic, he deviated, in almoſt every point, from his duty, as a dependent on that country. In the expedition againſt the two Marawars, he choſe to neglect to obey the requiſition of his ſuperior, for the aſſiſtance of his troops ‡: on the contrary, he diſmiſſed a part of his cavalry, that they might aſſiſt the Polygars, without the appearance of his being concerned §. When thoſe chiefs, by their own folly in refuſing the equitable terms offered by the Nabob, had ſuffered the extremities of war and were expelled, the Rajah not only admitted the fugitives into his country, but encouraged them to raiſe diſturbances **. This circumſtance forced the Nabob to keep an army, in the territories of the Marawars, at an expence, beyond the amount of the revenue ††. The Rajah had engaged, in the agreement ſigned, ſealed and ſworn to, at the gates of Tanjore, in October 1771, to refuſe his protection to the runaway Polygars

He had aided the Marawar.

He encourages the expelled Polygars.

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1111.
* Ibid. p. 1112.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1109.
General Smith to the Governor and Council. April 10th, 1772. Ibid. No. XXVI. p. 954.
** Ibid. No. XXVII. p. 1109.
†† Ibid.

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of Warrior-pollam and Alianore, and to reſtore their effects. But he not only detained their effects, but had aſſigned them a place of refuge, in the diſtrict of Cumcurrum belonging to Tanjore. He permitted, or rather perſuaded the Collories of his own country to make incurſions, into the province of Tritchinopoly; and to drive the cattle of the inhabitants away. He neglected to diſcharge the debt due to the Company, for their Paddy, which he had ſeized, in the year 1771; and he obſtructed, by various difficulties and troubles, the Engliſh garriſon at Vellum, from being regularly ſupplied with proviſions ‖. Though he was in conſiderable arrears to the Nabob ¶, he appears to have been in no want of money, by the ſums, which he had offered, and actually ſent, to other powers, to induce them to invade the Carnatic ⸸.

whoſe effects he detains.

Will not pay a debt owing to the Company.

Determined to ſupport his diſobedience and refractory conduct towards his ſuperior, the Rajah entered into a negociation, with Dutch and Daniſh factories on the coaſt, to ſupply him with money, upon mortgages on ſome diſtricts of his country *. He had reſolved to obtain a conſiderable loan from Goland Moodaly, "who was Dubaſh "to moſt of the GREAT FOLKS at Madras †." Had he purſued this plan, with more conſtancy, and to a much larger extent, the GREAT FOLKS, who were the maſters of Goland Moodely, might have had an intereſt, in overlooking for ſome time longer his deſigns. But Tulja-jî, though not more faithleſs, was leſs prudent, than his father Pretaupa Sing; who had always an expert agent at Madras to negociate a *loan*, when he wiſhed to obtain a favour. But the preſent Rajah choſe rather to enter into dangerous connexions, with the Dutch, than to negociate with the Engliſh Preſidency. Theſe connexions were deeply rooted, and, therefore, full of peril to the

He enters into negociations with the Dutch, &c.

He endeavours to obtain a loan at Madras.

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1110.
¶ Ibid.
⸸ Ibid. p. 1105.
* Ibid. p. 1110.
† Ibid. p. 1113.

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Company, as well as the Nabob. The latter had written to the General of Batavia, complaining of his ſubordinates at Negapatnam, for aſſiſting the Rajah; but that governor avowed, that in ſupporting that Rajah, the factory "had done no more than they were "bound to do by their engagements; and that in conforming to "thoſe engagements, they had done right ‡." Whilſt the Rajah was buſy in breaking every article of the agreement of 1771, the Nabob not only adhered to the terms, but ſeemed willing to eſtabliſh friendſhip and perpetuate harmony, between himſelf and his vaſſal §.

Governor of Batavia avows his ſupport of the Rajah.

The intrigues of Tulja-jî, his avowed diſregard of the agreement of 1771, his alliances abroad, his preparations for war at home, induced the Preſidency to liſten to the requiſition of the Nabob, for the aſſiſtance of the Company to reduce entirely an inmate ſo dangerous to the peace and ſecurity of the Carnatic. Mr. Du Prè, who had been Preſident during the firſt expedition againſt Tanjore, had reſigned the government, and returned to Europe, in the end of February 1773; and Mr. Haſtings, who had been deſigned to ſucceed him in the chair, had left the coaſt, more than a year before Mr. Du Prè's departure, to take upon him the government of Bengal. Mr. Wynch, the ſecond in Council, had ſucceeded Mr. Du Prè, as governor; and it was to him the requiſition of the Nabob, relative to the reduction of Tanjore, was made. The Select Committee, in deliberating on the ſubject, declared, that the treaty of 1762 had been cancelled, by the conduct of the Rajah, which obliged the guarantees of that treaty to take up arms, and enter into a ſolemn war ‖. That it is eſtabliſhed by the law of nations, that when a rupture happens, all treaties between the contending parties, prior to that rupture, are thereby diſannulled, or at leaſt ſuſpended; and that upon a reſtoration of peace, the former treaties may be reſtored, but not

The Preſidency agree to an expedition againſt Tanjore.

Mr. Wynch had ſucceeded Mr. Du Prè in the government.

The treaty of 1762 declared null and void.

Reaſons for that declaration.

‡ Papers publiſhed by the Company, relative to the reſtoration of Tanjore, vol. i. p. 4.

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII.

‖ Ibid. p. 1116.

without

without being named, to the ſtate in which they were before the rupture, or that others may be ſubſtituted in their place ¶. That the treaty of 1762 was ſo far from having been reſtored by the agreement, which had terminated the war of 1771, that it was not even mentioned or alluded to, in that agreement. That, at the commencement of the expedition, the Preſidency had promiſed and agreed, not to interfere in any negociations between the Nabob and the Rajah; but to leave the whole to be ſettled by the former *. That the Nabob had actually ſettled the whole, without a ſingle alluſion to the treaty of 1762. That, upon the whole, as war, which extinguiſhes all treaties, had intervened, the Company could not be conſidered, as guarantees to a treaty, which no longer exiſted.

Arguments and facts, relative to the neceſſity of calling the Rajah to account.

Though the meaſures of the Preſidency, who were veſted with the whole executive powers of the Company, were, in their *political capacity*, deciſive, and when they regarded the country powers IRREVOCABLE, their arguing upon every point was neceſſary, for the information of their ſuperiors, and important to themſelves, as the reaſons advanced might be proper grounds of cenſure, or a juſt foundation for applauſe. But, neither in the preſent caſe, nor in any other, beyond the trading powers, granted to the Company by charter, are the motives, reaſons or arguments of the ſervants of the Company to be admitted, by the diſpaſſionate, as a juſtification of wrong meaſures, or a confirmation of thoſe, which were right. This obſervation is, by no means, made to invalidate the juſtneſs of their reaſonings upon the treaty of 1762. Had the Rajah and his anceſtors been independent, from all antiquity, on the government of the Carnatic, his intriguing with foreign powers to invade that country, his raiſing diſturbances within its limits, his known deſign to join any of its eventual enemies †, the danger of that deſign, from the ſituation of his country "in the heart of the province ‡," would

Even if both he and his anceſtors had been independent.

¶ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII p. 725.
* Ibid. No. XXVII. p. 1116.
† Ibid. p. 1117.
‡ Ibid.

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not only render it juſtifiable, but, from ſelf-preſervation, neceſſary, in the Nabob, to prevent the intended miſchief, by the power, which Providence had placed in his hands. The Preſidency joining, or refuſing to join, could alter, in no degree or reſpect, the nature of the caſe. They had no claim to appear, as principals in the war, they had no right to decide upon its iſſue. The only thing of which they were the competent judges was the expediency of the meaſure, with regard to the intereſts of their conſtituents. That this expediency exiſted, is apparent from the ſtate of things, as well as from their own declaration. If their maſters thought otherwiſe, they had a right to cenſure, to ſuſpend, to diſmiſs their ſervants; but they had no right to interfere, none to reverſe the effect of the meaſure, in which thoſe ſervants had only aſſiſted, as mere auxiliaries of a country power.

Company had no claim to appear as principals.

No right to reverſe the effect of the war.

Preſidency more eager for the expedition than the Nabob.

The Preſidency were ſo ſenſible of the expediency of the expedition againſt Tanjore, that it is apparent, from their own minutes, they were much more eager for that meaſure, than the Nabob *. That prince, dividing his fears between Hyder and the Marattas, the allies of the Rajah, was unwilling to riſque the ruin of his own country, from an invaſion made by either of thoſe powers, by an expedition of uncertain event, againſt Tanjore †. It was known, that the object of each of thoſe powers was to take Tanjore into poſſeſſion, and not under protection ‡; and the march of the Nabob's forces againſt the place would probably be a ſignal, for their invading his dominions. The Nabob, therefore, declared that he was unwilling to preſs a ſervice of ſuch danger, unleſs it ſuited in every reſpect the Company's affairs §. He promiſed, however, to find the reſources, in the ſame proportion, as during the laſt ſiege. He declared his doubt of the event, as the Rajah, beſides his connexion

He declares his unwillingneſs.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1124.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1122.
§ Ibid.

with

with the country powers, was in friendſhip with the French, and had promiſes of aſſiſtance, from the Daniſh factory of Tranquebar *. The Select Committe repreſented to the Nabob, that in caſe the expedition againſt Tanjore ſhould take place at all, it ought to be undertaken, in time ſufficient to bring it to a concluſion, before the ſetting in of the rains †. They, at the ſame time, reſolved in their minutes, that " it was proper and *neceſſary* that the expedition " againſt Tanjore be undertaken; and that the preſent opportunity, " all circumſtances conſidered, is the moſt favourable for carrying " the ſame into execution ‡." The reſolution of the Select Committee was confirmed, by the Council at large, on the 29th of June 1773. In their minutes upon the ſubject, they recapitulated old arguments and advanced new. They agreed, that as the treaty of 1762 was annulled and extinguiſhed, by an intervening war, followed by another treaty, in which the Company were not mentioned; that " all idea of the exiſtence of a guarantee was removed." They, therefore, founded the auxiliary aſſiſtance, which they propoſed to give on the expediency, and even neceſſity of the meaſure §.

The Select Committee urge him to the expedition.

The Council confirm their reſolutions.

All idea of a guarantee had been removed.

Though the Members of Council, who planned, or rather urged the ſecond expedition againſt Tanjore, have been reviled, cenſured, and ſtigmatized by the Directors of the year 1775, that enlightened body could not have, with any juſtice, accuſed their ſubjects of neglecting the intereſts of the Company, in their ſtipulations with the Nabob. They inſiſted, that he ſhould not only pay for the future, but replace the pay already iſſued to three thouſand Seapoys, which the Preſidency had thought proper to levy ſome time before ‖. But as to the Nabob's promiſſory preſent of ten lacks of Pagodas ¶ to the Company, the Governor declared, that he made no condition for, nor

Attention of the Preſidency to the *intereſts* of the Company.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. Ibid. p. 1123.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1125.
§ Vide paſſim. Conſultation, June 29th, 1773. Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1129, 1130, 1131.
‖ Ibid. p. 1118.
¶ 400,000 l.

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claim of, any thing; but that whatever his Highneſs, out of his good-will and friendſhip, ſhould be pleaſed to offer, he would willingly receive it for the Company *. In return for theſe grants, on the part of the Nabob, the Preſidency engaged to ſupport him in his expedition againſt Tanjore, with a large army, to place the fort, when taken, either by capitulation or ſtorm, in his hands, with the ſtores and effects which might be found in the place. But they declared, that ſhould it be taken by ſtorm, the plunder ſhould become the property of the captors, by the uſage of war †.

They engage to ſupport the Nabob with a large army.

Rajah prepares for war.

The preparations of the Preſidency, for taking the field, could not long remain unknown to the Rajah. Having ſome time before diſgraced and confined Mona-jî, at the requeſt of his vulgar paraſites, he had, as early as the month of May ‡, endeavoured to reconcile the mind of that aged Chief, as the only perſon fit to manage his affairs, in times of difficulty and danger. Mona-jî endeavoured to excuſe himſelf, by alleging, "That he was now beſet with old "age and infirmity, and had no abilities left §." But being ſoothed, flattered, and threatened by the Rajah, he, at firſt, took the command of a body of five hundred horſe, and one thouſand Sepoys ‖; and on the 10th of July, he was placed at the head of the army ¶. The capital was, in the mean time, placed in the beſt ſtate of defence **. More than twenty thouſand men, of various kinds, were in arms ††. The French of Pondicherry amuſed the Rajah with hopes of effectual aſſiſtance §§. The Dutch of Negapatnam, and even thoſe of Ceylon, were ſincerely in his intereſt, and the ſupport of it favoured their own. The Danes of Tranquebar, as well as the

Releaſes and reſtores Mona-jî to favour.

He arms twenty thouſand men.

* Mr. Wynch uſes the very words of Mr. Du Prè, on a like occaſion, Sept. 18th, 1771. Ibid. p. 1145.

† Ibid. p. 1145.

‡ May 28th, 1773. Ibid. p. 1113.

§ Ibid.

‖ Ibid.

¶ Ibid. p. 1151.

** Ibid.

†† The force of Tanjore, in the beginning of Auguſt, 1773, amounted to twenty-one thouſand nine hundred thirty-three men. Ibid. p. 1167, 1168.

§§ Ibid. p. 1145. 1158. 1160. 1167.

Dutch

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Dutch on the Coaſt *, aſſiſted him with men †, money, and warlike ſtores. The uncle of the King of Candia, having arrived at Negapatnam, ſent a Vackeel to the Rajah, and promiſed aid ‡. The Dutch obtained in mortgage from him Nagore, Trivalore, and Viderniam, for an hundred and fifty thouſand Pagodas; and he ordered his Vackeel, at Negapatnam, to ſell entirely, for thirty thouſand more, the villages and grounds, for which the Dutch had till then paid rent §. Hyder Ali, having aſſembled a force at Dundegul, ſent aſſurances that he would aſſiſt the Rajah, when the army ſhould move againſt Tanjore ‖. The Dutch having hoiſted their colours at Nagore, ſupplied the Rajah with guns, military ſtores, and men, from Nagapatnam; and, in ſhort, every preparation was made for the ſecurity of Tanjore, which the Rajah ſeemed determined to defend to the laſt extremity ¶.

Danes and Dutch aſſiſt him with men, money, &c.

He mortgages ſeveral diſtricts to the Dutch.

They ſupply the Raja with military ſtores.

General Smith having encamped the army, in the plain of Tritchinopoly, in the end of July, entered the province of Tanjore, in the beginning of Auguſt. The firſt hoſtilities commenced on the 6th of that month, when the Nabob's cavalry defeated a body of the enemy, with conſiderable loſs, near the walls of Tanjore ‡. On the 20th ground was broke ** before the place; but the batteries, for making a breach, were not opened till the 27th of Auguſt ††. A detail of the ſiege is unimportant in itſelf, and unneceſſary to the purpoſe of this work. On the 17th of September, a practicable breach being made, Tanjore was rather ſurpriſed than ſtormed, at twelve of the clock at noon, when the ſun was moſt intenſely hot;

Army marches.

Ground broke before Tanjore, Auguſt 20th.

Place taken, Sept. 17th.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1146.

† Ibid. p. 1152.

‡ Ibid. p. 1150. 1152.

§ Ibid. p. 1150.

‖ Ibid. p. 1152, 1153. 1181. 1191.

¶ Ibid. p. 1153.

The dangerous connection of the Rajah, with the Dutch, is proved by the following extract of a letter, from the Governor-General of Batavia, to the Nabob, dated July 26th, 1771.

"Concerning the aſſiſtance of warlike ſtores, "given by thoſe of Coromandel to the Rajah "of Tanjore, I ſhall demand account from Ne- "gapatnam. Mean while ſerves to your Excel- "lency's information, that the Netherlandiſh "Company ſtands in alliance with that prince, "and that the duty of faithful confederates re- "quires to aſſiſt one another, in caſe of ne- "ceſſity."

‡ Ibid. p. 1174.

** Ibid. p. 1193.

†† Ibid. p. 1200.

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and the garriſon, conſiſting of twenty thouſand fighting men ‡‡, except a few, not expecting an attack, " had retired from the breach " to their houſes to eat rice §." The Rajah and his family, with Mona-jï, together with his ſons, were made priſoners; and the Nabob having agreed to pay a ſtipulated ſum to the army for the plunder, the place was ſaved from the devaſtation and rapine, which uſually attend a conqueſt acquired by aſſault ||.

Rajah made priſoner.

Operations againſt the Dutch.

Whilſt Tanjore was preſſed by a ſiege, the Dutch Preſidency of Negapatnam took poſſeſſion of Nagore, a conſiderable ſea-port, belonging to the province of Tanjore ¶, together with ſeveral valuable diſtricts, on the pretence of having purchaſed them from the Rajah. To ſupport their uſurpation, they had aſſembled a conſiderable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Nagore, to defend their new acquiſitions. The Nabob, after repreſenting the invalidity of thoſe tranſactions, between his tributary and the Dutch, and likewiſe the bad conſequences, which might reſult to his government, and conſequently to the Company, from the addition of influence and conſequence, which any other European power in India might derive from territorial poſſeſſions, requeſted the aſſiſtance of the troops to recover the alienated diſtricts, ſhould the Dutch refuſe to relinquiſh their claims in an amicable manner †. But the Preſidency, though ſenſible of the danger and inconvenience of permitting any other Company to increaſe their power on the coaſt, ſhewed an unwillingneſs to adopt a meaſure, which might be conſtructed into a violation of treaties ſubſiſting between the Crown of Great Britain and the States of the United Provinces *. They conſulted therefore, Sir Robert Harland, his Majeſty's Miniſter Plenipotentiary, on that ſubject; and he gave it clearly as his opinion, that " the Company's aſſiſting the Nabob, in recovering lands un- " juſtly alienated by his Feudatory, could be conſidered, in no re-

‡‡ Rous's Appendix, p. 1216.
§ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 1217, 1218.
|| Ibid. p. 1217.
¶ Ibid. p. 1362.
† Ibid.
* Ibid.

" ſpect,

" ſpect, as an infringement of treaties, which could not have re-
" garded any encroachments wantonly made on dominions, to the
" diſpoſal of which the Crown, much leſs the Company, had no right.
" That as the Preſidency, as auxiliaries, had actually aſſiſted the Na-
" bob, in the reduction of Tanjore, it was equally incumbent upon
" them to give their aid to put him in poſſeſſion of the country de-
" pendent on that capital. That he himſelf, as the repreſentative of
" the King of Great Britain, would have no objection to aſſiſt the
" Company with the force under his command, ſhould it be re-
" quired †."

Conduct of the army.

The Preſidency were ſenſible, " that from the ſyſtem of govern-
" ment, and the nature of tenures in India, the Rajah of Tanjore,
" not being Lord Paramount of his country, but tributary to the
" Nabob, had no right to alienate any part of his lands, without
" the conſent of his Liege Lord, the Ruler of the Carnatic Payen-
" ghaut *;" but notwithſtanding this reſolution of the Preſidency, the army, who expected little benefit from a conteſt with Europeans, ſhewed an apparent unwillingneſs to proceed on that ſervice ‡; and " conſequently, nothing was done with ſpirit §." Accounts of this unwillingneſs were ſoon carried to Negapatnam; and the Dutch became conſequently obſtinate ¶. The troops were, at length, prevailed on to proceed, but with a peculiar refinement on the operations of war. The Nabob's troops were placed in the front, to expel the Dutch; and thoſe of the Company were only to aſſiſt, in caſe of neceſſity, hoping, by this ſubterfuge, to ſeem not to have acted againſt the Dutch. This conceit was practiſed with ſuch a minute ceremony, that ſome of the Company's Officers, who led the Nabob's cavalry, " unſaſhed, and declared themſelves off

Affairs ſettled.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1363.
* Ibid. p. 1368.
‡ Ibid. No. XXVII. paſſim.
§ Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, Oct. 29th, 1773.
¶ Ibid.

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" duty §." But the Dutch thought proper to relieve them from their embarraſſment, by relinquiſhing the territory and town of Nagore to the Nabob, upon his replacing the money which they had paid to the Rajah ‖.

Tanjore fell by a regular conqueſt.

Thus fell Tanjore into the hands of the Nabob of the Carnatic, by a regular conqueſt accompliſhed in a ſolemn and neceſſary war. To the inconteſtible right which that Prince acquired by this event, to the territory of his dangerous and rebellious feudatory, was added

The King of Great Britain gives his ſanction to that conqueſt in his own perſon,

the ſanction of the King of Great-Britain, not only in the perſon of his repreſentative acting in India by the authority of the great ſeal, but even by his Majeſty's perſonal approbation of the meaſure. Sir Robert Harland had ordered, at the deſire of the Preſidency, two of his Majeſty's ſhips, the Dolphin and the Swallow, to bring troops and ſtores from Maſulipatam, to aſſiſt at the reduction of Tanjore. He, at the ſame time, ſignified to the Governor and Council,

and by his Plenipotentiary.

That ſhould they find it expedient for the preſent ſervice, he was ready to land the marine forces under his command to do duty in the garriſons or to act in the field. He aſſured them, that ſhould they judge it neceſſary to require any further aſſiſtance of his Majeſty's ſhips, or of the force under his command, they had only to ſignify their wiſhes; as he was well-diſpoſed to co-operate with them, in every thing, for the public good *. His Majeſty had approved of the firſt expedition againſt Tanjore, in a letter under his own hand; and it may conſequeutly be inferred, that he approved of the ſecond expedition, which was founded upon the ſame grounds of juſtice, expediency, and neceſſity. The words in his Majeſty's letter to the Nabob, which is dated April 7, 1772†, are theſe: " It gave " us ſatisfaction to hear, that the Governor and Council of Madras

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. paſſim.

‖ The *Honourable* Company have agreed, in their late diſpatches, to accept from the Rajah the town and diſtricts thus *rebought* by the Nabob.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1134, 1135.

† Papers publiſhed by the Company in 1777, vol. i. p. iv.

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" had ſent the Company's troops with yours to reduce your tri-
" butary the Rajah of Tanjore to obedience, in which we hope, by
" the bleſſing of God, they will be ſucceſsful ‡."

The Company acquieſce in the conqueſt.

To this approbation of the Crown and aſſiſtance of its Plenipotentiary, with reſpect to the meaſures againſt Tanjore, was added the acquieſcence of the Court of Directors, if in their caſe, as in that of others, the old addage may be applied, that " Silence is conſent." They had not even been ſilent on this ſubject; for the expedition of the year 1771 differed in no reſpect, in its cauſe and object, from that of 1773. The Court of Directors had been fully and regularly informed of the motives which had induced the Preſidency to give the aſſiſtance of the Company to the Nabob, in the firſt of thoſe expeditions; and they had approved of every part of the conduct of the Preſidency down to the month of January 1772 §. On the 20th of September 1773, juſt three days after the taking of Tanjore, the Preſident and Council informed the Directors, that they had been unanimous in their opinion in favour of the meaſure, for the reaſons ſet forth in their proceedings ‖. This diſpatch was received in

Fact to eſtabliſh that point.

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" George the Third, &c. &c. &c. To Nabob
" Wallajâh, &c. Nabob of Arcot and the
" Carnatic."

" We received with pleaſure your letter, in
" which you expreſs to us your gratitude for
" the additional naval force which we have
" ſent for your ſecurity, as well as that of *our*
" East India Company, and your CONFIDENCE,
" that we ſhall tread in the ſteps of our royal
" grandfather, by granting PROTECTION
" to you and your family. We have given
" our Commander in Chief and Plenipoten-
" tiary, Sir Robert Harland, our inſtructions
" for that purpoſe, and we flatter ourſelves
" that he will reconcile the differences which
" have ariſen between you and the Company's
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" God, they will be ſucceſsful; and ſo we bid
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" to you and your family.
" Given at our Court at St. James's, the
" 7th day of April 1772, in the 12th
" year of our reign.
" Your affectionate friend,
" GEORGE, *R.*"

§ Vide thanks of the Court to Mr. Du Prè, Auguſt 1773. Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, laſt page.

‖ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.

London

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London

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London on the 26th of March 1774¶; three weeks at leaſt before the latter ſhips of the ſeaſon ſailed for India. On the 24th * and 29th of October 1773, the Preſidency tranſmitted an account of their tranſactions, and the motives of their conduct, relative to the conqueſt of Tanjore, to the Court of Directors; and both thoſe diſpatches came to the India Houſe, on the 26th of March 1774†. The Select Committee, on the 29th of October 1773, entered into a detail of the motives and reaſons which weighed with them in the reſolution which they had taken to aſſiſt the Nabob in reducing Tanjore, ſending, at the ſame time, a copy of their proceedings to the Company; and "we truſt," ſay they, "that our conduct will meet "with your approbation ‡." This letter was alſo received on the 26th of March 1774§; but though the Court of Directors were poſſeſſed of the whole materials, and had ſome weeks to deliberate on the ſubject, before the ſailing of the latter ſhips, they remained totally ſilent.

Their entire acquieſcence proved.

Though, in the courſe of the ſummer 1774, ſeveral other diſpatches, relative to the conqueſt of Tanjore and the ſubſequent meaſures, which aroſe from that tranſaction, the Court of Directors entered into no examination, formed no reſolution, made even no mention at all of the ſubject. They paſſed it over as a matter of courſe, an event which had ariſen from expediency, and even neceſſity; a tranſaction, which had been the natural conſequence of the Company's connection with the Nabob, and the propriety of ſupporting the rights and dignity of his government, over his vaſſals, according to their own uniform and repeated orders to their ſervants ||. The winter of 1774, and the firſt two months of 1775, paſſed away, in the ſame ſilent approbation of the conduct of

¶ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.
* Ibid.
† Ibid. p. 1364.
‡ Ibid. p. 1367.
§ Ibid. p. 1366.
|| March 17, 1769. March 23, 1770, &c.

the

the Preſidency of Fort St. George, relative to the conqueſt of Tanjore. The Directors of 1773 had, in the moſt public and deciſive manner, approved of the expedition of 1771, which differed neither in juſtice nor propriety from that of 1773. They had thanked Mr. Du Prè, who had concerted and executed the meaſure, for his eminent ſervices to the Company, in every part of his conduct, during his government, and, in particular, in his SUPPORT of the rights of the Nabob. They had rewarded Mr. Haſtings, who had been Second in Council at Fort St. George, when the expedition of 1771 was planned and executed, with the government of Bengal. For near thirteen months after intelligence of taking Tanjore was received, at the India-Houſe, the Court of Directors, like their predeceſſors in 1773, ſeem to have entirely approved of the meaſure, by their total ſilence on the ſubject. It was not till the 12th of April, 1775, the very day on which the Court of Proprietors were met to chuſe new Directors, that the old diſapproved, cenſured, ſtigmatized, and reverſed not only the meaſures of their predeceſſors but even their own. How and from whence this ſudden light fell on the India-Houſe, and kindled in the minds of the Directors, when their power was juſt expiring, ſuch a fervour for juſtice, is leſs important, than it is difficult to explain.

A brief ſtate of facts.

The more points, in which the ſubject of Tanjore is viewed, the leſs defencible will the ſubſequent conduct of the Directors of 1775 appear. It has been already proved, beyond the power of a juſt reply, that Mahommed Ali poſſeſſed the only ſovereign authority in the Carnatic. That the Company, neither by charter nor even by uſurpation, either could poſſeſs, or even pretended to hold any ſovereignty in that country. That in no war, which, either the diſobedience or ambition of the Nabob's vaſſals might kindle, or render abſolutely neceſſary, the Company had any right to appear, as principals. That, by their connection with Mahommed Ali, their intereſt in the ſecurity of his government, they thought themſelves

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Company had no right to appear as principals.

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bound in duty to appear as his allies, when he found himſelf obliged to take the field againſt foreign invaders or refractory ſubjects. That the ſervants of the Company abroad never claimed any other title to themſelves, than that of allies, nor to their troops but that of auxiliaries to the government of the Carnatic. That, in the two expeditions againſt Tanjore, the Preſidency had been uniformly careful to mention, in almoſt all their minutes on the ſubject, that their forces were only auxiliaries in the Nabob's army. That, as they had laid no claim to the war, as their own, they had moſt ſolemnly relinquiſhed every idea of having any right to the making of peace. That, in the firſt expedition, they were ſo ſenſible of their own want of every right to interfere, they acquieſced in a treaty, which they declared to be inſecure; and withdrew their troops from the walls of Tanjore, when a practicable breach was made. That, when the expedition of 1773 was undertaken, the Governor and Council, who were veſted with definitive powers relative to all agreements with Indian princes, diſavowed every claim to any conqueſt, that might be made. That having accordingly aſſiſted the Nabob in making a conqueſt, that conqueſt was ſolemnly and irrevocably veſted in that prince, as the acknowldged principal in the war. That, when a territory is acquired in a regular and ſolemn war, by any power, that power has the moſt decided, the moſt indiſputable and irreverſible title to that conqueſt, by the law of nature and nations. That, by the ſame law, both the victor and his aſſigns are to be defended in the poſſeſſion of whatever he has taken from his enemies †. That, ſhould any other power diſpoſe of territories acquired, by the rights of conqueſt, ſuch interference would amount to actual hoſtilities, and place the injuring party in a ſtate of war with the party injured. That, ſhould the ſubjects of

Bound to appear as his allies.

They never claimed any other title.

Declare themſelves auxiliaries.

Diſavows every claim to conqueſt.

The conqueſt *irrevocable* by them.

The abſolute right of conqueſt veſted in the Nabob.

† Plato de Leg. lib. i. Ariſtot. de Repub. vii. cap. 5. Grot. lib. iii. cap. 6. ſect. 2. lib. i. cap. 4. Xenophon. de Inſt. Cyr. lib. Puffendorf, lib. vii. cap. 7. ſect. 3.

any other power, under any pretence whatſoever, ſeize or alter the poſſeſſion of any conqueſt, ſuch power is bound by the law of nature and nations, to puniſh its offending ſubjects, and to make, from their effects, due reparation to him, whom they had diſpoſſeſſed of his undoubted and acknowledged rights. That, ſhould the ſtate whoſe ſubjects the offenders are, either neglect or refuſe to bring them to juſtice, ſuch ſtate would commit a violation of the treaties ſubſiſting between it and the injured power; and be further acceſſory to a flagrant and unpardonable breach of public faith, ſhould it overlook the injuſtice done to an ally, by ſuch offenders, for any deſpicable advantage to be derived from them, to itſelf.

Company puniſhable for invading that right, &c.

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The Reſtoration of Tanjore examined.

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Cauſe of the ſecrecy of the Company. Jealouſy of Commerce.

THE Eaſt India Company, ever ſince their firſt inſtitution, had induſtriouſly, and, till lately, very ſucceſsfully, covered their tranſactions with a veil of ſecrecy; which few had the curioſity, and fewer ſtill the means to penetrate. This maxim of myſtery naturally ſprung from the jealous principles of commerce, which hopes to preclude rivals, by a ſuppreſſion of its profits. When ſtates and kingdoms, by ſcarcely accountable revolutions, came under the management of the Company, the ſilence, which had been thought neceſſary for preſerving commercial advantages, was tranſferred to a ſtill more neceſſary buſineſs, the concealment of plunder.

Concealment of plunder.

The principal ſervants, having fabricated fortunes under a myſterious cloud, had an intereſt in remaining quiet; and the fear of diſmiſſion, and conſequently of ruin, deterred thoſe in inferior ſtations from divulging that ſmall portion of the delinquency of their ſuperiors, which fell within their knowledge. Beſides, the enviable ſituation of tyranny and pillage, was a prize in the wheel, into which they had thrown their own lots; and even a kind of miſplaced honour ſometimes prevented men of principle from detecting peculation, injuſtice, and vice; to avoid the diſgrace, which the world has, perhaps injudiciouſly, annexed to the character of an informer.

Reaſons why their ſecrets were ſo well kept.

The diſtance of the ſcene of iniquity naturally diminiſhed the impreſſion made by vague reports of crimes; and the national curio-

The diſtance of the ſcene of iniquity.

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Averſion of the nation to their monopoly.

The vanity of their ſervants,

and their oſtentation, create ſuſpicions.

How a diſcovery was made.

Enquiries not followed by puniſhments,

encourage crimes.

The Directors fly in the face of the ſtate.

The fear of puniſhment being removed, rancour returned.

ſity, with regard to the affairs of the Eaſt, was leſſened by the national averſion to a monopoly, which precludes the people at large from their natural rights to univerſal commerce. The plunder of Aſia, in a manner, brought the firſt authentic accounts of Aſiatic revolutions to Europe. Mankind began to enquire, "how, and "whence ſuch ſplendor came;" and when they ſaw, that perſons of mean parts had amaſſed great and ſudden riches, they naturally ſuſpected, that rapacity, injuſtice and tyranny had ſupplied their want of talents. Inſtead of prudently brooding over their ill-got hoards, the Company's ſervants, upon their return from their provinces, flew in the face of nobility itſelf; rivalled it in the poſſeſſion of lands, outſtripped it in diſſipation, oſtentation, and luxury; and ſometimes overcame it in parliamentary influence. Jealouſy and reſentment, which are too often more powerful paſſions, than a deſire of redreſſing the injured, excited a degree of revenge. Some men of talents, who precipitately thought, that national indignation might produce national juſtice, unveiled ſome of the fountains of corruption in the Eaſt. Their diſcoveries were heard with attention by the nation; but a benumbed ſtate ſeconded not the ardour of the people, for reſtoring public honour, by exhibiting examples of public juſtice.

An enquiry into abuſes, when it is not followed by animadverſion and puniſhment, inſtead of repreſſing vice, produces a larger crop of delinquency. The Company's ſervants in the Eaſt, inſtead of "ſhortening their hands from vice," if an Aſiatic expreſſion may be uſed, on an Aſiatic ſubject, "lengthened" them to every act of inſolence and oppreſſion. Their maſters in the Weſt, finding that the ſtorm, which threatened the miſmanagements of the Company, had diſſipated without falling, flew in the face of a ſtate, which, from its inactivity, they had great reaſon to deſpiſe. When the fear of future puniſhment was removed, former rancour and ani-

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They reverse the decisions of their predecessors, &c.

mosity returned. To partake of the injustice, if not to share in the peculations of their servants, a Court of Directors, not only reversed the most solemn and decisive measures of their predecessors in office, but invaded and frustrated the most sacred engagements of the state. Some writers of spirit and information took arms in the cause of humanity and justice. They dragged forth the delinquents from the cloud, in which they had involved themselves, and brought them bound to the tribunal of the public. The public, before sentence was passed, shewed a laudable inclination to hear the culprits, in their own defence.

They are arraigned at the public tribunal.

They undertake their own defence.

The Court of Directors undertook this defence, with an appearance of conviction or their own integrity and the rectitude of their measures; a circumstance calculated to impose upon the world. In a public advertisement *, they assured their constituents and the nation at large, "That from the materials before them, they had "not the least doubt of refuting the heavy charges brought against "them, which, could they be proved, would not only render *them* "unfit to conduct the affairs of the Company, but utterly unworthy "of every degree of public trust and confidence." To support this precipitate declaration, they proceeded to what they called a defence of their conduct. But, when they ought to have stated their case in the plain and simple garb which conscious integrity and truth always chuse and love, they overwhelmed and frightened the nation, with many enormous volumes, printed from the heavy and contradictory records of the Company. The Directors, by this clumsy artifice, hoped, perhaps, to create a general disgust against a subject, which few had abilities and scarcely any the perseverance to expiscate, in such a confused mass. Under the cover of a dull and torpid publication, they thought they had secured a safe retreat from further censure. This Asiatic mud-fort formed of consultations,

Promise to refute the charges, or to quit their office.

They overwhelm and frighten the public with enormous volumes of records.

Hope to disgust the nation against the subject.

* March 26th, 1777.

dispatches,

diſpatches, and country correſpondences, we have ſtormed, with leſs danger than labour; and, we truſt, we have had the good fortune to diſcomfit an aukward enemy, by turning on him his own artillery.

Their own artillery turned upon themſelves.

Though the Court of Eaſt India Directors have failed, in their ſolemn engagements to the public, to juſtify their own conduct relative to their behaviour towards the Nabob of Arcot and the pretended † reſtoration of Tanjore, it is feared, that "by crawling over "the ſubject, they have rendered it diſguſtful to the generality "of readers, by the ſlime of their heavy papers." Our apprehenſions on that head will render it perhaps neceſſary to recapitulate ſome capital points, which have been more diffuſely examined and proved in the preceding part of this work. Where any doubts may ariſe in the mind of the reader of this chapter, he is referred to the pages in which the ſubject is treated at large, under the evidence of unqueſtionable authorities. In ſhort, inſtead of following the example of our opponents, whoſe obvious intention has been to reſtore the tranſactions of the Company to their original obſcurity and uncertainty, we ſhall endeavour to develope truth, and to preſent her, in her native ſimplicity, before the eye of the public. Whatever the deciſion of that public may be on the ſubject, we ſhall think ourſelves ſufficiently rewarded by the conſciouſneſs of having expoſed INIQUITY and ſupported JUSTICE.

The dulneſs of their publication has, however, raiſed a diſguſt againſt the ſubject, which renders a ſhort recapitulation neceſſary.

Reaſons for reducing into a narrow compaſs the preceding facts.

It has appeared that the Eaſt India Company, which was firſt formed in a period of time unfavourable to commerce, had carried into its original inſtitution and management, the narrow principles of mean traders ‡. That the managers of their affairs at home had

Conduct of the Company.

Injuſtice of their leaders at home.

† We ſhall have occaſion hereafter to ſhew, that the reſtoration of Tulja-jî, notwithſtanding the pompous virtue expreſſed in the orders of April 12, 1775, was but a cruel mockery of that Rajah, who has been only raiſed as a figure of ſtraw againſt the Nabob, to promote an auction of corruption in the Carnatic.

‡ Hiſtory and Management of the Eaſt India Company, p. 8. 12, 13.

very

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very early uſurped an abſolute dominion over the ſtock-holders; and had, by private contracts, unjuſt deductions, and iniquitous frauds, embezzled their property §. That their principal ſervants abroad, following the example of their ſuperiors, or obeying their orders ‖, had been guilty of treachery to the natives of India, and of acts of cruelty, injuſtice, and oppreſſion to their fellow-ſubjects ¶. That when they were called to account by the Great Mogul for their injuſtice to his ſubjects, their conduct in adverſity was as mean, abject, and ſubmiſſive, as their inſolence and haughtineſs had been intolerable in proſperity *. That when the miſmanagements of the Company forced, in a manner, their affairs into parliamentary diſcuſſion, they were detected in perverting public juſtice, by corrupting the venal and bribing the profligate †. That, after the two Companies were united, in the beginning of the preſent century, the ſame attention to ſelf-intereſt, the ſame eager purſuit of perſonal gain, continued among the leaders at home; and the ſame tyranny, circumvention, and fraud, among the principal ſervants abroad ‡. That when the Company, by various revolutions in Aſia, aſcended from the condition of *traders* to that of SOVEREIGNS, they multiplied their acts of injuſtice, in proportion to the extent of their power §. That though ſome men of talents and ſome of integrity, had frequently the management of affairs at home and abroad, few of theſe could diveſt themſelves of the confined principles of avarice and ſelf-intereſtedneſs ‖. That inſtead of behaving themſelves like dutiful ſubjects to the ſtate, with whoſe juſt authority the real intereſts of the Company are cloſely and inſeparably connected, the

Treachery of their ſervants abroad.

Their abject ſubmiſſion to the Mogul.

Company pervert juſtice by bribery.

Self-intereſt of the leaders.

Tyranny of their ſervants.

Some men of talents and integrity;

yet tinctured with avarice.

Their indecent conduct towards the ſtate.

§ Hiſtory and Management of the Eaſt India Company, p. 13.

‖ Ibid. p. 14.

¶ Ibid. p. 14, 15. Hamilton, vol. i. Harris, vol. ii. Dodſley, vol. ii. Univ. Hiſt. vol. x.

* P. 16. Hamilton, vol. i.

† P. 17. Journals of the Commons, April 1695.

‡ P. 19, 20, 21, &c. Harris, vol. ii. Dodſley, vol. ii. Hamilton, paſſim.

§ Vide the whole of this work, with the undoubted authorities on which it is founded.

‖ P. 160, et paſſim.

managers

managers of their affairs inſulted the commiſſion of their Sovereign, diſregarded the public faith, and trampled upon a national guarantee. That theſe principles, as they proceed chiefly from radical defects in the conſtitution of the Company, call aloud for the correcting hand of the legiſlature, to prevent future miſchiefs by new regulations, if not to puniſh former delinquencies.

Their conduct calls aloud for the correcting hand of parliament.

In the courſe of the preceding work, it has been proved, that the Company's ſervants uniformly were conſidered and owned themſelves the ſubjects of the Mogul, in all parts of that monarch's dominions, where they poſſeſſed ſettlements *. That, eſpecially in the Carnatic, when they took up arms, upon any occaſion, they avowed that they only performed their duty, as ſubjects of the Mogul empire, according to their original condition and tenure in the country and the fundamental principles of the Mogul government †. That they conſidered and always acknowledged the Nabob of Arcot, as the mediate power, between them and the Mogul, to whom their allegiance and ſupport was due, as faithful and approved ſubjects ‡. That they knew and owned, that Mahommed Ali, the preſent Nabob of the Carnatic, was the LAWFUL Nabob of that country, by the free and legal Saneds of the Mogul, as well as of his deputy, the viceroy of the Decan §. That they looked upon the French Company, who had been eſtabliſhed in the Carnatic, on the very ſame footing with themſelves, in the light of REBELS, for carrying on war againſt Mahommed Ali ‖. That, in the perſon of their governor, Mr. Pigot, they ſignified their wiſh "to carry on their buſineſs, *under* that prince's protection, as they

They uniformly owned themſelves ſubjects of the Mogul.

They acknowledged the Nabob the mediate power,

to whom they own obedience.

* P. 28. Hamilton, vol. i. Rous's Appendix, No. I. p. 15. Ibid. p. 9. Governor Saunders to the French Deputies, Feb. 15th, 1754. Mr. Pigot to Nabob, Auguſt 5th, 1759.

† P. 112. Governor Saunders, ubi ſupra.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

‖ Governor Saunders, Feb. 15th, 1754. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 5.

"did

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"did *under* that of former Subadârs*." That, upon the whole, as no revolution has happened in the Carnatic, no breach upon the legal appointment of Mahommed Ali, to the government of that country, the Company and their ſervants ſtill continue, in the ſame relation to that Nabob, as they had uniformly ſtood with regard to his predeceſſors and to himſelf. That, in the double capacity of ſubjects to Great Britain, and to the government of the country, where the ſettlement is placed, the Company, neither had nor have any right, to become principals in any war; and that they can only appear, as allies, auxiliaries or mercenaries. That in none of theſe characters, they have any right whatſoever to either the poſſeſſion or the diſpoſal of conqueſts; and, that their claiming the one or arrogating the other is a violation of their duty, as ſubjects of Great Britain, as well as of the country government.

They ſtill continue in the ſame relation to him.

Have no right to be principals in war.

None to the diſpoſal of conqueſts.

To demonſtrate the indiſputed right of the Mogul to the Carnatic and all its dependencies, by conqueſt, the hiſtory of that country has been deduced from the earlieſt times. It has been proved, that, as early as the year 1310†, a Gentoo prince reigned in the Carnatic, who was ſovereign of the provinces of Canara, Myſore, Travancore, TANJORE, Marava, and Madura‡. That this prince, to defend himſelf againſt the incurſions of the Mahommedans, had built the city of Bigenagur§, in the mountains, about eighty geometrical miles to the ſouth-eaſt of Goa||. That this city, which gave its name to the kingdom of which it was the capital, was attacked and taken, in the year 1565, by the united force of the four Mahommedan principalities of the Decan**. That, in a war which commenced in 1650, the whole Carnatic was entirely reduced under the yoke of the Mahommedan kings of Bijapour and Tellingana††.

Deduction of the hiſtory of the Carnatic.

Tanjore a part of it ſ om the earlieſt times.

The *whole* Carnatic reduced by Bijapour.

* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, Aug. 5th, 1759, and June 23d, 1760.
† P. 142. Dow, vol. i.
‡ De Faria, vol. i. p. 95. vol. ii. p. 83. 142.
§ Dow, vol. i.
|| Lettres Edifiantes, tom. xxiii.
** De Faria, p. 252.
†† Dow, vol. iii.

That

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That in the years 1686 and 1687, the emperor Aurungzebe conquered the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana. That the Naigs of TANJORE, by that conqueſt, became feudatories and vaſſals of the empire ‡. That about the year 1696, nine years after the reduction of the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana, one Ecko-jî, a Maratta, ſervant to the king of Bijapour, having been called by the hereditary Naig of Tanjore to his aſſiſtance, ſeized the country, which he had been called to defend §. That the Mogul Nabob of the Carnatic reduced Sahu-jî, the ſon of the uſurper, to an abſolute dependence on the empire. That the Nabob impoſed upon the vanquiſhed Sahu-jî, an annual tribute of thirty lacks of rupees ‖. That, in conſideration of that ſum and his entire ſubmiſſion to the mandates of the Mogul, that monarch conferred upon him the title of RAJAH, by an imperial Phirmân *. That, during an irregular ſucceſſion

Conquered by the Moguls.

Ecko-jî ſeizes Tanjore.

His ſon reduced by the Nabob of the Carnatic;

who impoſes upon him a tribute of 30 lacks a-year.

Mogul gives him the title of Rajah,

‡ P. 56, 57.
§ P. 57.
‖ 375,000 l.

* *Cowlnamma from Nabob Zulphukar Cawn Bahauder, Nabob of the Carnatic, to Sahougee, the Son of Ecko-ji, Naig or Zemindar of Tanjore.*

" I have received your obligation in writing, containing aſſurances of your humiliation, ſubmiſſion, penitence, and dejection, and of your avoiding your former untoward conduct, and not aſſiſting Ramah, begging pardon for your paſt faults, and engaging to become a faithful ſubject of the Empire; and alſo engaging to pay an annual tribute of thirty lack of rupees, twenty lack you will pay now, with jewels and elephants, and ten the next year; and in the room of furniſhing me with a force, you will deliver up to me the forts of Pollamcottah, Cittoners, and Tank, with their diſtricts; and alſo Cantenanaegoody, Sheamuſty, Tutlegoodynar, Imrapoor, Elvanaſoor, Haulcooret, and Pandalum, &c. which you took from Ram Rage; and further, begging to have the gracious Phirmaun, pardoning your faults, and giving you the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore.—Though your faults, from the beginning to this time, do not merit forgiveneſs, and by the bleſſing of God, the reduction of Tanjore was as good as accompliſhed, yet as the Imperial court is replete with mercy and forgiveneſs, and the ſervants thereof are ever diſpoſed to pardon offences, conſidering your humiliation and ſubmiſſive entreaties, I have agreed to your propoſal, on condition of your diſcharging the ſtipulated tribute, and not by any means aſſiſting the rebellious Ramah.—I have ſworn by the King, who is the ſhadow of the Moſt High (for whoſe ſafety may thouſands give their lives) and having marked this paper with the palm of my hand, have ſent it you, as an aſſurance that you may, in peace of mind and in confidence, diſcharge your tribute, deliver up the forts and diſtricts, avoid any connection with the rebel, and not act in any manner whatſoever, contrary to orders; that we may write to the preſence of the King, and obtain for you his gracious Phirmaun, granting you forgiveneſs

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who, when refractory, is deprived.

ſucceſſion of the poſterity of Ecko-jî in Tanjore, the ſettled tribute was paid, and the feudatory ſervices performed, by that country, for more than thirty years †. That, when the Rajah proved refractory, his ſuperior, the Nabob of Arcot, ſeized his country, as a forfeiture to the empire, and threw the revolted vaſſal into priſon, as a puniſhment for his contumacy ‡. That, though the Rajah, during troubles, which aroſe in the Carnatic, recovered his liberty and government, he continued ſubject to the empire of the Moguls; and was accountable for his tribute and feudal duties to the Nabob of Arcot, the mediate power between him and the throne.

Pretaupa neglects to pay his tribute.

Undutiful to the Nabob, treacherous to the Engliſh.

During the wars, which aroſe on the coaſt of Coromandel, from the ambition of the French and the intrigues of M. Dupleix, it has been ſhewn, that the Rajah of Tanjore not only neglected to pay his tribute, but acted a very undutiful and faithleſs part towards

of your faults, and giving you the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore,—by which you will be honoured and exalted!"

Tranſlation of an Obligation to Zulphukar Cawn Bahauder, from Sauhougee, Zemindar of Tanjore.

"It having pleaſed the moſt high and mighty Zulphukar Cawn, Nabob, to intend taking Tanjore from me Sahougee, Zemindar thereof,—I do hereby promiſe and engage to act differently from my former conduct, and to have no connection with, and give no aſſiſtance to, Ram Rage, but faithfully and humbly to pay ſubmiſſion to the Imperial court of his high Majeſty, which is like Solomon's in glory and magnificence; and being convinced that remaining his faithful ſubject muſt contribute to my preſent and future welfare and advantage, I therefore ſubmit myſelf to his orders, and promiſe to ſerve him as his vaſſal; and I have agreed to pay him a tribute of thirty lacks of rupees annually. I will now pay twenty lacks in ready money, jewels, and elephants, and I will be anſwerable for ten lack in the next year; and inſtead of furniſhing the ſaid Nabob, in his expedition againſt Gingee, with a thouſand horſe and four thouſand Sepoys from my troops (as was intended), I will deliver him up three forts, *viz.* Pollamcottah, Cittoners, and Tank, with their diſtricts; and alſo Culmanargoody, Sheemuſty, Tuttegoodynar, Imrapoor, Elvanſore, Haulcoorchy and Pandalum, &c. which I took from Ram Rage; all which I give the ſaid Nabob as a tribute. I hope, as a ſervant of the Court, to receive the gracious Phirmaun in my name, through the means of the ſaid Nabob, giving to me the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore. I promiſe that I will by every means, ſupport a connection with the garriſons, which are placed in the new-conquered countries; and I will not, in any reſpect, be guilty of diſobedience, or deviate from the path of ſubjection.——Given this 7th of Shavaul, in the 38th year of his Majeſty's reign."

† Rous's Appendix, No. IV. p. 70.
‡ P. 60.

his

his ſuperior the Nabob and the Engliſh Company *. That though he ſent a force to aſſiſt them in 1752, it was after they had obtained a manifeſt ſuperiority, by the junction of the Marattas and Myſoreans †. That when they had loſt that ſuperiority in 1753, he amuſed them with inſidious promiſes, whilſt he actually treated with their enemies ‡. That his conduct during the whole war, was not only uniformly deceptious §, but that he privately correſponded with the enemy ‖, entertained their agent at his capital ¶, ſtopt proviſions from being ſent to the Engliſh army, and diſconcerted their operations **. That, though the French attacked his capital in 1758, he exhibited marks of animoſity againſt the Engliſh, and, when he thought their fortune on the decline, when Madras was beſieged, he not only refuſed aſſiſtance to them and his ſuperior, the Nabob, but treated their repreſentative, Major Calliaud, with every mark of diſreſpect and contempt ††. That, though the power of the French manifeſtly declined, when they were forced to raiſe the ſiege of Madras, he not only refuſed aſſiſtance to his ſuperior the Nabob, but anſwered the requeſt of the Preſidency with a ſarcaſm upon their conduct ‡‡.

He amuſes them with inſidious promiſes.

Correſponds with the enemy.

Treats their agent with contempt.

Notwithſtanding the treaty of 1762, which ſettled the tribute of Tanjore, at leſs than half the ſum paid in the moſt regular times, was ſo favourable to Pretaupa Sing, it has appeared, that he ſhewed ſo little inclination to be punctual, in performing his part of the terms, that nothing but his terror from the troops, marching to the ſiege of Madura, could induce him to pay his ſecond Kiſt §§. When, upon the death of Pretaupa, in December 1763 |||, his ſon Tulja-jî ſucceeded to the Rajaſhip, he improved on his father's obſtinacy and crimes. Having

The treaty of 1762 raiſes no gratitude in his mind.

Succeeded by Tulja-jî,

* P. 85.
† Orme, vol. i. Lawrence's Nar. paſſim.
‡ Lawrence's Nar. p. 41. Orme, vol. i.
§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 44.
‖ P. 87.
¶ Orme, vol. i. p. 285, 286.
** Lawrence's Narrative.
†† Orme, vol. ii. p. 437.
‡‡ Ibid. p. 465.
§§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.
||| Ibid. p. 88, 89.

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who murders his relations.

removed the legitimate branches of his own family, either by the dagger or bowl ||, he formed a close connexion and established a secret correspondence, with Isoph Chan, then in actual rebellion, and besieged in Madura, by the Nabob and English ¶. When a war was kindled between Hyder Ali and the English, the Rajah, though he had obtained, at the time, favours from the Presidency, assisted their enemy with money §§. When that chief invaded the Carnatic in 1769, Tulja-jî assisted him with money and provisions ‡‡, which enabled him to carry the war to the gates of Madras, and to conclude a peace on his own terms. Hyder Ali was so sensible of the Rajah's services, and the Rajah so certain of the protection and assistance of that chief, that Hyder insisted, his new ally should be comprehended in the treaty ¶¶, which he dictated, in a manner, to the Presidency in April 1769. Though the Presidency, by a subterfuge, to which *they* endeavoured to affix a meaning ††, insisted upon including the Rajah in the treaty, as *their* friend, he did not consider himself in that light; but, on the contrary, depending upon the power of Hyder Ali, stopped the payment of the stipulated tribute, which became due, just three months after the treaty of April 1769 was concluded **.

Corresponds with Isoph.

Assists Hyder,

who insists on comprehending him in the treaty

He pays not his tribute.

Directors irritated at his conduct.

It has appeared, that the Court of Directors were so sensible of the duplicity and treachery of the Rajah, and so much irritated at the whole of his conduct, that, on the 17th of March 1769, they sent positive orders to the Presidency, to assist the Nabob in bringing to a severe account his undutiful vassal *. That the Court plainly were of opinion, that the treaty of 1762 had not abridged any part of the *constitutional rights* of the Carnatic over Tanjore. That they considered that country, as a PART of the Carnatic; and its Rajah

Orders for bringing him to account.

|| Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 198.
¶ P. 147.
§§ P. 155.
‡‡ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 15.
¶¶ Ibid.
†† Ibid.
** Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.
* P. 164, 165. Directors to the Governor and Council, and to the Select Committee, March 17th, 1769.

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only a Zemindar of that province †. That he had not only deſerved chaſtiſement for his conduct; but that the Company were bound to aſſiſt the Nabob againſt his refractory feudatory ‡. It has been ſhewn, that the oſtenſible reaſons, for not executing thoſe orders, proceeded from circumſtances very different §, from any amendment in the behaviour of the Rajah. That the Preſidency, who were, by no means, prejudiced in favour of the Nabob, declared that the Rajah certainly deſerved chaſtiſement, for having aſſiſted the enemy of the Carnatic, with money and proviſions, and for delaying the payment of the peiſhcuiſh, ſettled by the treaty of 1762 ‖. That, in the end of the year 1770, the Rajah's correſpondence with Hyder and the Marattas, which two powers he invited to an invaſion of the Carnatic, was diſcovered, by the Preſidency, as well as the Nabob ¶. That, whilſt he ſolicited foreign enemies to attack the Nabob, he himſelf actually took up arms againſt the dependents and vaſſals of that prince ⸸. That when the Engliſh Preſident wrote to the Rajah to ſuſpend hoſtilities, inſtead of paying attention to that application, he conveyed inſult and impertinence, in his anſwer **. That, upon the whole, the intrigues of the Rajah, with the avowed enemies of the Carnatic, his taking up arms againſt the dependents of a prince, to whom he himſelf was tributary ††, his breach of the treaty of 1762, of which the Company were guarantees, his oppoſition to the Engliſh commerce, his connection with other European factories, his avowed diſobedience to his ſuperior, his ingratitude to his protectors, his behaviour in the late war, the danger that might reſult from his known character, in any future war, rendered it juſt, expedient and neceſſary, to bring him to a ſevere account *.

Reaſons why thoſe orders were not executed.

Preſidency declare he deſerves chaſtiſement.

He invites Hyder and Marattas to invade the Carnatic.

He becomes the aggreſſor.

His inſulting anſwer to the Preſident.

Various reaſons for attacking him.

† P. 165.
‡ Ibid.
§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 569.
⸸ Ibid.
** Ibid. No. XXI. p. 609.
†† Preſident to Nabob, Feb. 20th, 1771.
* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 685.

Though

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Though the conduct of the Rajah appeared to the Presidency to merit the ultimate chastisement of war, it has been shewn, that the Nabob preferred negociation to hostility †. That when the decision of arms became necessary ‡, he vested his eldest son with powers, to accommodate matters with the Rajah §. That when an agent was sent with letters to Tanjore, from the President, the General, and the young Nabob, Tulja-jî treated him with indignity, and his dispatches with contempt ‖. That notwithstanding, when a practicable breach was made, a peace was concluded, so favourable to the Rajah, that the Presidency expressed the highest dissatisfaction, on that head ¶. That, from the known character and views of Tulja-jî, it was the opinion of the Presidency, that a second expedition against Tanjore would soon become necessary ⸸; and that nothing short of the absolute reduction of the Rajah could preserve the peace of the Carnatic. That this opinion was verified by the subsequent conduct of the Rajah, who renewed his intrigues, with foreign powers, as soon as the guns, which had breached his walls, were withdrawn from the batteries **. That he demanded succours from the Marattas ††, assured Hyder, that he had no other protector *, promised to assist that chief, in dismembering the Carnatic ‡‡, entered into intrigues, treaties and agreements for a military assistance, with the Dutch of Negapatnam, Danes of Tranquebar §§, and French at Pondicherry ‖‖. That, instead of treating the just authority of his superior, with becoming respect, he had refused, upon requisition, to assist him with troops, in terms of his tenure ¶¶. That he received,

Nabob prefers negociation to war.

He empowers his son to accommodate matters.

Insolence of the Rajah.

Yet he obtains a favourable peace.

Presidency think his reduction necessary.

He renews his intrigues.

Demands succours from the Marattas and Hyder.

Treats with the Dutch, Danes and French.

Refuses to assist his superior.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 686, 687. 693.
‡ Ibid. p. 728.
§ Ibid. p. 724.
‖ Ibid No. XXIV. p. 865. 866.
¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 801, 802. No. XXV. p. 929, 930, 931.
⸸ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 799.
** Ibid. No. XXV. 934. No. XXVII. p. 1107, 1108, 1109.
†† Ibid. No. XV. p. 230.
* Ibid. No. XXVII. p. 1111, &c.
‡‡ Ibid.
§§ Ibid. p. 1113, &c.
‖‖ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, passim.
¶¶ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1109.

protected

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protected and aided the enemies of the Nabob †, encouraged depredations in his country **, and neglected to pay the money ††, ſtipulated by the agreement, to the obſervance of which he had ſolemnly ſworn, in the month of October 1771 ‡‡.

Breaks the treaty to which he had ſworn.

Upon the whole, it has been ſhewn, that the Rajah, by withholding, for more than two years §§, the tribute ſtipulated to be annually paid to the Nabob, had broken the treaty of 1762, to which the Company were guarantees. That the Company were bound, by that treaty, which they themſelves had made, to aſſiſt the Nabob againſt the Rajah |||. That, though the Rajah, as a tributary to the Carnatic, was in juſtice bound to furniſh his quota of men and money, towards the general defence, he refuſed both, and aſſiſted the enemy. That the Preſidency of Fort St. George, by the expreſs orders of their ſuperiors, were obliged to give their aſſiſtance to the Nabob, in preſerving the peace of the Carnatic, as well as the rights and dignity of his government *. That the dangerous intrigues, preparations, and even hoſtilities of the Rajah had broken that peace of which they were the guardians †. That their duty to their ſuperiors, their engagements to the Nabob, and even ſelf-preſervation ‡, forced them to take the field §. That, when a war was once commenced, they could only appear, as they themſelves uniformly acknowledged, in the light of allies, auxiliaries or mercenaries. That, in none of thoſe characters, they poſſeſſed, or pretended to poſſeſs, any right to what might be obtained by victory, except the plunder of places taken by ſtorm ||. That, as Tanjore was a part of the Carnatic, as being tributary to that province, the keeping poſſeſſion of that place, when reduced, or the giving it to any other, than

He breaks the treaty of 1762.

The Preſidency bound to aſſiſt the Nabob.

They are forced to take the field.

But as auxiliaries.

Have no right to the conqueſt.

† Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1109.
** Ibid. p. 1110.
†† Ibid.
‡‡ Ibid. No. XXIV.
§§ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 939. Mr. Du Prè's Appendix, paſſim.
||| Treaty dated Sept. 20th, 1762.
* Letter of March 17th, 1769.
† P. 194, 195.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1118.
§ Ibid. p. 1117 & paſſim.
|| Ibid.

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To diſpoſe of it an infringement of the treaty of Paris.

its lord paramount, the Nabob, would have been, in the Company, a direct infringement of the treaty of Paris, which guaranteed Mahommed Ali, in the entire and excluſive poſſeſſion of the whole country ¶. That, granting Tanjore had *not been* a part of the Carnatic, a poſition which we deny, it became a part of that country, when it was conquered by the arms of the Nabob, in a neceſſary, regular, and ſolemn war. That, as ſoon as it became a part of the Carnatic, by conqueſt, which is the leaſt diſputable of all rights, it immediately fell under the ſecurity of the treaty of Paris. That nothing but another conqueſt, or a voluntary ceſſion of Tanjore, by the Nabob himſelf, could alienate it from that prince. That the Company, by taking poſſeſſion of it, by keeping it for themſelves, or tranſferring its revenue and government to another, not only infringed the guarantee of the ſtate, but committed an act of private injuſtice, if not robbery, which ought to be, and perhaps is, puniſhable by the laws of their country †. That, by reſtoring Tanjore to the Rajah, or, what in fact is the caſe, their ſeizing it for themſelves, they broke a ſolemn contract, concluded with the Nabob, under the faith of their own ſeal *.

Reaſons.

The Company, for ſeizing Tanjore, puniſhable by law.

Contraſt between the Nabob and Rajah.

The merits of the caſe being ſtated, it may not be improper, to contraſt the characters of the perſons, principally concerned. The Nabob of Arcot poſſeſſes the acknowledged and lawful ſovereignty of the whole Carnatic, by the fundamental laws of the Mogul empire, and by the regular and legal phirmâns of all the ſucceſſive emperors, who have ſwayed the ſceptre of Delhi, for thirty years. Tulja-jî is deſcended of an illegitimate branch of the family of a Maratta adventurer, who wreſted Tanjore, a *part* of the Carnatic, by treachery, from the hereditary Naig, who was himſelf a vaſſal to

¶ Vide 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, Feb. 1763.

† P. 195 & paſſim.

* Under the faith of this contract, the Nabob paid to their army, as *mercenaries*, a gift of ſeven lacks of pagodas (280,000l.), beſides the enormous expences of the expedition.

the

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the Mogul. Mahommed Ali has adhered, without deviation, for more than thirty years, to the Engliſh intereſt, and the Engliſh cauſe. The father of the Rajah, and after him the preſent Rajah, were, during that period, uniformly treacherous, and often hoſtile to their ſuperior, and always faithleſs to his allies. The Nabob, beſides his other expences in defending the Carnatic, againſt the enemies of the Engliſh, as well as his own, had paid, from the year 1750 to the end of 1773, 17,984,916 pagodas, a ſum exceeding SEVEN MILLIONS STERLING, into the Company's caſh †. The Rajah, whoſe territories lay in the heart of the Carnatic, inſtead of furniſhing his proportion of the general expence of defence, aſſiſted the enemies of the country, with money and proviſions. The Nabob deviated, on no occaſion, from his engagements to the Company. Tulja-jî broke their treaties, diſregarded their guarantee, and inſulted their principal ſervants. The Nabob is not leſs different in his private character, than in his public behaviour, from the new favourite, whom the Court of Directors have preferred to an old friend. Mahommed Ali was not only dutiful to his father, but affectionate to brothers, who had rebelled againſt his government; yet, whom he not only pardoned, but ſtill maintains, together with their families, at an expence, ſuitable to their dignity. Tulja-jî was ſuſpected of having murdered his father; and he actually cut off, upon his acceſſion, as has been already related, almoſt all his relations. The firſt is virtuous in his private life, juſt and dignified in his public conduct. The ſecond is addicted to almoſt every vice, that depraves and diſgraces human nature; and his public tranſactions have been uniformly marked with treachery and folly.

Attachment of the firſt to the Engliſh.

Uniform treachery of the ſecond.

The firſt pays amazing ſums to the Company.

The ſecond pays not even his quota.

The one keeps to his engagements.

The other breaks treaties.

Private character of the Nabob.

That of Tulja-jî.

The firſt virtuous.

The ſecond vicious in extreme.

The chain of facts, with the arguments, which naturally aroſe from thoſe facts, contained in the preceding pages, and founded

Obſervation.

† "The money, which I have paid into the "Company's caſh, ſince the year 1750, amounts "to 17,984,916 pagodas (7,193,966 l. 8 s.)— "The REST is well known to others now in "England." Nabob to Sir Robert Harland, Jan. 15th, 1774.

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chiefly on the authority of the papers publiſhed by the Directors, in their own *defence*, may be thought ſufficient to decide the judgment of the public. But the carrying forward a conciſe narrative of tranſactions to the reſtoration of Tanjore, may not be diſagreeable to ſome readers. In the year 1772, the miſmanagements of the Company abroad, but chiefly their pecuniary diſtreſſes at home, reached the ears of the nation, and rouzed, in ſome degree, the attention of government. The matter, when ſet afloat in parliament, was toſſed and tumbled, with all that vehemence and indeciſion, which are the characteriſtics of numerous aſſemblies. A ſubject rude and without form, extenſive in itſelf, and rendered ſtill more intricate and perplexed, by thoſe who dreaded an enquiry, was not likely to receive much light or benefit, from the deſultory examination of men averſe to application and labour. Committees were appointed to interrogate witneſſes, and to examine records. Much time was loſt, but little information gained. A bill was, at length, introduced and paſſed, which was ſo much amended in its progreſs, that it fell ſhort of its object. A change made in the government of Bengal rendered that opulent province leſs ſubject than formerly to the controul of the Court of Directors. But the leſs fortunate coaſt of Coromandel was left as a field for the exerciſe of their talents, and the exertion of their authority.

A narrative of ſucceeding tranſactions.

Obſervations on parliamentary enquiries.

A bill for the regulation of India affairs.

The COAST left *clear* to the Directors.

A permanency given to the members of that court,

The principal diſcovery made by the Committees, who examined the affairs of India, was, in all appearance, conveyed to them, by ſome members of the Court of Directors, who were diſpleaſed, at the ſhort duration of their own power. They repreſented, that the miſmanagements abroad aroſe chiefly, from that diſregard to the orders ſent from home, which had been naturally encouraged, by thoſe fluctuations in men and opinions, which had ſprung from a frequent choice of Directors. To give permanency to the power of Directors, was the only way to ſecure the obedience of Preſidencies. This ſuggeſtion was ſeized with eagerneſs, by men averſe to the labour of an

annual exertion of influence. Vainly imagining that gratitude was a ſtronger paſſion than fear, they hoped to gain by a favour, perſons whom that very favour placed beyond their controul. The permanency ſo much recommended and requeſted was accordingly given to the Court of Directors; but, inſtead of producing amendment, it ſerved to confirm, and perpetuate the old ſyſtem, with all its errors and abſurdity. The Court became, at once, independent of Government and the Proprietors. The latter were, in fact, reduced to mere cyphers, though they were ſtill amuſed, with the yearly mockery of voting for ſix Directors; who had actually ſecured their election, by an agreement with the eighteen brethren, whom they had left behind the bar, the year before. Thus the Directors themſelves, like the parliament of Paris, became their own electors; whilſt an improvident Government and an ill-uſed Proprietary were left ſpectators of meaſures, which they could not prevent, and which were too troubleſome to be reverſed.

which, inſtead of amending, perpetuates error and abſurdity.

The proprietors reduced to cyphers.

The Directors elect themſelves.

The Court feeling their own independence, began to think of the means of turning it to the beſt advantage. The law, which had rendered them perpetual dictators, had unluckily deprived them of Bengal, their beſt and moſt deſireable province. On the Coaſt, ſome advantages and much reſentment ſtill remained. A conqueſt had been made of an opulent province, under the auſpices of a governor, who, having come by accident to the chair, had not, perhaps, offered the cuſtomary *Nazir*, to his ſuperiors. Mahommed Ali, though perſecuted by ſervants, had not yet felt the heavy hand of the maſters, to correct him, for his defection to the ſtate. The ſtate, with peculiar reſpect to the Company, had delivered the victim into their hands; but the hurry ariſing from a parliamentary enquiry, had hitherto prevented the building of the altar, on which the ſacrifice was to be made. A new governor for Madras, to officiate as high-prieſt, at the intended ceremony, was ſtill to be found; and as the *choice pieces* were to become his perquiſites, there were many candidates for the office.

They think of turning their independence to advantage.

Tanjore promiſes that advantage.

Nabob delivered by government into their hands.

They prepare to make a ſacrifice of the victim.

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A new governor.

The intrigues of Leadenhall-Street are frequently too dark to be traced, and are ſeldom worth the labour of detection. The Court of Directors having, by a ſmall majority, nominated a governor for Fort St. George, in the beginning of 1775, their nomination was reverſed by the Proprietors, by a ſtill ſmaller ſuperiority of votes. The object of the Company's choice was Lord Pigot, who, before he attained the rank of an Iriſh Baron, had managed the affairs of the Company, for ſome years, as their Preſident, on the coaſt of Coromandel. Such parts of the conduct of Mr. Pigot, in that ſtation, as ſuited the public eye, have been explained, with the ſtricteſt impartiality, in the preceding part of this work. Other things we have choſen to leave in the ſhade, from a reſpect due to the dead. Beſides, the misfortunes, which attended the latter part of Lord Pigot's life, though they cannot juſtify his meaſures, claim an indulgence, againſt the ſeverity of animadverſion. But an undeviating attention to ſuch truths, as are abſolutely neceſſary to explain our ſubject, muſt ſuperſede every other conſideration.

Lord Pigot.

An indulgence to be ſhewn to the dead.

Riſe of Lord Pigot.

Mr. Pigot, having returned to Europe, ſoon after the concluſion of the laſt peace, had ſucceſſively obtained the rank of a Baronet and that of a peer of Ireland. Though poſſeſſed of thoſe honours and an ample fortune, Lord Pigot, after having paſſed twelve years in England, growing ſuddenly tired of the vapid pleaſures of an idle life, reſolved to ſolicit the government of Madras, and to return to India. More motives, than a love of buſineſs, probably ſuggeſted this reſolution to his Lordſhip. The treaty of 1762, which had ſettled money-matters between the Nabob of Arcot and his vaſſal the Rajah of Tanjore, had been, for various reaſons, the favourite meaſure of his former government. The vague reports, concerning the deprivation of the Rajah, had been confirmed to his Lordſhip, by a letter from Moodoo-Kiſtna, a Dubaſh, whoſe ſteady friendſhip had remained unimpaired, during an abſence of

Tired of a life of idleneſs.

But has other motives for going to India.

Moodoo-Kiſtna writes a letter.

many years. This faithful Dubaſh, having rented lands to a very conſiderable amount from Tulja-jî *, lamented the fall of that Rajah, with all the ſincerity of a grateful tenant. In the warmth of his zeal, he probably repreſented to his noble friend, the caſe of "that monarch" in a very different light, from that eſtabliſhed, by incontrovertible evidence, in the preceding part of this work.

His zeal carries him to the regions of fiction.

To his repreſentations of the injuſtice of the reduction of Tanjore, Moodoo-Kiſtna probably added thoſe reports of the cruelties of the Nabob, which were induſtriouſly circulated in the beginning of 1775, in Leadenhall-Street. It was alleged that Tulja-jî was cloſely confined in a dungeon at Tanjore; and, at the ſame time, that he was in irons at Tritchinopoly. Though theſe two ſtories could not poſſibly be true, they were both believed, by ſome tender-hearted perſons in the India-houſe; if their own allegations deſerve any credit. Some feeling clerks in office diſſolved into tears, upon hearing the melancholy tale; and even a few Directors, at the weekly feaſt in the London Tavern, were obſerved to abſtain from the delicacies of the Company's table, when they heard the ſad reverſe of fallen MAJESTY. Lord Pigot himſelf, transferring all his friendſhip for Pretaupa, to the unfortunate Tulja-jî, reſolved to paſs immediately to Aſia, to ſave the life of the devoted Rajah, from the dagger of Mahommed Ali. That hardened prince, it had been found by experience, was capable of any injuſtice. Though he had appointed Lord Pigot his agent in England, much of the ſalary annexed to the office remained unpaid. The Nabob, it ſeems, had ſheltered himſelf under the trite maxim, "that no reward ought "to be given, where no ſervice is performed;" and had conſequently been UNPARDONABLY negligent, in his remittances.

Rajah in a *dungeon* at Tanjore and in *irons* at Tritchinopoly at the ſame time.

Clerks in the India-houſe in tears.

Some Directors abſtain from their food.

Lord Pigot reſolves to paſs into Aſia.

Nabob had neglected to remit a ſalary.

Though a majority of the Court of Directors had voted, for another Governor, they were not ſo much attached to their former

His Lordſhip's party purſue their victory.

* Original Papers, vol. iii. p. 124.

choice,

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choice, as to carry their reſentment to any ſteady oppoſition to the meaſures propoſed, by the noble Lord recommended, by their conſtituents. The party, who had oppoſed the nomination of Mr. Rumbold, acquired credit and conſequently influence, by the deciſion of the Proprietors, in favour of Lord Pigot. The event of the conteſt brought to the latter all the advantages, derived from victory. A new light fell upon the India-houſe, which laid open at one view, to the Directors, all their own negligences and the errors of their predeceſſors. The obtaining or enjoying a government in India, without the ſplendour of ſome great revolution, was an object beneath the dignity of a noble perſon, who had already made a diſtinguiſhed figure, in the affairs of the Eaſt. The example of another Lord, who had new-modelled the tenure of the Company in Bengal, was an inducement to emulation, though not an object of jealouſy. The diſtreſs of Tulja-jî, and the merits of his father, brought the ſofter feelings of pity and gratitude to the aid of the more ſturdy paſſion of ambition.

A new light falls on the India-houſe.

An India government, without a revolution contemptible.

Gratitude to the Rajah.

Reſentment to the Nabob.

The Nabob of Arcot, though he had uniformly fulfilled his engagements to the Company, had, in his attention to friends in the Eaſt, neglected thoſe in the Weſt. He had beſides, been ſufficiently hardy to have appealed to a Government, who had ſuffered a ſignal defeat, in the conteſt, which had given a new governor to Fort St. George. Theſe reaſons, combining themſelves with the wiſhes of a ſucceſsful oppoſition in the India-Houſe, left Lord Pigot and his party the arbiters of the fate of the Carnatic. Orders and inſtructions were framed, leſs conſiſtent with the former conduct of the Directors, than ſuitable to their preſent views. Theſe views were ſo powerful, in their effect, that, in the purſuit of them, all regard to matter of fact, as well as to juſtice, was overlooked. The orders of the Court of Directors, for removing Mr. Wynch and appointing Lord Pigot, together

His Lordſhip's party arbiters of the fate of the Carnatic.

Zeal begets abſurdity and preſumption.

gether with the commiſſion to the latter, we may ſafely affirm, are not to be paralleled, in the records of any body of men veſted with authority. Ignorance, which by itſelf only merits contempt, aſſumes, in thoſe papers, a preſumptuous form, which might juſtify indignation, were the authors worthy of a paſſion of any dignity. In every ſentence, nay in every line, the Directors not only contradict matter of fact, but fly in the face of their own records, with a total want of caution, which is liable to detection, and conſequently muſt meet with diſgrace, and ought to ſuffer puniſhment. The facts, which we have eſtabliſhed, by incontrovertible evidence, in the preceding pages, are diametrically oppoſite to all the allegations contained in the orders of April the 12th 1775. If the Directors will chuſe to deny this truth, they muſt own, that they have impoſed SPURIOUS RECORDS on the world, in the volumes, which they have publiſhed in their own defence.

Ignorance, which only merits contempt, raiſes indignation.

Directors contradict fact, and their own records.

They are wrong, or have impoſed on the public.

To purſue theſe orders, through all their mazes of abſurdity and ignorance, would be a laborious and undignified taſk. We ſhall, however, examine briefly the moſt material; though to anſwer ill-founded allegations, may give them a conſequence, which they do not deſerve. "We have been uniform in our orders," ſay the Directors of 1775, "prohibiting our ſervants from extending the ter-"ritories of the Company and the Nabob *." But the reduction of Tanjore was not extending the Nabob's territories. That country was already in the heart of his dominions, defended by his reſources and arms, ſubject, under certain ſtipulations, to his government, liable to fall as a forfeiture into his hands, upon the diſobedience of its Rajah, and in every reſpect a part of the Carnatic. The true meaning of former orders, againſt enlarging territories, was to circumſcribe the extent of country to be defended, and to limit the expence of defence. The reduction of Tanjore, inſtead of increaſing

Orders examined.

Their pretended uniformity ſtated.

Facts, arguments and reaſons.

* Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 145. Paragraph 27.

the

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the preſent expence, was providing againſt a future waſte. It was the removing an internal enemy, and the obtaining reſources againſt foreign invaders. Beſides, the treaty of 1762 was ſuperior, in authority, to any orders from the Court of Directors, could even theſe orders be conſtrued to extend to territories, within the limits and government of the Carnatic. The Rajah had broke that treaty. The Company were bound to aſſiſt the Nabob. A war was begun, which terminated in a conqueſt. That conqueſt veſted an indefeaſible right to the territory of Tanjore, in the Nabob; and the Company's orders could not affect that right, without violating the law of nature and nations, the guarantee of their ſovereign, and the tenure, by which they held their own ſettlements on the coaſt.

Directors convicted of a miſrepreſentation of facts from their own records.

"We can by no means allow," ſay the Directors, "that you were "warranted in recurring to arms, ſo long as the king of Tanjore's "vackeel declared himſelf ready and willing to ſettle affairs *." The Directors allude to the expedition of 1771, of which they themſelves had approved in the moſt ample and ſolemn manner †. They aver, that the Rajah's vackeel was ready and willing to ſettle affairs. But it appears, from the papers which they have publiſhed, in their own defence, "that the Nabob had opened his demand to "the Tanjore vackeel. But that the vackeel declared, he had no "powers to accommodate the matter ‡." How could the vackeel have powers, when his maſter meant nothing leſs, than a reaſonable accommodation §? The Directors have ſince owned in their defence, that Tulja-jî "uſed delays, procraſtinations and evaſions, in order to "waſte the time, till the ſetting in of the rains and the riſing of the "monſoon ſhould deprive the Nabob and the Engliſh of the power

* Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 146, paragraph 31.

† Vide public thanks to Mr. Du Prè for every part of his conduct, during his government, eſpecially for his ſupporting the rights of the Nabob of Arcot. Aug. 1773.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 726.

§ Ibid. p. 718. 72 .

"of

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" of the power of military compulſion, for the ſeaſon." What are we to think of the morality of men, who advance falſehoods for facts? what of their knowledge, when they are ignorant of the very records, which they publiſhed in their own defence *?

They are convicted of miſrepreſenting other facts.

The Directors affirm, in their orders for the reſtoration of Tanjore to the Rajah, that it was, at the *requeſt* of the Nabob and Pretaupa Sing, that the Preſidency became guarantees to the treaty of 1762 †. But we have already ſhewn, that the treaty was forced on the Nabob. That Mr. Pigot framed it without his conſent. That he ſeized the Nabob's chop, and put it, with his own hand, to the paper ‡; and that even Pretaupa Sing would have been glad to forego the benefit of that treaty, could he have retained the money, expended in the courſe of the negociation §. The reduction of Tanjore, ſay the intelligent Directors, was " a direct violation of the " treaty of 1762, and contrary to our repeated inſtructions ||." The firſt is an extraordinary poſition in politics, and worthy of the wiſdom of a body, who diſpoſe of kingdoms, with the daſh of a pen. Why are treaties formed, but to be equally binding on the parties? Had not the Rajah broken that treaty, and forced the guarantees to take up arms againſt him? Did not a regular and ſolemn war commence, which ended in another treaty, in which the former was not ſo much as mentioned? Does not war, according to the law of nations and the univerſal conſent of mankind, extinguiſh all prior treaties ¶? Can any treaties, eſtabliſhed before a rupture, recover their former force, without being named, in the agreement, between the contending parties, which terminates the rupture? Would the Directors hold it forth, as a maxim, that an agreement

True ſtate of the matter.

They are again convicted.

Facts, arguments and reaſons.

* The noted orders of April 12th 1775, ſeem to confound together men and things, ſeaſons and years, treaties and agreements, in one confuſed maſs.

† Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 153.

‡ P. 127.

§ P. 128.

|| Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 153.

¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 725.

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between a ſuperior and his vaſſal is binding on the former, and not on the latter? If neither Pretaupa Sing nor his ſon were bound, by the treaty of 1762, or amenable to animadverſion, for a breach of it, why was the treaty ſent to Tanjore, to be confirmed by the ſignature and oath of the Rajah? And if the Rajah was not accountable for deviating from the treaty, what meaning do the Directors annex to the Company's guarantee, who ſolemnly promiſed to aſſiſt the party, who ſhould adhere to the treaty, againſt the party failing to adhere *?

Directors contradict themſelves.

"We have determined," ſay the Directors, "to replace the king "of Tanjore on the *throne of his anceſtors*, upon certain terms and "conditions, for the mutual benefit of himſelf and the Company, "without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally Khan, Nabob of the "Carnatic †." This ſelf-contradicting paragraph muſt be ſeparated, to be expoſed. But how have the Directors reſtored their mock-monarch to his throne? They inſiſt, that he ſhall admit a garriſon of their troops, into his capital ‡. That he ſhall aſſign revenues to the Company ſufficient for the maintenance of the ſaid troops, and for providing military ſtores §. That, "if the expence of the garriſon "ſhall exceed the amount of the revenues ſo aſſigned, then the *king* "of Tanjore ſhall make good the deficiency ‖." That all repairs of fortifications ſhall be conducted, by the Company's engineer, at the *king*'s expence. That no treaty with foreign powers ſhall be concluded by the *king*, without the concurrence of the Company ¶. That the number of native guards, neceſſary for ſupporting the DIGNITY *of his* MAJESTY's government, ſhall be fixed by the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, and not exceeded nor augmented, by the *king*, on any account or pretence whatever **. Such is the manner, in which the Eaſt India Company reſtore a king "to

Their mock reſtoration of the Rajah.

They ſeize his revenues.

Repair his forts at *his* expence, yet ſeize them for *themſelves*.

They ſtrip their monarch of all his prerogative.

Limit his guards.

* Vide Treaty Sept. 20th, 1762.
† Orders, par. 5. No. IX. p. 154.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. p. 155.
** Ibid.

"the

" the throne of his anceſtors!" They place a military force in his capital, make an indefinite demand on his revenues, preclude him from the prerogative of every SOVEREIGN, to make any treaty, and limit the number of guards for his perſon: yet theſe very men declare, in the ſame page ‡, " that no diminution of his authority is intended by them!" The diviſion of Poland, which lately aſtoniſhed Europe, was not half ſo barefaced a perverſion of the eſtabliſhed laws of nature and nations, as the pretended reſtoration, made by a trading ſociety, under the eye of a ſtate of which they are ſubjects.

Yet make " no diminution of his authority."

The Directors, in the paragraph juſt cited, ſay, " That they had " determined to replace the King of Tanjore on the throne of his " anceſtors, without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally Khan, " Nabob of the Carnatic." How often muſt we repeat facts, to convict ſuch men of ignorance, or wilful deception! It has been proved, by the moſt inconteſtible evidence, that neither the Rajah, nor his anceſtors, poſſeſſed the title, rights, or independence of royalty. That the firſt of the race was a MARATTA PLUNDERER, who ſeized Tanjore, by perfidy, about eighty years ago, and expelled the hereditary Naig. That Tanjore, before it was ſeized by that Maratta, was ſubject to the Mogul empire. That the Nabob of the Carnatic, in vindication of the right of his Sovereign to Tanjore, reduced the ſon of the Maratta to a total dependence on the Nabobſhip of Arcot. That the tribute of Tanjore was ſettled at the annual ſum of thirty lacks of rupees; and that the Naig of that country was ſo far from arrogating to himſelf the appellation of King, that he, for the firſt time, received the title of Rajah, from his SOVEREIGN, the Mogul *.

They reſolve not to " infringe the rights of the Nabob."

They are again convicted, by matter of fact.

" Without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally!†" This oracular order is worthy of the enlightened Divan of Leadenhall-ſtreet. It reminds us of the anſwer of a late great ſtateſman, who, when

Their oracular order.

‡ Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 154. 60, 61, 62.

* Vide paſſim. chap. iii. p. 56, 57, 58, 59,

† Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 154.

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Ridicule in making a ſerious reply to nonſenſe.

They are convicted of "infringing the Nabob's rights."

conſulted by his Sovereign, on a perilous occaſion, recommended "vigorous meaſures with MODERATION." There is a degree of ridicule in making any ſerious reply to nonſenſe; but an adherence to that maxim, would leave the Court of Eaſt India Directors unanſwered in all their late literary compoſitions. Were not the rights of Mahommed Ali infringed, by depriving him of a country, which fell under his government, by a regular conqueſt, in a ſolemn, juſt and neceſſary war? Was not Tanjore a province of the Mogul empire, depending and paying tribute to the Nabob of the Carnatic, long before the Company extended their views beyond the ſands of Madras? Was not the Rajah often puniſhed, and ſometimes deprived, when he failed in the performance of his duty, as a vaſſal to the Nabob of the Carnatic? Did not the Company themſelves, in the treaty of 1762, acknowledge, in the moſt ſolemn manner, the ancient dependence of Tanjore on the Carnatic, whilſt they ſettled the amount of the future tribute? Did that treaty comprehend any thing relative to Tanjore, except the mere adjuſtment of accounts and the ſettlement of the peiſhcuſh, to be annually paid by the Rajah? Did it preclude, or even mention, the acknowledged and undoubted *conſtitutional rights* of the Carnatic, to the Rajah's aſſiſtance, in time of war? Did the Rajah give that aſſiſtance? On the contrary, did he not aid the enemy of the Carnatic and Engliſh with money and proviſions? Was not a former Court of Directors ſo ſenſible of the Rajah's having broken every tie, which bound him to his ſuperior, that they ſent poſitive orders, the 17th of March, 1769, to bring him to a ſevere account for his conduct; and to aſſiſt the Nabob againſt him, in a manner ſuitable to the juſtice of his claims, and the dignity of his government?

Recapitulation of their infringements, from their own records.

Recapitulation from the records of the Directors continued.

Did the Rajah of Tanjore adhere to the treaty of 1762, of which the Company were the pledged guarantees? Did he not, for two years, prior to the expedition of 1771, with-hold the ſtipulated

tribute? Did he not kindle a war, in the heart of the Carnatic, by invading its vaſſals and dependents? Did he pay any attention to the friendly interference of the Preſidency, to prevent a rupture between him and the Nabob? On the contrary, did he not diſregard the guarantee of the Company; and force their ſervants, from ſelf-preſervation, as well as in ſupport of the rights of the Nabob, to take the field? Did he not make treaties with foreign powers, ſend bribes to foreign ſtates, to invade the territories of his ſuperior, after a ſolemn treaty had been ſettled between him and the Nabob? Did he not form connections with other European Companies, alienate to them a part of his country, and receive their aid, to ſupport him againſt his ſuperior, and the Engliſh Company? Was not a ſecond expedition undertaken againſt his capital, in which the Company's troops were declared, by the Preſidency, to be only auxiliaries? Did not the Preſidency of Fort St. George, under the ſeal of the Company, enter into an eventual agreement, that Tanjore ſhould remain in the hands of the Nabob, in caſe of conqueſt? Did not that conqueſt take place, and give the Nabob, as PRINCIPAL in the war, a deciſive and inconteſtible title to Tanjore?

The black catalogue of their acts of injuſtice further continued.

Did not the Nabob fulfil ALL his ſtipulations, relative to Tanjore, with the Preſidency? Did he not defray the whole expences of the expedition, pay the captors for their right to the plunder of the place, advance ſeven lacks of pagodas, as a preſent to the army? Did he not, upon the reduction of Tanjore, pay all the Rajah's debts to the Engliſh and others? Did he not redeem thoſe diſtricts of the province of Tanjore, which the Rajah had alienated, ſold or mortgaged to the Dutch at Nagore, to the Danes near Tranquebar, and to the French, round their ſettlement at Carical? Did he not enter into regular treaties with thoſe three nations, under the ſanction of the Plenipotentiary of the King of Great Britain, and the Repreſentatives of the Eaſt India Company at Madras? Was not the

Nabob

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Nabob obliged to borrow money, to diſcharge all thoſe engagements, from the inhabitants of Madras, and the country bankers, or ſoucars? Was not the country of Tanjore the Nabob's right, by a kind of purchaſe, as well as by forfeiture and conqueſt? Have not the Company, though only auxiliaries, or rather *mercenaries* in the war, deprived the PRINCIPAL in that war of his conqueſt, in breach of every law, which binds public ſocieties? And do a ſet of Directors preſume to affirm, in the face of the world, that they have reſtored Tanjore, "without infringing the RIGHTS of Mahommed Ali?"

Their barefaced conduct.

The manner in which this flagrant injuſtice was committed, was ſcarcely leſs barefaced, than the preſumption of defending ſuch a a breach of the faith of treaties, before an inſulted Public. We have already ſhewn, that the Court of Directors, after having the moſt full and regular information of the motives, which induced the Preſidency to aſſiſt the Nabob againſt the Rajah in 1771, approved of that meaſure, in the moſt ample manner *. That the ſame Court had received, on the 26th of March, 1774 †, three weeks before the latter ſhips of the ſeaſon ſailed, intelligence of the taking of Tanjore, with the whole materials relative to the expedition; but that they remained totally ſilent. That, in the courſe of the ſummer 1774, they received ſeveral diſpatches relative to the ſame ſubject, and the ſubſequent meaſures, which aroſe from the ſame tranſaction. That during the winter of 1774, and for more than two months of 1775, they obſerved the ſame myſterious ſilence, which ſeemed to imply a thorough approbation, at leaſt a tacit conſent. The truth is, the reſolution relative to the reſtoration of Tanjore, originated in the appointment of Lord Pigot to the government of Madras. Though the reſtoration was the principal motive, which induced his Lordſhip to brave the dangers of a long voyage, and the diſeaſes of a hot cli-

They approve of the expedition of 1771;

and by their ſilence approve of that of 1773.

Meaſures relative to Tanjore originated early in 1775.

* Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, laſt page. 1364. 1366.
† Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.

mate,

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mate, at an advanced period of life, the meaſure was ſo STRONG, that he proceeded with extreme caution. Having opened his mind to the Chairman and Deputy-chairman, men of diſtinguiſhed PUBLIC VIRTUE, he awakened the feelings of humanity, for decayed MAJESTY, in their ſympathetic boſoms. But, notwithſtanding this thaw in the breaſts of the two leaders, it was ſtill feared, that ſome more hardened Directors, would revolt at an abſolute reſtoration. It was, therefore, only propoſed, at firſt, to intercede with the Nabob, for the aſſignment of a proper allowance, for the maintenance of the Rajah, and a guard for the ſecurity of his perſon.

Cautious developement of that meaſure.

They firſt propoſe to *intercede* with the Nabob.

Had his Lordſhip, and his two tender-hearted proſelytes, ſtopped here, who would not approve, who would not applaud the meaſure? The Nabob has always been, he ſtill continues, willing to grant a Jaghire, a place of reſidence to the Rajah, an allowance for a guard to protect his perſon, or to gratify his vanity. When the country was in the poſſeſſion of his ſuperior, Tulja-jî was not only treated with humanity, but with an almoſt unbounded generoſity, which was denied nothing but the power of doing harm. He remained within his palace, which was ſurrounded with gardens of pleaſure, more than a mile in circumference, with his family, women, relations, and friends. Not a perſon belonging to the Nabob ever entered the gates, not one belonging to the Rajah was ever refuſed admittance. The ſoldiers, who mounted guard without, were inſtructed to behave themſelves as his ſervants; within there was a perpetual ſcene of feſtivity and joy, dancing, piping, and every demonſtration of happineſs. No ſums were refuſed to adminiſter to the pleaſures of the Rajah, none to ſatisfy his moſt extravagant follies. Freed from the weight of a government, which had been too heavy for the weak ſhoulders of a man devoted to vice and debauchery, he reſigned himſelf to thoſe intemperate pleaſures, which had been diſturbed before by his ungovernable ambition and unbridled

Obſervation.

Nabob always willing to give a handſome eſtabliſhment to Tula-ji.

His humanity to that Rajah, when in his hands.

Who paſſed his time in feſtivity,

and in intemperate pleaſures.

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His ſtate and dignity preſerved. He lives with his family. He is ſenſible of his happineſs.

unbridled folly *. "His ſtate and dignity are inviolably preſerved," ſays the Nabob to Sir Robert Harland †, "he is, in his own palace, "among his women and his family; he drinks and wears what he "pleaſes; his donations to Fackeers are furniſhed, as uſual: he "ſeems ſenſible of his happineſs; and both the Rajah and his mo- "ther have written to me very thankful letters on the ſubject ‡."

But

* All theſe particulars are well known, and, if neceſſary, will be atteſted, by ſeveral Engliſh gentlemen, who reſided at the time in Tanjore.

† Letter, January 15, 1774.

‡ Ibid.

Extract of a Letter from the Nabob to Sir Robert Harland, Jan. 15, 1774.

"Ever ſince that time (the capture of Tan- "jore), I have treated the Rajah and his fa- "mily, with every mark of reſpect and at- "tention. His ſtate and dignity have been "inviolably preſerved. He lives in his own "palace, amongſt his women, and in the "midſt of his family. He drinks and wears "what he pleaſes; even his donations to Fac- "keers are furniſhed as uſual. He ſeems ſen- "ſible of his happineſs; and both the Rajah "and his mother have written to me, very "thankful arzdaſhts on the ſubject. In ſhort, "he finds no alteration in his preſent ſituation, "from what it uſed to be."

Tranſlation of an Arzdaſht from the Mother of the Rajah of Tanjore, received 19th Rajibb 1187 Hegira, or 7th October 1773.

Although your Highneſs has, from the beginning, ſhewed kindneſs to the Rajah; yet, without the leaſt forethought, he has given ear to the advice of ſome ſervants, and has failed to act conformably to your Highneſs's pleaſure, and ſo has become guilty of a great fault; hence his affairs were thrown into confuſion, and he now labours under bad conſequences. At length your Highneſs ſhewed favour to us by ſending a letter to Madaur ul Mulk Bahaudre, who explained the whole contents to us, word by word, wherein you were pleaſed to ſignify your kindneſs and regard in granting protection to us. I want words to expreſs the ſenſe of my gratitude. Be pleaſed to continue to us that friendſhip you was ſo good to ſhew us formerly. We ſhall rely henceforth on your Highneſs for ſupport. I conſign my ſon to your Highneſs; my honour is in your Highneſs's hands; grant us your protection.

Tranſlation of an Arzdaſht from Tolagazee, received 19th Rajibb 1167 Hegira, or 7th October 1773.

Your Highneſs has, from the beginning ſhewed kindneſs towards me, and on my part, as a means to increaſe your favour, I was heartily diſpoſed to act agreeably to your pleaſure, but ſome of my ſervants, by many ſpecious reaſons to which I gave ear, prevailed upon me to act in a different manner, and ſo became guilty of a great fault, the conſequences of which I now feel. Your Highneſs, in conſideration of the friendſhip which ſubſiſted between you and the deceaſed Maha Rajah, has been pleaſed to pardon my fault, and to ſend a letter to Nabob Madaur ul Mulk Bahauder, the contents of which he explained to me word by word, in which letter you have been pleaſed to ſignify very particularly your intention to protect me at all events, which did me great honour. It is now my reſolution to act in every reſpect conformably to your Highneſs's pleaſure, that I may merit an increaſe of your favour from you day by day; your Highneſs is more dear to me in my eſteem than the deceaſed Maha Rajah was, for your Highneſs has manifeſted a greater degree of kindneſs than he ever did. When children are in fault, their parents ſhould forgive them, and reſtore them to favour; my honour, and every thing that is dear to me are in your Highneſs's hands.

Tranſlation

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No compromiſe will ſatisfy the Directors.

Their reaſons at large.

But no eſtabliſhment, no jaghire, no guards could enable Tulja-jî to gratify the humanity of old friends, or to gain the favour of new. Beſides the paltry ſum of 400,000 l. promiſed as a preſent by the Nabob, was too ſmall an acknowledgment to the *Honourable* Company, whoſe troops had ſerved him as auxiliaries in the reduction of Tanjore. The Preſidency, with a negligence not to be pardoned, had relinquiſhed the conqueſt to the PRINCIPAL in the war. The troops had received prize-money to a large amount, the civil ſervants had not probably been *unconcerned* ſpectators of the ſcene; but their worthy maſters at home, had been entirely forgot. The ſecurity, which the removal of an opulent enemy from the heart of the Carnatic, was likely to procure for that country, would render the COAST an unprofitable field, for the exertion of the talents of the friends and relations of the Directors. Trade had been long dead; and ſhould emulation and war between princes, be alſo deſtroyed, writers and even governors might quit their poſts. The Carnatic was the only ſpot left by the legiſlature to the management of the leaders of the Company; and as the ſoil is poor, it muſt be *cultivated*, to yield any thing of a good harveſt. An irritated

Tranſlation of a Letter from Mahommed Nagif Cawn, dated 1ſt Jummaudalouwell 1189 *Hegira, received on the 4th.*

I have received the favour of your Highneſs's gracious letter dated the 29th Rabbaſauney, wherein your Highneſs is pleaſed to mention, that your enemies report that the Rajah Tuljagee and his wife killed themſelves; and that I ſhould particularly inform your Highneſs of the preſent ſituation of the Rajah, and all his family.

I am aſtoniſhed at what your Highneſs mentions. This ſtory was made by people who wanted ſomething to talk about, and diſturbers invent lies; no ſuch thing has happened in the Rajah's family ſince the reduction of Tanjore, to give riſe to any ſuch report as diſturbers have propagated: however, by the bleſſing of God and your Highneſs's favour, the Rajah, his mother, his father's other widow, his own two wives, his younger brother, his daughter and his ſon, were all in good health and ſpirits, beſides his relations, ſlaves both men and women, and his attendants, who are in houſe, are all very well. Of all the people who have been from the beginning in the Rajah's houſe, there has but one died, who was a relation, and above eighty years old; he was carried off four or five months ago, by a tedious ſickneſs. This I informed your Highneſs of at the time it happened; all the other people are in good health and ſpirits, and Tuljagee often expreſſes his thanks to your Highneſs, and his ſatisfaction in his manner of living. The Circar people who are at his gates, act entirely as his ſervants, except in taking care of the gates according to my order.

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Nabob, and a reſtored *monarch*, had a chance of creating an auction for favour, which might be turned to a good account. Beſides, it was but equitable, at any rate, that as the State had got a *Nabob* on the Coaſt, the Company ſhould have a *King* to keep up "the balance of power *."

Theſe

* It has been obſerved in a late publication, that if intereſted views had influenced the late proceedings relative to Tanjore, the obvious arrangement would have been to ſupport the Nabob, who had made large offers, public as well as private, and not the Rajah who was a mere priſoner ſtript of every reſource, and conſequently could have no favours to confer.

A free examination of meaſures, and not a diſſection of party-miſrepreſentations, has been the object of our diſcuſſion. There might be an indelicacy, perhaps, in any illuſions to a corrupt influence, when it points to individuals. But when a public body, ſuch as the India Company, acts with ſo much ſeeming inconſiſtency and injuſtice, as to leave no explanation of their conduct but upon grounds of unfair influence, the charge may be brought with more freedom, as being attended with preſumptions to eſtabliſh itſelf. The miſconduct of individuals may ſometimes be excuſed, as proceeding more from error than deſign. But the ſame indulgence cannot be allowed to large ſocieties of men; whoſe meaſures, from the greater variety of opinions upon which they are formed, muſt be conſidered as the reſult of a more poiſed and deliberate reſolution.

To determine more clearly on the merits of the Court of Directors in this buſineſs, it is neceſſary to ſtate a few facts, relative to the reſpective ſituations of the Nabob and the Rajah at the time of transferring Tanjore to the latter.

1ſt, The Nabob has declared, and the declaration is known to be true, that, upon the reduction of Tanjore, he paid all the Rajah's debts to the Engliſh and others; and that he redeemed thoſe diſtricts of country, which the Rajah had ſold or mortgaged to the Dutch. He, in the ſame manner, ſettled with the Danes about their poſſeſſions at Tranquebar, as likewiſe with the French about their ſettlements of Carical. Theſe are facts which cannot be controverted; and regular treaties, under the ſanction of the Company, and that of the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, were concluded between the Nabob and thoſe foreign powers, on the ſubject of their reſpective poſſeſſions in the Tanjore country.

2dly, But the diſburſements of the Nabob, at that period, were not confined to thoſe purpoſes alone. Beſides the payment of the Rajah's debts, and the redemption of the diſtricts which had been mortgaged, what was given as prize-money to the army, as well as the whole expence of a long campaign, muſt be taken into the account. All theſe together amounted to an immenſe ſum; and the money was borrowed, by the Nabob, from the inhabitants of Madras, and the country bankers or Soucârs, at a very high rate of intereſt.

The advocates of the Rajah have aſſerted, that theſe loans were only a political manœuvre of the Nabob to get the property of the country into his own hands.

It is generally more eaſy to diſprove the aſſertions of party than to conquer their obſtinacy; for the ſame bold poſition continues often to be advanced, when there is not even a colour of probability to ſupport it. In the preſent inſtance, this is evidently the caſe. If his adverſaries ſpeak truth, it was certainly a very extraordinary kind of policy in the Nabob, to borrow millions of Pagodas at an exorbitant intereſt, if there was no occaſion for the loan. It was not certainly by a policy like this, that he could have amaſſed the hidden ſtores, which

he

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The most obdurate Directors begin to relent.

Theſe public-ſpirited motives, joined to that humane ſympathy for fallen MAJESTY, which ſuch *good ſubjects*, as the Directors have

he has been ſaid to poſſeſs. But ſo far were the Nabob's finances from being in the flouriſhing ſtate repreſented by his enemies, that, long before the Tanjore orders arrived, and even before they were thought of in Leadenhall-ſtreet, he was obliged, for want of money, to ſubmit to the daily clamours and inſults of his Madras creditors; and the whole power of the Preſidency was denounced againſt him, unleſs he aſſigned his country to diſcharge their demands.

It has been ſaid, and perhaps not without ſome foundation, that the Nabob himſelf once told a *certain* India Governor, who was ſpeaking of his ſecret wealth, that there was but one way of convincing the Engliſh of that matter, and that he was *ready*, if the Company and their ſervants *approved* of it, to give the Engliſh Parliament that conviction, which was to lay before them his receipts and *particular* diſburſements ſince his acceſſion to the Nabobſhip. The officious Governor ſeemed ſtartled at ſo unexpected a reply; and, for *obvious* reaſons, no doubt, he was never heard to ſay any more upon that ſubject.

But to return to the public point in this affair. It is certain, when the orders for the reſtoration of Tanjore arrived, that the revenues of the country, together with thoſe of the Carnatic, were aſſigned, by orders and mortgage, to the Nabob's different creditors, and to the Soucârs of the country. This is the common manner in which the princes of India anticipate their revenues. They borrow money, through the Soucârs, upon aſſignments of the Government ſhare of the crop and produce of the ground for the enſuing year; and it is well known, how effectual is the validity of a Soucâr ſecurity to the poſſeſſors of the lands. Even a conqueror * never attempts to invade or annul it; as that would be deſtroying the very *medium* by which his conqueſt was to become uſeful to himſelf afterwards.

We are ſorry to obſerve, however, that the very reverſe of that conduct, which would have been obſerved by a conqueror, has taken place in the affair of Tanjore. The conſequence has been, that the Nabob, who was reduced before to the utmoſt ſtate of diſtreſs by his creditors, was not only deprived of the beſt part of his dominions, but his credit, in raiſing money upon the part that was left, was utterly deſtroyed. For who would lend him upon any aſſignments upon countries that might be wreſted from him, in the ſame manner as Tanjore had been? On the contrary, the numerous merchants and Soucârs, who attended at the reſtoration of Tanjore, ſaw that the only real ſecurity in the country was that of the Rajah, who had many advantages on his ſide. He, at that time, had not a ſhilling of debt; and, without being burdened with any of the expences of royalty, he was inſtantly put in poſſeſſion of 800,000 l. a-year, out of which he only paid the Company 160,000 l. for their military charges. Beſide all this income, the particular ſituation of his country, which ſecured it againſt the incurſions of an enemy, enabled the Rajah to anticipate his revenues for not only the enſuing year, but for *years* thereafter.

Thus, on the one hand, do we ſee the old and faithful ally of the Company, with whom their proſperity began, and who, for his ſervices, was guaranteed by the treaty of Paris, ruined and deſerted by thoſe who ought to have ſupported him, and left without money, credit, or reſource; and that too at a time when he was loaded with a heavy debt of near † *four millions* ſterling to Engliſh ſubjects alone. But this is not all. Inſult has been added to misfortune; and, by an uncommon wantonneſs of power, the Company have further charged that injured

* See Orme upon Soucars.

† Nabob's Tanjore debts, lately conſolidated, are near three millions, as appears by the Company's records.

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The orders penned by a ready ſcribe; yet a *legal* number of ſignatures not obtained.

have always felt, wrought gradually a change in the moſt obdurate Members of the Court. The orders, which we have partly examined, were penned by a ready ſcribe, a clerk in the India-Houſe, under the inſpection of Lord Pigot. But notwithſtanding the

Prince with the pay and maintenance of thoſe very troops whom they had employed in depriving him of his dominions. Oppreſſed and borne down by ſo many calamities, his Durbar became a ſcene of miſery and diſtreſs. His army, having large arrears due to them, mutinied and ſurrounded his palace. His own life and the lives of his family were in danger. And nothing was to be heard, in every quarter, but the threats of a tumultuous ſoldiery, mingled with the clamours of creditors whom he could not ſatisfy, and the cries of ſubjects whom he could not relieve.

On the other hand, we ſee the Rajah, a man, who, ſo far from having ever rendered any ſervice to this country, has always proved its moſt determined and inveterate enemy; a man, who has long enjoyed, in the interior parts of the Carnatic, a perfect ſecurity derived from thoſe wars which have ruined his ſuperior, and in which much of the blood of Britain has been ſhed; a man, who never had an Engliſh garriſon in any of his forts, who paid not a ſhilling towards our expences, and in whoſe good or bad fortune England has not an intereſt; and yet this very man, this Rajah, has been cheriſhed by the Company's favour, exalted by their power, and now triumphs in the ſpoils of his lawful maſter and ſuperior.

Such are the outlines of the meaſures which the Company have adopted, and of the conſequences which have enſued; and ſuch is a faint ſketch of the merits and pretenſions of two men whom they have thought proper to treat in ſo very different a manner. Can we behold ſuch a ſtriking contraſt of characters and fortunes, without equal wonder and reſentment? Can we think on the authors of ſo much undeſerved injuſtice on the one hand, and ill-placed favour on the other, without an equal mixture of indignation and contempt? Or can we poſſibly give any but one reaſon for a conduct ſo diametrically oppoſite to every principle of policy and virtue?

But the evil will cure itſelf. The Nabob's creditors for ſo immenſe a ſum, feel their own diſtreſs, and know who are its authors. The effects of their diſtreſs extend, with their connexions, to almoſt every corner of Great Britain. They are entitled to redreſs; and it is the opinion of the beſt lawyers, that they can force it from the contrivers and managers of the orders for reſtoring Tanjore.

From a moment's ſurvey of the genuine ſtate of facts we have here given, it will be eaſy to determine, on whoſe ſide remained the power of procuring an unjuſt influence in the Eaſt, that of the Nabob or the Rajah. But, if future proofs are wanted, they may be found, perhaps, in the zeal and amazing exertions which the Rajah's *virtues* have been able to create for him, in reſerve, in this country: while the cauſe of the Nabob, who has made the fortunes of thouſands, both in his ſervice and by his generoſity, has hardly an advocate to ſtand up in his defence.

We will not, however, anticipate this ſubject; but hope that juſtice will be effectually rendered to the Nabob, that his creditors may be ſecured; and even that the Rajah himſelf, inſtead of his preſent mock royalty, may be placed on ſuch an eſtabliſhment of ſecurity, as may be moſt ſuited to his real happineſs. In a word, we wiſh he may find the deputies of the India Company, in whoſe hands he now is, as faithful guardians of his life and honour, as he found that very Nabob, againſt whom he has been made to complain, but who, during his power over him, contrary to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, ſaved not only his life, but left him undiſturbed in his palace, with the moſt ample allowances for his ſupport.

ſtrength

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ſtrength of the argument, the acuteneſs of the reaſoning and the eloquence of the diction, they lay a fortnight on the table, before a legal number of ſignatures could be obtained. The fate of a *kingdom* hung, at laſt, on the point of a moment. Lord Pigot threatened to reſign, Mr. Harriſon was juſt retiring to Bath on account of his health, Mr. Wheeler himſelf became indifferent about the promiſed ſeat in the Supreme Council at Bengal. The infectious ſorrow ſpread itſelf to the very clerks in office. Mr. Wilks ceaſed to pore upon diſpatches and records; and one ſolitary tear was obſerved to wander upon the cheek of Mr. Holt. To brighten up the face of the India-Houſe ſome of the oppoſing Directors thought it expedient to relent. The orders were accordingly ſigned on the 12th of April 1775, on the very day of the annual election, when the Court of Proprietors were met to chuſe new Directors, and had conſequently ſuſpended the authority of the old.

Lord Pigot threatens to reſign, and Mr. Harriſon to go to Bath.

Mr. Holt is in tears.

Some Directors again relent.

Such is the hiſtory of the reſtoration of Tanjore, which is delivered with all due deference to the public, by whoſe judgment we ſhall abide. To thoſe who may chuſe to examine the ſubject with attention, it will appear extraordinary, that, amidſt all the uſurpations of the arms of the Company, the only conqueſt made by the orders of the Court of Directors, is that which they have choſen to ſelect as an exhibition of their retributive juſtice. Not ſatisfied with a common act of reparation, that *honourable* body have refined, upon what they denominate "public honour." In all the hiſtory of their ravaging wars in India, they could produce but one inſtance in which their SOVEREIGN, both by his plenipotentiary and perſonal approbation, had given a ſanction to their hoſtilities. That was the act which *they* thought the moſt worthy of being ſtigmatized. The uſual progreſs of the Company, in their military tranſactions, had been to begin as allies, to grow into Duans, to conclude as uſurpers. In the buſineſs of Tanjore their conduct has been

Concluding obſervations.

Signal *virtue* of the Directors.

Uſual progreſs of the Company's wars.

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been more myſterious, and of courſe leſs ſuitable to their common principles. They began as guarantees, remonſtrated as adviſers, aided as allies, fought and conquered as auxiliaries. In the courſe of a few years they affected to relent; and with peculiar feeling, knowledge, and propriety, reſtored, as PRINCIPALS, what they and their ſervants had been paid for reducing as MERCENARIES.

Their *public virtue* had various opportunities to be exerciſed.

Where was the black chronicle of Indian devaſtations when the Honourable Court began to relent? Had they, in the hour of affected ſympathy, thrown their eyes on the melancholy hiſtory of the Company's ambition, they might find many acts more worthy of being redreſſed than the reduction of Tanjore; acts committed by their ſervants, not executed by their OWN ORDERS. From the banks of the Nirbidda, where the unfortunate Nabob of Broach commenced his alliance and ruin under their auſpices: from the Criſtna to the mouths of the Ganges, a field fruitful in the SILENT change and deſtruction of Rajahs; from the mouths of the Ganges to its ſource, a tract marked with the blood and wreck of Nabobs and Rajahs; and blackened with the moſt horrid treachery to the unfortunate Emperor, whoſe ſervants they profeſs themſelves. In all that extenſive ſcene of deſolation, was there no object that called for redreſs, no Prince worthy of being reſtored, but the Rajah of Tanjore, whom, for his own PERFIDY, they themſelves had ordered to be chaſtiſed? Perhaps not—where the Company act a part, death generally cloſes the ſcene!

Their real motives.

But to do juſtice to the Court of Directors, let it be ſuppoſed for a moment, that all the Nabobs, Rajahs, and Princes, over whoſe dominions the hand of ambitious rapacity has paſſed, are ſtill alive. That the Nabob of Broach had an early claim upon the friendſhip of any gentleman, or, if the Directors are fond of a title, any NOBLEMAN, appointed to the government of Bombay. That ſuch gentleman or ſuch nobleman had received a letter from India,

deſcribing the ſituation of the Nabob; expreſſing, at the ſame time, his remembrance of paſt favours and aſſurances of future gratitude. Let it alſo be ſuppoſed, that the deprived Rajahs and Zemindars of the northern Circars had ſimilar claims on gentlemen, about to be ſent from Leadenhall-ſtreet to be Chiefs in theſe provinces. That the JAFFIERS, the SINGS, the COSSIMS, the SHAW ALLUMS, along the banks of all the branches of the Ganges, had pretenſions to the favour and hopes from the ſupport of ſome old friends preparing to embark for India as Governors in or near their reſpective countries. In ſuch an intelligible ſituation, who could doubt the relentings of the leaders among the Directors, or the RESTORING influence of the India-Houſe cabinet? Who could ſuſpect their integrity, or who refuſe his applauſe to their PUBLIC VIRTUE?

Relative to Tanjore explained.

Should it unfortunately happen, that the RESTORING Chief, or Governor, ſhould throw diſcredit on that public virtue, by his capricious, violent, and arbitrary conduct upon his arrival at the ſcene of action. That every condition that could be aſked, for the intereſt of the Company and honour of the nation is rejected. That no conſideration of public inconvenience, none of private diſtreſs can either ſoften his mind, or ſuſpend his reſolution. That the moſt ample ſecurity and proviſion, for the party SUPPOSED to be injured, is rejected: That nothing but revolution itſelf, with every concomitant influence of terror, can ſatisfy this umpire of the fate of States and Princes: That, to complete the object of his miſſion, a ſanction, under every denunciation of vengeance, is to be extorted, under the ſeal of the party aggrieved. In that caſe, the moſt ignorant ſpectator can underſtand the PIECE, and enter into the conduct of the author, the managers, and the actors, in all the *liaiſon des ſcenes*, from the firſt idea of the plot to the cataſtrophe.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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